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Part 1: Evolving a Doctrine of Sympathy and Duty 
Introduction 
The many critical works discussing George Eliot's oeuvre examine the novels from 
every conceivable approach, with much opposition and contradiction between critics. 
Despite this history of critical opinion, one near-universal belief is that Eliot's 'doctrine 
of sympathy' is the major force behind the fiction (Noble 1965; Doyle 1981). It is not 
my aim to deny this tradition, but to examine exactly what 'sympathy' means. What did 
George Eliot consider the nature and function of sympathy to be; what did she intend by 
employing it in her novels; and what do the texts still say to readers about sympathy? 
Steven Marcus acknowledges: 
I had gotten just to the... discussion of the meaning and function of 
sympathy in George Eliot, when it struck me that actually I didn't 
know what I was talking about. I had read George Eliot often and 
closely enough to believe that I understood what she meant by it; and I 
had read enough of the comment on her to understand what her 
commentators understood her to mean by it, but what in fact was 
sympathy itself? (1975,33). 
Every time a critical essay unthinkingly refers to George Eliot's 'sympathy', we need to 
ask what is 'sympathy itself'? In addition, who administers it in the novels, who 
receives it, who does not, and why? What impedes - or encourages - the action of 
sympathy? Do the novels advocate sympathy beyond the text, and if so, by what formal 
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methods? Finally, does an extended analysis of sympathy approximate to the critics' 
unexamined orthodoxy? 
A second, generally accepted assumption is that 'duty' was an absolute for 
George Eliot, although 'duty' is rarely defined. Many critics see selflessness condoned 
in the novels and presented as duty, particularly women's selflessness. For them, there 
is 'no doubt that Eliot viewed [women's] self-sacrifices as heroic ... women give 
themselves to succour those close to them' (Uglow 1987,91). However, Eliot's novels 
do not advocate wanton self-sacrifice to any 'duty', and such an interpretation is not 
viable once the irony and latent readings of her texts are appreciated. This creed of self- 
sacrifice is not manifest in Eliot's own attitudes, particularly after her father's death 
(GEL 11,97). While she praised the fulfilling of obligations, she demurred at, for 
example, 'a diabolical law which chains a man soul and body to a putrefying carcass' 
(GEL 1,268). Here Eliot is referring to Rochester's marriage to Bertha in Jane Eyre, 
but at the time of writing she was 'chained' to her dying father. She never complains 
directly about father or family. Her father's demands came before her 'own pleasure' 
(GEL 1,256,263), but such self-denial was often difficult (GEL 1,121,2234). This 
duty of caring was a chosen moral obligation, yet she clearly understood the 
individual's struggle between egoism and altruism, particularly if an obligation was 
neither chosen nor morally valid. This dilemma is repeatedly investigated in her 
novels. Sympathy and duty in Eliot's works demand parallel analysis; their interaction 
is so profound that neither can be adequately investigated in isolation. This thesis will 
therefore interrogate the place of duty in Eliot's work, its nature, function and value, 
and its relationship to sympathy. 
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As Eliot was aware, sympathy and duty are complex ethical concepts, malleable, 
evolved over time, and variously manifested in all aspects of life. Since she inherited 
centuries of debate, I first investigate some possible philosophical influences. An 
evaluation of Spinoza, Comte, Feuerbach, Spencer and Darwin then follows, analyzing 
their views on sympathy, duty and gender for contributions towards Eliot's own beliefs. 
Victorian women such as Eliot were developing their own perspectives and increasingly 
questioned their evolving role of 'Moral Mother', which demanded 'sympathy' and 
'duty' while excluding them from all definitions and decisions. Eliot's personal 
experience of 'sympathy' and 'duty' also requires consideration. The main aim of this 
work is to assess what Eliot's texts convey regarding sympathy and duty in relation to 
the roles and personalities of men and women. This analysis considers her own 
intentions, the contextual influences to which the texts were sub ect, and a re-reading of 
the texts from the perspective of current feminist theories of gender and personality 
construction, specifically the feminist object-relations theories of Nancy Chodorow and 
Carol Gilligan. Eliot's texts explore and advocate those concepts that are her 
'sympathy' and 'duty' via her characters, themes, narrative structure and form, and via 
her increasingly relational yet autonomous narrators. However, what is explored and 
advocated escapes Eliot's control, and the sympathy and duty within the texts may have 
quite different meanings for a modem reader. The second part of this work therefore 
consists of a close re-reading of Eliot's novels in relation to these various analyses of 
sympathy and duty. 
Throughout her life, George Eliot's letters reflect sympathy as central to her 
moral code and art. When writing to Harriet Beecher Stowe in 1869, she suggested that 
a more perfect religion 'must express less care for personal consolation, and a more 
deeply-awing sense of responsibility to man, springing from sympathy with that which 
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of all things is most certainly known to us, the difficulty of the human lot' (GEL V, 3 1). 
Further, her review of Wilhelm von Riehl's books demonstrates her belief in the artist's 
sympathetic role as sacred: 'Art is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode of amplifying 
experience and extending our contact with our fellow-man' (Eliot 1992,2634). 
Published in 1856, this essay is an early public statement of Eliot's belief that 'If Art 
does not enlarge men's sympathies it does nothing morally' (GEL III, I 11) was present 
in Eliot's first published fiction, 'Amos Barton', and expanded in letters of 1857 (11, 
403) and 1859: JT]he only effect I ardently long to produce by my writings, is that 
those who read them should be better able to imagine and to feel the pains and the joys 
of those who differ from themselves in everything but the broad fact of being struggling 
erring human creatures' (III, I 11). 
As Steven Marcus suggests, definitions of sympathy are not easy. Prior to his 
definition-crisis, he describes sympathy forcefully as 'the power of entering into and 
sharing the minds of other persons ... it is the enabling social sentiment, it is the 
sentiment beyond all others of unification and solidarity'. Yet ultimately, Marcus sees 
Eliot's sympathy as a form of social control; he sees it manipulated as her defence 
against passion, violence, and a senseless changing world (1975,36-7). But this is not 
my reading. Another critic to consider sympathy central to George Eliot's fiction is 
Houghton, who places her firmly within the mid-Victorian cult of benevolence (1957, 
278). For him, Eliot's texts - unlike those of Dickens - do not descend into 
sentimentality because she founds her sympathy on understanding rather than feeling. 
Sentimental pity is self-indulgent, 'whereas George Eliot's benevolence presupposes a 
forgetfulness of self' (278). Yet while Houghton's account is perceptive, the notion of 
sympathy as self-forgetting denies the mutuality which Marcus' definition conferred. In 
the vanguard of the Eliot scholarship revival, Houghton furthers the myth of her 
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sympathy as selflessness. Noble's work on Scenes of Clerical Life agrees that 
understanding is the true basis of sympathy and is 'achieved through an imaginative 
extension of the self' (Noble 1965,63). He argues that in the 'Scenes' sympathy is the 
emotion that ties and elevates humans, while selfishness and lack of imagination are the 
greatest obstacles to sympathy (68). Yet when considering 'Janet's Repentance', Noble 
insists - despite the mutuality of Janet and Tryan's suffering - that 'selflessness' must be 
'the goal towards which Janet moves in her struggle for redemption' (86). Selflessness 
is a dimension that critics simply must add. The opening of Chapter 5 of 'Amos 
Barton' outlines Eliot's moral approach for Noble (66). The reader is exhorted to a 
sympathy and understanding for all lives different from our own and encouraged to 
understand, to feel, and then to extend sympathy to others via the imagination. 
However, the narrator never asks for, or expects, selflessness. 
Few critical works specifically analyse sympathy in the novels. InGeorgeNiot 
(1985b), Elizabeth Ermarth aims to remedy misconceptions concerning Eliot's 'idea of 
community ... the delineation of moral life, the conception of sympathy' and mistaken 
beliefs concerning Lewes's influence (i). Ermarth concentrates on the influence of 
Feuerbach on Eliot's conception of sympathy and community, and is one of the few to 
register the importance of Spinoza's Ethics. However, the many other influences upon 
Eliot are not examined. In 'George Eliot's Conception of Sympathy, Ermarth claims 
that Eliot's 'sympathy depends absolutely upon a division in the psyche, a split in 
consciousness that permits two conflicting views to exist simultaneously. This mental 
division is the material of conscience' (1985(a), 23). Ermarth derives this view from 
Feuerbach's account of the 'I/Thou'. While Feuerbach talks of man's self-division 
during prayer, and of the 'thou' as the other, or alter ego, this state does not constitute a 
split psyche (24). Further, ideas about man's recognition of himself as part of a species, 
6 
the importance of multiple humanity and the other as part of conscience were already 
important to Eliot from the work of Spencer, Spinoza and Adam Smith. It is imperative 
to establish the overall influences on Eliot before arriving at conclusions about her 
sympathy. Finally, although I concur with Ermarth's stress on the importance of 
difference in Eliot's works, the free action of sympathy depends on more than 'the 
recognition of difference' (25). Meanwhile, Mary Ellen Doyle analyses how George 
Eliot's moral aim to encourage sympathy in her readers affects the artistry of her work, 
and regards rhetoric as Eliot's main formal technique. Doyle defines sympathy as: 
4simple pity'; or 'a sense of mental or moral compatibility'; and the reader's 
understanding of a character as a result of 'deep intellectual and imaginative union' 
(Doyle 1981,20, n9). While these distinctions are important, there is little 
consideration of Eliot's own definition of sympathy. 
Critic Timothy Pace considers sympathy as central to Eliot's creed: ('My own 
experience and development deepen every day my conviction that our moral progress 
may be measured by the degree in which we sympathize with individual suffering and 
individual joy' [GEL 11,403]), and that the extension of sympathy to her readers via her 
art was a major aim (1986). However, he cannot understand the exhortations and 
strategies used by Eliot's narrators to encourage the reader to sympathy. If 'the single 
universal truth supporting [her] creed is expressed in Eliot's insistence on the 
individual's innate capacity for spontaneous sympathy' (81), then surely this should not 
require encouragement. The first question then, is whether Eliot considered sympathy 
to be innate and spontaneous, as Pace claims (76). In support of this claim, Pace cites 
Eliot's apparent distinction in her Riehl essay, between a lower and a higher capacity 
(77) for sympathy: 
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The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or 
novelist, is the extension of our sympathies. Appeals founded on 
generalizations and statistics require a sympathy ready-made, a moral 
sentiment already in activity; but a picture of human life such as a 
great artist can give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that 
attention to what is apart from themselves, which may be called the 
raw material of moral sentiment (Eliot 1992,263). 
This statement deserves closer analysis. 
As Pace observes, George Eliot does not claim 'the power to expand the faculty of 
sympathy' (76); however, I claim she wishes to stimulate it. She aims to develop the 
reader's understanding by providing varied experiences, and to extend imagination by 
repeatedly having readers experience, understand and feeL The first sympathy, which, 
tkocu, clirý 6ýýe, Elioý. c4cises as mechanical and limited - "'sympathy ready-made, a 
moral sentiment already in activity"' -I consider to be capable of understanding and 
reasoning, and responding to the more abstract "'appeals founded on generalizations 
and statistics"'. However, it may lack the feeling and imagination necessary for 
sympathy with those who are 'different'. By contrast, the minds that require ... a picture 
of human life such as a great artist can give... are the trivial and the selfish minds who 
may lack understanding, reason and imagination. They need to be surprised "'into that 
attention to what is apart from themselves"', and encouraged towards a sympathetic 
imagination which I believe is akin to Spinoza's 'intuition'. For Eliot, it was the artist's 
responsibility to stimulate benevolence by arousing the 'nobler emotions, which make 
mankind desire the social right' (GEL VII, 44). Further on in the Riehl essay she 
actually says: 'We want to be taught to feel' (1992,264). 
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Contrary to Pace's view, the sympathy George Eliot perceives, even if innate, is 
not quick to act in all situations - like Aristotle's virtues, it requires practice. In 'Amos 
Barton', when the narrator states, 'I wish to stir your sympathy with commonplace 
troubles', the intention is to encourage. Pace's Hegelian claim that Eliot had an 'ideal 
of an immediately-felt sympathy [which] establishes for her the reality of a vital 
collective existence for human beings' (77) is excessive. Crediting Eliot with a belief in 
spontaneous pan-sympathy is dangerous; even Comte accepted that the altruistic virtues 
needed to be cultured and exercised. When discussing Dickens' work, Eliot describes 
as a 'miserable fallacy' the idea that 'the working classes are in a condition to enter at 
once into a millennial state of altruism, wherein everyone is caring for everyone else, 
and no one for himself' (Eliot 1992,265). Eliot does regard sympathy as paramount 
and employs her work to encourage it. However, what exactly her sympathy constitutes 
is still problematic. If she considers it innate, it obviously requires stimulation and 
practice, and it is questionable whether she regards any group, such as women or the 
working classes, as having a monopoly on sympathy. I aim to demonstrate that she 
requires a sympathy by all, for all, but that it has to be worked for. There is also little 
evidence that selflessness is essential for her sympathy. Elsewhere Eliot observes that 
'We should distrust a man who set up shop purely for the good of the community' 
(Pinney 1963,154-7), and certainly 'Such "disinterested officiousness"... stands 
opposed to true acts of sympathy' (Ermarth 1985(b), 23). 
The myth of George Eliot's belief in an 'absolute' duty stems largely from 
Frederic Myers' recollections of her 'sibyl ... in the gloom' persona, for he represents her 
as discussing 'God, Immortality, Duty' and pronouncing: 
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with terrible earnestness, how inconceivable was the first, how 
unbelievable the second , and yet how peremptory and absolute the 
third.... it was as though she withdrew from my grasp, one by one, the 
two scrolls of promise, and left me the third scroll only, awful with 
inevitable fates (1881,62). 
Rosemary Ashton's trenchant dissection rejects this presentation of Eliot 'as an 
Evangelist of a new and gloomy Gospel'. Yet Ashton states that 'perhaps George Eliot 
did say what Myers reports her as saying; it certainly accords with her views' (1996, 
334). Her views on God and immortality maybe, but what duty, whose duty, and duty 
to whom, is under discussion here. This is the woman who refused to go to church, who 
consorted with atheists, who translated heretical works, who had several affairs, and 
who ultimately lived openly with a married man. Further, in all of her works George 
Eliot has heroes and heroines who are castigated by their communities for neglecting 
what is deemed to be their duty. Many are judged immoral, yet the narrators' multi- 
level tales repeatedly reveal them to be more dutiful and moral than their community. 
In his novel Nemesis ofFaith, which Eliot reviewed favourably in 1849 (Eliot 1992,15- 
17), J. A. Froude talks of the duty of the clergy and that they do not know it. In Scenes 
of Clerical Life, George Eliot gives ample illustration of such dereliction of duty, while 
later novels explore moral corruption yet often sanction behaviours that many would 
consider a flouting of conventional duty. Eliot never advocates unthinking, selfless 
duty to men, church, masters, or mores. 
Life had led George Eliot to develop her own personal deontology before she 
came to write fiction. In her review of R. W. Mackay's The Progress of the Intellect in 
1851 (Eliot 1992,18-36), she praises the author for his exploration of 'the true basis and 
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character of religion and morals' (20), and concurs with his assumption of an 
'undeviating law in the material and moral world' (21). Further, she agrees that while 
science accepts this law, it is 'perversely' ignored in relation to ethics, religion and 
social organisation. Eliot claims that 'human duty' consists of the study and obeying of 
this 'law of consequences' (21) which impresses sanction or prohibition on all our 
deeds, yet involves reason and feeling. Following Mackay, her essay asserts that all 
areas of life and study are related and that religion and philosophy both involve reason 
and the emotions. Religion was not just a matter for the sentiments, and its 
representation as such by the Victorian Church meant that "'the sentiments are over- 
excited; the judgement becomes proportionately languid and incapable, [and] the 
connexion between the theory of practice and duty is unobserved, and dogmas are 
blindly learned without regard to their origin or meaning.. (Eliot 1992,22, quoting 
Mackay). Eliot demands greater inquiry into religion, morality and their laws and 
reasoning. This quest is a human duty in which full knowledge and understanding are 
essential regardless of all claims of sanctity, for without it duty is misunderstood. The 
laws relate to all aspects of life, internal and external, reason and feeling, and their 
complex inter-relationship. With reference to The Mill on the Floss, Ashton says that 
'duty, like the passion to which it is here opposed, is a complex idea. It is not a stem 
extrinsic law to be obeyed in spite of everything, but is itself bound up with love - love 
of the past, of roots, of family of friends' (1990,62). 
In critical essays on Eliot, duty is rarely defined or analysed. Seemingly, it is a 
commonly understood virtue. In 'The Sacred Nature of Duty', Frederick Karl insists 
that Eliot 'demonstrates through all her heroines that one must live for others', yet he 
ignores the dangers of selflessness (1956,256). Meanwhile, Eliot's heroines do not 
exhibit duty as mid-Victorian society would define it; ladies' conduct books, such as 
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those by Sarah Stickney-Ellis, saw women's nature, selflessness, and duty as one. 
According to Karl, Charles Hennell's Inquiry Concerning the Origin of Christianity 
'helped [Eliot] to replace God with duty and Christ with moral justice' (277), but this 
does not clarify Eliot's duty. 
The effect of Myers' essay was 'most insidious' (Barrett 1989,8) with Eliot 
seeming to demand a dour, sacrificial, all-encompassing duty from all. Yet repeatedly 
the novels illustrate how duty born of sympathy is impeded by conventional societal 
duties such as religious duty, family duty, or duty to community or calling. Too often in 
the novels the duty of conformity or tradition wins, with disastrous consequences, 
especially when there is an expectation of selflessness. The message is submerged, but 
such sacrifices are never approved, and are ironically condemned, while selfishness is 
never condoned. Yet the legacy of conservative criticism on George Eliot promotes the 
belief that she 'advocates "sublime resignation... (Barrett, xi) to undefined duty. 
An initial hypothesis on Eliot's notions of duty and sympathy is possible. The 
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy describes duty as 'that which one must do, or that 
which can be required of one', which rather implies something already owed. 
Interestingly, the Oxford English Dictionary's definition of 1642, has 'duty' as the 
action which was due, while 'obligation' was the bond by which one was bound to 
carry out the action. This sense still holds and, I believe, corresponds to the 'duty' 
which George Eliot had in mind. Thus duty is only 'peremptory and absolute' when 
one is already under an obligation to carry it out. What is therefore under debate here is 
which moral obligations George Eliot does and does not sanction. Her essay on 
Mackay's The Progress of the Intellect suggests that this choice is determined by the 
'inexorable law of consequences' (1992,21), which is in turn influenced by the many 
12 
and complex natural laws. Natural or undeviating law for Eliot corresponds to the laws 
of science. She is following Bray, Comte and Spencer in suggesting that the laws of 
science and nature apply to everything, everywhere. To break the laws will produce the 
inevitable and appropriate consequences. Understanding, reason and emotion, and all 
inner and outer environments affected, as are both individuals and communities, and all 
factors contribute to decisions about duty. Hume identified obligation with a subjective 
or sentimental pressure. Meanwhile, Kant describes obligation as the necessity to act in 
a certain way as dictated by reason. Kant discriminates between perfect duties that 
allow no choice - such as not killing or harming others - and imperfect duties which 
allow choice in the manner by which they are accomplished. ' I consider Eliot's 
definition of duty to involve a choice of obligation, to be informed by reason - as Kant 
describes - yet to be more informed with feeling, and the implications of the natural 
laws. Her 'imperfect' choice not to live with her widowed sister Chrissey was dictated 
by both reason and feeling, for she could earn more money and thus help more if she 
was working, but would run mad if forced to live with her family and accede to 
sentimental duty. George Eliot came to accept that she had an obligation of benevolent 
duty to Humanity -a duty of sympathy - yet she was not selfless. The philosopher 
Schneewind describes both George Eliot and Spinoza as intuitionist thinkers (Atkins 
1978,68): they are in control and choose the optimum option available according to 
knowledge and reason as informed by their emotions, but they ignore the pressure or 
sanctions which correspond to Hume's idea of convention or sentimentality. By 
dramatising the claims of convention versus an 'intuitionist duty' in her novels, Eliot 
encourages such refiection in her readers. 
I Generally, ethicists now identify 'negative duties' such as not Oling or hanning others and 'positive 
duties' of benevolence. 
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Sympathy is the disposition to share in another person's feelings to the extent of 
forming a sense-impression of their emotions. It is 'the propensity to think and feel in 
tune with the feelings and opinions that we observe in others' (Mautner 1996,419). 
Sensitivity, tolerance, understanding, pity and condolence are aspects of sympathy, and 
while all play their part in George Eliot's concept, this is not yet enough. Ethics is the 
study of morality, particularly of goodness and right action (Audi 1995,244-5), and for 
ethicists sympathy is a part of duty - the obligatory and expected right action of men 
and women who live together in fellowship or community. Empathy, like sympathy, is 
a complex emotion. Adam Smith argued that such moral sentiments allowed human 
society to exist; they aid the creation of the social relationship that facilitates peaceful 
co-existence (Oatley and Jenkins 1996,90-92). Empathy, a term coined by the 
psychologist Titchener in 1909 from the German 'EinfiAlung, is the power of 
projecting one's personality and fully understanding the object of contemplation; it is 
the power to feel oneself into a situation via the senses, knowledge and imagination. 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy deflnes empathy in contrast to sympathy. 
With sympathy one's identity is preserved while feeling with the other, but with 
empathy there is a tendency to lose oneself in the other: 'The concept of Einfflhlung' is 
more than to understand; it is to 'apperceive the meaning of expressions of experience 
in relation to their context' (Audi, 219). Freud argued that empathy enabled us to 
understand "'what is inherently foreign to our ego... (quoted in Wisp6 1987,25); this is 
a sentiment particularly relevant to Eliot's analysis of outsiders in the small 
communities her novels inhabit, a sentiment encompassing the tolerance and 
understanding of 'difference' encouraged by Spinoza, Comte and Feuerbach. Sympathy 
is also often confused and conflated with altruism, both in general and in relation to 
George Eliot. Auguste Comte created the term 'altruism', but this is far more than 
sympathy or empathy. It is the ethical view that people should act in the interest of 
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others; it is 'behaviour that promotes the welfare of others without conscious regard for 
one's own self-interests' (Hoffman 1981,124). Altruism is a far more extreme form of 
benevolence and often demands self-sacrifice. However, the value and status of 
altruism is questioned by ethicists, as self-interest often precipitates those actions 
described as altruism. Many of Eliot's texts have examples where a differentiation 
between selflessness, benevolence and self-interest is required. 
My initial conclusion is that George Eliot's concept of sympathy, as manifested 
in the novels, has more in common with empathy. Eliot wants an understanding and 
imaginative sympathy that allows a caring identification -a transcendence of difference 
- possibly with practical and emotional help and support. But this is not a demand for 
altruism. However, I deduce that much critical comment assumes and expects altruism, 
and where selflessness occurs in Eliot's fiction, it is assumed that Eliot or the text 
condones it. Generally critics do not distinguish between altruism, empathy and 
sympathy. What is expected of readers is also rarely examined; the formal methods by 
which sympathy is encouraged may be considered, but not what is expected or 
encouraged. An undefined sympathy appears to be acceptable. Again this is not 
accurate enough. An examination of Eliot's influences leads to the conclusion that 
sympathy, and particularly empathy, requires knowledge, understanding, reason and 
imagination. A wide experience and constant practice also helps - which is where 
fiction can assist. As Eliot remarks: 'To make men moral, something more is requisite 
than to turn them out to grass' (1992,263). Eliot's work makes sympathy, caring, and 
even righting the wrongs of the world a responsibility of all individuals in society, even 
a duty, but not at the expense of self. 
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Chapter One - Eliot's Intellectual Inheritance 
Eliot inherited a vast repository of philosophy, theology and natural science, although 
we do not know exactly what she read. Given the contents of her library (Baker 1977), 
the evidence of her reading of German philosophy alone (Ashton 1980; McCobb 1982), 
the breadth of her research for the Westminster Review, as well as her numerous 
references in notebooks and letters, there is evidence of a formidable knowledge of 
philosophy, including an understanding of ideas on sympathy and duty. Yet Eliot was 
not a philosopher; she was self-taught, often reading works in translation, and lacking 
friends with whom to discuss the work. I take heart from her experience as I attempt to 
pick my way through centuries of alternating accounts of egoism and altruism. I am not 
a philosopher, yet it is necessary to explain simply many different theories which 
provide readings towards a sympathy and duty that may have inspired George Eliot. 2 
Critics often restrict themselves to the belief that Eliot acquired her ideas of sympathy 
mainly from the romantic heritage, or they refer to the theories of benevolence 
developed by Shaftesbury, Hume or Adam Smith (Houghton 1957,273; Noble 1965, 
56-60). But Eliot's sources are more complex. It is hints of influence I wish to explore 
here, and while my interpretations may be faulty and subjective, I also take heart from 
the knowledge that 'even Kant misread' Hume's work (Tice and Slavens 1983,107). 
Eliot may not have read some of these works, but this chapter is an introduction to 
possibilities and probabilities; I am imagining what philosophy may have said to an 
intellectual woman who was searching for a creed to live by; it is also a personal 
journey. 
2 The background reading for this section on the history of philosophy is derived from the various texts 
quoted throughout the chapter. 
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Plato regarded ethics as a conflict between reason and the passions, and this 
stance set the stage for many of the major philosophical disputes to come. In Homeric 
and Aristotelian ethics, altruistic virtues were not highly regarded. Goodness was 
merely an aspect of carrying out roles; thus, a leader was 'good' if he displayed 
leadership qualities - and these were not altruistic. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
argues that the pursuit of happiness and man's advance are the aims of moral thinking. 
The right action was therefore the use of reason, not sentiment. He believed that virtues 
are acquired and improve with practice (Unnson and Rde 1989,29-30), but the virtues 
discussed are courage or temperance; sympathy was unmanly and irrational. Despite 
Socratic pleas for altruism, many virtues we value now in the West only gained 
eminence later, with Christianity, while until the Renaissance any opposition between 
egoism and altruism was not debated, since 'in medieval views no distinction was made 
between what I would owe to myself and to others, since all good was generally held to 
be formed by divine love and directed by divine command' (Tice and Slavens 1983, 
399). The Judeo-Christian tradition was the main source of ethical teaching. Judaism 
provided the laws and commandments which prescribe obligations; while initially, 
Christianity provided few ethical rulings other than loving our neighbour as ourselves. 
This creed encourages benevolence, although perhaps self-interest is uppermost. 
However, the emphasis in the Judeo-Christian tradition was on the needs of the 
community, and benevolence and adhering to obligations were necessary if people were 
to live together successfully. George Eliot was crucially aware of this point as she 
surveyed her moral inheritance. But for her morality was no longer immutable. If a 
moral code had evolved once people first began to interact, then a newly evolved ethics 
was now required as communities in the nineteenth-century experienced cataclysmic 
change. 
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From the end of the Middle Ages two strands of ethical theory began to unwind. 
Either humans were 'animals' in whom reason happened to predominate, so that 
calculated acts ensured self-interest; or natural man's emotions led him to be good, 
recognise good, and do good. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) argued that only reason 
could be relied upon. However, in The Passions of the Soul (1649) he also related our 
emotions to our thinking part, arguing that the emotions tell us what is important to the 
inside, and thus linking the two strands of ethics. The Renaissance, the Reformation 
and the influence of Machiavelli and Martin Luther led to a further reassessment of 
man's nature and morality. As individualism grew, reason predominated, and 
community-based values came under siege, as Comte describes. In Leviathan (1651), 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) assumed constant war between solitary individuals bent 
on self-interest, and he argued that reason could ameliorate this situation only if humans 
restrained their egoism and co-operated. Eliot would later appreciate from evolution 
, that man 
is never solitary, but exists in relation as members of family, community or 
species, as feminist ethicists are currently asserting (Koehn 1998,5, n13). Hobbes' 
solution was to strive for peace - as long as all individuals do - and simultaneously 
accept certain limits to liberty. Benevolence is absent, or was a disguise for self- 
interest, as individuals invested power in a chosen Sovereign to whom duty was owed in 
exchange for peace. Hobbes' philosophy is not Eliot's benevolent concern for 
humanity, yet the debate over egoism and altruism opened up from his interrogation of 
dominant Christian values and demands for unquestioning benevolence. 
The importance of equality, freedom, and individuality grew during the English 
Revolution, asserting 'the individual conscience in opposition to institutional authority' 
(Hesse 1995,68). Simultaneously, feelings grew in importance as empiricism deposed 
the dominance of the rational mind (Bate 1961,129). The work of John Locke (1632- 
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1704), the founder of British empiricism, presented a major reassessment of human 
reason and morality. Eliot and Lewes had read Locke's Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690) (Baker 1977, xxxvii), and Eliot's reviews for the Leader show 
the breadth of her knowledge of all philosophy, including Locke (Eliot 1992,133-137). 
He dismissed all rationalist notions of knowledge being innate or a priori, insisting that 
knowledge derives from sense experience. His main importance for Eliot may be the 
suggestion of a form of intuition, or imaginative way of viewing in the mind, which 
records early impressions as if innate. Such an explanation of seemingly a priori 
knowledge compares with current ideas of psycho-social structuring, where lasting 
attitudes are constructed in a child's early months. British empiricism was receptive to 
the importance of the imagination, which complemented reason and became its working 
partner. Morally, Locke believed that all men are equal and free, and that there was a 
law of nature which it was our duty to obey, and uphold 'natural rights' for all, by all. 
He was also an early feminist, believing that women were equal to men with differences 
being psychologically constructed and capable of change. Although women were no 
longer regarded as equivalent to animals or slaves, there was always a difference of 
degree; women were rarely beings of stature. For the benefit of all, Locke advocated a 
dsocial contract' whereby an impartial authority ensured natural laws with three 
legislators to assist: God, democratic government, and convention. Eliot's novels 
frequently question these three legislators. In Middlemarch, Dorothea's initial 
imaginative and sympathetic attachment to Casaubon is encouraged by his similarity to 
a painting of Locke (1998 [1874], 16). 
Empiricists such as Locke had begun the trend that placed knowledge in 
advance of metaphysics, the metamorphosis central to Comte's philosophy. The rise in 
scientific research during the seventeenth century also propelled study towards the 
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complex question of human moral and social life - towards psychology and evolution - 
and a concern with benevolence (or altruistic sentiments) accelerated as the shift from 
reason to feeling gathered pace. An ethics of naturalism also arose, proclaiming that 
good stems from human nature. The greatest expression of this position is in the work 
of the 'moral sense' theorists, particularly the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), who 
argued for a sensibility that negotiated between empiricism, reason and feeling and 
detected morality according to the responses of this 'moral sense' to pain or pleasure. 
Shaftesbury, in his Investigation Concerning Virtue and Merit (1699), stressed the 
importance of 'affections', where sympathy was an instrument of virtue and an act of 
the imagination which allowed the self to identify with others. He asserted that humans 
were innately benevolent and that benevolence gave rise to a good life if the passions 
were well-directed. A moral feeling labelled conscience maintained virtue. Sympathy 
was another moral feeling which, like conscience, exists in humans because we are 
social beings and have to balance our needs and desires with others, it is the ability to 
feel the sufferings and joys of others as part of a greater whole, which presages 
Feuerbach's work. Shaftesbury's account of this striving towards a head-heart balance 
has great resonance with Eliot's novels, particularly that all humans can be benevolent. 
Combined with imagination, sympathy allowed humans to achieve identification one 
with the other, which is a creativity reflected in Eliot's novels, for Shaftesbury believed 
that creativity or imagination was the mind's capacity to produce original ideas from 
received perceptions. 
The feeling of confidence in an 'inner sense', conscience, sympathy or God- 
given morality gradually came to dominate British thought by the late eighteenth 
century. Sympathy and imagination became increasingly important, writh Shaftesbury's 
work entering the German tradition; the Romantics later revived his ideas. James 
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Arbuckle, a disciple of Shaftesbury's, argued that we cannot act morally unless we are 
able to enter into the feelings of the other (Bate 1961,133). Francis Hutcheson (1694- 
1746), in his Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil (1725), saw benevolence and 
self-interest as clearly opposed, with benevolence paramount and innate. Reason 
provided information and knowledge via the senses - forming simple and complex ideas 
- but not moral judgement, so that Hutcheson sought an empirical basis for moral 
judgement via Shaftesbury's hypothesis of an affective and moral ity-perceiving 'inner 
sense' which apprehends virtue and finds it pleasant. Two inner moral senses are 
proposed, which have a basis in rational behaviour and apprehend perceptions of ethics 
and aesthetics. Hutcheson considered all morally good motives to be benevolent, 'that 
is, an affection that seeks as its object the good of another' (Roberts, 7). The affections 
of benevolence and self-interest are all-present and humans can choose to be benevolent 
or egoistic (Roberts, 11-12), with the moral choice made when the affection is chosen in 
response to the sense input. Hutcheson argued that virtue is pleasant and vice is not, so 
that our moral behaviour is almost an aesthetic choice. However, much depends on our 
experiences, so that benevolence may be encouraged or repressed. Hutcheson believed 
humans were essentially benevolent because of our social nature and heritage. He 
thought it natural to be benevolent to close family and friends, while the ability to 
extend benevolence even further is the highest virtue (Roberts, 13-14), a belief reflected 
in Spencer's work. In his Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue 
(1725), Hutcheson's theory of man's 'inner sense" perception of beauty and morality as 
internal and intuitive led to speculation that such perceptions were imaginative rather 
than rational. Burke and the associationists soon began to call this inner sense the 
imagination (Engell, 40). 
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The work of David Hume (1711-1776) furthered the demotion of reason as the 
moral arbiter, but also suggested that happiness did not stem from a God-given moral 
sense. Eliot was familiar with Hume's philosophy: Herbert Spencer's 1853 essay for 
the Westminster Review, 'Universal Postulate', covers Hume's work, while the Eliot- 
Lewes Library houses a copy of Hume's complete works (Baker 1977,100, no 1069). 
Further, Lewes would have discussed Hume during the revisions of his philosophical 
biography. The critic W. E. Henley debates in 1890 whether Eliot's books are novels or 
philosophical treatises and suggests they were dictated ... to a plain woman of genius by 
the ghost of David Hume"' (GEL 1, ix). Haight dismisses this claim, but perhaps 
Henley saw influences that have escaped critics, for there is much in Hume's 
philosophy that would appeal to George Eliot. 
Hume's conception of our nature had an organic, almost evolutionary bias, and 
his naturalism later made him a favourite with the Darwinians. In his Treatise of 
Human Nature (173940) Hume described an original and complex theory of meaning 
and moral sense responsible for guiding human behaviour and motivation, which 
stressed the importance and centrality of the passions and the imagination. Hume 
asserted that we cannot found knowledge on information from our senses alone. We 
have to examine our own individual psychology and how exactly it structures acquired 
information into knowledge, and thus conditions our beliefs and morals. All thought is 
based on single, simple sensory impressions which become compounded as a result of 
our individual psychologies; the many impressions form complex ideas which depend 
on the strength of the imagination, the amount of experience, the wealth and type of 
sensations, and the individual input from the passions. Thus knowledge is individual, 
complex and varied. The forces between impressions are 'associations' or imagination. 
If we form an impression that we are amused with a friend's witticism, this response 
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becomes associated with an impression (we imagine) that we are fond of the friend. 
Thus Dorothea associated Casaubon with Locke and imagined similar virtues. For 
Hume, the imagination was far more important than reason, which is why he saw it as 
central to passion and belief-formation. The causes of all passions are pleasure and 
pain, which are themselves 'impressions of reflections' and are thus based on our 
thoughts of what gives us pleasure or pain. 
Book III of the Treatise of Human Nature (173940), indicates Hume's belief 
that man's social condition produces sympathy, which is defined as "'the propensity we 
have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and 
sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own... (Van Holthoon 1993, 
36, quoting Hume). Thus morality is felt by the passions according to pleasure or pain 
not reasoned, although reason has an input as part of a complex of psychological 
influences. In the Treatise, Hume devises an associationist mechanism to describe how 
our capacity for sympathy helps us perceive the emotional state of others. The passion 
centred on the self, and the feelings which derive from the actions and judgements of 
others, are both associated with pain and pleasure, and we mediate between all these 
emotions via sympathy. It is a sympathy which may become empathy, for if our 
sensibility and imagination are strong enough, the idea we form of the emotion we 
experience becomes the actual feeling which we observe in another. Any natural 
relationship or connection is more likely to provoke sympathy, as development takes 
place in family or community groups where selfishness has given way to benevolence, 
as living in social groups becomes safer and social interaction develops. We tend to 
adopt the frame of mind of those around us because of sympathy with the familiar, with 
our family and society. However, while this process leads to friendliness and 
community feeling it can also lead to conformity and constraint. Herbert Spencer's 
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work reflects Hume's influence, and George Eliot was familiar with these ideas, 
particularly the importance of imagination in sympathy, the identification within family 
and community, yet also the antagonism and the urge to non-conformity. Hume's ideas 
of virtue are also relevant to Eliot's work; he considered natural virtues such as 
compassion and modesty to be invariant across cultures. However, there are artificial 
virtues, such as conforming to convention for the good of the state, community or 
family. Justice was a major artificial virtue of convention for Hume, important for the 
protection of property rights and promises, for the protection of all contracts, and for 
government. These artificial virtues all feature in Eliot's novels as bastions of society to 
be questioned as society changed. 
Hume's friend, Adam Smith (1723-1790) was better known as the author of the 
Wealth of Nations (1776). Yet Smith, a philosopher of considerable influence, 
developed a complete system of ethics, suggesting that morality was based on the 
central tenets of imagination and sympathy. In his Theory of Modern Sentiments 
(1759), he developed Hume's work to explore a distinctive 'doctrine of sympathy'. 
Imagination was essential and without it sympathy could not function (Bate 1945,147). 
The imagination was perceived as a mental power that influences and creates using all 
the materials from the senses, plus impressions, sensibility, and the input of the 
passions. In particular, the imagination creates connections to achieve sympathetic 
identification. It is an ordering and organising power, an endless searching for sense in 
the chaos of the mind. With the scientific and artistic imagination, ideas and ultimately 
creativity result from an aesthetics of sorting and filing on the part of the imagination. 
Meanwhile, the imagination dealing with self and others attempts to render our myriad 
impressions of other and self, coherent. This is imaginative identification, or sympathy. 
Sensory impressions about others and their behaviour and experiences are ordered and 
24 
compared to other ideas by the sympathetic imagination. This is how we appreciate and 
eventually understand the state of mind of others. It is then possible to form moral 
decisions - for example, to decide if someone's actions are justified by their 
circumstances; thus we excuse and sympathise with Godfrey Cass once we understand 
his upbringing and inheritance. 
This leads to Smith's moral theory. In order to interact successfully, humans 
require observation skills and an understanding of what is observed. Sympathetic 
imagination facilitates this awareness as it imagines and imitates, or mirrors in the mind, 
the observed situation of the other. This process creates the 'other' as a mirror and 
leads to the realisation that one is also being observed and assessed, which leads to the 
need for self-assessment in order to pre-empt judgement by others. Society, Smith 
argues, exists for us to measure ourselves by, which results in the development of the 
conscience - another mental power derived from the work of sympathy - which 
becomes the imagined ideal spectator, or other, to measure ourselves by. This reasoned 
conscience is Smith's main contribution to moral theory as it, along with public opinion, 
becomes the means of arbitrating on how we can pursue our own interests without 
hurting those of others. Smith believed that ultimately the conscience allowed us to step 
outside ourselves and judge ourselves as we would others. The power of the 
sympathetic response was so awe-inspiring for Smith, that he declared the feeling of 
sympathy to be a constant pleasure. Ms argument is that the passion that sympathises 
with the observed experience may be pleasurable or painful depending on what is 
observed, but the emotion which arises from realising the perfect coincidence of these 
passions is always agreeable. It is the 'pleasure of understanding' (Van Holthoon, 45). 
Smith saw sympathy becoming empathy and moulding the moral judgements. Such 
sympathy he considered natural, but he also recognised the effects on it of habit and 
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custom, for it could easily be enhanced or erased. This consideration echoes in Eliot's 
work, for where a strong family or community life are lacking, then the prerequisites for 
sympathy - others, observation, experience, understanding and imagination - are not 
available. Hence the urge to encourage sympathy via her fiction. 
Smith argued that only the imagination could allow us to feel the pains - and 
pleasures - of others by suggesting what it would feel like to ourselves. Although our 
sympathy may not accord completely with the feelings of others, 'we sympathise with 
what we know; and the wider our knowledge and experience, the wider is the scope of 
our sympathy' (Bate 1945,151). Smith considered it better to extend sympathy to the 
community, or even all humanity, rather than limit it to family (Smith, 37). This forges 
links with Eliot's discussion of both family bonds and the reception and tolerance of 
outsiders, for our strongest sympathies are aroused by what we most admire, or are 
familiar with. Thus family and community, even objects, landscapes, rhythms and 
places become points of sympathetic identification, as Eliot demonstrates repeatedly in 
her work. The influence of Smith's work was enormous, particularly on the Romantics. 
His premise that the imagination recreates in our own minds and emotions what another 
is feeling 'darted down like a shaft of sunlight in a century that, since Hobbes, had been 
darkened with moral systems based on self-interest' (Engell, 15 1). 
The works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) mark a significant change in 
this journey through the possibilities for Eliot's philosophical influence. As a young 
woman she had devoured Rousseau's oeuvre. When Emerson visited Rosehill in 1848, 
she credited Rousseau's Confessions for her habit of deep reflection (GEL, 1,271, n6), 
while William Hale White reported her 1853 opinion that to be able to read Rousseau 
was worth all the trouble of learning French (Haight 1968,65, n 4). Ashton suggests 
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that Rousseau's work helped to save Eliot from despair in 1848 (1996,67). Rousseau 
rejects the Christian idea of original sin, and when George Eliot's own belief was first 
in retreat the idea of 'natural man' as tabula rasa was wonderfully antithetical to 
Calvinist notions. While Eliot did not accept Rousseau's ideas unconditionally and 
acknowledged that his 'views of life, religion, and government' might well be 
&miserably erroneous' she nevertheless declared that his 'genius has sent that electric 
thrill through my intellectual and moral frame' which inspired and suggested new 
combinations of thought (GEL 1,277). 
Rousseau proposed an ideal society based on total voluntary subjection to the 
common will of the community. Like Comte, Rousseau never doubts that there is a 
single common good and that the needs and desires of all citizens could coincide if 
uncorrupted. The general will could produce a supportive society, but instead the 
perversion of the social contract creates despotism, inequality (Maclntyre 1998,185), 
and the education, social rules, conventions and false duty that had destroyed man's 
innate capacity for sympathy, as described in his Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundation of Inequality (1755). Western civilisation had become limited, distorted 
and controlled and needed different perspectives free from these false values. Kant said 
that he had learned from Rousseau to recognise the sharp difference between mores and 
morality (Tice and Slavens, 110), a distinction that George Eliot constantly draws in her 
novels. It was a passionate demand for freedom from corruption and artificiality that 
drove Rousseau and attracted Eliot. 
Rousseau saw man as an original, innocent nature that has been distorted, and 
he believed that all men - notjust the dlite - must become self-governing moral agents. 
On realising the immorality of society, an individual is justified in withdrawing and 
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forging their own moral pathway. Any blanket adherence to imposed laws and duties is 
slavery, while adherence to the law that one prescribes for oneself is freedom. To 
achieve such a state, both reason and feeling are needed. Many lack the knowledge, 
understanding, feeling and imagination to be sympathetic, as do many of Eliot's 
characters - these are to be understood and treated with tolerance. Eliot was already 
familiar with this argument from Spinoza's work, but her reading of Rousseau 
accelerated her shift towards feeling (Dodd 1990,105), although she also analysed 
reason alongside this mutual, balanced exploration of emotion - particularly women's 
emotions. Rousseau's work sanctioned and encouraged the consideration of head and 
heart that is mirrored in Eliot's work, but even in her earliest letters it is obvious that 
Eliot already had the powers of observation, imagination and sympathy to analyse 
reason and emotion. That Rousseau also praised the ideas and insight of the less 
4constructed' and sophisticated members of society, such as children, artisans, and 
peasants, has obvious links with Wordsworth's poetry, Comte's doctrines, and Eliot's 
concern with 'ordinary people'. 
Rousseau's radical moral divergence from his predecessors was in dissolving the 
opposition inherent in self-interest and benevolence. His argument is that natural man 
merely aims to achieve a type of life where needs are satisfied and he can live in 
relationship with others. Self-interest is present as the dominant force essential for self- 
preservation, but it also provides 'an awareness of a reciprocal relationship of the self to 
others' (MacIntyre 1998,186), and thus the possibility of a more complex morality. 
Such a reciprocal relationship suggests the 'self-in-other' that was to become central to 
Eliot's own doctrine. In his ideas on the reformation of society by the accession of the 
4general will' Rousseau includes a concern for individuals and society as bound 
together in relationship, arguing that any person is a point of interconnection within a 
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web of social relationships. This knowledge of self-in-relation promotes sympathy, and 
his account of sympathy influenced the Romantics and compares to the idea of 
'negative capability'. 
Via her novels, Eliot examines damaging social and political institutions, 
particularly family and social conventions, education, and a patriarchy which oppresses 
and represses women - although Rousseau was not alert to the oppression of women. 
Redinger suggests that what Eliot valued in creative literature was 'a delineation of 
human passion with which she could empathise' (1975,153), and that Rousseau 
provided this for Eliot's writing, in addition to awakening her to new perceptions of 
man and nature and thought and feeling. Eliot was partly seduced by Rousseau's utopia 
and encouraged to turn to Voltaire and Saint-Simon, which led eventuallY to Comte 
(Dodd, 107); however, her initial admiration was not eroded, and in 1876 she and 
Lewes made a pilgrimage to Les Charmettes in order to visit Rousseau's rooms, while 
their evenings were spent in reading his works aloud to each other (GEL VI, 265, n3). 
George Eliot read and debated on Kant (1724-1804), and her 1855 essay 'The 
Future of German Philosophy' suggests a comprehensive understanding of his works 
(Eliot 1992,133-37). When discussing Sara Hennell's Christianity and I? Ilfldelity, Eliot 
calls on the authority of Kant to convince Sara of her errors (GEL 11,268). Eliot's 
reading, reviewing, and references to Kant have been charted by Anthony McCobb 
(1982) who suggests she imbibed much during the early Westminster years, and was not 
introduced to Kant's works by Lewes. Thus, while Eliot never wrote extensively on 
Kant, the wealth of her knowledge is indisputable. 
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The concepts of sympathy and benevolence were basic to moral theory until 
Kant attacked them and attempted to reinstate reason. His main influences were the 
rationalists, but also Hume's empiricism, while Rousseau had inspired his respect for 
human nature. Central to Kant's theory of mind is a fusion of rationalism and 
empiricism. Kant insisted that the mind was not a tabula rasa, but a union of learned 
experiences acquired via the senses, and certain apriori intuitions and concepts. ' The 
Critique ofPure Reason (178 1) explains his theory, where 'pure reason' is that which is 
known by means other than experience. Kant suggests that human sensibility and 
understanding are innate intuitions and concepts of the mind, and that they influence the 
way that we perceive and deal with experience. Thus what we perceive empirically 
may be influenced by our innate nature, rather than by constructed aspects of the mind 
as in Hume's work. Kant was not saying that our knowledge derived partly from our 
sense input and partly from a priori intuitions, but that knowledge derives from the 
interaction of these two. Lewes explains how oxygen and hydrogen are not two 
separate causes of water, but that the only cause of water is the union of the two (Lewes 
1902,546). Concepts of the mind were identified which, when applied to sensory input, 
made sense of it. Time and space are two such modes of perception which order the 
way we discern things. 
Kant believed that this theory of knowledge demonstrated that morality cannot 
be based on anything we experience, such as pain or pleasure. He accepted the idea of a 
basic human moral consciousness, but asked what exactly defined morality. In the 
search for unchanging a priori aspects of human nature Kant concluded that anything 
morally good was done out of duty. Anything done from enjoyment, self-interest, 
altruism, or any inclination, is not duty and is not decisively good (MacIntyre 1998, 
3A returned confidence in the apriorl stemmed ftom Newton's work, which discussed phenomena that 
cannot be accounted for empirically. 
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192-3). Kant was searching for the unchanging that is always universally moral and 
which will explain where duty lies. The answer was universalisability: 'The maxim, or 
subjective principle, of virtuous action can only be that "I ought never to act except in 
such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law"' (Craig 
1998,190, quoting Kant). Such a view can be more colloquially expressed as, 'Is it 
feasible for everyone to act in the way that I wish to actT This is Kant's 'categorical 
imperative' which suggests that certain actions are right or wrongper se. A categorical 
imperative is not a source of moral principles but a test of the ones we already have; 
where it would not be feasible for everyone to act in a certain way, then an individual 
should not act. No exceptions are permitted for universalisability determines our duty 
to self and others completely. 
Kant's ethical theory means great freedom for those capable of a self-governing 
morality, for we impose our moral requirements on ourselves and do not need external 
authorities such as Church or State. We also choose all obligations, beyond the 
categorical imperatives, and these override all other demands (Schneewind 1992,309). 
We are not committed to benevolence unless it is a chosen obligation, for selfless caring 
or philanthropy often result in servility, inequality or paternalism (Schneewind, 311). 
Such moral autonomy demands freedom and equality for all within the social and 
political system, which includes freedom of speech, religion and movement. However, 
we are not completely free, for conscience and the law of causality restrain, but we are 
reasoning beings and have a part in how the world exists. Otherwise, Kant gives little 
guidance concerning duty. Perfect duties tell us what not to do: not to kill, lie, break 
promises, or commit suicide. However, the personal morality of reason that he 
describes sanctions any way of life that is compatible with not contravening these 
perfect duties, and thus sympathy is not a duty. For imperfect duties to oneself, Kant 
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suggests improving our talents, while imperfect duty to others could include being 
benevolent. From a morality based on Divine Will, to a presumption of self-interest, to 
a climate where sympathy, even altruism, are desirable if not innate, Kant suddenly 
provides an ethics based on the autonomy of reason, acknowledging the importance of 
benevolence, but not that actions should be driven by it. 
Theorists of moral behaviour such as Gilligan object to Kant's theories on the 
grounds that there is no real moral relativism, no allowance for individual cases; further, 
Kantian ethics is rejected for only expecting minimal duties (Koehn 1998,6, n16); 
finally, a priori 'rationality and autonomy provide the necessary base for Kant's 
morality, thus anyone not capable of this, such as women and idiots are excluded from 
the moral sphere' (Hekman 1995,2); for Kant believes that women are unreasoning and 
subject to indiscriminate benevolence. Eliot's campaign for tolerance, understanding 
and sympathy, and her accounts of the psychological determinants of her characters as a 
defence of their behaviour suggest a defence of moral relativism. It is also apparent that 
Kant's preoccupation with reason ignores the profound emotions involved in close 
family ties, which are central to Eliot's novels. The novels also suggest that she would 
agree with feminist theorists in preferring reason balanced with feeling - she considered 
his insistence on the apriori an error (Eliot 1992,135). However, Kant's ideas on duty, 
and not being governed by external agencies are important. I consider that the greater 
autonomy Eliot wished for all would include the opportunity to choose obligations, 
although certain ties of caring and sympathy would be more important than Kant 
allows. 
The Romantics had initially considered themselves Kant's heirs, but under the 
influence of Rousseau's work they came to emphasise sensibility and imagination 
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(Gaarder, 287). In his 'A Defence of Poetry' Shelley argues, like Eliot in her 'Progress 
of the Intellect' review, that our moral and social sciences have lagged behind the 
natural sciences; we have knowledge, but do not know how to use it to be happy. In his 
references to sympathy and the imagination Shelley is strongly influenced by the work 
of Smith and Hume. He argues that poetry is a moral force because sympathy and love 
are the basis of moral life, but they need to be awakened by the imagination, via, for 
example, art or poetry (Shelley 1954,276; 282-3). This belief is essentially the same as 
Eliot's in her Riehl essay. The intuitive working of the imagination allows sympathetic 
identification with others, places and things (Bate 1945,144-5); the imagination thus 
permits a way of looking that allows sympathy to achieve empathy by actually entering 
into an object. Such sympathetic intuition was important to Wordsworth, Coleridge and 
Keats. While the Romantic influence was important to Eliot, she is as likely to have 
acquired her input from philosophy itself, she always values reason, and her Riehl essay 
suggests a wariness of selfish instincts fostered by Romanticism. 
Like Kant, most male philosophers considered women to lack reason and to be 
overly benevolent. Originally this view dated from women being associated with nature 
and animals, but was to develop along different lines with the Enlightenment. The 
growing interest in sexual difference in the eighteenth century arose out of the 
Enlightenment and Revolutionary fervour for equality (Benjamin 1991,137). As 
equality looked to improve the standing of women, the opposite desire of some to deny 
equality to women led to the ongoing "'equality within difference... philosophy 
(Badinter 1995,7). Among other moves, as science developed and biology was born 
(Shuttleworth 1984,3, n 4&5), anatomy was employed to ensure woman's destiny so 
that her reproductive role condemned her to inequality - before, male and female bodies 
had been considered equal but opposite (Poovey 1988,6; Badinter, 8). The full 
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appreciation of biological and anatomical difference by the early 1800s led to theories 
of radical sexual dimorphism which were to evolve variously with Comte, Spencer and 
Darwin into ideas of a 'complementarity' (Badinter, 7) which further oppressed and 
repressed women. Complementarity argued for women's restriction to feminine roles 
just as they were beginning to move into masculine ones, and added extra restrictions to 
those already established by the 'separate spheres' argument. This distinction between 
the public and private spheres of men and women, and the complementarity 
increasingly dictated by science, both developed as if compensating women, who 
eventually became characterised by a maternal love which was soon extended to a 
universal caring that labelled her as the guardian of morality (Poovey 1988,7-8). It was 
from the equal but different philosophy that Comtean images of maternal woman 
developed, as well as Patmore's and Ruskin's sentimentalised notions of woman's 
nature. 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) may have influenced Eliot's notions of 
sympathy and duty, particularly later in life. If she had not read Schopenhauer's work 
before 1852, she was introduced to it then, along with many British journal readers 
(McCobb 1985,343), via John Oxenford's article in the Westminster (1853). Eliot was 
impressed, recommending the essay to Sara Hennell and George Combe, for it proved 
the catalyst for Schopenhauer's growing reputation in Britain (GEL 11,95, n 5; VIII, 55, 
nl). Oxenford laments Schopenhauer's neglect, praises his forcefulness and lucidity, 
yet deplores his doctrine, describing it as 'the most disheartening, the most repulsive, 
the most opposed to the aspirations of the present world' that exists (1853,394). Both 
Lewes and Eliot read much Schopenhauer, and Eliot read Die Well als Wille und 
Vorstellung (The World as Will and Idea) (1818) in 1872-3 while she was writing 
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Daniel Deronda (McCobb 1983,323) in which there is a Schopenhauerian air of world- 
weariness throughout. 
Schopenhauer's main doctrine is that individual existence is illusory and 
human life is futile. We are organisms whose brains and physiology enable us to 
perform functions, but the innermost core of the human being is the will, and our mental 
processes are subservient to this blind will to life, which 
drives us on through an ever-ramifying set of desires and goals, 
but we reach no ultimate point or final satisfaction. To have 
desires unsatisfied is to suffer, to have needs is to be vulnerable 
to deprivation, and - the final irony - to be without needs 
usually brings only a state of empty boredom waiting to be filled 
by a further cycle of desires (Craig, 550). 
Schopenhauer's major work, The World as Will and Idea, is an application of his ideas 
to moral philosophy. He examines questions of free will and responsibility and makes a 
case for determinism, distinguishing between the freedom to act, which one has when 
there are no impediments to doing what one wills, and the freedom to will. Many of 
Eliot's characters are not even free to act, yet her exploration repeatedly shows that they 
are less free to will. Schopenhauer thinks that acts of will are the outcome of character 
(which he considers to be unchanging) and our motives represent states of affairs in the 
world. If character and motives remain the same, then the actions and outcomes would 
always be the same. Yet still we feel responsible. It is this effect of the will which must 
be transcended for us to be free (Craig, 552). Eliot explores situations where motives, 
and therefore outcomes change, but unlike Schopenhauer she believes character can 
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change, as with Adam Bede's growth from reason and knowledge alone, to sympathy 
and intuition. Schopenhauer considers reason to be overvalued, even impotent, and that 
Kant in elevating the reason undervalued the feelings, especially sympathy. 
Compassion or sympathy is 'the only true moral impulse for Schopenhauer' 
(McCobb 1983), giving value to human existence and providing some release from the 
anguish caused by the will. However, it is a rare virtue as humans are mainly egoistic. 
Sympathetic humans see others as themselves: 'Everything and everywhere is "I once 
more... (Craig 552). Compassion overcomes the effect of the will because its wide 
vision reduces the distinctness of individuality, and dismisses it. Sympathy is present in 
each human, with the best apprehending the world and their place in it; they and their 
actions are good. Everyone has a combination of sympathy, egoism and malice, but 
egoism is the greater part of the character for most natures because the will to live 
causes us to strive to survive and advance. The 'inability to transcend individuality and 
so treat others as equals debars such egoists from feeling sympathy or true compassion 
"which is the basis ofjustice and morality.. (McCobb, 324, quoting Schopenhauer). 
The ethically sublime was a test for sympathy by Schopenbauer, for 
surrendering to the sublime signals a bliss in the loss of individuality and oneness with 
the world, "'a vanishing nothing in the face of stupendous forces... (McCobb, 543, 
quoting Schopenhauer), a faculty exhibited by Eliot's most exalted characters, 
particularly Esther and Dorothea who both find solace in the 'largeness of the world' W 
776) while Gwendolen is frightened. Most people would fear this loss, but the 
sympathetic person is "'not oppressed but exalted" by the world's immensity, for his 
cognition and intellect lead him to identify his 'I' with the 'Thou' of the species' (543), 
a stance that suggests similarities to Feuerbach, Spencer and Spinoza. The will may be 
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transcended through virtue and reason, which help to shift the self from centre and relax 
the individual will to power. But this is limited as 'virtue cannot be transmitted by 
practical reasoning, nor can it arise from abstract, conceptual knowledge, but rather 
from intuition' (McCobb, 325). "'Virtue must spring from the intuitive knowledge that 
recognises in another's individuality the same inner nature as one's own... (McCobb, 
325, quoting Schopenhauer). Again there is a strong echo of Spinoza, but unlike 
Schopenhauer he believed that man could change via a growth to perfect knowledge to 
achieve happiness and develop intuition. Schopenhauer suggests this possibility, but 
also claims that character cannot change: 'Redemption ... from such enslavement to 
individual self-assertion and to the illusory pleasures of life is ... provided by the 
faculties of Reason, cognition and intellect generally; in relation to the will' (McCobb, 
325). 
While the elevation of sympathy in Schopenhauer's work is paralleled by Eliot 
and may have been admired by her, she never shares his pessimism or extreme 
disillusion. It would have been a negation of her own lifetime striving. Schopenhauer's 
attitude to women would also have been disputed: "'The weakness of their reasoning 
faculty also explains why women show more sympathy for the unfortunate than men.. 
(Brabeck 1993,33). Women are commended for their love and motherliness, but are 
patronised as an 'intermediate stage between the child and the man' and considered 
quite ugly and 'unaesthetic' (Hollingdale 1970,81,85). Schopenhauer also agrees with 
most other male philosophers by considering that women's lack of reason results in 'a 
lack of a sense ofjustice' (83). Schopenhauer's views are so misogynist that the whole 
range of Eliot's women characters in Daniel Deronda could be her riposte. 
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Finally, in following this quest for sympathy and duty, 'We have to remind 
ourselves of a fact that should never be forgotten in any consideration of the subsequent 
influences on her development: namely, that the basic inspiration which gave direction 
to all her works and led her to make of her novels a plea for human solidarity was 
Christianity' (Svaglic 1954,146). Many critics assume that Eliot's ethics derive largely 
from her period of Evangelical Christianity (see Granlund 1994,2-3), neglecting all 
other influences and the fact that Eliot did not herself receive much sympathy from 
Christianity. Christian theology does provide developing theories of sympathy and 
duty, but while I owe a debt to Granlund - for she observes that few who investigate 
Eliot's influences delve further back than the Romantic input (4) and thus sparked my 
philosophical journey - Eliot is not concerned with the individual rather than the species 
and does not regard selflessness as the route to self-fulfilment (5). 
While Eliot's faith made her aware of the doctrine of universal love and 
benevolence, I believe that she experienced mainly self-sacrifice in her early life, and 
received little help or support in return. The evangelical Anglicanism she was involved 
with was a sectarian and militant branch, with a system to be imposed on society. 
Despite a philanthropic creed, the horror of the French Revolution had led to rigidity 
and an anti-intellectual stance within the doctrine. Many 'Evangelicals consistently 
taught that sympathy subverts morality by breaking down the distinction between good 
and evil' (Carlisle, 28), and the religion that Eliot embraced with Maria Lewis, and in 
an extreme form with the Franklin Sisters, opposed most of her pleasure and enjoyment. 
As Knoepflmacher observes, her early religion concentrated on what drove man to 
&selfish action' and 'human depravity' and the cure was seen as 'self-denial' (1965,31); 
only later was she to build upon her knowledge of philosophy and humanism to 
proselytise for sympathy. Meanwhile, her eschewing of fiction, dancing and anything 
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other than sacred music furthered the distance between herself and her more worldly 
brother Isaac (see GEL 1,5,8,10) and made it dffficult to make friends. Her beliefs 
involved a rejection of intellectual stimulation and demanded emotional acceptance only 
- something she was later to criticise in her Mackay review - just when she was being 
tempted by everything from Scott's novels to her own ambition. These contradictions, 
added to her extensive reading of philosophical and religious debate, and her realisation 
that there was so much dissent, were to lead to crises of intellect, conscience and faith. 
Eliot's habit of profound introspection, dating from her Bible reading and 
intense critical analysis of her belief (Hesse 1995,25), adds to the psychological 
insights of the novels, although her study of philosophy added extra dimensions. 
Fortunately her wide study provided part of the necessary support to secede from 
traditional faith, for while she admitted that it was 'no small sacrifice to part with the 
assurance' of immortality, she did not believe 'the conviction that immortality is man's 
destiny indispensible to the production of elevated and heroic virtue and the sublimest 
resignation' (GEL 1,136). It must be remembered that at first she felt her loss of faith 
to be a release for her soul from 'the wretched giant's bed of dogmas, which though 
painful, allowed for the turn to the 'truth offeeling' (GEL 1,162); while in 1874 she 
still insisted that 
the fellowship between man and man which has been the 
principle of development, social and moral, is not dependent on 
conceptions of what is not man: and that the idea of God, so far 
as it has been a high spiritual influence, is the ideal of goodness 
entirely human (GEL VI, 98). 
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Chapter Two - Eliot's Debate with her Intellectual Peers 
In 1840 George Eliot was steeped in the works of Carlyle, Mill and Coleridge, who had 
themselves questioned all certainties and now sought a head/heart unity (GEL 1,1839- 
42; Dodd 1990,75-78,81): 'a new theory of perception in which reason and intuition, 
intellect and emotions are merged' (Dodd 15). Several modem critics have examined 
George Eliot's work in the light of the head/heart struggle (Schneewind, 1965), but 
none has considered it in relation to the nature and function of sympathy and duty in the 
novels, or to how all may be related to personality and gender construction. The 
theorists I consider here have all been considered in relation to their influence on Eliot's 
novels; however, my project is distinct. Firstly, these theorists have rarely been 
examined for their stance on sympathy and duty in relation to conceptions of gender; 
secondly, few works on Eliot consider such a range of influences together, without a 
partisan approach. I am less concerned with arguing for the specific influence of any 
one theorist, than with observing what all may have contributed to Eliot's evolving 
concept of sympathy and duty and how their work influenced gender relations. Finally, 
I am looking for theories for fiction. Eliot does not accept the work of others 
uncritically, she challenges, deconstructs and recreates, thus generating different ways 
of seeing, different voices and different possibilities for viewing human psychology and 
gender. As she said herself 'the writers who have most profoundly influenced me ... 
are not in the least oracles to me ... [yet] inspiration has so quickened my faculties ... 
that I have been ready to make new combinations' (GEL 1,277). 
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Eliot met the Brays and Hennells, neighbours who were to accelerate her 
cultural and philosophical metamorphosis, in 1841. Bray's Philosophy of Necessity 
(1841) outlines his optimistic necessitarianist philosophy that human minds are 
controlled by inviolable laws in the same way that the laws of science control events. 
Following Priestley, he believes that it is man's duty to find out the natural laws and to 
then work with them to improve life for all, thus demonstrating that man is not 'innately 
damned, but only miseducated' (Postlethwaite 1984,121). Bray employs Benthamism, 
Priestley's Unitarian psychology and phrenology in support of his ideas. He hoped to 
grevise the Benthamite psychology of action' (Dodd 1990,85) which argues that 
freedom was not a matter of having free will, but involved the range of action open to 
an individual (85). From phrenology, Bray argued that our change and growth were 
governed by the characteristics which nature had bestowed, but which nevertheless 
could be further developed with education and stimulation 'Although man's behaviour 
is determined by his "mental constitution" and his "circumstances", he can reasonably 
educate himself to understand, and thus potentially to alter, his behaviour' 
(Postlethwaite 1984,127, quoting Bray). Reason could influence instinct, which for 
Bray was more than just self-interest, since it encompassed fellow-feeling for family 
and friends (Bray 1841,169). Since reason and emotion acting together could achieve 
the maximum self-determination, Bray believed that social reform along utilitarian lines 
would achieve the conditions to foster hope and the greatest possible development of 
reason and fellow feeling. From this, the maximum 'action' would be possible for each 
individual, and freedom could be exercised within the scope allowed by determinism. In 
encouraging these 'laws' and advocating fair and equal chances for all, Bray is raising 
morality to the rank of a science. 
41 
It was partly George Eliot's growing conviction of the need for social reform 
that attracted her to Bray's ideas. Postlethwaite also suggests that it is their 
consideration of intellect and emotion as mutually important that best unites Eliot and 
Bray (124). In addition, the idea of secular and scientific laws controlling our 
psychological, moral, and intellectual development was a continuation of the search for 
truth encountered in her reading from Coleridge to Carlyle. Whether rekindled by 
Spinoza, Comte or Darwin, her belief in inviolable laws is perhaps one of the most 
stable points in her work. Bray's belief in family and kin empathy, partly derived from 
Saint-Simonianism, was also important, but also involved his phrenological interest in 
benevolence, a quality which he was concerned to encourage. Thus an early influence 
presents a vision of the importance of duty and sympathy to Eliot. 
Charles Hennell's An Inquiry into the Origins of Christianity (183 8) was another 
major influence. Bray had cast doubt on the divine origin of Christianity, distressing his 
wife Cara, Hennell's sister. The search for evidence to confound Bray led to the 
publication of the Inquiry, which aimed to investigate the Gospels and separate truth 
from fiction, history from miracle. Hennell had assumed that the 'principal miraculous 
facts supposed to lie at the foundation of Christianity would be found to be 
impregnable' (Hennell M8, ill). However, he was forced to concede that the true 
accounts of the life of Jesus and the spread of Christianity could be accounted for by 
'the operation of human motives and feelings, acted upon by the peculiar circumstances 
of the age and country whence the religion originated' (Hennell 1838, iv). Hennell 
stresses that the excellence of the moral system and the beneficial influence of the 
Scriptures were still important, and suggest a way between sectarianism and loss of 
faith. The effect on Eliot was crucial, being one of many steps that led to her 
humanism, and prompting her to search for a new morality. She had already been 
42 
moving in this direction, so that the Brays and Hennells are not responsible for her 
change of mind. Yet they do influence a change of heart, for their friendship and 
reasoned fellow-feeling eased her state as an intellectual and emotional outsider. They 
also gave her the courage to follow her head and heart with regard to her own beliefs: 
... I say it now, and I say it once for all, that I am influenced in my own conduct at the 
present time by far higher considerations, and by a nobler idea of duty, than I ever was 
while I held the Evangelical beliefs"' (Svaglic, 150, quoting Cross). 
In early 1844, Eliot began work on a two-year translation of Friederich Strauss's 
Das Leben Jesu (The Life of Jesus: Critically Examined) (1835-6). Undoubtedly the 
project provided her with a sense of worth, which was otherwise lacking in her life. It 
was also a means of proving that she was capable of such a difficult and sustained task, 
and an outlet for ambition; she also sympathised with Strauss's struggle to bear witness 
to new beliefs and duties in the face of ignorance, intolerance and convention. An 
historical analysis of the Gospels, Straussýs work not only rejects their supernatural 
content but also disputes a great deal of their historical veracity; he even questioned the 
existence of the creative, personal, transcendental God. Strauss adopts a "mythological 
interpretation' (Craig 1998,164) believing that the Gospel writers added the miracles 
forecast in the Old Testament to the myth-history of Christ the man. The text was not 
as accessible as Hennell's, or as comforting, and Eliot struggled: 'I am never pained 
when I think Strauss right, but in many cases I think him wrong' (GEL 1,203). Strauss 
was unsparing. He did not compensate by outlining the worthy human history of 
Christ's life as teacher, or the benefits of Christian ethics. Her conviction emerged that 
Strauss forgot the essence of Christianity. In particular, he forgot people; he failed to 
analyse the human dimension of belief, the importance of stories, and the mere idea of 
wish-fulfilment. Eliot also disliked his Hegelian approach and particularly the notion of 
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the "'transcendental spirit of collective mind"' (Hesse, 36-7, quoting Strauss) with 
Christ as 'God-man' - filled with divine spirit but also a man of genius. Nevertheless, 
the work contributed to Eliot's moral and intellectual evolution, and held particular 
relevance for her future writing career, introducing her to hermeneutics as a tool for 
fiction, particularly for the psychology of swaying the reader. Meanwhile, the spiritual 
pain she felt caused her conviction that sympathy was necessary - from the theorist - for 
the readers who were being deprived of their belief Finally, Strauss's Hegelian 
influences led to his notion of the mythus, which 'indicated the way in which subjective 
perception transformed objective facts into literature' (Dodd, 92). Both Hennell and 
Strauss found the Gospels beautiful, poetic and literary, suggesting that 'it was qua 
literature that the gospels were able to inspire men to moral excellence' (Dodd, 93). 
Possibly such a suggestion accelerated Eliot's desire to write fiction, her aim being to 
to emulate the Gospels in encouraging benevolence and duty. 
Benedict (Baruch) de Spinoza (1632-1677), the foremost exponent of 
seventeenth-century rationalism, may seem an unusual mentor for the young George 
Eliot, yet she first read his work in January 1843 (Haight 1, xxiii). While Spinoza's 
influence on Eliot was early, lacked an immediate form of expression, and occurred 
when we have few letters and no journal comments with which to asseoits impact, it was 
nevertheless profound and should not be neglected. Spinoza was concerned with man's 
knowledge and the understanding of those inviolable laws that were already so 
important to Eliot. Further, it was once more 'a thinker who tried to reconcile opposing 
modes of enquiry who attracted Marian Evans's attention' (Dodd 1990,95). By 
February 1843 Eliot had begun a translation, probably of the Tractatus Theologico- 
Polificus (1670). She recommenced it in 1849 when her father was dying, while in 
January 1844 she translated portions of Ethica (1677) (Karl 1995,74). Later, while 
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with Lewes in Weimar in 1854, and on their return to England, she produced a complete 
translation of the Dhica. The reasons why Spinoza's ideas would attract Eliot are 
legion. He defended freedom of thought, advocated a form of democracy and, above 
all, his was 'the moral system of the philosopher whose chief distinction was to embrace 
determinism while persuasively showing the possibility of - and indeed the necessity for 
- moral sympathy and social duty' (Ashton 1983,15). 
In May 1? 43, Lewes published an essay on Spinoza in the Westminster Review, 
eventually to become a chapter in his Biographical History ofPhilosophy (1902 [1845- 
6]). Thus Eliot and Lewes were simultaneously yet independently enthusiastic about 
Spinoza: 'mental sympathy existed before their lives converged' (Dodd, 1990,142). 
George Eliot possibly experienced a sympathetic and imaginative identification with 
Spinoza, for Lewes's florid account of Spinoza as pilloried and ostracised by his own 
religion and community for expressing his beliefs mirrored her own experience when 
father and family rejected her. Tolerance and acceptance of outsiders were major 
aspects of Spinoza's doctrine, and of its appeal for Eliot. Overall she believed that this 
complex and easily misread work required a full analysis and estimate of the author's 
life and oeuvre. Having been greatly moved by his work, she wished to render him 
accurate and accessible, with his ethical message clear. 
Spinoza lived, and was educated in the Jewish faith, in Amsterdam. He was 
excommunicated, possibly for the publication of the Traclatus Theologico-Politicus, 
and refusing all bribes to recant he withdrew into austerity and scholarly labour. 
Denounced as an atheist, Spinoza was a forerunner of German higher criticism. His 
philosophical works lay neglected until Lessing, Goethe, Coleridge, and German 
Biblical critics such as Strauss began his rehabilitation. Spinoza wished to make 
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everything intelligent to human reason so all could achieve the joy and freedom that 
results from knowledge. In this alone he is an exponent of both benevolence and duty. 
He is often classed as a Cartesian, despite his opposition to most of Descartes' 
principles; Descartes was seeking to improve science and thereby increase human 
control over nature, while Spinoza wished to explain truth and knowledge and thereby 
improve human beings by explaining that they are Nature. His philosophy of 
knowledge and blessedness for all was intoxicating for Eliot, who craved knowledge, a 
new moral system, and a path to God and joy which lay outside conventional Christian 
worship. 
There is a dearth of work concerning both Spinoza's ethical theory and its 
influence on Eliot's work. In George Eliot and Spinoza, Dorothy Atkins notes that 
George Eliot is lauded as a 'philosopher-novelist' (1978,1) yet Spinoza's influence on 
her is virtually ignored by other critics. The philosopher Garrett also emphasises that 
recent research on Spinoza has not done justice to his actual ethics, concentrating 
instead on his metaphysics, epistemology, and social and political theory (1996,269). 
Ethics and the search for the "'right way of livine' were Splnozaýs major concerns 
(268, quoting Spinoza), and the Ethics is his most studied work. However, it is the 
geometrical method which is researched, and the work is rarely studied as a statement 
of ethics to live by. The logical truth of mathematics was there to guarantee the truth of 
his philosophy for Spinoza, proving its basic axioms. Yet, despite the Euclidian 
geometry, the underlying ethics are still powerful. His earlier and unfinished Treatise 
on the Emendation of the Intellect (Tractalus de Intellectus Emendatione) (1677) 
outlines the ethical argument overshadowed by the geometrical method in the Ethics. 
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Spinoza's ethical system is based on the central tenet that all reality is explained 
by a single philosophical system, and that if humans can reach full understanding of this 
system they can acquire complete happiness. His doctrine is for humans to understand 
every possible aspect of life, cease being afraid once fears and evils are explained, and 
then take control of their lives and achieve joy, looking beyond earthly life. Spinoza's 
two main aims were to explain, and to explain rationally and truthfully, and explanation 
involved demonstrating that everything is determined by the inviolable laws of nature. 
He wants humans to achieve a way of life that 'transcends merely transitory desires and 
which has as its natural consequences autonomous control over the passions and 
participation in an eternal blessedness" (Garrett, 268). 4 The first step towards 
transcendence is understanding man's oneness with God, and that all creation, humans, 
nature, everything, are one entity, which is Substance, 'the fundamental essence of the 
universe' (Atkins 1978,8). Spinoza's God is not omnipotent like the theistic God of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, who renders humans passive, afraid, and unable to be active 
and strive for understanding, knowledge and freedom. Spinoza's God is himself 
creation and must follow the inviolable laws that govern creation / Substance. 
Therefore, the Ethics begins with an account of the most fundamental 'being' God or 
Substance (Spinoza 1981,9-12). For humans, the outcome of this full explanation and 
awareness should be growth and change, an appreciation of our temporal and finite 
earthly existence, and a rejoicing in our eternal existence as part of Substance. Man's 
main false knowledge is the arrogant belief that we are the centre of the universe and 
can control nature. This misunderstanding causes all evil, greed, anger, and jealousy, 
because humans conduct relations on the premise that they are of primary importance. 
4 En-narth describes how Spinoza devalued 'purpose' (1985(b), 34) and that ideally activity should be 
without purpose. Here, purpose corresponds to transitory material desires and pursuits, and desire for 
recognition, which are to be transcended. Ermarth's 'purpose' should not be confused with self- 
preservation, which Spinoza thought to be our main duty, 
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Intellect and adequate knowledge are required before humans can attain the 
freedom and happiness that Spinoza advocates. He describes three different types of 
knowledge: the first is derived solely from sensory perceptions, experience, opinions, 
hearsay and 'imagination' (Atkins, 59) or 'fancy'. Because it is confused and 
disorganised, this is 'inadequate' knowledge, especially if relied upon without reason. 
Belief in the supernatural and other irrational ideas stem from inadequate knowledge. 
However, training the imagination and empowering the intellect (Garrett, 307) are part 
of Spinoza's project, so that 'adequate" knowledge may result. The second type of 
knowledge is pure reason, which is 'adequate' and based on ordered simple ideas, 
common notions, and deductions of cause from effect. The third type of knowledge, 
which is also adequate, is reasoned intuition. The last two types of knowledge can give 
us accurate information and understanding; they can be relied on and are to be 
encouraged. However, the third type of knowledge is not attached to the intellect but is 
intuited, or directly felt: it is the 'scientia intuitiva, which simultaneously grasped 
isolated specifics and the totality of existence' (Dodd, 95). This knowledge corresponds 
to the combination of knowledge, reason, and emotions - particularly sympathetic 
imagination - as described by Hume and Smith, and is, I contend, illustrated by Eliot in 
her Riehl essay as that flash of sympathetic intuition which the artist may produce in 
people (Eliot 1992,263). Such prominence and importance given to the feelings 
coupled with reason as part of knowledge is fundamental to George Eliot's increasing 
concern with a head/heart balance. 
Although we derive all our initial knowledge from sensory perception, 
observation and imagination, this knowledge is inadequate, and the outcome may be 
what Spinoza calls bondage. Humans who stay tied to their observable life, not wishing 
to know of the wider universe and their own true selves, are in bondage. They think 
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they are free because they are aware of their own actions, but they know nothing of the 
real causes (Atkins, 52). A lack of intellect, or of access to knowledge results in, or 
maintains bondage, as does the inability to modify the effects of bondage. Humans have 
a limited amount of power and are often beset by outside elements which are stronger 
than they. Bondage may even be chosen, or the finite objects to which emotions are 
attached may exercise control: such bondage ranges from being controlled by another 
human, as Gwendolen is by Grandcourt, or being worked upon by valued possessions, 
such as Mrs Tulliver with her china. Such outside forces may induce passions that can 
impede the perception of what is good, or our ability to follow good (Garrett, 274). For 
Spinoza, a major part of obtaining knowledge includes how to control the passions. 
When adequate forms of knowledge are available, chosen, and practised, then 
understanding and growth to freedom is possible. If a state of complete knowledge is 
obtained, Spinoza terms it "'blessedness"' - to him it is the ultimate freedom 'existing 
solely from the necessity of one's own nature, uncompelled by any external nature' 
(Atkins, 10). Living happily and well, in knowledge and in freedom is the greatest 
reward, Although punishment exists, it is not conceived by Spinoza as a form of 
damnation but the inability to live in harmony With the rest of existence (Atkins, 46). 
Eliot believed that "'learning is only so far valuable as it serves to enlarge and enlighten 
the bounds of conscience... (GEL 1,107, n3), while her novels 'dramatize this human 
urge to achieve liberating understanding' (Atkins, 10). However, she is as concerned 
with the characters that do not reason adequately or cannot live in harmony, and her 
novels follow their fates while exhorting us to sympathy, as with Hetty or Bulstrode. 
It is often assumed that in a determined world moral responsibility is not 
possible. However, Spinoza believes that if we have gained freedom, from adequate 
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knowledge, then it is possible to achieve moral responsibility and self-determination. 
Even arriving at this stage presupposes some ability to change our lives within the limits 
available, choosing between different destinies by using adequate knowledge. 
Admittedly, Spinoza suggests that much of what controls our choices, and even the 
growth to understanding and adequate knowledge that allows choice, is determined. 
However, he is not a fatalist: 'His view is not that the same events would occur whether 
we acted or not, but rather that the causal determination of what we do contributes to the 
causal determination of what events will occur' (Gar-rett, 298), which 1 believe to 
largely explain the idea of the 'inviolable law of consequences. Neither does Spinoza 
believe that free will is about choosing to be good or evil; he thinks that we can 
sometimes freely do good, but evil is never freely chosen since we are always played 
upon by external causes. Thus reason would counsel love for those who do good, but 
lack of hate or indignation for those who do bad. 
Another foundation of Spinoza's ethics is that all humans - all modes or things - 
possess conalus, or a drive to preserve themselves. They constantly strive to persevere 
in their existence; and their striving is their essence. Conatus is the major virtue, with 
suicide something that Spinoza could not approve of or understand, for self-preservation 
is a duty, and therefore self-sacrifice can never be right - or be a duty. I believe this to 
be a tenet Eliot acquired from Spinoza. It may explain why she was less self-sacrificing 
after her obligation to her father ended, and why, as I will illustrate, self-sacrifice in the 
novels is never condoned. The primary emotions - pleasure, pain and desire - are 
central to self-preservation. The passions are the more primitive drives which promote 
passivity and pain, while emotions are active ideas derived from adequate thought; they 
promote perfection. When we blame our actions on external factors it rather is our 
inability to control both our passions and the effect of external stimuli on them that are 
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at fault. Some critics have misread Spinoza as rejecting emotions, but they are lauded 
as promoting activity and encouraging conalus - only the passions are opposed because 
they lead to bondage. Increased adequate knowledge allows us to understand and 
oppose the passions, and once understood a passion ceases to have any hold over us. 
One of the moral dilemmas that Eliot explores in the novels occurs when emotions, 
which originate with our basic drive for self-preservation and are necessary and good, 
are not controlled and contained by reason and become passions instead, as with Mr 
Tulliver or Caterina Sarti. 
The experience of an emotion is very different from one person to another and 
may arouse different degrees of pleasure or pain in different humans. Such a 
consideration of the relative nature of our emotions is quite remarkable and offers 
another example of Spinoza being ahead of his time. George Eliot's understanding of 
this relativism is crucial in the representation of opposing emotions in her novels. At 
the end of Part III of the Ethics Spinoza lists emotions and passions whose infinite 
varieties exercise him in a study of human psychology (1589,127-35). He distinguishes 
between them and isolates positive emotions such as joy, from negative passions such 
as sadness. Vice is defined as any depression of the vitality of life, while virtue is 
anything that promotes activity, pleasure and freedom. Power and virtue are the same 
for Spinoza, in that man can take control of his life (Atkins 1978,78). 
The awareness Spinoza demonstrates of the complexity of the emotions and 
feelings is stunning, and not matched by philosophers or psychologists until Freud. His 
cure for man's inadequate knowledge, for his excusing and rationalising his behaviour 
and for blaming external causes, is to make man more self-conscious of his Conatus, and 
understand the self, accept the inner causes, understand the laws of nature, and own 
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responsibility. Spinoza suggests that as we gradually know more we will understand 
that many of the inexplicable causes of things are the laws of nature that we do not yet 
know. For example, there will be causal explanations for all illness, disease and 
disturbing behaviour (Hampshire, 121). There is also a general encouragement towards 
compassion and benevolence - as understanding - which is a part of duty, for duty is 
self-preservation and these aspects of duty assist life. Spinoza concludes that positive 
emotions form the source of true human activity towards self-preservation and can be 
summed up as ! fortitudo' or 'strength of character'. Fortitudo is divided into two 
aspects, 'tenacity (animosilas), which is the "desire by which each one strives, solely 
from the dictate of reason, to preserve his being"; and nobility or (generositas), which is 
"the desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men 
and join them to him in friendship... (Garrett, 272, quoting the Ethics). Thus, there is an 
in-built benevolence to Spinoza's creed, even if it receives little attention, and he is 
constantly exhorting benevolence. 
The emotions play a major part in affecting the degree of activity involved in 
self-preservation. Joy (laelitia) increases the capacity for activity, or perfection, while 
sadness (Iristilia) decreases perfection (or the capacity for being active) (Garrett 271-2). 
Part of what achieves joy is striving for knowledge and freedom. George Eliot's 
heroines, such as Dorothea and Romola, achieve self-preservation, freedom, and are 
active in the lives they choose, so in Spinoza's sense they achieve happiness. Spinoza 
thought some emotions, such as sympathy, have active and passive aspects. If nothing 
active can come of the sympathy, then such a passive emotion is not useful, and may 
even cause harm. For example, if an atrocity is observed but no aid can be offered, the 
sympathetic response experienced by the observer is useless according to Spinoza. The 
sympathy is only useful if accompanied by action, such as averting suffering. I believe 
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Eliot's opinion differs, for Spinoza ignores the beneficial effect of sympathy on the 
observer. Even if they cannot assist, they have experienced, understood and developed, 
and may be able to help another time. Eliot's readers are in the same position, and she 
would-have them learn from her fictions and take their sympathy out into the world, for 
sympathy is never useless. 
Spinoza suggests that beings strive to overcome external threats and make 
internal modifications that assist in self-preservation. Maintaining external and internal 
equilibrium becomes a central tenet for survival with Spencer, Darwin and biologists. 
Living in communities is a survival tactic, for 'community virtue' is achieved through 
the good actions and intelligence of individuals (Atkins 83); also it hopefully promotes 
tolerance for we all have a self to preserve. The importance of community in Eliot's 
work has prompted Bernard Paris is to judge that for her the "'objective basis of 
morality is other men.. and cites Feuerbach as the main influence. However, Spinoza 
had written long before that "'the most important thing to man is other men .. (Atkins, 
12, quoting Paris and Spinoza). 
Consideration of community life leads to the question of altruism versus self- 
interest. To explain altruism Spinoza has to explain how conatus or self-preservation 
can be directed to the well-being of others. He does not deny the phenomenon of 
altruism, but is committed to the view that 'the causal origins of these phenomena 
always lie in a single psychological force, which is the individual's own endeavour for 
his or her own self-preservation' (Garrett, 303). While still praising generositas, 
Spinoza sees the intellect and the imagination (fancy) as two separate faculties. If the 
well-being of another is the focus of our actions of self-preservation, then for Spinoza 
such altruism only acts through inadequate knowledge and results in passivity. It is 
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quite different when the intellect, via the reason, directs our conatus to help others: it 
does so through recognition that the true advantage of individuals largely coincides. 
The reason perceives that the same things will be beneficial to all, and Spinoza views 
such altruism with favour. Acting from virtue, acting under the guidance of reason, and 
acting in our own self-interest are equivalent in Spinoza's doctrine, and thus feelings 
can contribute and be as important as reason - it is how they are judged and valued, 
using adequate or inadequate knowledge, that is the important distinction for Spinoza. 
In situations where complete coincidence of interests does not occur, do we help 
ourselves or aid others at a sacrifice to ourselves? Spinoza argues that self-sacrifice 
cannot be good, nor is it the result of reason or virtue, and must result from being 
overcome by passion. He identifies certain types of 'self-sacrifice' at a pre-rational 
level, such as parenting and sexual sacrifice for the species, and helping another of the 
species when overcome by sympathy, even to the detriment of oneself. For the first, 
more recent philosophers suggest species preservation to be the explanation. For the 
second, Spinoza suggests that the observer is affected in the same way as the one 
suffering; a suggestion approximating to the ideas of sympathy put forward by Hume 
and Smith. 
Finally, Spinoza rarely writes in terms of obligation. There are also few 
negatives, little talk of sin, or wrong. His ethical propositions do not exhort or entreat 
but evaluate using such positive terms as virtue, joy, happiness, and freedom (Garrett, 
285-6). There is little 'duty' other than striving for self-preservation, which 
automatically involves freedom and joy, and even generositas or benevolence. He 
acknowledged the need for some system of law and order, but held that punishments by 
elected powers need be done out of duty, not hate or indignation. Unfortunately, as 
with many of the theorists whom Eliot studied, Spinoza is yet another who does not 
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consider women equal. He rarely discusses women, but in the Tractatus Politicus he 
argues that democracy cannot be extended to them, as they are not independent but 
subject to their menfolk, like children (Spinoza 1958,443). He further insists that this 
inferior position is due to nature and not mere convention, for history has demonstrated 
that women are always inferior to men, weak in intellectual and moral power, and 
therefore not eligible to rule in any way (443-4). As an embodiment of how wrong he 
could be, Eliot repeatedly presents women characters who are vastly superior to their 
male counterparts, such as Mary Garth. 
Aspects of Spinoza's influence reverberate through Eliot's life and work 
synchronously with her many other influences. In discussing Basil Willey's choice of 
Feuerbach as Eliot's major mentor, Dorothy Atkins argues strongly that Spinoza fits the 
model far better (12). While I am interested in Spinoza's general influence, and how he 
contributes to the make-up of Eliot's creed, I do agree that he has been neglected and 
plays a vital role in Eliot's conception of sympathy. 
it is not known when Eliot first read Comte whose influence upon her may 
parallel that of Spinoza during the 1840s. A possible awareness dates from 1843 with 
her first reading of J. S. Mill's System of Logic (1843) (Postlethwaite 1984,27& 43), 
which she reread and referred to throughout her life (GEL 1,310,363; IV, 233; V, 163). 
She may also have read articles on Comte during this period; David Brewster's review 
for the Edinburgh Review appeared in July 1838, and Lewes wrote several pieces 
(Lewes 1843 (a); (b); 1844), crediting Comte with the most influential work of the 
century. In the wake of the secular and scientific attack on Christianity, many 
intellectuals required an alternative belief system, and the humanism of Positivism had a 
major impact, substituting a science of society for religious belief. By 1851 Eliot's 
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review of Mackay's Progress of the Intellect refers knowingly to Positive ideology 
(Eliot 1992,18), and by 1852, she may have read the Cours de Philosophie Positive 
(Course in Positive Philosophy) (183042) and the Catichisme Positive, although her 
journal mentions reading the Catechisme in October 1859 (GEJ 1998,81). As she was 
soon Lewes's companion, she would know of other works as they appeared. A letter to 
Charles Bray in 1853 is assumed to suggest a Comtean influence: 'I begin to feel for 
other people's wants and sorrows a little more than I used to do. Heaven help us! said 
the old religions - the new one, from its very lack of that faith, will teach us all the more 
to help one another' (GEL 11,82). 
Positivism was a synthesis of many disparate ideas. In an age of fragmentation 
Comte appeared to reconcile opposites -a by now standard attraction for Eliot. His 
work is considered to fall into two distinct phases, the earlier Course in Positive 
p1jilosophy, and the SyslJme dc Politique Positive (System of Positive Polity) (1875-7 
[18514]). However, recent commentators admit a considerable overlap (Hesse 1995, 
64), which is quite apparent when the works are read closely. The aim of the Cours is 
to demonstrate the existence and continued discovery of the 'Invariable natural Law? 
(Comte 1853 [183042], 5) which control all branches of knowledge and life. The 
solution to man's problems lay not vAth politics and institutions, but VAth a disciplining 
of human opinions, behaviour and customs in line with these laws. Comte rejected a 
Rousseauan society based around autonomous individuals, freedom and equality, 
emphasising instead an organicism of society and family, with relations defined by an 
ethics informed by reason and feelings. A system by which these ethics could be 
reinforced was required. 
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John Stuart Mill, an early admirer of Comte, rewrote much of his System of 
Logic because of the influence of early Positivism. Although he and Comte were to 
disagree, Mill retained great sympathy for Positivism and influenced Lewes whose 
articles on Positivism and The Biographical History of Philosophy (1902), present 
Positive philosophy as a doctrine of unity. However, by 1852 Lewes was disenchanted, 
although he later claimed that the influence of one who was very dear to him - assumed 
to be George Eliot - had persuaded him to view Comte's work as a Utopia rather than a 
doctrine. By 1852, George Eliot had also persuaded Herbert Spencer to read Comte. 
Spencer reveals how much 'Positivism was discussed in the Chapman circle and how 
Marian Evans and Lewes were in the vanguard of the movement' (Dodd 1990,177). 
The primary tenet of the Cours is that all humans and all states of knowledge 
have evolved through theological, metaphysical and positivist stages of thought. This 
law of three phases was the basis of all intellectual., emotional and social development 
as a progressive dialectical history, and one repeated in any individual's and nation's 
development. The second major tenet is the hierarchical structure of knowledge. 
Although every branch of knowledge must pass through the three stages in its growth 
and evolution, the progression is not simultaneous; thus some disciplines are more 
'Positive' than others - as are some individuals, nations or races. Lewes gives the 
example of meteorology as still at the supernatural or metaphysical stage, with prayers 
still offered for min (1902,649). Mathematics was the most fundamental discipline and 
all remaining sciences were arranged according to how they build on the preceding 
sciences; and how well their 'laws' are known and understood. Comte's classification 
of sociology as a science was revolutionary; thus extending scientific method to 'the 
fields of History, Politics and Morals' (Willey 1949,188). Ultimately all social 
questions are scientific questions and can be explained and measured by these natural 
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laws. Psychology is absent from Comte's list; he considered it a branch of both biology 
and sociology and one that, concerned solely with reason and intellect, did not take 
sufficient account of the feelings. Mill considered this neglect of psychology a major 
error (1865,62-3). 
In 1842, Lewes lamented that of the Cours 'the chapters relating to science 
alone have been read; while those more important chapters on social science, to which 
the former are but preparatory, have been neglected' (1902,643), which is still true of 
much critical discussion. A close examination of Book V of Volume I, which deals 
with biology, and the whole of Volume II which is devoted to sociology - or 'social 
physics' - reveals much relating to sympathy and duty. Evolution is central to both the 
biological and sociological histories, but, unlike Darwin Comte saw evolutionary 
development as progressive, citing Lamarck - with reservations - to support his ideas of 
gradual improvement through the inheritance of advantageous features. He did not 
accept Lamarck's theory of constant mutability, or the notion that species were still 
impermanent and had given rise to each other, but he did agree that slow gradual 
changes could occur (1853 [1830-42], 1,413-15). Comte therefore suggested that social 
perfection was possible for humanity, a condition that could be hastened once social 
laws were understood. Acquired characteristics could be passed on, particularly if they 
were reinforced in life. Eliot's hopes for a slow, gradual meliorism, rather than 
revolution, found support in this doctrine. 
Comte was further influenced by Franz Joseph Gall (1759-1828) who claimed to 
explain man's nature and morality, suggesting laws that resided in the feelings. Comte 
'believed the intellect alone could not discover truth, for " the heart is necessary to 
prompt the chief inspirations of the intellect, and it must also be put to service to 
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understand the results of intellectual enquiry"' (Dodd, 115, quoting Comte). Gall 
identified the cortex as the organ of intelligence, noting that its larger size and surface 
area permitted greater intelligence. More important was his assumption of hereditary 
intellectual and moral characteristics, which complemented Lamarck's work. Gall 
believed he had located various 'organs' for moral and intellectual 'faculties' at 
individual sites in the brain, and identified the 'organs' of benevolence, adhesiveness, 
amativeness, and so on. From this work, phrenology originated, for Gall considered 
that the faculties of the brain influenced the shape of the bone, so that a reading of the 
contours of. the skull disclosed how well developed the faculties were. Gall believed 
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that men were innately mediocre, but that his science could be used to educate, improve, 
and even perfect them, by developing or repressing certain faculties as required. 
Influenced by Lamarck, he developed the possibility that improvements encouraged 
during life could be transmitted to the next generation. Reformers such as Comte 
adopted his theory, for it presents man as malleable and capable of improving. Comte 
therefore modified his stance and some of the 'inviolable laws' became malleable. 
Gall's work gave rise to various gender-specific statements that Positivism 
amplified, for example that men are more intellectual because their brains are larger, 
while women have better developed regions of benevolence, adhesiveness and 
philoprogenitiveness (love of children) than man and so are suited for nurturing and 
dealing with social relationships (Russett 1989,19). From this Comte talks constantly 
of women's altruism, maintaining that they are innately sympathetic. 'Altruisme' in 
French derives from the Italian 'altrui" meaning 'of or to anotherý or 'what is anotherY, 
and Comte's 1830 coining meant 'devotion to the welfare of others, regard for the other 
as a principle of action; opposed to egoism or selfishness' (OED, 1989). Interestingly, 
Comte's altruism stresses a lack of egotism, but does not initially demand the welfare of 
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others to the detriment of the self. Yet it was the growing demand for selflessness that 
Mill feared in Comte's later work. Comte suggests that the affections had developed 
within the family to control all base instincts and that altruism was originally extended 
to all, as social interaction developed. The development of 'individuality' disrupted this 
process; thus for Comte, modem civilisation was atrophying altruism and encouraging 
egoism. 
The Positivist stage would arrive once the underlying laws governing social 
physics were fully known (1853 [183042], 11,74), but in advance of this Comte 
formulated his first 'certainties' concerning the major attributes of human nature. 
Firstly, the essential ideas of our human nature are fixed by the preponderance of the 
affective over the intellectual faculties (11,128). Secondly, as man is not strong he 
must use his intellect, but sociality has to be developed for all to help each other, as 
most are not sufficiently intellectual. Further, the personal affects are stronger than the 
social ones, so that it is the latter which need to be developed if the common welfare is 
to flourish. More intellectual and sympathetic development will assist the social instinct 
to grow (11,131-3) with the groundwork for both being done in the family, where we 
are educated to be social. Comte considered any attempts to disrupt the family as 
signals of social decay (11,132). These certainties Comte still considered immutable. 
With hindsight, Mill described this system as spiritual despotism, with Comte dictating 
not directing behaviour. Comte considered equality to be revolutionary and dangerous 
(Mill 1865,78), and allowed no personal liberty whatsoever, seeing it as inconsistent 
with the laws of society; in fact, obeying the laws was liberty (Comte 1858 [1852], 228- 
9). This moral policing implied unanimity over moral issues, yet this was not possible 
until the Positive stage had been fully realised (Mill 1865,06). 
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The Syst6me de Politique Positive appeared during 1851-54. In his first phase of 
work, Comte had argued that study and understanding could lead to morality, but since 
then he had met and fallen in love with Clotilde de Vaux. When she died in 1845 
Comte nearly lost the will to live. His experience fixed love, duty and altruism as 
paramount for humanity's progress, with woman now elevated to Madonna status. The 
Systame was written to expound a newly developed doctrine - the Religion of Humanity 
- which further elevated feeling over reason and 
held love and service to others to be 
the major guiding principles: 'In the treatment of social questions Positive science will 
be found utterly to discard those proud illusions of the supremacy of reason, to which it 
had been liable during its preliminary stages' (Comte 1848,10). In order to ensure the 
continued progress of altruism, Comte's Systýme dictated how all life was to be lived. A 
philosophic and scientific priesthood consisting of the greatest minds in all the subjects 
comprised the intellectual guides. Their powers were to be upheld by the moral 
influence of women. Now that intellect was once more subordinate to the heart, women 
could assume their place on the pedestal of emotion, and exercise their moral force over 
all. The capitalists were to be the material providence, while the majority of the people 
would do the work and be the general, or active, providence. Rank and function were 
only to be preserved until spiritual power was established and then merit would dictate 
rank - although little in the works suggests how such changes would ever take place. 
Every possible aspect of life was dictated to re-assert the reign of the emotions, as 
'Positivism now turns to the task of devising "a system which regulates the whole 
course of our private and public existence, by bringing Feeling, Reason and Activity 
into permanent harmony"' (Willey 1949,196, quoting Comte). 
The political climate in 1851 led Comte to think that the time had come to 
'direct the thoughts of women and working man to the question of a thorough 
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renovation of the social order' (Comte, 1858 [1852], 134) - hence The Catichisme 
Positive (1858 [1852]) was produced as a guide for women. It is in the form of a 
dialogue between a woman and a Positivist priest, for since knowing Clotilde, Comte 
has become 'a twofold organ' for Humanity (Comte, 1858 [1852], 19) - that is, he can 
now speak for women. Comte's inflexibility is most evident in his attitude to women 
and working men. If George Eliot's novels concentrate on the extension of sympathy, 
the groups she considers most are women and "ordinary people". While these are not 
Riehl's or Comte's peasants or working classes, many are nevertheless a developed 
English equivalent, such as Eppie, Adam, Hetty, Bob Jakin, and Felix. Comte's 
seeming concern for women and 'ordinary people' may well have acted as another 
catalyst for Eliot's initial interrogation of Positivism, yet his remarks in the Cours were 
ominous. Of working men he declares that Positivist Philosophy is best suited to 
&ameliorate the condition of this majority, without destroying its classification, and 
disturbing the general economy... (thus] regulating the final classification of modem 
society'. Instead, reorganisation and peace are to be achieved by 'habitually interposing 
a common moral authority between the working classes and the leaders of society' 
(Comte 185ý tl880421,11,48). This proposal does not suggest a radical change in the 
rprogress' of the lower classes. In the Cat&hisme Comte says that if the worker is in 
need of some new ideas, he 'must go again to the priesthood for them. He must not 
interrupt his industrial action by a vain attempt at scientific cultivation' (Comte 1858 
[1852], 275). 1 do not think Adam Bede or Felix Holt would observe this. Yet, 
paradoxically, Comte believed that working men needed 'Emancipation from obsolete 
beliefs and a sufficient amount of mental culture' (1880 [1848], 136). Mostdisturbing, 
when discussing 'humanity', Comte declares that people must be 'whole' and capable 
of assimilation, hence we can ignore those "'born upon the earth merely to manure it"' 
for 'these mere digesting machines are no real part of Humanity' (1858 [1852], 74 -5, 
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quoting Aristotle). It is not clear to whom he was referring here, but it would be 
interesting to know Eliot's response as she read her Catichisme. 
Meanwhile, Comte considered that white, middle and upper-class woman had 
reached the pedestal of development. The task of Positivism was to prevent regression, 
while encouraging working-class women to aspire to the situation of their superior 
sisters: 'the law of social progression ... consists in disengaging women more and more 
from all employment which is foreign to their domestic functions' (1853 [183042], H, 
292). Initially Comte describes woman as wholly subordinate. In the Cours he insists 
that the conditions of marriage will be 'the natural subordination of the woman, which 
has reappeared under all forms of marriage, and worse, that 'biological analysis 
presents the female sex ... as constitutionally in a state of perpetual infancy', while 
(social science will show their equality is incompatible with their separate special and 
permanent functions' (11,135). This is Comte again predicting the outcome of social 
laws as yet unknown. 
in the Catichisme Comte has become less dismissive of women, no doubt 
mellowed by the influence of Clotilde. Despite Eliot's admiration for Comte's 
eagerness to promote sympathy, it is unlikely that she accepted his attitudes to women. 
Many of her women characters rebel against imposed gender roles, despite the resulting 
pain and disruption. Alcharisi pursues her vocation, Romola, an intellectual, becomes 
head of her household, Mary Garth writes books, Dorothea remarries, and Hetty and 
Rosamund are sad lapses from innate womanhood, variously killing their babies. One 
wonders what Mrs Poyser would have to say to Comte, since while she may not work 
outside the home, she contributes much of its income. Women are educated under 
Comte's system - some critics seem to think they are excluded - and have the same 
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education as men, but schooling stops at twenty-one (Comte, 1858 [1852], 293) and 
they do not experience the vocational stage 'for their vocation is always known and 
happily is uniform' (132). Finally, women are denied individual 'incorporation'; that is, 
they are not praised after their death in the manner that ensures their eternal memory on 
Earth (137) except via their husband's incorporation. Consequently, perhaps Eliot was 
being arch - if not subversive - when she contributed '0 may I join the Choir Invisible 
Of those immortal dead who live again' to the London Positivist group. 
in the General View (1848), Comte does suggest a means of combining 
women's domestic role with a wider social influence by suggesting 'Positive salons, 
which are remarkably similar to the ones Eliot praises in her 'Woman in France' essay 
(1992,37-68). Here is 'the mode in which women can with propriety participate in 
public life ... women 
in their salons will promote active and fiiendly intercourse between 
all three classes ... 
Gently and without effort a moral control will thus be established' 
(1880 [18481,171). Comte's argument for restricting women was because their 'most 
important duty ... 
is to form and perfect man' (137), by which the family and society 
would grow to greater sympathy. Comte even recommends idealising and worshipping 
women as 'guardian angels' (Wright 1982,36). This is an impossible role to sustain, 
and one that compares to Feuerbach's deconstruction of why man has created a perfect 
being, God, to compensate for his lack of perfection. Overall, Comte's readers were 
misled. Because he talks of improving man and society, and of change and growth 
through his equal education system; and because women are relatively raised and 
praised, with sympathy and the caring virtues lauded, and altruism encouraged, Comte's 
doctrines appear radical yet benevolent. Yet women are to be exploited as a sympathy 
resource, while he regards many working people as plebeians beyond improvement. All 
are themes strongly countered in Eliotýs novels. 
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In The Subjection of Women (1869), Mill disputed Comte's contention that 
woman's nature was immutable and innate, and that they lived entirely for others and in 
their affections (Wright, 47-8). He further insists that an adequate psychology is 
required before the differences between the sexes can be understood (Millet 1972,127). 
Certainly George Eliot exceeded the limited education that Comte allowed women, he 
being concerned only to educate the mothers of sons. In 1840, Eliot had read 'Woman's 
Mission' (Lewis, 183 0), an originally anonymous abridged translation of De Peducation 
des meres de Jamille, ou de la civilisation du genre humain par les femmes (183 7), by 
Louis Aimd-Martin, a Saint-Simonian. The work recommends improved education for 
women if they are to be good mothers and wives. Eliot initially approved and was soon 
quoting and recommending the original (GEL 1,66,70,107). The 'Woman's Mission' 
cult of the mid-Victorian period had a powerful influence, and for many such as Eliot it, 
and Saint-Simonianism, led to Comte's work. This level of sentiment is one that Eliot 
skilfully subverts in several of her essays. She wanted more for women, and her 
journalistic voice of a man to men is a strategic ploy to win converts, as in 'Margaret 
Fuller and Mary Wollstonecraft' where s/he advocates women's education for its own 
sake, stating that 'some of the best things [Fuller] says are on the folly of absolute 
definitions of woman's nature and absolute demarcations of womanýs mission. ' (Eliot 
1992,183) - hardly a Comtean sentiment. 
Comte does not really engage with the idea of man becoming altruistic. He 
considers men unable to extend care and sympathy beyond their immediate domestic 
bounds, although its encouragement is part of woman's role. Morals are simpler to 
women than social rules, because she has 'felt' them naturally rather than having to 
reason out her actions like a man (Comte 1858 [1852], 184). Within the family we are 
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first weaned from self-love to altruism by being able to love our parents, and love for 
siblings teaches us to extend this process; marriage is the second step beyond the love of 
self as 'conjugal love [is] an education for universal sympathy' (1880 [1848], 172, n), 
and having children the third. Comte accepted that man's sociability was innate but had 
been submerged as individualism developed and civilisation distanced family and 
female influence - hence it needed to be encouraged. However, he seems unconvinced 
that in 'the tendency to place social above personal feeling... [woman] is undoubtedly 
superior to man' (1880 [1848], 155). Further, he assumes that women are better 
oVýermothers when a child's mother has died and in most cases 'do better than the father 
himself (1880 [1848], 179), while in the Systame he declares that 'the paternal is the 
least pure of all the domestic feelings' (1875[1852], Il, 159-60). 
Comte's view that man's obligations are to humanity and not to God has 
immediate appeal to any non-believer searching for an ethical creed to replace God, 
although Mill thinks it goes too far in its suggestion that whatever is not a duty is a sin. 
Mill also objects to Comte's idea that the good of others should be the only reason on 
which we allow ourselves to act (1865,138). In On Liberty, Mill referred to Comte's 
Ifiberticide', suggesting that altruism would be crushed if men's 'active faculties' were 
depressed by over-control (Wright 1086,45-6), a situation frequently explored in Eliot's 
novels. Comte banned the word 'rights" substituting 'duty' since all security is now to 
be found in "reciprocal obligations' (1880 [1848), 266). Comte even suggested that 
artificial insemination should replace sex so that the 'Utopia of the Virgin Mother' 
could flourish (Wright, 30). For Comte, happiness, altruism and duty coincide. 
Seemingly, Mill correctly perceived the full extent of selflessness demanded by 
Positivism, for under its requirements no-one lives for himself Yet if working men are 
to observe 'the gratuitousness of labour' (Wright, 30) and work for sympathy and duty 
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as their reward and motive, and women are to be the moral conscience of the system yet 
cannot have their intellects improved - despite the whole basis of the system being that 
the faculties are malleable - then where is the altruism from the capitalists and 
philosophers? Comte is establishing a giving and receiving of sympathy which is 
divided along the same class and gender lines that Eliot parodies in her novels. 
There is continuing debate as to how committed to Positivism George Eliot was, 
and to what extent it influenced her fiction. Wright charts the critical history of opinion 
on this, while claiming that Paris (1965) and Knoepflmacher (1965) overestimate the 
influence of Feuerbach to the detriment of Comte (1981,257-8). More recently, Hesse 
has insisted that Eliot's affinity to Comte is greater than is generally accepted (Hesse, 
16). 5 1 am intrigued by this partisan defence of favourite theorists, although far more 
interested in the synthesis of possibilities, and any sources of interpretative fictions. 
The major attraction of Positivism for Eliot lies in its vision of a community of 
sympathetic people whose priority is benevolence. While the constant striving within 
Eliot's fiction to encourage such sympathy suggests approval, how closely does 
Comte's conception of altruism correspond to Eliot's ideas on sympathy? 
Whether Comte's altruism was to be encouraged in all, for all, is debatable. He 
suggests that women should use their positive knowledge of the brain to further their 
work with the affections (Comte, 1858 [1852], 265), yet he considers them too 
intellectually inferior to achieve man's work. He does suggest that 'each sex should 
strengthen the moral qualities in which it is naturally deficient' (1880 [1848], 196) but 
the concentration is always on women helping men to become more sympathetic. 
Although woman is supposedly less intellectual and short of energy and thus needs 
5 Hesse also insists that many critics do not read Comte's works closely orAridely enough, particularly 
before forging connections with Eliot's work (134). 
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something to 'strengthen courage' (196), little is said about how she will be encouraged. 
Above all, will everyone be equally selfless? Given Comte's attitudes to women, the 
working classes, and equality it seems unlikely. Eliot repeatedly explores the dangers 
of one-sided altruism, and the outcomes are not beneficial. Conversely, in her novels 
sympathy is often the force that drives a character to rebel against the blind insistence 
on the type of tradition, dogma and duty that form the heart of Comte's system. 
Eliot was attracted to Comte's cerebral theory - his belief that human faculties 
are malleable and that the constant improvement of mankind is therefore possible - 
because she hoped all would eventually extend their sympathy. She was also intrigued 
by his attitude to children. Comte lists 'matemal instinct' as egoism not altruism, as 
children are often regarded as possessions on which to exercise power or avarice, so that 
this relationship does not qualify as an altruistic relationship (Comtel858 [1852], 261). 
Not only does Eliot explore situations where all materrial love is lacking she also 
portrays myriad relationships where children are merely their parents" possessions - for 
example Tulliver's casual dicing with Tom's future and the Cheverels' callous neglect 
and objectification of Caterina. 
However, there were many aspects of Positivism to discourage Eliot, not least 
Comte's dogmatism and rigid system-building. Further, while Eliot was often scathing 
concerning women's company and intellect it is unlikely she would condone a doctrine 
forbidding herself and all her closest women friends from carrying out their work. The 
law of eternal widowhood (Comte, 1858 [1852], 33-4), which Eliot ignored in marrying 
John Cross, was another area of contention (GEL VII, 271-2) and Richard Congreve 
gave thanks that 'her adhesion to Positivism had not been more open and complete' 
(Wright 1964,177). Finally, Comte's many scientific errors would not have retained 
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her respect. In 1853, Lewes had objected to Harriet Martineau's failure to correct many 
scientific mistakes in the Cours. 
Finally, two other major factors influence all judgement of the effect of 
Positivism on Eliot, one relational, the other vocational, a pattern of influence which is 
to be repeated. First, references to Comte and his work are scarce in the letters until 
1859, when Eliot and Lewes moved near to the Congreves in Wandsworth (Simon 
1963,207). Richard Congreve (1818-99), leader of the Positivist movement in London, 
was married to Maria Bury (d. 1915), the daughter of Eliot's father's surgeon. Since 
girlhood Maria had admired George Eliot and having become re-acquainted they soon 
became very close. This relationship makes it so difficult to be objective about Eliot's 
Positivism. The letters between them are warm and caring; Maria was the first of those 
worshipping young women who were to flock around, yet she appeared after George 
Eliot's long period in the social wilderness, and I believe Eliot would have done 
anything to maintain this sweet friendship. The letters oscillate between declarations 
that Eliot misses her, or thanks for loving gifts (GEL IV, 482) as well as Comtean 
related pleasantries: that Lewes is to read the Systýme; that Eliot has been 'swimming in 
Comte'; that reading the Politique every day is anticipated with enthusiasm and has 
improved her life (GEL 111,101; IV, 116,333). 
Yet overall there is relatively little enthusiasm. Congreve's lectures are 
described as 'chilling' (GEL IV, 363), and with a possible ironic jibe at Comte, Eliot 
says of Congreve that he 'internally resents everything like a freedom, looking very 
benignant all the while' (GEL 111,70). She is described as being very impressed with 
the Catichisme (Simon 1963,208), but when Lewes recommends Sara Hennell to read 
it, it is only because Sara will find her own ideas already written (GEL 111,320). There 
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is little distinct praise recorded and generally only in the letters to Maria; she did admire 
Comte's account of the Middle Ages, defending him against Leslie Stephen's criticism, 
but with faint praise: 'I quite agree with you ... 
in regarding Positivism as one-sided; but 
Comte was a great thinker ... and ought to 
be treated with reverence' (GEL 111,439). A 
final irony is the realisation that George Eliot had known Frederick Harrison for six 
years - he was introduced by the Congreves - but she does not appear to have entered 
into any close acquaintance with him until she sought advice on the legal aspects of 
Felix Holt. Harrison tried to call in his favours by asking for various supportive 
rwritings' influenced by Positivism, but Eliot never commits herself (GEL IV 284-289, 
300-302) and argues that her art cannot be dictated to. 
A second consideration is Comte's stance on imagination, of which he was 
wary, seeing it as only secondary faculty and not empirical (Comte 1858 [1852], 263). 
However, he did think imagination was important in the hands of the artist for 
conveying an understanding and sympathy of the new system, and that it was an area 
where women could excel while maintaining their domestic and social role. If Eliot 
agreed with the main tenets of Positivism - the importance of sympathy and sociality, 
progress and order, and a system of ethics that could further all these - then she may 
have employed certain aspects of Comte's teachings in creating her own ethics of 
fiction. Comte suggests that we arrive at a knowledge of the universal laws by "direct 
observation, observation by experiment and observation by comparison' (Hesse, 121), 
All of which Eliot employs in her psychological fiction. Comte also appreciated the 
power of imagination in art to influence for the good. However Eliot is far removed 
from Comte's notion of art as 'an ideal representation of Fact', nor does she consider 
the proper role of imagination to be 'the idealisation of truth' (1880[1848], 208,237). 
Instead, Eliot transforms Comte's idea of the artist using imagination to produce 
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propaganda for Positivism - for he calls for the artist to present "'a vivid picture of the 
ameliorations that the new system should bring about in the condition of mankind... 
(Hesse, 122, quoting Comte), creating instead a psychological exploration of sympathy 
and duty that questions and contradicts, forcing the reader to analyse and reach their 
own conclusions. She attempted 'the formula voirpour-prevoir, and would then leave 
her readers to perform the second part, privoirpourpourvoir' (Hesse, 122). 
Overall, Eliot's novels do not prioritise the selflessness that Comte desired. The 
sympathetic actions of Eliot's characters have more in common with the moral 
development described by Carol Gilligan, with the most successful stage being a care 
that includes the self: Silas Marner is benevolent but not selfless when he takes in 
Eppie, for he knows she will complete him and return him to the happiness of family. 
Eliot is also far more concerned with a balance between head and heart. Comte became 
too pro-feeling, while Eliot 'succeeded, better than J. S. Wl, in uniting ... the two main 
streams of the nineteenth century mind' (Willey 1949,205). The final voices on the 
controversy are the Positivists and Eliot herself In 1891, the 'Positivist Society of 
North London' discussed the Positivism in Eliot's novels, concluding that the lesson to 
be gleaned from her work was the need to fulfil the moral obligations she had neglected 
in her life (Quoted in Wright, 178). Meanwhile, Eliot declared: "'I cannot submit my 
intellect or my soul to the guidance of Comte... (GEL 1, xlvi). This would appear to be 
her clear preference, particularly when it is remembered that elsewhere she freely 
declared: 'With the ideas of Feuerbach I everywhere agree' (GEL 11,153). 
Again, we do not know when Eliot first read Feuerbach's work, although much 
comment by Eliot which is claimed by critics to be Comtean is as likely to reflect 
Feuerbach's influence. For example, Basil Willey considers Eliot's letter to Charles 
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Bray (GEL 11,82) to reflect Feuerbach's influence, not Comte's (1949,230). If Eliot 
was familiar with the work of Comte before that of Feuerbach, then she moves from a 
Positivist doctrine urging her to be a sympathetic, nurturing woman and wife, 
pennanently closeted at home to the liberating doctrine of Feuerbach encouraging her to 
be a sympathetic woman living a life at one with nature, believing in herself as an 
individual but also as a member of a species and community, producing work and 
celebrating her humanity, especially with regard to relationships. She moves from the 
commandment to care only for others, using her skills in order to improve men and her 
children, and eschewing sex and happiness in favour of Comtean duty; to an 
encouragement to live a benevolent but full life, pursuing happiness and enjoying her 
sexuality. Overall, the developing pattern of Eliot's life mirrors Feuerbach's 
injunctions. 
After her experience with Strauss's The Life ofJesus, Eliot had vowed never to 
translate again. However, by June 1853 she was committed to a translation of Ludwig 
Feuerbach's (1804-72) Das Wesen des Christentums (184 1) (The Essence of 
Christianity) following John Chapman's advertisement of the project in the Leader, as 
part of his quarterly series (GEL 11,90, nl). Despite agreement, in December 1853 she 
was fighting fiercely with Chapman, arguing that the promised translation should go 
ahead: 'I am very anxious to fulfil my engagements both to you and to the public ... I 
don't think you are sufficiently alive to the ignominy of advertising things ... which 
never appear' (GEL 11,130). Money was not the issue, but her name and reputation 
were. This work would be the first to bear her own name and she wished it to go ahead, 
for she was moving to a position where building her reputation and earning her own 
living by such works was paramount. 
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It is possible that Eliot had read Feuerbach quite early in her intellectual career. 
A letter to Cara Bray in June 1844 has the following request: 'My love to Sara, and tell 
her I do not wish to distress her conscience with the purchase of an atheistic book, but I 
feel sure there is "Bauer's Wesen des Christenthums" (sic) published in Berlin'. Haight 
concludes that Eliot was mistaken and means Feuerbach (GEL 1,177, n9). The only 
other early mention of Feuerbach occurs retrospectively in a letter of March 1854, when 
Eliot, stung by some reported criticism of Robert Noel's, declares that she is 'rather 
surprized that Mr. Noel should "speak slightingly"' of Feuerbach. She brushes off his 
comments by adding: 'Au reste, Mr. Noel is not a reading man and, I know, has no clear 
idea of the contents of Feuerbach's works' (GEL 11,144). She was not to be distracted 
from her work, or her convictions, and her sense of belief in both was growing stronger. 
The translation had multiple ramifications for Eliot. It was a branching out into 
a new career; it was deciding to use her name and extend her repertoire and reputation; 
and it was daring to be more radical than even the Westminster. Feuerbach's work was 
more disruptive than is generally realised. Engels wrote: "'One must himself have 
experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was 
general. We all became at once Feuerbachians' (McSweeney 1991,32, quoting 
Engels). Feuerbach, a Bavarian philosopher and humanist theologian, was initially 
influenced by Hegel, and he himself influenced Marx and Engels. His writings were 
critical of the current Christian theology, his most important work being Das Wesen des 
Christentums, which saw him labelled 'atheist'. He rejected Hegelianism, moving to a 
naturalist, empiricist, and materialist stance; and in dismissing metaphysics he may have 
weaned Eliot away from Pantheism. In particular, his celebration of Nature, often 
ignored, appears to elide with the more 'organic' aspects of the moral philosophers, 
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Spinoza's work, developmental science, and Natural History. For all of Comte's 
concentration on science and the laws of nature, his writing does not communicate with 
the natural world as Feuerbach's does. 
Feuerbach's main thesis is that man created God in his own image, as the 
imagined perfect representation of all that man most loved, revered and aspired to. 
Feuerbach considered that the true essence of Christianity - or indeed religion in 
general - was a psychological and anthropological representation of what man wanted 
and needed -a Being or God of understanding, morality and love. However, his 
damning critique was that theology, or the institution of religion, had taken over from 
man's needs and wants, so that existing religion was a false essence where God had 
taken on an existence independent of man. Worship of the Christian God now 
inculcated a belief in miracle, revelation, supernatural sacraments and an altogether 
undesirable religious materialism. For Feuerbach, God was an illusion from which man 
was divorced, while also being alienated from reality, nature, and his sexuality. Karl 
Marx sums up Feuerbach's stance: "'The criticism of religion ends in the teaching that 
man is the highest beingfor man, it ends, that is, with the categorical imperative to 
overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, forsaken, contemptible being 
forced into servitude.. (Kamenka 1970,16, quoting Marx). 
While this may seem a radical stance for Eliot to champion, Feuerbach was a 
complete democrat, believing that the government of the day would not survive once 
the people knew they were being duped in the name of preserving reactionary systems 
(Kamenka, 115) - an honest, naYve approach similar to Felix Holt's. With a belief in 
slow, gradual progress, he hoped that his work, in revealing the illusion of religion, 
would empower man and that the need for religion would disappear, with the result that 
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'human feelings of helplessness and dependence could be overcome, comparatively 
simply, by a democratic political order and further scientific progress' (Kamenka, 68). 
While utopian, Feuerbach honoured his convictions, building on the work of others and 
overshadowing the Higher Critics, extending where they had stopped short. Thus 
Feuerbach saw Strauss as timid in not acting on his revolutionary findings, and not 
sufficiently concerned with people to pursue the implications of his work. Feuerbach's 
work was briefly courted but quickly superseded by revolutionary Marxism. This 
association may explain why reference to Feuerbach disappears from Eliot's later 
writings, although she may have been impressed because he refused the revolutionary 
route of Marx, opting for an emancipatory and educative stance (Craig 1998,637). 
Of Sara's response to Feuerbach, Eliot says: 'Your impression of the book exactly 
corresponds to its effect in Germany. It is considered the book of the age there' (GEL 
Ilý 137). This endorsement reflects Eliot's enthusiasm. It was thirteen years since its 
appearance when the work had lost its cachet, but its importance to Eliot cannot be 
overestimated. She was following a trajectory of radical development mapped out by 
the works she chose to analyse and adopt. This is not a mere following of trends in 
Eliotýs case, works are explored according to an evolving personal creed. As 
Feuerbach's man had created his own God, so Eliot recreated herself and her future 
vocation through a symbiotic relationship with the works studied. In fact, her personal 
development mirrors Feuerbach's statement about his own philosophical experience: 
'God was my first thought; reason my second; Man my third and last thought' 
(Kamenka 1970,35). 
While Marxism had diluted and deflected the impact of The Essence of 
Christianity, its reputation had been primary. The work is not atheistic, neither is Eliot, 
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and despite some residual Hegelian bias, the idea of Man as God was opposed to all 
(metaphysical systems of thought' (Knoepflmacher 1965,52). As a preface to 
debunking the supernatural, alienated aspects of religion, Feuerbach wished man to 
understand that the relation between philosophy and false religion is comparable to that 
between 'thought and fantasy', or between 'healthy and unhealthy states of mind' 
(Kamenka 1970,37). Originally religion was merely man's imagination coming to his 
aid in times of need, fear or ignorance (39), and every God or spirit was a wish or an 
emotion of man's (43). In this sense, both religion and imagination are praised and 
considered healthy by Feuerbach, but theology has frozen man's lively imagination into 
rigid observance or enforced superstition. Man's original healthy religion was both 
cognitive, in that man would revere those images most relevant to further his interests, 
and emotional, in that religion helped man to combat his sense of dependence and 
helplessness (42). These deductions from his analysis of the history of man's religion 
led Feuerbach to develop idea of theology as anthropology, with metaphysics as 
psychology: 'God exists only as the object of man's thought, so that "to deny man is to 
deny religion. " But between them is a gap which only love can bridge' (GEL 1, xlv, 
quoting Feuerbach). It was love as the bridge between all that interested Eliot. Haight 
argues that in this translation her radicalism reached its peak; I argue it is what she 
makes of it that is radical. 
The impact of Feuerbach's work on Eliot was threefold, with all three aspects in 
direct contradiction to the implications of Positivism, despite the readiness with which 
many critics elide Comte and Feuerbach under the banner of 'Religion of Humanity'. 
Yet Feuerbach's influence is not more important, just different. As she notes in a letter 
of December 1880: 'with all systems ... "If you give them [the reading public] a whole 
they will straight away take it to pieces. Each seeks what is adapted to him"' (GEL VII, 
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344, quoting Goethe). Even by 1854, Eliot's own history of constant change and her 
knowledge of the history of philosophy had moved her beyond objective truth. Initially, 
the crucial aspect of Feuerbach's work is the insistence on the importance of the 
imagination, which not only pulls together so many threads from Eliot's philosophic 
inheritance, but also extrapolates into the two other strands of Eliot's personal and 
vocational future: the importance of sympathy for relationships, and for writing and 
creativity. 
Feuerbach's main thesis, that man created God, is a celebration of man's 
imagination, and the influence of this revelation on Eliot is catalytic. She can re- 
develop the idea of the imagination coming to man's defence in times of helplessness, 
but this time in order to formulate a moral fabric in place of the rigid and limiting 
theology that religion had become. Feuerbach's account of the formulation of religions 
by man's imagination has been described as if 'religion is the first form of self- 
consciousness, being the child-like condition of humaniv, an imagined religion as 
therapeutic, helping us 'recognise our natures and their personal limitations' (Coulson 
1981,93). This interpretation of religion compares remarkably well with Adam Smith's 
account of the role of the imagination in the formation of our conscience. It is religion 
as imagination, as the moral mirror which helps us to relate and compare, to make sense 
of our perception of self and other. Initially religion functioned as another means for us 
to measure ourselves by, in the way that the conscience and sympathy develops out of 
our relations with others, as a means of observing and judging ourselves: 'He 
[Feuerbach] compressed the "I" and "thou" relation of man to God into a synthetic One; 
he fused the first and second Persons of the Trinity into the "completed self- 
consciousness of the alter-ego "' (Knoepflmacher 1965,530, quoting Feuerbach). Once 
theology takes over, man becomes divorced from conscience, sympathy and 
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imagination, and religion judges us where our own conscience once did. In imagining 
God as our early strength and defence, we put all our good into him and left the bad in 
man; now, in overthrowing theology while forming a new relation of God in man, the 
imagination can be used to re-imagine ourselves, and all others, as potentially the good 
that was previously only revered and acknowledged in God. Gillian Beer talks of 
Feuerbach "'negativing limits... so that imagination helps us to exceed/succeed 'Without 
any suggestion of transgression' (Beer 1986,76). Imagining a secular yet moral excess 
is Eliot's achievement for both her personal doctrine, and for her fiction. 
Feuerbach's work provides 'an ethic and a psychology applicable to men in their 
unheroic every day (or, as George Eliot often put it , "working day") lives' (Ashton 
1994,159). The centre point of this ethic and psychology is imagination, but also the 
goodness, sympathy and relationship that imagination thus makes possible; these 
constitute human nature, and have been lost in God for too long. They also constitute 
the second aspect of Feuerbach's influence. As Ashton observes, Feuerbach's work, 
and Spmozaýs, as mirrored in Eliot's Riehl essay, is about being brought into sympathy 
with flawed, even stupid people, because - as their philosophies tell us - 'we belong to 
the same species, we share our humanity with them' (Ashton 1996,157). This begins to 
define the specific meaning that sympathy had for Eliot, particularly as it is represented 
in her earlier works. The divine virtues of wisdom, justice, love, and the benevolence 
that is part of love, are represented by Feuerbach as being the best of man that man has 
attributed to God (1854 [1841], 18). Feuerbach, and Eliot in following his ethic, 
believes that these have to be reclaimed and practised by man. Feuerbach has been 
criticised as too naYve, ignoring all the evil that man has done (1854 [1841], xxviii). But 
these charges are unfair since Feuerbach is not suggesting that man is the perfection that 
he places in God, but that such perfection is the best that man can imagine for himself; 
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it is what he would aspire to. Elsewhere Feuerbach clearly acknowledges that there is 
evil; he suggests that a real atheist is one who does not value love, wisdom, reason, and 
justice, or law (1854 [1841], 2 1). 
While revering reason and law, Feuerbach insists that love is the most important: 
'the law holds man in bondage; love makes him free' (48). It becomes a major element 
of Eliot's novels that 'what faith, creed, opinion separates, love unites' (48). A mere 
moral judge who employs law, reason and justice cannot forgive and be sympathetic; to 
forgive, flesh and blood and love are required. Carol Gilligan argues that the justice 
ethic is only one voice because it lacks the wider judgement of relational, sympathetic 
love. As Eliot illustrates, Tom Tulliver cannot forgive Maggie"s transgressions when he 
is being purely just, but when love returns to him in the light of Maggie's love, he 
becomes flesh and blood again and forgives her. "Not abstract beings - no! only 
sensuous, living beings are merciful. Mercy is the justice of sensuous life' (49). 
Feuerbach argues that the Trinity demonstrates man's need for closeness to one another, 
because it reflects his dislike of a void and his need of community (Dodd 1990,186). 
This belief has much in common with Hume's: man desires happiness and avoids 
suffering, yet is all the time coupled to sympathy, or the ability to imagine and 
understand and participate in others' sufferings. Man needs contact with others and is 
vulnerable to others' displeasure: 'love is moral and has a special position in morality 
because in it your happiness and that of another coincide' (Kamenka 1970,134). 
Feuerbach also sees the 'I' and 'Thou' relationship of man and God as man's 
imagination via Christianity 'teaching the perennial truth of human love and 
selflessness' (Knoepflmacher 1965,53). The 'I-Thou' becomes the epitome of 
relationality for Feuerbach and his followers, even extending to psychological therapy, 
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where it is 'repeated and elaborated' in the work of Rogers and Laing (Wartofsky 1977, 
1). I-Es thesis, like Comte's, is mainly concerned with sympathy and altruism, but aims 
to restore these values to man without the intermediary of God, whom religion has 
styled as the reason for sympathy. Comte would reinforce and enforce altruism 
through his social system, while Feuerbach argues that a duty of sympathy will return to 
man once the 'duty' of good deeds for God and self-interest in salvation has been 
replaced by the full realisation of man's universal humanity and suffering - which is 
what Tryan argues for when he criticises 'good deeds' in 'Janet's Repentance. 'For 
though there is also a self-interested love among men, still the true human love, which is 
alone worthy of this name, is that which impels the sacrifice of self to another' 
(Feuerbach 1854 [1841], 53). 
Yet, pace some critics, Feuerbach does not advocate an imposed self-sacrifice 
and always qualifies his statements on selflessness. 'Sympathy presupposes a like 
nature' (1854 [1841], 54), he asserts, which suggests that the bonds of kin, familiarity 
and love, as recognised by ethicists, are important in prompting altruism. Such 
sympathy for a loved or recognised one is never truly selfless, as love for the other 
always includes the self Further, 'Love does not exist without sympathy, sympathy 
does not exist without sutTering in common' (Feuerbach, 54). Feuerbach does not 
expect sympathy and sacrifice from everyone, or expect them to be extended to 
everyone. While 'the image of the suffering God expressed the idea that suffering for 
others was of ethical value' (Dodd 1990,184), this image was an ideal, as God was 
man's ideal. So although Feuerbach believed there to be a natural Gemeinschaft or 
community where people find that the happiness of each is dependent on the happiness 
of others (Kamenka 1970,135), he was aware that such an ideal does not always exist. 
Therefore, he stresses that sacrificing one's own happiness for another should only 
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occur when the doer feels the sacrifice to be more important than their own happiness 
(135), as when Maggie rescues Tom. While Feuerbach makes it clear that the example 
given by man's ideal of Christ's suffering suggests self-sacrifice for others to be the 
most noble of all actions - 'Love attests itself by suffering' (59) - there is no suggestion 
of demand or enforcement, unlike Comte's totalitarian system. When Feuerbach 
discusses sympathy he is talking of sympathy by all for all in the sense of equal 
responsibility; and when speaking of 'man' he includes women, who are not expected to 
be the moral conscience for humanity. 
Recent psychoanalytic theories of the self bear comparison to Feuerbach's 
account of the 'I-Thou', such as Chodorow's 'self-in-relation' (1989,99-113). 
Although concerned to recognise man as an individual - without over-emphasising this 
as he believed religion had done - it was important that man understand himself as part 
of a community and species. Man's vitality and humanity originate from the species. 
Feuerbach acknowledges the individual drive for happiness, but sees it as the source for 
universal morality by regarding the 'I-Thou' relationship as an essential part of human 
nature. Without 'thou' there would be reason only - the 'I-Thou' is needed for 
happiness, for benevolence, for the consciousness of a being that belongs to a species: 
(-we can speak of morality only where the relationship of man to man ... of landthou 
are in question... (Kamenka 1970,134, quoting Feuerbach). Such a view is compatible 
with Chodorowian theories of how a child moves from a state of totally merged yet self- 
centred absorption, to a state of individual 'self-in-relation', as a result of realising the 
equal self-centredness yet relatedness of others. Chodorow suggests that male children 
may achieve autonomy as a result of early separation, while females relate for longer 
with the mother and thus become more aware of the Tthou' and sympathise more. 
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The first stone against which the pride of egoism stumbles is the 
thou the alter ego. The ego first steels its eye in the glance of a 
thou before it endures the contemplation of a being which does 
not reflect its own image ... I reconcile myself to the world only 
though my fellow-man (Feuerbach 1854 [1841], 82). 
Overall, man's duty is to himself and not to a religion of alienation. Duty is to the 
happiness of the individual and the species, with love and sympathy for others, but not 
if this ignores the self Feuerbach argues that ethics must be grounded in man's nature 
and desires (Kamenka 124): 'The relations of child, and parent, of husband and wife, of 
brother and friend - in general, of man to man - in short all the moral relations are per 
se religious' (Feuerbach 1854 [1841], 271). 
A further aspect of Feuerbach's plea of sympathy and love for all which had a 
tremendous impact on George Eliot was his call for full acknowledgement of sexual 
love between men and women. In placing all that was good in God, man had alienated 
himself from love, and particularly from a belief and delight in sexual love. This 
process began as a sacrifice to God, but developed into a sense that sex was wrong, and 
that celibacy represented worship. If God was the God of reason and understanding, 
then freedom and the sexual impulse were the antitheses of this supposed ideal and must 
be repressed. Yet Feuerbach proclaims that God is not polluted by nature or sex and 
that '-personality, individuality, consciousness without Nature is nothing, but then 
Nature without corporeality is nothing, and 'flesh and blood is nothing without the 
oxygen of sexual distinction ... it penetrates bones and marrow. The substance of man is 
manhood; that of woman womanhood ... Repudiate then, before all, thy own horror for 
the distinction of sex' (Feuerbach, 91- 92). He even insists that 'the basis of morality is 
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the distinction of sex. Even the brute is capable of self-sacrificing love in virtue of the 
sexual distinction' (91), which suggests that tolerance, sympathy and an empathy with 
difference are born out of difference. 
Moving beyond a distinction between man and woman and a celebration of 
difference and sex, Feuerbach also celebrates sexuality in its full expression: 'The 
'thou' between man and woman has quite another sound than the monotonous thou 
between friends. ' (92). He finds the idea of celibacy bizarre as it denies the creation of 
life. Sexuality is the cord that ties the individual to the species. Like Comte, he 
celebrates the mutually supportive symbiosis of the male and female relationship in 
mamage: 'But mamiage - we mean, of course, marriage as the free bond of love - is 
sacred in itself (271). He adds that a marriage of external restriction - such as the legal 
bond holding Lewes and his wife Agnes - "is not a true marriage, and therefore not a 
truly moral marriage'. A moral marriage would be 'spontaneously willed, self- 
sufficing' (271) as was Eliot's relationship with Lewes. Most biographies note that the 
translation of Feuerbach took place just before Eliot's decision to live with Lewes, and 
it is generally accepted that his philosophy sustained and encouraged her in this difficult 
decision. However, this consideration is over-emphasised by critics to the neglect of 
Feuerbach's impact on Eliot's conception of sympathy and duty and its effect on her 
writing. It is the case that certain of the unions that Eliot describes in her novels are 
morally sound in Feuerbach's sense even if they contravene accepted ideas of 'duty': 
the relationship of Dorothea and Will is set against her marriage to Casaubon, and that 
of Janet and Tryan is contrasted with her relationship to Dempster. However, 
Feuerbach's work means far more to her than his pronouncements on marriage. 
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Feuerbach's views on the imagination helped to free Eliot's creativity and had 
multiple effects on her writing, increased her desire to write fiction. He stresses that we 
always succeed best in what we do willingly, but that our happiest activity is to produce 
(Feuerbach, 215). Feuerbach's influence may be reflected in her journalism, as when 
she rejects Cumming's notions that intellect alone decides morality (Eliot 1992,144-5), 
that good deeds are only good if consciously done for the glory of God (166-7), and that 
all love, even of husband and wife, is to be for God and not for love of a fellow human 
being (167). Cumming's God sounds like Comte's duty. For Eliot, happiness and 
spontaneous love of another are more relevant. 
Eliot critics often consider Feuerbach's work to feed directly and simply into the 
novels. In 1863, Richard Holt Hutton wrote to Eliot saying that he found the character 
of Romola too modem, as if she had read Feuerbach (Ashton 1983,53). The 
importance of the sacraments as man's symbols of relationship, nature and life are 
remarked (Knoepflmacher 1964), as are her Feuerbachian stereotypes of earthly 
Madonna and working man 'saviour'. However, while Eliot has an ideological and 
moral agenda, even if much of it is unconscious, she is not an ideologue or a moralist 
intent on incorporating a specific derived doctrine. This would be to suggest that she 
was an inert receptacle for all these theories by men, whereas she is never passive, and 
all philosophies have passed through the mill of her mind. However, as a philosophical 
novelist, she uses fiction to think about moral and philosophical issues, and the theories 
she interrogated suggested methods of investigation for her fiction. Feuerbach had 
much to offer to the growing arsenal of models for interpretative fictions that Eliot was 
amassing. His importance lies mainly in his emphasis on man in relation to others - 
loved, despised, hated or revered others - and to himself, his inner, outer, moral, 
intellectual, emotional and constantly changing self. The emphasis on the senses and 
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imagination (Ashton 1980,166), and the sympathy that results, provide all the 
information necessary for analysis of all relationships. In using Feuerbach's framework 
of belief in man, belief in love and understanding and justice, acceptance of nature and 
sex, and the need not to alienate ourselves from man, love, understanding, justice, 
nature and sex, Eliot begins to arrive at a malleable, self-conscious and constantly 
evolving interpretative ethic for fiction. 
Knoepflmacher says that Eliot was constantly 'painfully reappraising and 
refining her humanist convictions throughout the entire corpus of her novels' (1965,6). 
He writes here as if this evolution is disturbing, as if he expects certainty, yet in a 
notebook entry from the 1870s Eliot affirms: "'Doctrine, no matter of what sort, is 
liable to putrefy when kept in close chambers to be dispensed according to the will of 
men authorised to hold the keys... (Ashton 1983,52); she acknowledged and accepted 
constant change in response to constant feedback. Nietzsche criticises Eliot as weak 
and nalve for clinging to Christian morality having supposedly rejected Christianity 
(Newton 1981,5 1). However, her moral and philosophical stance is far more complex. 
Her own precise version of sympathy and duty contributes to her overall moral creed the 
products of centuries of thought. Feuerbach's work adds another dimension in that he 
helped her to realise that 'the idea of God, so far as it has been a high spiritual influence, 
is the ideal of a goodness entirely human (i. e., an exaltation of the human)' (GEL VI, 
98). Thus morality is not Christian per se, but is man's which he has 'projected outside 
himself (Newton 1981,52). The feelings, the values, and even the valued virtues 
remain in man even without a God. To develop a literary strategy that argues for, and 
defends these beliefs is not weak or naive, and especially not if Eliot had foreseen the 
future as proposed by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer and was exhorting us to sympathy 
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And duty before it was too late. If so, many of the aspects of the work of Herbert 
Spencer (1820-1903) may have urged her to greater rigour. 
So far, the theorists who influenced George Eliot have been discussed 
chronologically according to her acquaintance with their work. Herbert Spencer (1820- 
1903) is different, for he spans much of her life and she knew him before, during, and 
after many of her other influences. Investigating Spencer's work for his ideas on sex , 
gender, sympathy and duty has been a revelation. I consider him to be underrated, both 
as a thinker and as George Eliot's friend, despite the extreme nature of some of his 
ideas. Spencer made a considerable, if indirect contribution to her work, whether she 
approves of his ideas or whether they fuel reaction via her writing. Further, his 
discussion concerning sympathy and duty is relevant, as are the parallels between his 
work and the feminist theory I employ. 
Eliot first met Spencer in 1851. Initially their relationship prospered (GEL II, 
29) so that people began to speculate about an engagement, but Spencer had made his 
position clear: he did not love her (GEL VIII, 42, n 5). The summer of 1852 was a 
difficult time for Eliot, and two extraordinary letters reveal how she tried to win 
Spencer's love (GEL VIII, 50-52; VIII, 56-7, & n7) to no avail. As painful as this 
period is, it is not the defining moment of her life - even in relation to Spencer - and 
apart from a brief period of cool relations in 1859, after Spencer inadvertently revealed 
to John Chapman the identity of 'George Eliot' (GEL 111,12,49,111,154), the 
fliendship endured. Spencer was the only friend told about Eliot's authorship; he 
regularly featured in the list of guests at dinners or outings; and their library was full of 
his books - presentation copies to his dear friends (Baker 1977,191-2, nos 2057,69). 
At Lewes's death he wrote to Eliot to let her know that 'with more than conventional 
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truth I grieve with you' (GEL VII, 87). Eliot and Lewes were always fully aware of 
Spencer's shortcomings, yet both still valued and welcomed him. In 1861, he is 'very 
delightful' so long as they don't talk about art and classical literature (GELRI, 469). 6 
In 1880 she wrote to Sara Hennell to plead: 'I wish you did not find yourself so repelled 
by Herbert Spencer's words. He has so much teaching which the world needs' (GEL 
VII, 344). 
By 1851, when he met Eliot, Spencer had published Social Statics: The 
Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified, and the First of Them Developed 
(1850). Spencer, like Spinoza, is concerned with what constitutes the good life for man, 
and is primarily concerned with correspondence, for if evil results from the non- 
adaptation of an organism's constitution to its internal and external conditions (Spencer 
1954 [1850], 54), then man's lack of correspondence to his current social state will also 
result in evil (58). Spencer argues that it is man's duty to use his faculties for self- 
preservation via adaptation, but man must have liberty to do so, yet should not infringe 
each other's (Spencer 1954 [1850], 68-9). This statement is his 'first principle' for 
happiness and the right way of living, although the emphasis in Social Statics is more 
on the individual's rights than duties, the first being the right of self-preservation. 
One of the catalysts for Social Statics was a repudiation of Benthamite 
interventionism, for Spencer believed that everything is governed by natural laws, that 
the action of certain laws ensured a general trend towards progress, and thus 
government should not interfere in society's actions, so as not to disrupt the action of 
6 Paxton says that 'the letters that remain do ... reveal how her appreciation for his developing 
evolutionary analysis turned to an angry criticism which, by 1861, prompted her refusal to discuss with 
him its implications for art, literature, education, social reform and feminism' (1991,6). However, 
generally there is no suggestion of 'angry criticism' in the letters of this period, and the only appropriate 
reference I can find for 1861 is the one quoted above, which merely goes on to say that Spencer can be 
rather a bore for their other guests, although they are quite happy talking with him. 
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the laws and derail progress. Both Eliot and Spencer were increasingly exposed by their 
intellectual pursuits to the belief in man having the capacity to improve and become 
virtuous, as illustrated by the growth of the doctrine of sympathy. There would be less 
need for a controlling state because public opinion influenced by natural law and moral 
sense would take control, allowing more liberty for the individual. This is why Spencer 
is viewed primarily as an individualist, but the overall trend of his work is toward 
sociality, with critics mistaking his acceptance of the harshness of survival for 
misanthropy. 
Spencer is fully aware of man as a social creature, but his understanding of 
relations as part of a complex correspondence or feedback system - of man being part 
of an ecosystem - is generally misunderstood. He is also a biologist/naturalist with 
many of his evolutionary beliefs stemming from his perception of man as a complex 
individual within a complex community where both are mutually supportive. 
Shuttleworth interprets Spencer as seeing the environment as static (1984,21) because 
originally 1he perceived evolutionary progress as continuing until a state of perfection 
was achieved; but even by 1851 he had discarded this idea (Wiltshire 1978,193): 'as 
fast as adaptation approaches completeness, it becomes slower and slower ... adaptation 
must ever remain incomplete' (Spencer 1926[1904], 1,361). Spencer rejects utopianism 
(Wiltshire 193), acknowledges that nature and its laws are not static, and allows for 
constant gradual mental and moral change within humans. 
In 'A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility' 
(1852), Spencer developed the work of Thomas Malthus to explain the drive behind 
evolution. Malthus advocated population control to counter human reproduction 
outstripping food production. However, Spencer suggested that as the population grew 
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and food production failed to keep up, the 'excess of fertility entails a constant pressure 
of population upon the means of subsistence' (Spencer 1852,498). We strive to 
produce in order to feed all, and this constant environmental pressure stimulates our 
evolution: mechanical skills, intelligence and morality all progress as a result of the 
constant striving to supply. By 1850, Spencer's reading of Lamarck and his study of 
fossils led him to accept that progressive adaptation through the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics by new generations leads to the production of all new animals and plants 
- the popular conception of evolution before Darwin's work. In 'The Developmental 
Hypothesis' (1883b [1852], 1) Spencer argues that 'any existing species ... when placed 
under conditions different to its previous ones, immediately begins to undergo certain 
changes of structure fitting it for the new' (383). He then develops his 'use and non- 
use' principle (384), using it to account for the differences between the sexes and the 
development of intellect and morality, a principle based solely on Lamarckian 
evolution. However, in 1844 Darwin was already writing "'Heaven forfend me from 
Lamarck nonsense"' (Freeman 1974,213). 
To account for the underlying cause of evolution Spencer adopted an 
explanation based on the 'Persistence of Force', derived from Helmholtz's 1847 work 
on the conservation of energy (Hofstadter 1955,36-37). Spencer considered that energy 
or 'Force' explained the drive behind all changes and phenomena, however the ultimate 
cause behind evolution remained unclear and was to evade all evolutionists until an 
understanding of genetics was achieved. Ultimately, Spencer suggests that further 
explanation is not yet possible. Eliot, genuinely impressed with this humble and honest 
stance, praised Spencer's agnostic account of the 'unknowable' in his essay 'Progress: 
its Law and Cause' (1883 [1857]): "'the sincere man of science ... learns at once the 
greatness and littleness of human intellect ... 
its impotence in dealing with all that 
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transcends experience ... He alone 
knows that under all things there lies an impenetrable 
mystery"' (GEL 11,341, n 1; 111,358,364). 
'Progress: its Law and Cause' (1883 [1857]) is the first occasion when Spencer 
applied Lamarckian evolutionary terminology to matters of social growth and change - 
as he was to apply evolution to all aspects of science and life. He was also excited by 
the embryology research of Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876), which detailed the 
multiplication and differentiation of germ cells into millions of different units that in 
turn form tissues and organs. Here is Lydgate's 'primitive tissue'. Spencer seized on 
this idea to describe the life-process as 'essentially evolutionary, embodying a 
continuous change from incoherent homogeneity, illustrated by the lowly protozoa, to 
coherent heterogeneity, manifested in man and the higher animals' (Hofstadter, 37). 
Evolution is an increasing differentiation or specialisation of function together with the 
integration or mutual interdependence of the structurally differentiated parts and the co- 
ordination of their functions, and it was from this starting-point that Spencer's theories 
of the division of labour derived. Within a community or ecosystem different people or 
groups of organisms perform different tasks. As such systems are complex and 
unpredictable, our actions should be restrained and considered. The universal laws 
operate, and realisation of the unpredictability of man's actions in this cause-and-effect 
process makes it our duty to strive continually to understand the laws. 
In First Principles (1862) and The Principles of Psychology (1881 [1855]), 
Spencer employs his evolutionary theory to account for the functioning of the mind, and 
to begin a lifelong examination of the concepts of sympathy and duty. This move to an 
evolutionary psychology paralleled his continuing interest in associationist psychology 
and Mill's work on ethology, the science of character formation. Spencer was opposed 
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to ideas of a priori essence or innateness, but, mildly influenced by Whewell, he 
accepted the idea of inherited faculties and rescued associationist psychology by 
suggesting how individual differences of the mind develop (Peel 1971,115-9). His 
account of the brain organising and changing, with its echoes of Adam Smith's theory 
of the development of sympathy, imagination and conscience, is central to Spencer's 
discussion of the development of moral sense, and his ideas on the distinctions between 
the sexes. As inheritance, faculties, and organisation develop further, then higher 
animals can formulate general laws from specific truths, they can develop premeditation 
and begin to make, suspend and change judgements (Peel, 124). As conditions become 
more secure and settled, these modifications to the mind permit and promote the growth 
of sociality and sympathy (125). Spencer argues that such emotions represent more 
than kinship or 'herd instinct' and signal a 'likeness' in families and groups that 
depends, in a complicated feedback process, on mutual emotions for its continued 
development. 
Spencer is generally represented by his 'survival of the fittest' coinage, but 
sympathy and altruism are central to his work: 'Spencer's formulation of his doctrine of 
sympathy as the root of justice and benevolence in a society of self-interested 
individuals was a contemporary restatement of the idea that was foremost in Spinoza's 
work' (Ashton 1994,158). Man's priority is self-preservation - basic needs have to be 
met - but once satisfied, then sympathy can develop. The Principles of Psychology 
(1855) proposes that as a result of the mind's development there is an inherited 
memory, such that a baby recognises smiles and frowns as relating to pleasure and pain, 
even before they are learned (Spencer 1881 [1855], 11,596). Over generations, the 
development of these mental pathways foster sympathy between mother and child, and 
then within the family; sympathy may even be extended to the rest of the group. For 
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most of man's history, antagonistic relationships between groups have restricted the 
actions of sympathy and sociality (11,577). According to Spencer, when general 
sociality plus 'the special socialities of a permanent sexual relation and of a double 
parental relation' are developed, then 'sympathy develops more rapidly' (576). While 
such conditions suggest a community progressing to altruism, they also reflect one of 
Spencer's main assumptions which has repercussions for the construction of gender 
relations, for he assumes that stable, heterosexual monogamy is the highest form of 
human relationship. However, he does stress the importance of the double parental 
bond. 
Spencer regarded the evolving parental altruistic urge as responsible for our 
tendency to aid the weak, small and helpless; and also suggests that this response came 
to operate in men's choice of women (1881 [1855], H, 624-5). If Eliot's writing was 
sometimes in reaction to Spencer's sexist ideas as Paxton suggests (1991, passim), then 
this could explain her almost mocking account of Hetty's attractions, where weak, small 
and helpless is a disastrous sexual selection. Interestingly, Spencer suggests that man's 
lesser parenting is a factor which has restricted sociality: where there is 'a parental 
relation which, on the man's side at least, is vague or not persistent' fellow-feeling is 
feeble (1881 [1855], 11,576). There are two major aspects to his ethics, beneficence 
and justice. His term for sympathy is pity, which he considers the most appropriate 
form of benevolent response to any pain or suffering observed in another, and insists 
that its prevalence will increase as society evolves (U, 613). Eventually our evolved 
sympathy will prevent us from acting in ways that cause others pain, and we will also 
learn to recognise, by a feedback mechanism, the pain that generates our sympathy, and 
will respond with help (11,615). Justice being central to Spencer's concept of the 
highest personal freedom (11,616), one of his arguments against women ever being able 
92 
to evolve to the same level as men is that men are always more just (Haller 1974,64). 
However, Eliot's novels often show justice as too harsh and logical, as ignoring the 
wider issues of sympathy and mercy - although Spencer does envisage an evolution to a 
higher state where justice debates with mercy (11,622), which compares to current ideas 
of feminist moral theory. 
Spencer's most outspoken work on the evolution of altruism occurs in The Data 
of Ethics (1879), which Eliot read and admired (GEL IX, 270). Although it was 
published too late to directly influence Eliot, it no doubt reflects numerous 
conversations over the years . The primary aim of all 
his work was to achieve an 
'ethics' of man. When the species was under threat, Spencer argued that sympathy and 
sociality were less possible (1879,133-4) and in such periods 'survival of the fittest' 
operates within human social groups. He acknowledges that at present sympathy can 
seem like self-sacrifice, when many are needing and few are giving, but sympathy will 
increase by example, education, and evolution. Eventually egoism and altruism will 
merge (256). However the ethics described, hoped for and possibly evolving, represent 
the ideal; whereas the ones we have to work with for now are relative (280). Ultimately 
he believed that 'sympathy is the root of both justice and beneficence' (148) but was 
only to be achieved via self-preservation. In particular he vehemently opposed self- 
sacrifice; we have to preserve our lives, 'egoistic claims must take precedence of 
altruistic claims' (189). He argued that a healthy egoism reflects well on those around, 
while someone who is 'undermined by self-sacrifice carried too far' is negative and 
depressing (193). Any self-sacrifice, especially that of mothers, had overall deleterious 
effects (194), which Eliot exposes in her novels. 
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In his discussion of duty Spencer is adamant that all aspects of moral 
consciousness should be employed willingly and not forced or done in fear. He 
identified three external controls, developed over time, that exert 'force' over our moral 
responses: the supernatural - including Christianity - the political, and the social (1879, 
114-5). Often the actions of these agencies are not moral. They have evolved a status 
supposedly congruous with the well being of man, yet often exert control via external 
coercion coupled with the notion of obligation (119-20). Spencer's discussion of forced 
duty seems catalytic for Eliot's work, but published here at the end of their relationship 
it is not possible to say which way the influence had flowed over the years. However it 
supported the idea that Eliot questioned these external controls while the concept of 
'duty' she discussed with F. H. Myers was far higher than his conventional views could 
comprehend. Nevertheless, evolving communities had required the stability granted by 
these three external controls before it was possible to evolve to full moral consciousness 
(1879,122). As man developed, the senses and the faculties were able to move on from 
the satisfaction of basic drives, needs, and self-preservation. Gradually an evolving 
higher development suggests that distant, or more conceptual goals are more rewarding, 
such as honesty, truthfulness and keeping promises. These powerful feelings have a 
sense of authority, which becomes part of the idea of duty (126), but which may also be 
overcome by the second strand -a coerciveness derived from politics, religion and 
society. The fear and punishment inherent in these restraints gives rise to the feeling of 
moral obligation. Spencer considered that all societal relationships developed out of 
'ought' relationships which were to do with family and the preservation of the group, 
but that with increased peace, security of self, intellect and wider sociality, forced 
obligation would fade and moral sentiments come to guide man as simply as the senses 
(129). 
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In The Principles of Sociology (1,1876), Spencer insists that he has not 
retrenched on his opinions in Social Statics, but believed that the weak had to perish so 
that the reality of the harshness of survival would teach all to survive, and also that the 
weak should not be a drain on finite resources: "'Society advances where its fittest 
members are allowed to assert their fitness with the least hindrance, and where the least 
fitted are not artificially prevented from dying out"' (Wiltshire, 197, quoting Spencer). 
Such an attitude sits uneasily with us, for whom the fear of eugenics is strong. Yet I 
think Spencer genuinely believed himself to be scientifically describing what took place 
through time to ensure continued survival and progress, if man is a product of animal 
evolution. This opposition is the main area of contention concerning Spencer's 
(eugenics' arguments. Many see him as a utilitarian (Wilkinson 1993) with his attitude 
to welfare motivated by libertarianism and a refusal to have individual rights infringed; 
while others defend him as an evolutionist (Miller 1976). 
The eugenics movement, which developed a social Darwinism that is largely an 
exploitation of Spencer's work, had by the 1880s begun to express great interest in the 
women's movement. By this time the dominant feeling was that too intellectual an 
education unfitted women for maternity, which idea derived largely from Spencer's 
work. Chapter XVI of Social Statics offers Spencer's discussion of the 'Rights of 
Women', and the 1850 version is remarkably radical: 'Equity knows no difference of 
sex ... the 
law of equal freedom manifestly applies to the whole race - female as well as 
male' (1954[1850], 138). When Eliot first met Spencer in 1851 both had extremely 
feminist views. However, both Sayers (1982) and Paxton (1991) assert that Spencer 
reneged on his feminist principles 'by erasing most of the chapter on "The Rights of 
Women" and rewriting many other passages about women in his Social Statics, 
(Paxton, 7). 'The Rights of Women' is vastly reduced and less impassioned in the later 
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version; however, the sense is the same but the omissions are interesting. In the 1850 
version, Spencer suggests that there are trifling bodily and mental differences between 
men and women, and then goes on to explain that these are not enough to decrease 
women's rights (1954 [1850], 138-9). Both parts are absent by 1892, as is Spencer's 
defence of woman's as yet untested intellect (140); and an argument that we do not yet 
know women's 'sphere, and therefore cannot condemn her to her 'mission' (15 1). This 
suggests a decisive revaluation. I consider that by the 1890s Spencer genuinely 
believed that evolution had demonstrated that woman's sphere was decided, and that for 
the sake of the species, woman's progress was - albeit temporarily - determined. 
This period was very difficult for intelligent women such as Eliot. Their own 
drive, abilities and intellect told them that they were capable of almost anything within 
the academic, intellectual and professional worlds of the day. Yet just as Biblical 
certainties about woman's role were finally being challenged, it appeared that science 
was teaching them that their lives were as determined and circumscribed as ever. In her 
essay 'Cassandra', Florence Nightingale demands to know why women have been 
granted 'Passion, intellect, moral activity' (1978 [1928], 396) when they are never 
allowed to exercise them. She claims that women have no means by which they 'can 
resist the "claims of social life... (403). Pointedly, Nightingale outlines how in every 
dream of activity women are accompanied by 'the phantom of sympathy' (407). The 
implication is that they are expected to be endlessly self-sacrificing, always ready as 
part of their 'woman's mission' to minister to others. However, while Nightingale 
laments woman's endless self-sacrifice, most of the occupations she lists are nurturing. 
While opposing the demand for sympathy from woman, she also believes in woman's 
sympathetic capacities. The same can be seen in Eliot's life and novels. The work of 
Spencer and Darwin, and more particularly its exploitation by others, becomes central to 
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attempts to restrict women to their caring roles. The growth of science's seemingly 
objective backing for essentialist notions of a caring and sympathetic woman's nature 
served to undermine the feminist movement later in the century (Jann 1994, passim). 
Dyhouse (1976,43) finds Spencer's early essays supportive of women's 
education. In Social Statics he had made it clear that social convention prevented a 
development of true feminine intellect and that therefore we could make no decision on 
the 'alleged fact' of women's inferior mind (1954 [1850], 140) until women had 
received a fair education. This sentiment is echoed in Mill's On Subjection of Women 
(1869) and Eliot's 1855 essay 'Margaret Fuller and Mary Wollstonecraft' (1992,180- 
186). In an essay on physical education Spencer comments that men care little for 
women's intellect (1932 [1859a], 203), but this is asserted within the context of the 
risks to the physical well-being of girls who are being educated in physically damaging 
conditions. This essay is often cited as an example of Spencer objecting to women 
being educated at all. However, he details a daily regimen reminiscent of Lowood 
school, and demands instead proper exercise, sleep, good food, and fun for the girls 
(193). His point is that damaged health is too great a penalty for over-education (204) 
for boys and girlS. 7 
NI 
Paxton also finds Spencer s early stance on education enlightened (1991,30), 
but senses a reaction by the time of his 1858 
8 essay on the moral discipline of children. 
7 This essay first appeared in April 1859 in the British Quarterly Review, vol LVIH. Dyhouse quotes 
from Spencer's 1861 collection, Education: Intellectual, Moral andphysical, which contains four essays 
ranging between 1854 and 1859, but it is not always clear which essay is being referred to; I have used a 
1932 text of the same essays, but have indicated throughout both this date and the date of first publication 
of each essay. 
8 This essay first appeared in April 1858 in the British and Quarterly Review; Paxton uses this version; 
whereas I refer to the 1932 text containing the essay 'Moral Education'. 
97 
I find this opinion problematic. All of Spencer's comments are made within the context 
that it is reprehensible if parents, men and women, have no idea how to educate children 
as moral citizens. Supposedly, 'Spencer made it clear that he did not intend that girls 
should have an education equal to that of boys' (Paxton 1991,30), but I cannot find 
evidence for this assertion in the essay. Further, Spencer advocates 'how to parent' 
education for males and females, stressing that both need it (1932 [1859a], 115,158), 
and is as critical of fathers as mothers (1932 [1858], 118). A further essay on education 
for the Westminster attacks women's mothering skills but again acknowledges that they 
have rarely been advised how to bring up children (1932 [1859b], 32) and advises that 
both parents should study ethology (35). He did think that women needed a good 
intellectual education, if only to prepare them for ... the grave responsibilities of 
maternity" (Dyhouse 1976,43), and recommends educating 'as highly as possible' but 
flexibly, with 'the parrot faculty cultivated less, and the human faculty more', arguing 
that 'were the discipline extended over that now wasted period between leaving school 
and being married' then women would prosper (1932 [1859a], 204). His much 
lampooned comment about women's excess education putting them at risk of infertility 
is from this same essay, but my understanding is that he claims the women will be too 
physically run-down and unable to bear the rigours of married life. This is not yet the 
suggestion that a lack of energy can affect fertility, although this view is developing. 
Spencer did eventually believe that women, and men, should preferably be attractive, 
while for women a good physique for childbearing was more important than intellect 
and education. Later, when discussing Eliot, Spencer said of her phrenological 
appearance that 'she had "high philosophical capacity with extensive acquisition.. but 
that her ... abnon-nal" mental powers' involved "'a physiological cost which the feminine 
organization will not bear without injury more or less profound"' (Brady 1992,4, 
quoting Spencer). 
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Spencer considered the monogamous Western family with the man as 
breadwinner and woman relieved of work as the pinnacle of social evolution 
(Dyhousel976,43). The constitution of the family had changed overtime and was only 
now returning to the 'proper' family group of parents and offspring (Spencer 1876,1, 
707) so that he feared radical feminist activity as threatening this near-perfect condition. 
Yet in 'The Comparative Psychology of Man' (1883 [1878])9 he considered women as 
non-radical and less modifiable than men due to 'the relative conservatism of women - 
their greater adhesion to established ideas and practices' (436). Often it is Eliot's 
women characters who are most eager for change and growth, while their menfolk 
adhere to obsolete traditions. Spencer's sexist beliefs become increasingly prominent in 
his later works, firstly in his inability to think of women as other than mothers, 
secondly, with his assumption that stable, heterosexual, monogamous relationships are 
the height of progress; and thirdly, because of his horror at women working. This latter 
objection is the greatest indicator of his increasing concern with women's fragility: 
'where the men are no longer occupied in war and the chase, the division of labour 
between the sexes becomes humane in its character: the men do the heavy, outdoor 
work, and the women the light, indoor work' (Spencer 1969,647). 
Spencer's change of attitude is mainly conditioned by his extrapolation of 
Helmholtz's theory of the conservation of energy. He believed that each human being 
had only a limited capacity for energy, and that women had to reserve more of their 
energy for reproduction. Consequently, any physical or intellectual work will deplete 
the system of energy. He further held that most of the psychical differences stem from 
9 The essay was published in 1878, but the version referred to here is in an 1883 collection of essays 
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the different parts played by the sexes in parenting, another example of his general 
belief that function dictates structure, which is at odds with Darwin and most 
anthropologists. In The Study of Sociology 10 he hypothesises that women's individual 
development, both physical and mental, slows and stops earlier than men's because of 
the need to reserve vital energy (1878 [1874], 273). This foreshortened development 
results in reduced development in the nervous and muscular systems, so that the 
intellectual and emotional faculties are not as developed in women as in men. This 
assumption explains why women are not as physically strong, as quick and intelligent, 
and do not achieve 'justice'. If women squander their energy in physical and 
intellectual activities, in careers and education, their fecundity would deteriorate, and 
thus the species would suffer. 
In 'The Comparative Psychology of Man' (1883 [1878]) the major argument is 
always that environment and activity affect the organism to produce change. 
'Assuming the cumulative effects of habit on function and structure, as well as the 
limitation of heredity by sex, it is to be expected that if, in any society, the activities of 
one sex, generation after generation, differ from those of the other, there will arise 
differences of mind' (435). He thus blames difference on a division of labour, which 
has become exaggerated over time and produces both physical and mental effects. 
Again structure is derived from function, and he also argues that if men and women 
carried out certain roles in society, it was because they had evolved to perform these 
different tasks. Spencer ignores the circularity of his stance. In The Study qfSociology 
he further develops his ideas of physical and mental differences between the sexes. He 
argued against workers such as Mill that to claim the sexes were mentally alike 'is as 
10 The Study ofSocioloSy (1874) was a slight break from Spencer's production of the 'Synthetic 
Philosophy'. All the chapters had previously appeared as instalments in Youmans' periodical Popular 
Science Monthly. 
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untrue as that they are alike bodily' (Spencer 1878 [1874], 373). Spencer believed that 
all differences between male and female were related to their different functions, 
particularly the reproductive ones. This opinion appears in The Principles of Biology 
(1867), which was largely responsible for women's biology being used as a fixed 
explanation of their psychological and cultural differences. He also states: 'absolute or 
relative infertility is generally produced in women by mental labour carried to excess 
... the 
deficiency of reproductive power among them may be reasonably attributed to the 
overtaxing of their brains' (1867, H, 485-6). He adds that there is a greater incidence of 
infertility and that 'earlier cessation of childbearing ... [and] frequent inability to 
suckle' occur, while 'most of the flat-chested girls who survive their high-pressure 
education are incompetent' to mother properly (1867,11,486). 
According to Spencer, certain behavioural traits had developed because women 
were weak and powerless relative to men. These include women's ability to please and 
thus influence a powerful mate (1878 [1874], 375), the facility for concealing emotions, 
particularly anger, antagonism and resentment, and also the capacities of influence, and 
the ability instantly and correctly to read someone's feelings - all nicely summed up by 
the term 'intuition' (Haller 1974,62). All are basically defence or survival techniques, 
which can be seen as a specific form of sexual selection - women with these traits being 
more likely to mate and survive in a relationship with a male. Spencer's hypotheses 
here are particularly interesting when compared to Carol Gilligan's work on moral 
development. She suggests that women may have a greater ethic of care, but one 
argument levelled against her is that women's caring is merely a defence mechanism 
characteristic of subservient groups. Meanwhile, Sara Ruddick would argue that many 
of the behavioural traits described are likely to result from caring for children. They are 
examples of 'maternal thinking', where women have learned what is the best action 
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when looking after a child, a process involving the ongoing feedback described by 
Spencer. For Ruddick this attribute is learned, while Gilligan's 'caring' is psycho- 
socially acquired. Neither is evolved, innate, or determining. 
Overall, what Spencer describes is sexual selection. As part of his argument for 
survival, he suggests that men choose pretty women with a good childbearing physique; 
likewise he argues that women have evolved to choose stronger males - women who 
chose weaker men would have less chance of survival, and their choice-type would die 
out Yet such differences would not normally result from natural selection as 'this 
would imply that "the two sexes follow different habits in their struggles for existence, 
which is a rare circumstance with the higher animals... (Sayers, 31). It is Spencer's 
notion of women preferring powerful men that sponsers his belief that they support 
authority and power unquestioningly, and could not yet vote rationally. He refused to 
support Mill over the women's franchise in 1867, feeling it would jeopardise freedom in 
society, for "'women as a mass are habitually on the side of authority"' (Wiltshire, 115, 
quoting Spencer). He would agree to women having the vote ultimately, but not 
immediately, as this tendency to worship power is a trait that only evolution can cure. 
Yet Spencer also argues, without any sense of contradiction, that women are too 
sympathetic to make ethical judgements because 'women are naturally the nurturers of 
the young, so that their sympathy gravitates towards the weak. They would tend, 
therefore, to view social questions in a matemal light, resulting in "a more general 
fostering of the worse at the expense of the better" (Wiltshire, 115, quoting Spencer). 
This compares to Freud's claim that 'for women the level of what is ethically normal is 
different from what it is in men. Their super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, 
so independent of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men' (1974,241-2). A 
similar argument is still levelled at women and initiated Gilligan's work, with her 
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questioning of Kohlberg's assumptions concerning girls' poor moral reasoning power. 
Spencer described Eliot as "'so tolerant of human weaknesses as to be quickly 
forgiving; and indeed, was prone to deprecate harsh judgements. This last trait I doubt 
not in part caused by constant study of her own defects"' (Haight 1968,119, quoting 
Spencer). 
Although acknowledging that some differences between the sexes will decrease 
as evolution proceeds (1878 [1874], 379) and as increased peace and security allow 
intellect, sympathy, and non-obligatory duty to flourish, Spencer himself sometimes 
appears to forget this possibility, as when he argues for the persistence of 'innate' 
feminine and matemal characteristics. It is certainly ignored by the anti-feminists and 
eugeniCiStS who exploited his work. It is also forgotten now that his social sexual 
selection is not evolution in a Darwinian sense. The Lamarckian evolution that supports 
Spencer's work was soundly overthrown by the 1890s. T. H. Huxley remarked that 
"'Spencer is bound to it a priori - his psychology goes to pieces without if " (quoted in 
Freeman 1974,217). His observations on women were responses to environmental 
conditions which, he believed, could and would change as conditions changed. Further, 
many of the behavioural adaptations he describes in women are comparable to the 
psycho-social development discussed by feminist object-relations theorists, which are 
constructed rather than evolved. This is a type of psychological development which is 
also dismissed as essentialist, rather than being seen as something which can be 
changed. Damning verdicts on Spencer's evolutionary thesis cannot be avoided: he was 
indeed 'incapable of separating changes in a group's learned repertory from hereditary 
modifications' (Freeman 1974,220). 
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While it is obvious that Spencer did move away from his convictions of the 
1850 Social Statics, his comments are often taken out of context, and even some of his 
most contentious opinions are less barbed when seen as part of an explanation of a 
sexual selection which need not be fixed. However, he discusses sex roles, gender roles 
and mothering extensively, and his importance in establishing evolutionary science as a 
master discourse defining 'sexuality, knowledge, and power' (5) is not to be 
underestimated. Women needed to refute this seeming biological determinism (Eagle- 
Russett 1989,13) and only by end of the century were cultural interpretations given 
credence in accounting for much of women's 'difference'. With hindsight, the dangers 
of Spencer's work are obvious, in that anti-feminists would exploit his ideas to ensure 
that woman remained in the domestic role and be denied education. 
In addition to providing Eliot with much material to write against, Spencer's 
work supplies much support. Most important is his dual stress on the individual and 
society, which was relevant both to her personal life and her work. He details how Eliot 
complained of a 'double consciousness', with a 'current of self-criticism being an 
habitual accompaniment of anything she was saying or doing; and this naturally tended 
toward self-deprecation and self-distrust' (Spencer 1904,1,396). Lewes confirms 
Spencer's account when explaining his habit of keeping bad reviews from Eliot: 
'Unhappily the habitual tone of her mind is distrust of herself, and no sympathy, no 
praise can do more than lift her out of it for a day or two' (GEL V, 228). Spencer's 
induction of Eliot into the mysteries of species, individual organism, and community 
may have provided some positive resolution of this divide. Organicism helped her to 
find a place within the order or (eco)system, able to contribute to the life of the 
community, while still remaining an individual. Spencer also has a role as a fiction- 
catalyst, for her novels are partly examinations of societies as ecosystems. 
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From biology to anthropology and on to psychology: for as Spencer applied 
evolution to all, so Eliot evolved her fictional worlds by considering all these levels. 
Not only do the natural laws operate in life, they also operate in her fiction. Several 
critics have commented on Spencer's influence via anthropology. Postlethwaite 
considers Eliot's Riehl essay to demonstrate that she had 'thoroughly assimilated 
Spencer's movement from a biological to a social model in Social Statics' (1984,195). 
Even feminist anthropologist Rosaldo commends Spencer's close attention to 'available 
anthropological data' - although she otherwise dismisses him for his offensive 'sexist 
assumptions' (1980,402, n 21). Yet this influence is not a case of Spencer directly 
transmitting ideas to Eliot. It is rather the opening of new sources for fiction, and for 
formal approaches. Thus he becomes both a source of ideas and a clue to method. 
If anthropology provided the means for studying whole communities, 
psychology allowed close investigation of individuals in all the infinite interactions that 
form community. The Principles of Psychology suggested a means of investigating 
natural feeling that did not rely on the innate or metaphysical (Newton 1981,57). 
Psychology and evolution combined allow a developing, natural investigation of 
characters and the narrator's relationship with the reader. Further, the concept of 
correspondence is crucial: 'the degree of life in any organism ... depends on its active 
correspondence with the complexities of its environment' (Myers 1984,4). The 
psychological theories put forward by Spencer, Comte and Lewes all suggest that real 
problems are to do with a character's inadequate relations to community. They all 
suggest that 'species and even identity derive part of their essential nature from the 
environment, and that the external fatality to which man, in particular, must adjust in 
order literally to be a man, is the human community' (Myers, 39). 
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Overall, there is much in Spencer's account of the evolution of sympathy and 
duty that accords with Eliot's own views, and Spencer's suggestion of a gentle growth 
to change is amenable. She may also have shared Spencer's idea of an ultimate 
perfection of universal altruism and duty, without self-sacrifice, but while valuing 
mercy and pity equally with justice. Finally, with regard to Spencer's attitude to 
women, while there were areas of agreement, such as Eliot's belief that perhaps women 
were not yet ready to vote, and the need for slow change, there were also many 
disagreements. She was able to see his blind spots and expose them in her novels - 
which resist his more sexist ideas. Paxton has charted examples of Eliot's skilful 
parody, mockery and opposition to Spencer, however, Eliot is not the feminist that 
Paxton indicates. She may not agree with Spencer, but her beliefs about men and 
women are complex. 
On 25 November 1859, Eliot wrote to Charles Bray: 'We are reading Darwin's 
Book on Species, just come out, after long expectation. It is an elaborate exposition of 
the evidence in favour of the Development Theory, and so, makes an epoch' (GEL III, 
214). It was over seven years since Eliot's relationship with Spencer had first brought 
her into intimate contact with an evolutionist, and over four years since her 'elopement' 
with Lewes and a subsequent induction into natural history and classification - Lewes's 
Seaside Studies being very Darwinian (Ashton 1990,31). However, she was already 
familiar with evolutionary ideas before meeting Spencer from her reading of Lyell 
(1830) and Chambers (1844). Even as early as September 1839 she was flaunting her 
geological knowledge by comparing the chaotic layers of her mind with 'a stratum of 
conglomerated fragments that shews here a jaw and rib' (GEL 1,29). 
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Evolution or "'transmutation", as it was usually called' (Ellegard 1958,11) had 
long been a topic for enlightened debate. Darwin's grandfather Erasmus Darwin (1731- 
1802) had published his Zoomania, or the Laws of Organic Life in 1794-6, which 
anticipated Lamarck's more renowned Philosophie Zoologique (1809), with its theory 
of organic evolution caused by the passing on from generation to generation of 
advantageous acquired characteristics. Since Lamarck's version of inheritance was the 
mechanism best known to most aware readers, the main debate in the first quarter of the 
century was between Lamarckian evolution and the Biblical story of Creation. The 
growing interest in fossil-hunting and the publication of Lyell's massive The Principles 
of Geology in 1830 advanced the evolutionary debate into public controversy. Lyell's 
work, Darwin's 'Bible' as he journeyed around the world on the Beagle (Gilmour 1993, 
117), nurtured his theory of natural selection. 
Even those unaware of the complexity of the arguments about evolution soon 
became aware of a serious challenge to religious orthodoxy, as well as the questioning 
of fundamental principles such as the superiority of man, the fixity of the species, and 
the age of the Earth. Christians who accepted evolution followed the theory of 
'Catastrophism', which hypothesised different phases of creation successively washed 
away by global cataclysmic events, such as Noah's flood. An all-powerful God still 
orchestrates the sequential creation and destruction of serially progressive organisms, 
while the presence of fossils that do not correspond to existing organisms is explained, 
thus reaffirming current species fixity. Meanwhile Lyell's work supported the 
alternative theory of uniformitarianism, which suggested a constant, gradual cycle of 
change. Landscapes are worn down over time while others are deposited. Species 
change in a similar, ongoing manner. Lyell discounted Lamarckian evolution but did 
not yet have an alternative explanation for development. 
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There was extensive discussion in the press on all topics surrounding evolution. 
Lewes, one of the most enthusiastic commentators from 1850 onwards, regularly 
reported advances in the 'Developmental Theory' in his Leader column, 'The Progress 
of Science' (Ashton 1991,107). Until 1859 all theories of evolution had an element of 
progressive change - even Lyell's work has a teleological underpinning - and Chambers 
stated quite clearly that any law of development had originally been designed and 
instigated by a Creator. Although the mutability of species and questions of man's pre- 
eminence were dangerous areas, many found it possible to accept a theory of slow 
gradual improvement as guided by a benign God. Even aspects of Spencer's early work 
were interpreted in this way, and he did more than most to popularise the notion of a 
meliorist evolution. From this summary of the situation before the publication of The 
origin of Species, it is apparent that while a more conclusive evolutionary theory was 
anticipated, Darwin's contemporaries were not at all prepared for his particular theory. 
Darwin accumulated most of the material for his account of evolution by natural 
selection during his voyages on H. M. S. Beagle in the 1830s. His notebooks suggest 
that while still on the journey he already believed that the species evidence he was 
recording in the Galapagos Islands would "'undermine the stability of Species... (quoted 
in Freeman 1974,212). Once back in England, he then arrived at his "'creative moment 
of imaginative insight" not later than March 1837' (212). Fearing what he had 
conceived, Darwin spent the next twenty years analysing his findings, and only 
published when Alfred Russel Wallace independently arrived at the same deduction. 
Darwin's extensive journeying, meticulous observation, appropriate specimen- 
collecting and creative lateral thinking enabled him to see that numerous similar, yet 
different, species existed in the regions he surveyed, and that their differences were 
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related to the different environmental conditions of their different habitats. Yet Darwin 
came to believe that the environmental conditions were not the cause of difference. As 
with Spencer, Malthus's theory of population outstripping food production helped 
Darwin to arrive at his mechanism for evolution, although his interpretation is quite 
different (Darwin 1996 [1859], 55). Darwin saw 'Nature' metaphorically as a surface 
with few available niches, while multitudes of clamouring species and individuals are 
sharp wedges trying to drive home in the surface; some will catch and others will not. 
This is a metaphor he removed after the first edition, possibly because of its violent or 
sexual connotations (Beer 1983,71). The aim is to force the reader to understand the 
pressure and strife of survival. Darwin describes all organisms as 'striving to the utmost 
to increase, suggesting that a constant state of struggle is necessary for life, for far 
more are bom than can ever survive (1996 [1859], 56). Nature is always represented by 
Darwin as 'she', while natural selection is neutral (Beer 1983,70). Nature is the 
nurturing, fecund, productive side, while natural selection is the harsh culling side that 
yet makes life possible. 
From this image of the drive to survive in the face of over-population, Darwin 
developed his idea of the mechanism that makes survival possible for the well-adapted 
few. He was fully aware of the process of artificial breeding of species - where specific 
characteristics can be deliberately selected in animals or plants, such as breeds of dog or 
pigeon, and strains of roses - and he spent many years familiarising himself with the 
intricacies of such breeding in order to test his ideas. This information forms the 
introductory part of The Origin ofSpecies. He realised from his observations that there 
was a similar but natural process of selection taking place in all living things. His 
account of this process was to become his theory of natural selection, although he had 
no explanation for the mechanism of the change that was taking place. Darwin's one 
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certainty was that it was not Lamarckian inheritance, which he held in contempt 
(Freeman, 213). His revolutionary explanation was that within every species, natural 
variations - or mutations - occur constantly regardless of environmental conditions. 
Such variations appear continually as reproduction proceeds. If environmental 
conditions change, then within any species those types with natural variations which 
suit the new conditions will be better adapted to *survive; and as they survive they pass 
on their advantageous characteristics, so that their type may prosper for so long as 
conditions remain the same, with new variations still being produced. Beer sums up his 
whole theory as 'hyperproductivity, variability and selection' (1996 [1859], xx). The 
immediate underside of Darwin's theory is that this process of variation and selection 
for survival is totally arbitrary, impersonal, and harsh. Further, certain naturally 
occurring variations may unsuit a variety for survival, with the result that extinction 
may occur. 
'The reality of organic life, Darwin came to see, was adaptation and 
development under the pressure of the struggle for existence' (Gilmour 1993,127). The 
emphasis is on many slight variations, deviations or examples of difference - 'Not the 
normative but difference proves to be the generative principle ... No virtue or effort is 
involved, simply a sorting process' (Beer 1996, xxi). Such an elevation of difference 
has obvious implications for Eliot's characters, the issues of difference and tolerance 
being paramount in her work, with most of her main characters alienated because they 
are 'different'. Darwin defined three forms of selection: artificial selection, or breeding 
for certain characteristics; natural selection; and sexual selection, which is relegated to a 
few pages (Darwin 1996 [1859], 73-5) in Chapter IV of The Origin of Species. Sexual 
selection in humans remained a major preoccupation, both of Darwin and his readers, 
and was dealt with extensively in The Descent qfMan (1871). Throughout The Origin 
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ofSpecies, Darwin avoids all discussion of human evolution, although it lies beneath the 
entire text. Darwin's anticipation can be sensed, for once natural selection and his 
endorsement of an undirected or non-'Created' evolution has been understood, then 
questions of man's origin erupt. 
In response to Darwin's theory, T. H. Huxley wondered "'why, if continual 
physical conditions are of so little moment as you suppose, variations should occur at 
all"' (quoted in Freeman 213). This question Darwin could not answer, and until 
genetics was understood no solutions were forthcoming. His lack of explanation for the 
cause of variation led Darwin to be constantly tentative about 'natural selection'. in the 
first edition of Origin of Species he had suggested that other means of modification 
might play a part. By the final edition he considered the 'use and disuse of parts' 
theory, and the effect of external conditions, as possible explanations of variation, 
largely because they appear plausible when no other explanation for the constant advent 
of new variations exists. Despite the obvious distinction between them (Freeman 1974, 
passim), Spencer's theory was linked with Darwins's. Spencer assumes a constant 
gradual progress or improvement for all species, while Darwin does not assume 
progress. Natural selection is totally arbitrary and Darwin himself clearly stated: "'I 
believe ... 
in no law of necessary development... (Freeman, 218, quoting Darwin). 
Although it disturbed him deeply, Darwin also made it explicit that there was no 
supernatural dimension in his explanation of natural selection (Ellegard 1958,12). 
The work provoked a furious debate, much of which was initially hostile. T. H. 
Huxley became Darwin's 'Bulldog', particularly in the infamous debate with Samuel 
Wilberforce at the British Association meeting in 1860. Lewes was one of Darwin's 
keenest supporters. From January 1860 for six months, Lewes produced complimentary 
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articles in the Cornhill, explaining and analysing Darwin's 'Developmental Hypothesis' 
(Ashton 1991,204). Apart from Huxley, Lewes was the only reviewer to deal with 
Darwin's work 'with such fairness and knowledge' (245). His articles in The 
Fortnightly (April to November 1868) pleased Darwin immensely and the two began a 
scientific coffespondence (GEL VIII, 413,418,425), with Darwin proposing Lewes for 
membership of the Linnaean Society (GEL VIII, 436-9). The Darwins also met George 
Eliot, and the two couples visited each other on several occasions (GEL V, 449). 
Darwin was particularly disturbed by the moral and social implications of the 
random nature of natural selection. He did believe in a caring, philanthropic society, 
based largely on Christian ethical values, even if he himself was not a religious believer. 
He was therefore 'hurt' to be told he had proved that 'might is right'; he had also not 
foreseen that the struggle for survival would be perceived as so negative (Hofstadter, 
90-1). One raison Xgtre for the Descent of Man is Darwin's attempt to demonstrate 
that man can be moral. Darwin's weighty marshalling of fossil and developmental 
evidence demonstrated that evolution had to be taken seriously as a bleakly endless 
struggle for survival with no promise of perfection. Further, Darwin implicitly attacked 
the basis of western civilisation: firstly, by implying that this process of natural 
selection had happened to man; secondly by implying that man 'has not always been 
present' (Beer 1996, ix). Thus humans were explained by the same natural laws as all 
other organisms - we were not, after all, a special, separate creation. Thus it was no 
longer possible to accept a static, immutable picture of species, society, or life. 
Although Darwin did not attempt to explain the origin of life, the shortened version of 
his title intimated this. It was only a short time before critics and admirers questioned 
man's ancestry. Victorians were faced with the challenge to overthrow all certainties 
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and contemplate a dynamic world with no certainty of direction, goal or hope of 
ultimate perfection. 
The credibility that attached to Darwin also extended to Spencer. Darwin's 
concern over the arbitrary non-progressive aspects of natural selection led to his 
acceptance of Spencer's term 'the survival of the fittest', with its connotations of the 
best, or strongest finally winning a fierce struggle; although the fittest are not the best, 
merely adapted. Darwin's work radically complicated the moral debate. If God did not 
exist, if there was no progress, no teleological framework, then how should man behave 
morally? Although these questions had long been debated by that portion of the public 
who followed religious and philosophical trends and were aware of 'Higher Criticism' 
the importance of the Darwinian debate forced such questions into the public domain. 
While there is little reference in Eliot's letters or journals to these questions, the 
significance of Darwin's bleak hypothesis would not escape her. The lack of purpose 
and progress, but also the implication that man could not be a moral being, because the 
pressure to survive ruled out altruism, would certainly concern her greatly. When 
Darwin published The Descent ofMan (187 1), he finally addressed the issue of human 
evolution, human morality, and the natures of man and woman. 
in the decade following the publication of The Origin of Species, the demands 
for equality from the women's movement had increased, as had the arguments of the 
scientists who opposed women's emancipation. Spencer was not alone in arguing for 
women's 'special' difference. Henry Thomas Buckle proposed that woman had a 
especial "genius" for deductive and intuitive modes of thought' which derived from her 
special nature. Even the American feminist Margaret Fuller - whose text Woman in the 
Nineteenth-Century (1845) Eliot had reviewed (Eliot 1992,180-6) - had earlier 
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accepted the idea of woman as one side of a dualism, where the feminine side of love, 
beauty and holiness "'was now to have its full chance"' (Alaya 1977,263). The 
developing belief - as encouraged by the 'Woman's Mission' ideology - that woman 
was naturally more caring, sympathetic and maternal, was gaining ground. Initially this 
view derived from worship of the Virgin Mary, but Comte and others had secularised it, 
and now naturalist scientists proclaimed it biological fact. Increasingly, industrialists 
and bourgeoisie accepted the idea of nature and society as being under the sway of 
natural scientific law, since this permitted individualism and prevented state control. 
Even supporters of the women's movement, were also supporters of naturalism, and 
they were therefore compromised when naturalism began to insist that women were 
different - if equal - in that they naturally and biologically possessed special womanly 
characteristics (Richards 1983,61). This trend was also part of the developing 
secularisation and scientism of morals, for women were now biologically, and thus 
officially, the moral conscience of man. 
Darwin did not ignore these developments, and along with many prominent 
anthropologists of the period, is now considered to have 'solved' the issue of woman's 
nature - at least for himself and anti-feminists - by constructing a history of gender roles 
and 'writing Victorian conceptions of female nature back into the past as biological and 
cultural norms' (Jann 1994,287-8). This was not Darwin's conscious, specific, 
patriarchal agenda. For a long time, research assumed Darwin and his work to be an 
objective and scientific investigation. More recently, this assumption has been 
questioned, with his entire cultural and social context now being analysed (Richards 
1983,58). Darwin was fully aware of the work of Spencer, Galton and anthropologists 
such as Tylor, McLennan and Lubbock and their increasing consensus that the growing 
civilisation of man included the move to monogamy, marriage and domestic work for 
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women (Jann, 290-1). Further, Darwin's own experience of women - With the female 
members of the Darwin and Wedgewood houses, particularly his wife Emma, 
seemingly all conforming to the Victorian stereotype of caring, placid, maternal types - 
seemed to confirm domestic nurturing as the norm for women (Richards, 1983,79-87). 
Richards argues that while Darwin believed he had much evidence to back up his 
conclusions on woman's nature, he was also strongly, if unconsciously, influenced by 
his own constructed patriarchal, Victorian beliefs, and these were read back into man's 
pre-history and animal ancestry, with Darwin accounting for them largely by his theory 
of sexual selection. 
The definition of sexual selection in The Origin of Species describes a struggle 
not for existence - as is the case with natural selection - but a struggle for the best 
mates. Specifically, it is 'a struggle between the males for possession of the females; 
the result is not death to the unsuccessful competitor, but few or no offspring' (Darwin 
1996 [1859], 73). Darwin had developed a theory, long debated with Wallace, that 
sexual selection was responsible for all racial and sexual differences, including mental, 
moral, emotional and physical differences, and the whole of The Descent of Man is a 
defence for his theory of sexual selection (Richards, 64). Part One deals plainly with 
man's evolution. Man is evolved from ancestors shared with the higher animals and our 
closest relatives are the apes. Darwin stressed that such animals share much of our 
moral, intellectual and social organisation, and thus such faculties are not God-given. 
The moral sense, defined by Darwin as duty (1901 [1871], 148), is described as 
the highest development in man. He argues that once sociality along with parental and 
filial affections exist in a group of higher animals then a moral sense will follow where 
there is enough intelligence (150). Sociality and altruism are likewise deemed to have 
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evolved as innate faculties, and Darwin furnishes numerous examples of social and 
altruistic acts (153-161), arguing that such characteristics have been naturally selected 
with faculties such as selfishness, imagination and experience being added and refined 
in the case of evolving humans (163). Jann argues that this anthropomorphic crediting 
of animals with aesthetic and sympathetic faculties was developed by anthropologists 
and evolutionists to distance modem man from 'primitive' man, whose sexual and 
social habits did not confonn to Victorian norms. Such 'native' groups were said to 
have regressed from their natural animal instincts to an egoistic human development, 
which involved such conscious practices as infanticide, rape and lack of natural 'kin' 
sociality. Meanwhile higher animal behaviour was awarded Darwin's saccharine 
anthropomorphism (Jann 1994,292-3). J. S. Mill objected strongly to Darwin's claim 
for an inherited morality, arguing that such faculties are learned. Certainly Darwin had 
created a problem for himself. if natural selection had caused sympathy to evolve in 
man, then caring humans may object to the harshness of natural selection, with the 
danger of contravening natural laws. Darwin's stance is that weak or non-adapted 
humans should be aided, rather than the fight for survival being allowed to run its 
course. 
The second section of The Descent of Man explains what sexual selection is, 
giving examples of its actions in many of the different animal phyla. Details are 
included on the various secondary sexual characteristics that have evolved as a result of 
female choice. In all of these instances it is the males who are the decorated ones and 
who actively need to attract the females if they are to be selected as a mate. While the 
secondary characteristics are assumed to be symbols of the males' good lineage, and not 
themselves necessarily valuable, it is as if the features of the females make no 
contribution. The whole of the discussion is directed at the male reader, Darwin 
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probably discounted the woman reader, as he had discouraged his wife-to-be from 
reading Lyell. 
This central discussion sets the scene for the third and final section of The 
Descent of Man, where human sexual selection is examined. Here, unlike most other 
animal groups, the choosing of a mate has passed to the males by virtue of their greater 
strength and intelligence. Darwin makes it clear that everything now deemed beautiful 
in women, in all different cultures and races, has been selected by man over time. 
Choice had developed in order to improve survival rates. Implicit in this argument is the 
idea that sexual selection permits some control. Evolution is no longer the randomness 
of natural selection (Jann, 294). Man is portrayed as a breeder rather than a mate 
(Richardsl983,78). However this image presumably added greatly to the attraction of 
the theory for the Victorian male reader. Darwin differentiates between characteristics 
innate to the sexes and others that have been selected. Man is naturally aggressive, and 
women naturally caring, intuitive and maternal, although the selection for these 
characteristics has led to the greater development of all the altruistic characteristics in 
women, while men are more distant although far more intelligent than women. Women 
have also been selected to be passive and coy, again corresponding to Victorian gender 
ideology (Jann, 292). In contradiction to Mill, Darwin insists that intelligence is innate 
or biologically determined. Women have smaller brains - comparable to a child's - and 
are incapable of developing beyond a certain level, thus women's education is a wasted 
resource (Richards 1983,73). 
No doubt Darwin believed his assertions and also felt that he had all the 
evidence for them, yet so much of what he claims rests on assumptions or observations, 
read through the distorting mirror of Victorian male ideology. The Descent qfMan was 
117 
to have many subversive effects. Although many contemporary women, such as 
Frances Power Cobbe, were to discuss and debate Darwin's works, Eliot was one of the 
few women novelists who understood all the implications. However, as with Spencer's 
work, Darwin's texts could be positive catalysts for Eliot's writing, both in opening up 
new possibilities and by offering grounds for disagreement and challenge. One of the 
most immediate effects is the extra dimensions that Darwin's work seems to add to life 
and history. In The Origin of Species the world is teeming with life, both here, in 
distant places, and in the past. Even the earth overflows with the life of the past, as do 
all humans by virtue of their multiple inheritance. Beer has noted the 'intense air of 
connection' (1983,47) that Darwin conveys, but when this is closely considered it 
becomes overwhelming. It is also quite obvious that Eliot becomes more concerned 
with chance, and unexpected and bizarre connections and coincidences, after the 
appearance of Origin. Another impact on Eliot is that much of Darwin's work is about 
disclosing how things came to be the way they are (Beer 1983,24). This feeling for 
origins and causes is already present in her work, but becomes more implicit, although 
not always to the good. For example, trying to read the throw-away clues to why Hetty 
came to be the way she is proves an informative exercise; while having too much 
explained can be tedious, as with Bulstrode's past; however, the conscious menace of 
knowing absolutely nothing about what constructed Grandcourt is superb. All ideas of 
permanence, certainty and perfection are challenged (Levine 1988,17) and closure is no 
longer possible - which is why I can read a much more fulfilling life for Dorothea than 
seventies feminists did. This negation of closure is, I think, what Beer describes as 
'imaginative release into a continuing and undescribed future', or the "'intention to 
continue"' (1983,64-5, quoting Edward Said). In particular, character is not certain and 
readings depend on what is and is not 'embedded in the plot' (17). 
118 
With regard to character, plot and aspects of form, Darwin's work adds much 
more to the organic 'species and community, 'I and Thou' dimension. Beer suggests 
that Darwin's use of the term evolution blurred the distinction between individual, 
organism, and species (1983,15). Many of Eliot's contemporaries may have found this 
disturbing, but from her existing knowledge, Eliot was already comfortable with such a 
blending - if anything it helped her sense of belonging - and it fuels the sense of 
community, which reaches its apotheosis in the ecosystem of Middlemarch. 
Simultaneously it allows Eliot to examine both man's idea of his own overpowering 
centrality in the world and his total insignificance. There is 'imaginative attraction' for 
Eliot in the ... inextricable web of affinities" which Darwin saw as the order of physical 
life' (Beer 1986,15), but while Darwin adds extra dimensions to this complex of inter- 
relations, such an imaginative awareness was present in Eliot's work long before his 
influence. However, the denial of a grand design and underlying teleology, and the 
totally arbitrary nature of natural selection may explain the move to character that 
Levine detects (1988,18), with plot emerging from characters' musings, moves and 
4chance' encounters. Yet this is not to suggest disorder; even in the expansive 
Middlemarch the natural laws, so important to Eliot, still underlie everything. It is the 
narrator in Eliot's texts who takes on the role of experimenter and observer. Beer 
suggests this was a strategy of authors following upon Darwin's removal of the sense of 
omniscience or omnipotence (1983,45), but Comte had suggested such strategies for 
Eliot's works much earlier. Of Eliot's possible reactions against Darwin's work, the 
obvious ones are an interrogation, and rejection of many of his statements concerning 
women (after all Man as sexual selector Lydgate foolishly selects Rosamund). 
Overall, Darwin's work had two main outcomes. Many of his colleagues felt 
that he had over-extended the significance of sexual selection, with the result that the 
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ensuing pathway in evolutionary work was to re-explain many of his phenomena in 
terms of natural selection or 'use-inheritance' (Richards, 99). However, the trend was 
now set fair to ensure women were perceived as naturally and biologically caring and 
matemal. Darwin did not achieve this conclusion on his own, but his stature helped 
give credence to the general concept and underpins the many post-Darwinian works 
rproving' woman's natural altruism and mental inferiority. This 'biological backlash', 
with evolution restricting women more than religion - for evolution was now accepted 
as objective fact - caused a radical discontinuity of feminist ideology. 'Nineteenth- 
century science, [ ... ] gave such vigorous and persuasive reinforcement to the traditional 
dogmatic view of sexual character that it not only strengthened the opposition to 
feminism but disengaged the ideals of feminists themselves from their philosophic 
roots' (Alaya 1977,262). The transition from a women's movement that was concerned 
to de-gender society, believing that differences are acquired or constructed, to one that 
believes in and encourages women's natural or innate abilities, has been charted in the 
twentieth-century, as well as this turnabout in the 1870s (Chodorow 1989,99). All 
these coming developments, coupled with the sense of dislocation caused by Darwin's 
vision of natural selection, were most depressing. That Schopenhauer's bleak 
philosophy came along, with Nietzsche waiting in the wings, may account for the 
invocation of the 'Promised Land' in Eliot's final novel, now that perfection was no 
longer obtainable. 
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Chapter Three - Feminist Object-Relations Theory: 
A Twentieth-Century articulation of ideas on Sympathy and Duty 
In the preceding chapters I have provided a selected array of possibilities and 
probabilities that may have contributed towards George Eliot's evolving conceptions of 
sympathy and duty. This analysis of influence is not intended to be exhaustive, 
however, I do feel that it is sufficiently inclusive to suggest two conclusions. First, 
certain ideas which appear relevant to Eliot's developing concepts occur independently 
in works of varying age and origin. As these ideas are often reproduced in the fiction, I 
consider there to be enough evidence to offer more precise definitions of Eliot's 
sympathy and duty. Secondly, the repeated occurrence of similar ideas in the work of 
different theorists demonstrates that it is not possible to argue for one or two theorists 
being primarily responsible for influencing Eliot. 
My reading of these works was originally intended to be background research 
towards definitions of Eliot's sympathy and duty. However, I feel that the preceding 
chapters are interesting in themselves, particularly as my concentration on ideas of 
sympathy and duty in relation to gender has revealed aspects which have not generally 
been engaged with by other workers. Examples are Spencer's concern with ethics, the 
profound nature of Spinoza's influence on Eliot, and the multiplicity of sources 
available to Eliot on many subjects, where perhaps only one influence has been 
emPhasised in the past. While many of the ideas have influenced my reading of the 
novels, there is far more to be applied. I therefore regard these early chapters as my 
own 'theories towards criticism', which may suggest approaches to Eliot's work that 
have not been explored before. 
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As a result of considering all these known and possible influences on Eliot, I feel 
that a stronger account of her ideas on sympathy and duty is possible. Concerning the 
origins of the general and sympathetic caring faculties in individuals, it appears obvious 
that Eliot was strongly influenced by Spinoza's, Comte's and Feuerbach's ideas that 
family and community life help to psychologically or psycho-socially encourage 
sympathy in offspring. The parental relationship is primary for the acquisition of 
sympathy, but as Eliot demonstrates in the novels, while the mother) s role may be 
central, it can be carried out by men. Secondly, Eliot considers sympathy to be 
naturally present, but not necessarily innate or spontaneously active. Like Comte and 
Spencer, Eliot knew that sympathy could be encouraged or lost according to an 
individuaPs experiences - hence the importance of encouraging readers to sympathy via 
her novels. Thirdly, the evolutionary work of Spencer and Darwin suggests changes 
take place in organisms over time and Eliot develops Spencer's work to explore via 
fiction the possibility of men becoming more nurturing and women becoming more 
autonomous. Finally, relationship was important for Eliot, as was individuality, and 
rather than arguing for one or the other being predominant, this thesis suggests that the 
tself-in-relation' - as suggested by Feuerbach's concept of the 'I/Thou' and Spencer's 
idea of the individual as part of the species - is more relevant to an understanding of 
Eliot's ideas of mutuality. 
A consideration of relationship helps to define Eliot's sympathy and duty, 
because these are values that are only relevant in relation - whether with a significant 
other, the family or the community. A definition of sympathy is strongly influenced by 
the work of Spinoza, the moral theorists, and Hume and Smith, while the action of 
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sympathy is encouraged by the development of many aspects of the character. 
Empirical knowledge is necessary, as well as experience, reason, understanding and the 
emotions. Imagination and the conscience also contribute to any sympathetic reaction. 
The action of sympathy is a complex but natural process, and Eliot considers that 
constant practice and development of all these faculties can enhance our powers of 
sympathy. Awe at the functioning of sympathy is registered in Spinoza's account of the 
third or intuitive level of knowledge, in Adam Smith's description of sympathy as 
empathy in action, and in Eliot's account of the self being surprised into 'attention to 
what is apart from themselves' (Eliot 1992,263) and all these three suggest the nature 
of Eliot's sympathy. At its best it approaches empathy, but it is not self-sacrificing - 
although as Feuerbach and Spinoza acknowledge, sympathy for another may be so 
important to the happiness of the self, that selflessness is present. However, Eliot's 
sympathy is not Comte's altruism. Finally, Eliot's sympathy is not restricted to women, 
unlike Comte, Eliot illustrates that men can grow to sympathy. 
A definition of duty is more complex, perhaps because more personal. Eliot's 
duty has little to do with the social contracts, artificial virtues, mores, forced duty and 
rights as discussed over time by Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Spencer and others. These 
conventions - originally formed out of necessity, but now often petrified by tradition, 
habit and law - are often represented as a duty to be questioned in Eliot's novels. Duty 
for Eliot is firstly to honour all obligations that have been freely undertaken. Secondly, 
a duty of sympathy or benevolence is desired, but this is not altruism or selflessness. 
No one, women included, is expected to be selfless - self-preservation comes first. Thus 
there is also a duty to the self. Duty is also governed by the natural and inviolable laws, 
and all laws and information should be taken into account when actions are chosen. 
This obviously reflects Spinoza's idea that happiness stems from ever-increasing 
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knowledge and understanding - the more we know the more accurately we can choose 
our actions and duties - and it also considers Spencer's advice to always consider the 
correspondence between internal and external environments. Thus choosing duties may 
depend on understanding ourselves - our psychology - and knowing of what we are 
capable. This leads to the final point, for Eliot appears to be influenced by Kant, in that 
duties can be chosen, but Eliot gives greater importance to the feelings, and does not 
engage with Kant's apriori ideas. 
In Part II of this thesis I shall argue that George Eliot's fiction draws on this 
complex of ideas to provide both a critique of the existing notions of sympathy and 
duty, and to offer challenging proposals for change. Despite the immense amount of 
critical work on Eliot's novels, such an approach has not been followed before, perhaps 
because there is no convenient label to attach to this mixture of theories. To avoid 
confusion I will refer to Eliot's particular concepts as 'intuitive sympathy and duty' thus 
reflecting both the influence of Spinoza's 'intuition' and Schneewind's opinion that 
both Eliot and Spinoza were intuitionist thinkers (Atkins 1978,68). However, the ideas 
that Eliot drew on have continued to evolve, and in the remainder of this chapter 1 argue 
that feminist object-relations theorists, in particular the work of Nancy Chodorow and 
Carol Gilligan, provide an articulation of ideas very similar to those I find in Eliot? s 
work. Usefully, they also provide an explicit terminology which helps to make visible 
for the modem reader patterns of analysis and advocacy which were the outcome of 
long thought and experience for Eliot. This chapter is therefore a detailed exposition of 
feminist object-relations theory. Because this work has been subject to much 
misrepresentation I have also addressed some of the major criticisms, as well as 
including a summary of the literary critical applications of the theory. 
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Object-relations theory evolved in Britain as a psycho-dynamic theory of 
personality structure and human interaction. Early theorists felt that neither traditional 
psychology, nor Freudian theory acknowledged sufficiently the centrality of social 
relationships to the human subject. Major object-relations theorists include Melanie 
Klein, Ronald Fairbairn, Donald Winnicott, and Harry Guntrip. Their main poir, ýY of 
focus are: the relationship between the child and its primary carer from birth, and any 
psychopathology that may develop as a result of problems in this relationship. The 
importance of both the basic drives and the erotogenic zones outlined by Freud are 
acknowledged, but object-relations theorists do not accept that these structure 
psychoanalytic growth and personality formation (Guntrip 1961,29). Rather than the 
child/subject being driven to seek erotic pleasure by the drives, these theorists consider 
the child as seeking objects/people for the purpose of relationship itseo' . The drives or 
erogenous zones are points of interconnection, or 'channels mediating the primary 
object-seeking aims of the ego' (Fairbairn 1952,162), which are developed or not in 
relationship. Intimacy and mutuality are more important than erotic satisfaction. 
The basic premise is that a child's personality - or its ego, or sense of self - 
develops first as a result of its earliest interactions. The 'objects' with which the 
subject has relations are people, parts of people, and symbols of people - for example, 
mother, mother's breast, and bottle/dummy. Initially, the child is in a stage of primary 
narcissism with no sense of itself as separate and having no separate ego. As objects 
begin to be perceived in interaction, the proto-ego is slowly formed. A gradual 
realisation of the self as separate from the carer occurs as interactions continue. It is 
because the carers are not always and exclusively available to the child that awareness 
of separation arises. As the child realises the external environment as separate from the 
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self, it also develops an internal environment. Object-relations includes 'relationships 
with objects which have been internalised during early life under the pressure of 
deprivation and frustration' (Farbaim 1952,162); these are mental representations 
formed as the child develops its inner and outer object worlds. Simply, 
internalisations of the mother are formed, and may assist the child in coping with the 
mother's absence during periods of separation. The internal and external worlds 
continue to develop as relationships continue, with successful development resting with 
the carers, who try to ensure a constant, consistent relationship, and monitor separation 
so that the child becomes a happy self-in-relationshil). 
Dorothy Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow, Carol Gilligan and others are 
collectively referred to as feminist object-relations theorists. Their ideas have 
permeated literary criticism, and their work is central to my analysis of Eliot's novels. 
In addition to a concern with relationships, and the internal and external object world or 
environment, feminist object-relations locates gender identity in the primary parenting 
period and sees subsequent gender-specific development as influenced by this period, 
particularly moral and social development. Theorists question whether mother-only 
parenting is determined and appropriate, if early-year gender prescription can be 
changed, and, if so, what would be the effect on moral and social development. Eliot 
was aware of the harinful effects, for both sexes, of extreme gender-role polarisation; 
yet simultaneously, she valued both the ýmaternal? - the intuition, sympathy and 
relationship traditionally associated with women - and the independence and autonomy 
associated with men. As these values coalesced in Eliot herself, formed the basis of her 
mutuality with Lewes, and also reappear in many of her protagonists - as well as in the 
novels' form - then I contest that feminist object-relations theory is the most appropriate 
perspective for a re-reading of the novels. 
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In the Rocking of the Cradle and the Ruling of the World (1987)" Dorothy 
Dinnerstein argues that in the West, cultural attitudes towards birth, mortality, nature 
and sexuality, are destructively sex-biased, stemming from a woman-hatred that results 
from everyone being nurtured by one major carer - the mother. Like Comte and 
Spencer, Dinnerstein considered it important to change people rather than external 
legislation: in her view, those who believe that altering legislation will result in the 
liberation of women, underestimate the immutability of the psyche as formed by 
mother-only parenting (7). Yet women-only mothering is not immutable. 
Dinnerstein claims that the mother is generally perceived as the source of all 
early pleasure and gratification (28), but also as the origin of all fear and frustration, in 
that she cannot be always available to the child. The work of Melanie Klein is a major 
influence; she revolutionised psychoanalysis by decentring the oedipus complex, 
stressed the importance of the pre-oedipal period and proposed a primary phase of 
femininity for both sexes. Klein also investigated the development of the child's psyche 
in relation to the carer's presence or absence. As the mother cannot totally satisfy the 
demands of the child, the child internalises both the good mother and the bad mother as 
a means of dealing with issues of maternal absence, ambivalence and aggression. 
Dinnerstein argues that the emotions and associations arising from these opposing 
psychological images perpetuate harmful gender relations. Woman is seen as loving 
and nurturing, and we always wish to recreate our symbiotic relationship -with her; yet 
woman is also the omnipotent mother, unreliable and frustrating. As this experience 
"originally published as The Mermaidand the Minofaur(1977). 
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takes place before the child has fully perceived the mother as a separate subject, 
unconscious influences remain and woman becomes irrationally linked with an inability 
to control life. Contemporary nuclear family arrangements, or single-mother units, in 
Western families generally mean that since the father-figure is absent he does not 
become a significant figure for the child until he is perceived as a separate subjectivity, 
and so the father escapes from the preoedipally-inspired 'blame' that equates to 
&mother'. He becomes the repository of culture and all that is rational. 
Dinnerstein stresses the strong erotic links to the 'good' mother, particularly for 
girls, who remain with the mother longer. These erotic ties, muted in the girl (40) by 
society's fear of lesbian-incest, are severed by encouraging the tum to the father; 
nevertheless, a strong homoerotic pull from being mothered by a woman remains (48). 
Bart asks how Dinnerstein can defend her idea that mother-reared daughters hate their 
mother (1977,835), yet ignores Adrienne Rich's acknowledgement of the tremendous 
anger daughters feel for mothers who by remaining victims have lost their daughter's 
chance for inclusion in history and culture (Rich 1977,243). To children, all adults - 
father as well as mother - appear like Gods (Dinnerstein, 120), and Dinnerstein portrays 
humans as constantly attempting to maintain these mythical roles of 'all-powerful' 
mother (209) and male history-makers - as both sexes had perceived the idealised 
father-figure. The male T sees the earth and nature in relation to the mother he lkishes 
to dominate (108-111). For this reason man feels at liberty to plunder the earth in an 
attempt to control that which once controlled him - it is noticeable that Eliot's more 
maternal men are at one with nature. Adrienne Rich accuses Dinnerstein of ignoring 
male terrorism and of being obsessed with psychology to the exclusion of 'economic 
and other realities that help to create psychological reality' (1987,30-31). Yet the 
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existence of social problems results from the situation outlined as Dinnerstein's central 
argument, which demonstrates how economic and material realities result from this 
psychological construction. 
This concern with gender-issues originally stems from Dinnerstein's alarm at the 
human capacity to destroy ourselves (ix). Women collude with men in this destructive 
exclusion from power and history-making, not only because we fear the mother, but 
also because our role as childbearer seems a more impressive one (215) - thus women 
concede the earth and history to men. Since woman-only mothering is not a fixed 
condition (xxiv), Dinnerstein considers that the solution is for men to take an equal 
share in the task of child-rearing, so that the fear, anger and blame currently attached 
solely to women as mothers, can be spread to both sexes: 'They cannot be our brothers 
until we stop being their mothers' (90). Our constant attempts to re/create the symbiotic 
relationship of infancy via our sexual partnerships (xiii) needs to stop; for this reason, 
her suggestion of shared parenting cannot be accused of being homophobic (Bart 1977, 
835) or perpetuating the monogamous, nuclear family; for although she does want 
men/fathers to be involved in parenting, this does not have to be in the context of a 
heterosexual structure. 
Exploring similar territory to Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow's The Reproduction 
of Mothering (1978) asks why women still generally have sole responsibility for 
childcare, particularly when the physical and biological demands of child rearing have 
decreased. She suggests that 'the contemporary reproduction of mothering occurs 
through social structurally induced psychological processes' (7), a process I will refer to 
as psycho-social structuring. Chodorow is providing a descriptive account of why 
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women mother. She does not valorise the gender-roles produced, but wishes to 
engender change. Morally her theory is quite contentious (Housman 1982,49), for she 
recommends change via a form of psycho-social engineering in order to produce 
cungendered' selves-in-relation. 
Women's matemal role had generally been ignored by most sociological 
theorists because it was assumed to be 'natural'. Therefore Chodorow refers to 
extensive scientific and sociological research to oppose theories of 'matemal instinct' 
and woman's essentialist mothering. Anyone can be a mother - an adoptive mother is 
as receptive as a biological one - while biological mothers may refuse to care - as with 
Hetty Sorrel in Adam Bede. It is caring itself that produces carers: 'Arguments from 
nature, then, are unconvincing as explanations for women's mothering as a feature of a 
social structure' (Chodorow 1978,30). Chodorow also denies that social-role leaming 
is sufficiently powerful to exercise this degree of control over women, and defends her 
idea of a psycho-social structuring. While acknowledging the centrality of socialisation 
in dictating the exact form that sex-stereotypes take within a particular society, she 
insists that 
Women's capacities for mothering and abilities to get 
gratification from it are strongly intemalised and 
psychologically enforced, and are built developmentally into the 
feminine psychic structure. Women are prepared 
psychologically for mothering through the developmental 
situation in which they grow up, and in which women have 
mothered them (39). 
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Her theory is based on psychoanalytic research and observations in white, 
Western, heterosexual nuclear families. She was also influenced by feminist research in 
the social sciences, particularly Gayle Rubin's feminist anthropology (1975). In 
western caplikist countries, woman's lower economic influence within the household, 
the separation of home and workplace, the distancing of the extended family, and 
increased male absence from caring, have all contributed to the biological mother still 
having most responsibility for childcare (Chodorow 1978,4-5). Here the system of 
production has manipulated the sex and gender system in such a way as to ensure the 
continued reproduction of this system. Housman claims that Thodorow's work 
appears to suggest that the politics of personal life can be separated out from the politics 
of society' (1982,49), yet she ignores the point that such social politics ensure that the 
mother is the sole carer and perpetuates the system. 
The object-relations theory of Fairbaim and Winnicott is the source of 
Chodorow's hypotheses, a dangerous theory for feminism (Sayers 1986,67) since their 
emphasis on 'good-enough' mothering has been cited in campaigns opposing working 
mothers. Yet Chodorows reformulation of object-relations demonstrates the damaging 
repercussions of mother-only primary parenting and hence arrives at her argument for 
shared parenting, preferably by carers of both biological sexes. Chodorow accepts the 
premise of object-relations that early interactions are central in the formation of 
personality, mutuality, and satisfying relationships; and that object-relations 'provides 
the most useful psychoanalytic approach for a sociologist, because it integrates drives 
and social relations' (Lorber, et al 1981,507). Fairbaim and Winnicott retain Klein's 
idea of the good and bad mother. Me ego, says Fairbairn, only develops gradually. It 
is formed out of the baby's internal representation of its relation to the mother 
recognised bit by bit as separate from itself (Sayers 1986,65). The child, in the pre- 
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oedipal or 'primary parenting' period, interacts via feeding, holding, rhythm, gazing, 
cleaning and changing. A 'process of "differentiation" or "separation-individuation"' 
ensues, the child having been born feeling 'merged and continuous with the world in 
general, and with its mother or caretaker in particular' (Chodorow 1989,102). The 
child's separation between its 'self and the object world is gradually achieved, both by 
the development of a personal psychological division or ego boundary, and also as a 
'body ego', or sense of the boundedness of one's own body. This sense of separation 
evolves from the mother's ministrations, and the distinction between self and other is 
gradually perceived. 'The mother is thus a supplementary ego for the infant: her 
perceptions are mirrored to the infant who utilises this mirroring to organise its own 
perceptions' (Wright, 286). The mother protects the child's "'going-on being"' (Sayers 
1986,66) so that this proto-ego is not damaged by too harsh or too early an 
infringement of reality. The mother's actions also mediate between internal and 
external realities so that the child gradually builds up its 'inner object world', which 
contains representations of the mother, the self, and interactions and connections. The 
child can eventually cope with the mother's absence via its mental 'object' that sustains 
it over ever longer periods. The child is psycho-socially structured by a mothering 
which gradually conveys to the child an understanding that it is separate from the 
mother (Adams 1983,44-6). Thus separateness or individuality can only be defined in 
relation - which is why this work is so relevant for Eliot and her texts. 
Problems occur when the mother cannot cater to every need, and internal object- 
relations are formed in repressing intemalisations of the 'bad' mother. Thus as the child 
appreciates its own subjectivity, it also begins to realise that the carer is more than just 
'other', but a subject vAth separate needs and activities. True differentiation then 
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involves understanding of the interaction between self and another self (Chodorow 
1989,104) - as when Eliot enables the reader to acknowledge Casaubon's own centre 
of self One of the problems for mothers is that they may not be fully perceived as 
separate subjects by the child, but are seen as narcissistic extensions. This perception is 
often extended to women in general, who are deemed always available for sympathy 
and care, as Florence Nightingale describes. Ideally the newly emerged self/child needs 
to feel that it is an agent and can affect others and its surroundings, that it has been 
allowed to develop its own feelings and ideas, and also that there is a fit or mutuality 
with the needs and feelings of the mother (106). Validation and love from the carer 
achieve these aspects of the self, while rejection - through being ignored or allowed no 
freedom - will not. The crucial sense of the self-in-relation with the carer becomes 
internalised, and thus a part of self becomes the good mother, so that 'the central core of 
self is, internally, a relational ego, a sense of self-in-good-relationship' (106). If this 
ego-core is strong, then the wholeness of self patently does not inhere in separateness or 
individuation alone; genuine autonomy is about still being in connection: 
'differentiation is ... a particular way of 
being connected to others' (107). Many of 
Chodorow's critics underestimate or ignore the psychoanalytic account of the formation 
of a core gender identity and a 'self-in-relation' to the mother, and its importance 
(Housman 1982,51-2); Lorber insists that socialisation is enough to explain women-'s 
continued child care - despite Chodorow's refutation of the role-learning argument 
(1981,484). 
In theory, both mate and female children, coming through the pre-oedipal period 
and having received a loving, relation-based caring that achieves this sense of self - 
even allowing for not having secured the ideal - should be sufficiently caring and 
relational in their sense of self-in-relation, to be able to mother. However, males 
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generally do not mother, and, even if willing, lack the 'intuitive' responses of females. 
Because physiological explanations for women's mothering are accepted, why men do 
not mother is not questioned. Chodorow wants to know why, and concludes that 
gender difference explains this anomaly. While children are not born with an awareness 
of gender difference, Chodorow believes that it is apparent early, and suggests that a 
6core gender identity' is created in the pre-oedipal period, which for men ultimately 
conflicts with the masculinity that must be developed (1989,109). Core gender identity 
is 'a cognitive sense of gendered self, the sense that one is male or female. It is 
established in the first two years concomitantly with the sense of self (109). As the 
sense of self is formed in relation, so is the core gender identity; and if women mother, 
then the child - male or female - develops a sense of femaleness as its self-in-relation 
develops. Meanwhile, the mother perceives the female child as having the same core 
gender identity, while the boy is perceived as different or 'other', which becomes 
conflictual with a forming core of femaleness. Consequently, to be male is to be in 
reaction against this femaleness that defines male as different, and if there are no male 
figures of love and identification who are as personal and important to the male child as 
the mother, then 'leaming what it is to be masculine comes to mean learning to be not- 
feminine, or not-womanly' (109). Other additions to this core identity will develop 
later, such as sense of class, colour, sexuality and so on, but they build on this core and 
do not erase, create or change it.. 
Elizabeth Spelman (1988) criticises Chodorow's insufficient consideration of 
class and race in the formation of the gendered self. However, Spelman does not 
engage with the concept of the early primary parenting period. At this time the 
conditions to be incorporated into the child's forming sense of self and gender will be 
ones which are significant to the mother-child relationship. Chodorow's argument is 
134 
that issues of 'difference' are paramount, and gender is the most common difference. It 
is obvious that if there are other major 'differences' between mother and child, then it is 
likely that these would affect the core gender identity. For example, if a child suffered 
great pain, this 'difference' may be part of its core gender identity. 
Boys, then, do not develop the relational and caring attributes necessary for 
mothering because gender conflict results in their ejection from the pre-oedipal 
relationship earlier than girls (Chodorow 1978,107). The mother perceives the boy 
child as more 'other' than a daughter and at the same time the son's core gender identity 
develops away from the mother. The male child's sense of self is consequently built on 
6me - not me' rather than 'self-in-relation'. Girls do not experience these problems as 
mothers consider them continuous with themselves; girls may even feel too continuous. 
The forced separation and acquisition of early individuality further gender the boy, so 
that in male-dominated, father-absent societies masculinity and sexual difference are 
defined as separation and individuation issues. Therefore, children are aware of their 
gender well before the usual site of the Oedipus complex., 
The boy's swift transition from preoedipal to oedipal stage can also lead to his 
associating primary love with rejection, and an inability to be relational, although boys 
are more able to form a separate self and impermeable ego boundaries. Chodorow cites 
research showing that fathers are always far more concerned with issues of gender role 
expectation, and in treating boys and girls differently (1989,109). The boy eventually 
perceives that he still has the 'promise' of power that is part of being male, but is 
always rejecting his experience of the feminine. A girl's identification is personal, 
based on a real relationship with her mother and knowing what it is to be female, while 
the boy's is largely positional, formed in relation to roles, status and ideas of being 
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masculine. This early relationship with the mother is basic in three ways. Most 
important, the psycho-social condition for parenting is founded. Second, people come 
out of it with the memory of a unique intimacy, which they want to recreate. Finally, 
the relationship provides a foundation for expectations of women as mothers 
(Chodorow 1978,57). 
Chodorow argues that girls, by remaining longer in the pre-oedipal with the 
mother, develop more permeable ego-boundaries that allow for easier relationships. 
She does not say that women have weak ego-boundaries, but from a close relationship 
with the mother they are able to empathise and merge with others, and are thus prepared 
for mothering, although such close identification may create separation problems and a 
lack of autonomy. Girls' main problem with their gender identity arrives later in life 
once they perceive the female gender as negatively valued, and see mothering and 
femininity as available to them but with little power or cultural and social value 
(Chodorow 1989,111; 1995,145). While some critics misread Chodorow's work as 
valorising an essential motherhood, others have seen it as an attack on mothers. The 
. literary critic 
Jennifer Strauss sees the work as belonging to an anti-maternalism 
prevalent in the Seventies (1992,3). Yet when Chodorow talks of mothers, she makes 
it clear that men are just as gendered and psycho-socially structured, and that both are 
further manipulated by the dominant discourse. In outlining girls' turning away from 
their mothers, Chodorow acknowledges their sometimes desperate attempts to separate 
when the relationship has been too close. 
According to Chodorow the oedipal complex in girls is characterised by the 
continuation of preoedipal attachments, by sexual oscillation in an oedipal triangle with 
the father, and by the lack of either absolute change of love object or absolute oedipal 
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resolution (1978,133); they do not generally achieve the same heterosexuality as boys. 
The girl does not effect a change of object when she turns to the father in response to his 
heterosexual advances - which are societally dictated in order to overcome the greatest 
of taboos, the incestuous, unproductive, lesbian mother-daughter relationship - instead 
she maintains her internal link to the mother. The turn is not complete; the girl is 
always looking back to the mother with love, and her acceptance of heterosexuality is 
rarely complete: 'Her turn to her father is both an attack on her mother and an 
expression of love for her' (126). At adolescence other objects - such as close female 
friends, or an idealised pseudo-mother figure - may become the centre of the girl's 
attention; she may try to be as unlike the mother as possible, as with Eliot? s early 
friendship with Maria Lewis. Again, complete separation and adherence to 
heterosexuality are not necessarily achieved, but pressure for this conformity is 
mediated by, and reproduced within the psycho-socially constructed, nuclear, 
heterosexual family. 12 
As the father is largely absent, the boy-child must imbibe his role 'positionally' 
by identifying with particular aspects of masculinity - both psychologically and 
sociologically - appropriating components of his masculinity, and identifying with 
cultural images of maleness. This means that 'boys are taught to be masculine more 
consciously than girls are taught to be feminine' (176). As they may lack an affective 
relationship with their father and reject their ties to the feminine, boys come to value 
isolation and separation. In a clamour for an elusive masculinity, boys begin to derogate 
all things female, as well as claiming for themselves exclusive Cmasculine activities'; 
they learn what Freud called 'the normal mate contempt for women' (182). Chodorow 
claims that this response stems not from any awareness of woman! s 'lack' but from a 
12 Chodorow is accused of reinforcing heterosexuality (Rich 1987,32; Housman 1982,49) but is 
pxplaining b0crownwIlIV5 WnStWtion and tbg*, malf fýar of moftr-d-agbw ingest. 
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belief in female inferiority reinforced by fathers, although the original contempt is born 
of fear of rejection and maternal omnipotence as a result of the boy's early exodus from 
the preoedipal. 
The main objections to Chodorow's work are from psychoanalysts over 
the downgrading of the Oedipus complex and the consequent displacement of the 
unconscious. Rose denies that a theory of the unconscious plays any significant role in 
Chodorow's account (Mitchell & Rose 1985,37) and describes it as gender imprinting 
compatible with 'a sociological conception of role' (37). Yet the repression of certain 
'bad' objects and object-relations into an unconscious internal suggests the presence of 
an unconscious. Adams joins this chorus, arguing that Chodorow is: 'disregarding 
Freud's concept of psychical reality and making the social determining of the psychicall 
(1983,48). But what first originated the psychical. if not the social? Freud frequently 
cites the importance of the incest taboo in the construction of the psyche. 
Both males and females have a memory of a unique and intimate relationship 
which they wish to reproduce. For the male this is generally via woman as a return to 
the mother in a heterosexual relationship. For women, the impermeable ego of the male 
does not permit the closeness desired, and the triangular relationship of her childhood 
means that a man is only ever secondary and does not provide a way back to the mother. 
Having a child, however, does - hence the reproduction of mothering. Chodorow 
concludes that women's mothering includes the capacities for its own reproduction 
resulting in the production of women with, and men without, the particular 
psychological capacities and stance to achieve primary parenting (1978,206). To break 
this so that women can achieve greater separation and individuality, and men can 
become more relational, Chodorow recommends shared primary parenting; all nurturing 
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and socialising should be carried out by both sexes/parents, from birth onwards. As she 
argues in favour of 'ungendering' she thinks that both sexes should care for both sexes. 
Many critics misunderstand the crucial significance of the primary parenting 
period, and discuss socialising theories for later in the child's life. But 'primary 
parenting' is from birth onwards, when the formation of the child's 'self and core 
gender identity slowly proceed as a result of the psychic interactions of carer and child. 
Critics assume that Chodorow expects 'ungendering' to proceed from men doing a little 
more baby care. But the task is arduous, and needs to be if it is to change 
psychoanalytic development. Ortner's comments that men's participation in childcare 
will not change the cultural view of women (Sayers 1982,109) fails to understand that 
men's primary parenting would change gender, so that mate children would emerge 
with an anti-women bias no longer factored into their psyche. The sexual division of 
labour cannot be separated from sexual inequality - it, and the womaWs responsibility 
for child-care that produces it, generates male dominance. However this system is not 
biological or inevitable and 'it can be changed' (Chodorow 1978,214). Having 
exposed how parenting qualities are created in women through psychoanalytical 
processes dictated by social structures, she suggests that by implication 'these qualities 
could be created in men, if men and women parented equally'(217). 
Children can become satisfactorily attached to more than one carer, and 
Chodorow disputes research which claims that any dilution of primary care militates 
against basic ego development, observing that such studies only relate to cases where 
care was inadequate. She gives evidence that children with more than one carer are 
both more relational and assertive - as shown by children in Kibbutzim or other 
extended family situations (217) - and is generally in favour of 'othermothering' in 
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addition to shared primary parenting. However, she believes the 'mother as caretaker' 
model may be preferred by a patriarchal society as it appears to produce offspring who 
are 'good for society' in that they are 'achievement-oriented men and people with 
psychologically monogamic tendencies' (75). Further, 'because men have power and 
cultural hegemony in our society, a notable thing happens. Men use and have used this 
hegemony to appropriate and transform these [preoedipal] experiences' and define 
maleness as human, and femaleness as 'not man' (1989,111). 
Critics also claim that Chodorow ignores women's lack of power in the world 
and argue that economic considerations, not psychoanalysis, are primary in explaining 
women's oppression and their decision to mother (Lorber 1981,484). Yet The 
Reproduction ofMothering contains a remarkable expose of male and capitalist control 
of life. The sex/gender system is explored, showing how women are part of the 
exchange (Chodorow 1978,8-9); the division of labour is discussed, where low-paid, 
unvalued work encourages women to stay at home (35), and manufactured changes in 
family structure mean that they have no support (37), while society's structure 
discourages non-mother or multiple caring (76). But the main question and remit 
always was, why do women want to mother? Chodorow defends herself against her 
critics, both in the Lorber essay and more recently (1995,141-153). She states 
forcefully that few men will carry out primary care - even if there are exceptions - and 
is insistent about the near universality of women's mothering; she also makes it clear 
that many issues criticised were dealt with in the 'Afterword' (1978), particularly that 
her theories addresses white, Western nuclear families. Surprisingly, while there are 
many criticisms of these works, few comment on the enormity of the changes being 
suggested. Both Lasch and Housman see the suggestions as potentially dangerous, 
while Chris Weedon is more appreciative of the tension generated by Chodorows ideas: 
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lemim 
'[the 
A] produces a position where what 
has always been is not inevitable' (1987,62-63). 
Adams (1983) is one of the few to appreciate the enormity of the idea of shared 
parenting, and sees it as liable to produce a dangerous androgyny of the emotions. 
Nevertheless, many feminist theorists are now coming to recognise that changing the 
psyche can be accomplished by social means. 
For the purpose of my analysis of the operation of sympathy and duty in George 
Eliot's fiction it is notable that theorist Carol Gilligan recognises the importance of 
Chodorow's ideas in accounting for observed gender differences in ethical decision 
making. Gilligan first came to prominence with In A Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women's Development (1982), where she announced that she had been 
hearing 'two ways of speaking about moral problems, two modes of describing the 
relationship between other and self'(1). Since then she has argued at length that there is 
a different voice speaking about moral decisions, a voice that is not heard or valued, but 
which is vital to any full understanding of human development and morals (Gilligan 
1986,1987,1988). Although she states that she is not making claims 'about the origin 
of the differences' (1982,2), Gilligan gives a clear outline of Chodorow's theory (7-9), 
citing her contention that "'girls emerge from this [pre-oedipal] period with a basis for 
'; empathy' built into their primary definition of self in a way that boys do not... and that 
girls have "'a stronger basis for experiencing another's needs or feelings as one's own"' 
(8). Gilligan is concerned that object-relations theory ties the formation of the self to 
separation (1987,28), yet Chodorow describes self-in-relation: 'a relational rather than 
a reactive autonomy', and claims that extreme separateness is a rigid defence (1989, 
106-7). Gilligan's theories interact productively with Chodorow's work, and offer 
important insights into Eliot's novels. 
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Gilligan, a psychologist whose research concerned tests of ethical reasoning, 
became aware that girls could be marked down compared to boys of similar age, 
background and ability, because their answers did not conform to the moral response 
expected. Their response was not 'wrong', but just not fully catered for by the test and 
thus graded lower. These moral maturity tests, devised by Laurence Kohlberg, had been 
graded using male participants only; they present moral dilemmas and grade 
participants according to their solutions. Gilligan concluded that acceptable responses 
involved seeing the dilemmas as self-contained problems of moral logic which could be 
solved by the rigid application of a 'justice' ethic. She describes one boy as perceiving 
the dilemma as a 'math problem with people?, while for a girl it becomes ýa narrative of 
relationships that extends over time' (Gilligan 1982,28). The moral stance preferred by 
the tests is one of separation, autonomy, individuation, and natural rights as associated 
with male values. On Kohlberg's scale women generally reached the third level, where 
A goodness' is defined as helping and pleasing others (18). 
Gilligan is often misrepresented as claiming an ethic of care and relationship for 
women., and a justice ethic for men. This is too simple, for she is quite clear that the 
'different voice' is characterised by theme and not gender; yet her immediate empirical 
and interpretive observations did associate the ignored caring ethic with women. 
However, Gilligan does not claim that men cannot have a care perspective and women a 
justice perspective; her observation was that philosophy had constructed a hierarchy of 
moral values which did not value the 'different voice' of an ethic of care and 
relationship, and that traditionally this caring principle has been associated with women. 
Already in this thesis, remarks on women"s 'questionable" sense of justice have been 
noted by Spencer, Schopenhauer, Darwin and Freud. Gilligan suggests that such 
opinions result from women being judged according to normative developmental 
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theories that depend upon standards derived from male values. Freud, Piaget and 
Erikson (7,10,12) continued to value 'a trajectory toward increasing autonomy and 
individuation rather than toward intimacy and connectedness' (Benjamin 1983,291). 
Gilligan carried out her own 'moral dilemma' investigation, where groups of 
boys and girls are presented with certain ethical questions. A well-known example is 
whether a man should steal medicine for his sick wife or not (1982,25-31). Overall, 
girls' answers tended to consider the wider implications - their thinking was lateral or 
'web-like' - and was rooted in a desire to avoid hurting anyone, and a concern for 
relationships. They considered whether the man could get the drug elsewhere, or that if 
he went to prison his wife's situation would be worse. To them, the problems were of 
conflicting responsibilities rather than competing rights. By comparison, boys saw the 
problems as straightforward 'rights' issues, generally responding that the man had a 
right to steal the drug. 
Another investigation analyses sex differences in relation to the perception of 
violence. College students, male and female, are asked to write stories in response to 
seemingly innocuous illustrations. Simply, men indicated that they perceived danger - 
and therefore wrote stories of aggressive response - in pictures suggesting relationship, 
trust and caring, particularly where women were represented; while women perceived 
danger in situations of ambition and success which they interpreted as suggesting 
alienation and isolation. These results suggest tendencies that Gilligan's work threw 
open to debate. If men are afraid of connection, relationship and intimacy, then this 
supports Chodorow's hypothesis that male gender may be constructed in reaction to 
anything female; it also accounts for any lack of relational concern in their moral 
thinking. Meanwhile, if women fear success - as studies suggest (Gilligan 1982,14-16) 
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- imagining that it brings isolation and alienation, Chodorow's contention that girls are 
constructed in relation, and anything which threatens this and provokes aggression is to 
be opposed, appears to be validated. Interestingly, Eliot critics have commented on her 
fear of ambition and success (Bodenheimer 1990). Benjamin notes that Chodorow's 
account of separation versus self-in-relation highlights the paradox of a desire for 
independence versus a desire for recognition (in Lerner et al 1981,160), which rather 
suggests that aspects of the 'other' are strangely present in each gender. On woman's 
moral sense Gilligan states: 'women's deference is located not only in their social 
subordination but also in the substance of their moral concern. Sensitivity to the needs 
of others and the assumption of responsibility for taking care lead women to attend to 
voices other than their own and to include in their judgement other points of view' 
(1982,16). 
A further study investigates women's moral-decision making processes 
concerning abortion. Gilligan discusses at length women's lack of voice and frequent 
inability to speak and freely exercise moral opinions, or make decisions. Moral 
decision-making involves choice 'and the willingness to accept responsibility for that 
choice' (1982,67). Abortion was chosen as a forum where women have to choose, and 
have to take responsibility for their choice. Follow-up interviews indicated that those 
women who had struggled to make their own decision and taken responsibility for it felt 
that they had grown and changed as a result. From these studies Gilligan proposes a 
model of moral development, one of increasingly complex and differentiated 
understanding of how care which also includes responsibility for oneself as well as 
others. At the first level, self-preservation is the primary concern and moral decisions 
revolve around one's own needs, such as having a baby in order not to feel lonely. The 
transition to the second level of morality involves balancing connection with others 
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alongside a definition of self - so there is the awareness of deciding between self and 
other. At the second level, goodness is perceived as self-sacrifice, where it is thought 
good, right, or one's duty to always defer to the other and avoid hurting their feelings, 
while ignoring one's own; thus a girl might abort the baby to please her parents. The 
transition to the third stage involves understanding that a morality of care involves care 
for the self What matters is not what others will think of us, but what the consequences 
will be for both self and other. The transition is complete when a morality of non- 
violence is achieved where the most appropriate action involves not hurting either. 
The 'different voice' of care which Gilligan identifies is a morality of 
responsibility based on non-violence and a recognition of the need for compassion and 
care for self and others. As with Chodorow's findings for women nurtured in the 
preoedipal, there is an emphasis on relationships and on the constant need to evaluate 
self-sacrifice versus selfishness. The main aspect of the 'ethic of care' is concern for 
the self in connection with others. All moral dilemmas are complex and contextual; 
they need solving via ongoing, web-like, feedback mechanisms and inductive thinking. 
There are no simple rules or rights because all situations are unique, each involving 
people in relation. Meanwhile, Gilligan does value the ethic of justice and is not 
valorising care. Although justice has been over-privileged and needs to work in 
harmony with the care ethic, in order to establish reciprocity, faimess and a respect for 
rights - our own and others'; there is also an emphasis on separateness, and the 
individual is to be respected. At the highest level of reasoning, moral problems are 
solved by the application of universal moral principles via formal and abstract thinking 
(Brabeck, 1993,36). 'Development for both sexes would therefore seem to entail an 
integration of rights and responsibilities through the discovery of the complementarity 
of these disparate views' (Gilligan 1982,100). If there are two sides to 'relationship', 
145 
then perhaps the optimum is mid-way, which means that caring should not be over- 
prioritised. 
One of the strongest condemnations of both Chodorow and Gilligan is that they 
present an essentialist view. Chodorow's work appears 'an essentially biologically 
determinist and pessimistic account' (Leonard 1984,54), with 'an essentialism about a 
female nature no less insidious for being culturally determined' (Wright 1992,289). 
However, the definition of essentialism changes, at one time being synonymous with 
innateness and concerned with the unchanging inward quality of something as opposed 
to its attributes and existence. Now 'The term essentialism in feminist theory is taken 
on the one hand as biological or psychical determinism and on the other as denying the 
possibility of historical changes occurring in the structures of subjectivity' (Wright 
1992,77). Thus critics were taking Chodorow's account to be essentialist because of 
the psychic construction that she describes - disregarding her central project of 
changing subjectivity, which actually makes her work less 'essentialist' than that of 
Freud and Lacan, for whom our nature was fixed by the oedipal structure. Meanwhile 
Gilligan had always argued that she was not suggesting an essentially female ethic of 
care (Kerber el al 1986,306,308). In an extended discussion on the frequent use of the 
'anti-essentialist critique' against second-wave feminist projects by third-wave 
feminists, Cressida Heyes (1997,142) acknowledges that the meaning and the 
application of the term have become disconcertingly cavalier (143-4), now often 
meaning any feminist theory that is determinist, exclusionary, ahistorical, or that falsely 
reifies or generalises anything female. Overall, Heyes exonerates both Chodorow and 
Gilligan (147). 1 concur with Heyes' conclusion that it is easier to criticise than fully 
engage with ýpolitical problems that often seem too overwhelming to address? (16 1). 
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Gilligan has never claimed statistical truth for her studies (126), insisting that it 
is enough if the 'different voice' is heard. Yet still critics assert. that her work is not 
statistically viable (Luria; Kerber et al, 1986,318-9). Critic Christopher Lasch assumes 
some faux pas on her part when she describes a 'caring' man (1992,3 6), but Gilligan 
never said men could not care. Overall, the critics are correct, since empirical evidence 
in support of her claims is not available, interviews are not standardised, and no 
quantitative data is given (see Brabeck 1993). However, Gilligan never intended to 
prove that women were more empathic and relational; she just wanted the 'different 
voice' to be heard: 'To claim that there is a voice different from those which 
psychologists have represented, I need only one example - one voice whose coherence 
is not recognised' (Kerber et al, 327-8). It also does her an injustice to claim that she 
valorises the caring ethic at the expense of the justice ethic. Vandenberg castigates 
Noddings for her partial appropriation of this aspect of Gilligan's work, observing that 
'these "different modes of moral understanding" are "complementary rather than 
sequential or opposed... (1996,256). 
In 1982 Gilligan acknowledged that far more research was needed - unaware of 
the revolution that her work was to catalyse; for she has changed the 'voice' of social 
science, one example being that Laurence Kohlberg changed his own tests to include a 
care ethic (Kohlberg el al 1983). That people are increasingly able and happy to 
perceive themselves the product of different cultures across time and space, is one result 
of Gilligan's work (Bohart and Greenberg 1977). Whatever its faults, Gilligan's work 
has allowed for and encouraged the valuing of different realities and different ways of 
seeing - something that is investigated repeatedly in Eliot's novels. 'Gilligan's theory 
embraces relativism as the solution to moral choice' (Brabeck 1993,46) and this 
position is her major advance over other moral development theorists. 
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All of these works have generated major, ongoing criticism, while also changing 
feminist theory beyond recognition, and many current practices and ideas are derived 
from feminist object-relations, even though they may no longer be credited. 13 The 
successful 'rhetoric' (Davis 1992) of the original works provoked an ongoing debate, 
based around the controversies, the disagreements, the areas still to be explained, and 
the popular spin-offs. As a literary critic, I was attracted to feminist object-relations 
theory because it seemed to offer a new approach to much Victorian literature and 
George Eliot's work in particular, with its involvement with the science and morality of 
the period, and complex approach to ethics, interconnection and changing 
environments. 
In a disturbing book, Death Without Weeping (1992), Nancy Scheper-Hughes 
castigates theories such as Chodorow's as Western, bourgeois, history-bound, and 
essentialist, because she feels that they have no place in her investigation of infanticide, 
deliberate neglect and selective care among the mothers she studies on the Alto do 
Cruzeiro, in Brazil. She asks, What does mother love look like in this inhospitable 
contextT (400), and suggests that 'the invention of mother love corresponds not only 
with the rise of the modem bourgeois nuclear family (as Elizabeth Badinter [1980] 
pointed out) but also with the demographic transition: the precipitous decline in infant 
mortality and female fertility' (401). Further, she is angry at the way some feminists 
have "celebrated, even idealised, the intuitive, empathic womanly ethos', and adds: 
ýHere I question the paradigm of an essentialist 5Temale'? psychology itself. The 
13 For further discussion see: Fisher el all 998; Hekman 1995. 
148 
"'object-relations" that take shape in the womanly experience of pregnancy, birthing, 
and early mothering may just as "naturally" reproduce maternal sentiments of distance 
and estrangement as of attachment and empathy' (403). 
Hughes is right in claiming that the impossible ideal of the 'good enough' 
mother is largely a bourgeois invention, and many feminists have done Chodorow and 
Gilligan a disservice in presenting their work as over-valorising female nurturing. 
Chodorow's aim is to show the dangers of such a practice and to suggest change, while 
Gilligan insists that if such a relational morality exists then it deserves to have an equal 
voice with the justice ethic. Neither is guilty of the ahistorical essentialism practised by 
Darwin and Spencer as they constructed 'primitive' woman and motherhood by reading 
the Victorian ideal back through time. Chodorows attention to the details of industrial 
capitalist society strongly implies that motherhood practices are always environmentally 
relative. It is nevertheless true that the kind of unconditional care described by 
Fairbaim is common to all our primate relatives, so long as conditions are good. It is 
the struggle for survival which produces the dark obverse of this picture suggested by 
Hughes, including infanticide and selective care of infants (Blaffer-Hrdy 1999, passim) 
-a picture corresponding to Eliot's dark profile of 'Dame Nature'. The parallels I draw 
between Chodorow and Eliot do not, therefore, depend on their belief that motherhood 
'is' one thing or another. Rather, they each recognise that whatever mothering is, only 
women are 'supposed' to do it, so that only women are held responsible for the potential 
extremes of parenting, from self-denying devotion to callous disregard. 
The literary application of feminist object-relations theories is comparable to the 
approach of psychoanalytic criticism, although the former is psycho-social, more fluid, 
and not restricted to the unconscious or the Oedipal crisis. Eagleton (1983) and Wright 
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(1982) concur in the belief that psychoanalytic literary criticism follows four main 
approaches: 'It can attend to the author of the work; to the work's contents; to itsformal 
construction; or to the reader' (Eagleton 1983,179). Both critics privilege attention to 
the formal construction and the language of the text - especially the literary analysis 
carried out by Lacan - and a concern with the relationship between the reader and the 
text. 
References by literary critics to the works of Chodorow, Gilligan, Dinnerstein et 
al have become legion, yet few readings employ their theories extensively and 
specifically, or attempt to consider the form or the reader; most attention is given to 
analyses of the author and content. Patsy Stoneman provides a reassessment of 
Elizabeth Gaskell and her work with the aid of feminist object-relations theory, 
contending that critics have often dismissed Gaskell because they cannot read the 
feminine language of mothering and maternal thinking that is central to her work 
(1987(a), 14). By far the most common use of feminist object-relations theory involves 
a psychoanalysing of characters as if they were constructed on lines described by 
Chodorow and Gilligan. In a wide-ranging study of Caribbean women writers Niesen de 
Abruna employs Chodorow and Gilligan? s theories to analyse the repeated incidence of 
women! s bonding and the ethic of care among the characters in the novels discussed: 
'The women characters best able to survive form a bond, a type of "mifforing" 
relationship with other women' (1988,86). 
The analysis of the latent structure of texts, including themes, form and 
language, continues to develop, and is the area where feminist object-relations theory 
has had its most profound impact. Gynocriticism elucidates woman's history through 
her texts and reveals, publicises and celebrates womaiYs previously hidden social, 
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personal and relational life; including woman's mothering, and increasingly the mother 
as subject (Gallop 1986; Suleiman 1988). Building on the continued emergence of such 
women-centred literature and criticism, Gardiner and others began to make the 
connection between the fluidity of women's writing, as cited by French feminist 
theorists, and the merging boundaries discussed in feminist object-relations theorists. 
Women's autobiographies are considered to be less 'goal'-orientated than men's, while: 
'Critics find the merging identities and blurred boundaries which are attributed to 
women's relationships in all aspects of writing by women' (Gardiner 1985,137). 
Meanwhile, Rachel Blau DuPlessis (1985) demonstrated that women writers were 
! Breaking the Sentence: Breaking the Sequence? (3 1) in order to sever the narrative 
form from conventional structures and thus achieve a 'writing beyond the ending'. She 
refers to the theorists discussed here and asserts that "'Maternal Thinking" the ideology 
to which mothering gives rise' (180) is seen as extending through all the social 
institutions and pervades all habits of mind in much contemporary women's fiction. 
Much of the critical work on the formal structure of women's texts is indebted to 
the theories of Dinnerstein, Chodorow and Gilligan. A classic text, The Voyage In: 
Fictions ofFemale Development (Abel et al 1983), builds on a base of feminist object- 
relations theory to analyse women's novels of development, comparing and contrasting 
the plots and narrative structures of typical Bildungsromanen by male authors, to the 
non-linear, more fluid, web-like and relational texts of female evolution by women 
authors - texts that resist closure and rigid classification, so that a new sub-genre of 
gender emerges. Furthering this work, Mothering the Mind (Perry & Brownley 1984) 
proposed new frameworks for assessing the structure of female texts and advocated a 
reading for sub-plots which celebrate women's relatedness - as outlined in Chodorow 
and Gilligan - sub-plots which ýcommunicate multiple and contradictory messages, 
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displace heterosexual love plots from the centre of women's fictions, disrupting their 
seemingly smooth surfaces to reveal the repressed content beneath' (Wright 1992,281). 
Other formative texts are The (MOther Tongue (Garner et al 1985), Abel's Writing and 
Sexual Difference (1982) and Hirsch's The MotherlDaughter Plot (1989). To some 
extent, the catalytic effect of feminist object-relations theory has been overshadowed by 
the presence of these groundbreaking texts, which are often referred to without their 
own influences being considered. While such works lay heavy stress on connectedness 
and caring as 'female', they do present an alternative reading schema for a perception of 
a non-male psyche, relatedness and progression in literary texts, particularly texts by 
women where gender issues are under debate and latent readings possible. 
Margaret Homans attempts an analysis of language and literary form by fusing 
Lacan's and Chodorow's work in Bearing the Word (1986). Homans considers that 
Chodorow's reformulation of the oedipal complex has profound implications for Lacan's 
theory of language acquisition. In the absence of a reasonable Lacanian account of the 
girl's experience of the oedipal period, Homans appropriates Chodorow's theory and 
suggests that because the girl is the same as her mother, the father's interruption does 
not have as significant an effect as for the boy; there is no difference that needs linking 
by language, no gap or desire opens up to require repeated attempts at closure because 
the girl is not separated from the mother. The girl has less incentive to enter the 
symbolic order, and the preoedipal period lasts into the period of representational 
language, during which time she is in a triangular relationship, as described by 
Chodorow. 
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For Freud and Lacan, the girl's longer preoedipal period is a disadvantage as she 
is denied the early experience of separation, individuation and symbolic language 
acquisition. However, Homans suggests that the 'daughter has the positive experience 
of never having given up entirely the presymbolic communication that carries over, with 
the bond to the mother beyond the preoedipal period. The daughter therefore speaks 
two languages at once' (1986,13). She speaks both the literal of the mother, and, as she 
makes the gradual shift to the symbolic order, the figurative of the father. Employing 
Chodorow's theory to tell the story of the daughter is interesting, and Homan's defence 
of Chodorow's theories as truth, as well as myth for literary criticism is persuasive. 
However, her leap from Chodorow? s re-privileging of the preoedipal, to a referential 
language of women is problematic. Although Chodorow's theory is not essentialist, 
Homan's notion of a literal language for women seems just that, and is frequently 
interpreted as such. Stoneman agrees that Homans may be seen to be embracing 'a 
position outside culture' and feels that 'the pursuit of "literal language" is not a positive 
reaction for women' (Stoneman 1987(b), 11). 
In describing her concept of the literal language, Homans distances herself from 
Julia Kristeva's explication of the semiotic (Homans 1986,19). Yet I think that far 
greater use can be made of a Kristevan analysis of language, as part of a feminist object- 
relations literary criticism. This linkage of Chodorow and Kristeva was first suggested 
by an essay which questions the psychoanalytical base where women's oppression is 
seen as psychologically intemalised, and somehow 'given' or irreversible (Leland 1989, 
82). Blau DuPlessis quotes Mich6le Barrett in order to make the point, like Chodorow, 
that things don't have to be like this (1990,36). Further, Jacqueline Rose at a 1982 
conference admitted that 'as women gain power in society, the oedipus complex may 
itself change' (Stoneman 1987(b), 5). The theories I have outlined correspond to what 
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Leland describes as 'a growing body of feminist research [that] is providing support for 
a politically important counter-thesis: gender and sexuality are social constructs that are 
in principle susceptible to intervention and change' (Leland 1989,90). 
The Lacanian claim that 'language only reacts to loss' (Chodorow 1989,190) is 
subverted by Kristeva's theory of a pre-oedipal or semiotic language. While the 
serniotic is not an alternative to the signifying system of the Symbolic Order, the 
serniotic is an essential precursor; a scaffolding of relational syntax and communication 
practice that organises the child prior to the acquisition of language. The serniotic is 
derived from the basic pulsions that traverse the pre-oedipal child's body, and which are 
influenced by the carer's rhythms. It is not essentialist in the same way that Homan's 
literal language appears to be, for all children experience the serniotic, and if 
strengthened the semiotic must disrupt traditional gender divisions. However, some 
children, in staying longer in the pre-oedipal period, or by virtue of their relationships, 
may have greater access to the serniotic. Further, although the semiotic is repressed on 
entering the symbolic, it can erupt, disrupting symbolic language as 'contradictions, 
meaninglessness, disruption, silences and absences' (Moi 1985,162). If Homans can 
conceive of yoking Lacan with Chodorow, then I find Kristeva's non-gendered pre- 
oedipal 'language' far more amenable for the purposes of an object-relations literary 
criticism. 
Kristeva's work has moved through many stages, and more recent developments 
are influenced by object-relations theory (Doane and Hodges 1992,54; Benjamin 1998, 
88-9). Employing the work of Andrd Green, Kristeva is concerned with 'the maternal, 
and in affect (particularly its potential as language)' (56). Green makes use of Lacanian 
theory but criticises Lacan because his emphasis on symbolic language ignores the 
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situation of analysands whose problems are tied to the 'space before language where the 
vicissitudes of the passions are inscribed' (57). Green follows the work of Klein and 
Winnicott to investigate the effect on language of a child's experiences of mother loss, 
and it is this work that Kristeva has developed in Black Sun (1989). Green is concerned 
with the effects of 'bad mothering' which is often psychically represented as the child's 
loss of the mother. This may be actual death, but generally it is an absence, withdrawal 
or passivity of the mother that Kristeva charts as having an effect on language 
acquisition. The good enough mother gradually effaces herself in a way that frames and 
supports 'the ego and its object representations' (59). Where the "'dead mother 
complex? " develops, offspring prove ! gifted at representation and interpretation, but 
these representations are finally disconnected from emotions' (60). Kristeva is 
particularly concerned with 'affective language, which exists at 'the border of the 
maternal unnameable and the paternal Symbolic' (Oliver 1993,62). Generally, the loss 
of the 'good enough' mother is acknowledged, and then she is refound via the 
acquisition of language; this process is necessary before girls can go on to develop 
affective relationships with other objects. Kristeva is more interested in the problems 
with lost or bad mothers, where language is disrupted by the semiotic or affective 
language. While still a tentative theory - and although my interest in Kristeva's work is 
tangential -1 feel it provides another avenue for exploring Eliot"s form and language as 
part of a feminist object-relations re-reading of her novels. 
The account of gender-differentiation provided by feminist object-relations 
theory, and the resulting gender-role dichotomies - where women appear to be more 
caring and relational, with men more autonomous and separate - not only corresponds 
to the gender roles which were assumed to operate during Eliot's lifetime, but also 
accounts for the traditional gender division of sympathy and duty that Eliot eschews. 
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Simply, women had responsibility for all caring and nurturing, including the provision 
of sympathy for all, where self-sacrifice was often expected; while men defined and 
dictated duty which was generally determined according to God, law, or societal mores. 
Eliot's apparent adoption of forms of sympathy and duty which ideally had no built-in 
gender divisions relates remarkably well to the ideas suggested by Chodorow and 
Gilligan, where all may ultimately be both caring and relational, and just and 
autonomous. Obviously there is no simple one-to-one relationship between Eliot's 
sympathy and duty, Gilligan's care and justice ethics, and Chodorow's ideas of 
relationality versus separation. However, there is considerable correspondence, and 
given that all the concepts have been discussed in detail, overlap is possible. 
My own literary critical approach is to employ the psycho-social outline 
described earlier as a feminist object-relations reading of Eliot's fiction, in order to 
analyse the nature and function of sympathy and duty in the texts. I investigate the 
content, form and reader response, with some reference to Eliot herself With regard to 
the form of the novels, I am particularly concerned to chart narrative strategies which 
encourage the reader to sympathy and which give multiple reports on events and 
characters so that sympathy and duty are variously assessed. I also map all aspects of 
form which are primarlilý related to relationship, such as: movements within the text 
through time and space; incidences of absence and connection; occurrences of rhythms 
and repetitions; patterns of speech and silence; and the use of metonymy. Where 
appropriate I also make links with Kristeva? s theory of the serniotic and the lost mother. 
The major part of my analysis, however, rests on characters and their relationships. 
Although this is not the emphasis preferred by Eagleton and Wright, my focus on 
sympathy and duty, care and justice makes the representation of people and their 
relationships a central aspect of my investigation. 
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Until Eliot met George Henry Lewes, her life had largely consisted of the duty 
of caring for her father and hard work; she appears to have received very little 
sympathy, care or support throughout her early life. The details of Eliot's life are well 
known and there are numerous excellent biographies (Ashton 1996; Karl 1995), 
however, I feel that there is still insufficient consideration of Eliot's own experiences of 
sympathy and duty. Although such an analysis is beyond the scope of this work, I do 
feel that Eliot's letters deserve a reading which considers her isolation, the demands 
constantly made upon her, and the thwarting of her own ambitions. Between 1841 and 
his death in 1849, Elfot was her father's housekeeper and latterly his sole companion 
and nurse during his final illness. She was tied to duty, particularly a duty of care and 
sympathy in a situation where no sympathy and care was returned. 
After her father's death, despite some friends, possible lovers, and the ability to 
lose herself in her work for the Westminster Review, Eliot was essentially alone - with 
no one to turn to for support, encouragement or love - until she met Lewes in 1851.1 
am not acceding to the argument that Eliot needed someone to lean upon, however, I do 
feel that she required the love, happiness and mutuality that she bestows on the heroines 
of her later novels. These she found with Lewes. They had been together for nearly 
two years when they visited Ilfracombe in May 1856. 'Recollections of Ilfracombe' 
(GEJ 1998,262-273) notes that Eliot's review of Riehl's The Natural History of 
German Life - to be published in the Westminster in July - coincided with this ecstatic 
first-hand experience of natural history. Her review of Ruskin's Modern Painters had 
appeared in April, and ýSilly NoveW was to appear in October. Together these four 
pieces form the core of her initial fiction-writing manifesto. This period also signals 
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Eliot's rebirth. The woman scrambling around on Ilfracombe's rocky seashore is not 
the lonely, self-questioning creature of a few years earlier. 
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Part ][I - Sympathy and Duty in Eliot's Fiction 
Chapter Four - Challenging the Status Quo: 
Scenes of Clerical Life and Adam Bede 
On Tuesday 22 September 1856, George Eliot noted in her journal: 'Began to write 
"The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton... 14 (GEJ, 63). This is the first of 
Eliot's Scenes of Clerical Life (1988 [1858]) and these short tales embody the essence 
of her ideas on sympathy and duty. They also represent her first attempts to win the 
reader to sympathy. These early tales are told looking back in time, so that the distance 
afforded allows the reader to be sympathetic to difference. It also allows the narrator 
more control, for the reader is on unknown territory. The stories take place in small 
relatively enclosed communities which are all experiencing disruption so that traditional 
values cannot hold - an increasingly central theme in George Eliot's novels. The 
settings of the works examined here correspond to what Suzanne Graver describes as a 
Gemeinschaft culture (1984,14): that is, one predominantly based on family and 
tradition, where the culture is not sophisticated but organic relationships still hold sway. 
Typically, the community is rural as in Adam Bede, or almost feudal as in 'Mr Giffil's 
Love-StorY 5- 15 Yet the pains of transition to a GeselIschaft - or urban, industrial, 
capitalist community - are beginning to be apparent. The Scenes provide snapshots of 
communities where intolerance and injustice result from change. But change is also 
needed, for there is a general lack of care, justice, and intuitive sympathy and duty; as a 
result damage is done; in particular men and women suffer because their roles fracture 
14 Hereafter referred to as 'Amos Barton'. 
15 Hereafter referred to as 'Mr Giffil'. 
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along the lines of these virtues, and women become scapegoats as a result of their self- 
sacrifice or objectification. 
Repeatedly, these tales are concerned with outsiders who do not conform to the 
traditions or conventional duty of the community, with women outsiders frequently 
contravening gender norms. Newcomers are regarded with distrust, particularly if 
alone, intelligent, or 'different'. When the outsider belongs to the community and yet 
behaves in an alien manner, the response is worse. Hetty Sorrel is a striking example of 
such an &outsider-within', and Janet Dempster anticipates all of Eliot's statuesque 
heroines such as Maggie, Esther, and Dorothea. The narrator introduces the outsiders 
via their impact on the community, and in every case they are viewed through several 
filters: comments from neighbours and family; what they reveal about themselves; the 
narrator's response to the community reaction; and the narrator's own opinion of the 
outsiders. The reader is thus presented with a seemingly multivalent picture where 
nothing is certain, and it is necessary to suspend judgement towards the characters. 
Divining the rights and wrongs of such judgements and the subsequent allocation of 
sympathy will not be an easy task for the questioning, tolerant reader whom the author 
is struggling to create - particularly when the communities and characters themselves 
are not questioning and tolerant. 
Scenes of Clerical Life and Adam Bede are explorations in form, particularly in 
finding the appropriate narrative voice for a realistic yet potentially evangelically 
empathic narrator. Eliot laboured to create narrators who can make effective appeals to 
the reader. The effect can be disconcertingly familiar, yet what emerges is not quite the 
voice of an omniscient narrator: 
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There can be no illusion of life where there is no bewilderment, 
and the omniscient narrator is obviously not bewildered. The 
process most like the process of life is that of observing events 
through a convincing, human mind, not a godlike mind 
unattached to the human condition (Booth, 1961,45). 
That the narrator is self-confessedly a man is ironic, for our knowledge now (Beer 1986, 
38) that the voice originated in a woman condemned to social ostracism because she 
was 'different' adds piquancy - and levels of interpretation - to our readings of 
'difference'. The narrator is also self-consciously a man's man, with suggestions of a 
classical education and an understanding of science and philosophy that would usually 
be beyond the 'sphere' of women authors. Yet much of this is a smoke-screen, partly to 
counter the evidence of 'female knowledge' in the novels, partly because it is fim to 
play and poke fun from behind this assumed male mask (38), and partly because the 
voice of male reason and knowledge, added to female relational concern, underlines yet 
subverts the whole notion of gender differentiation. The complexities of the outsiders' 
relationships with the community structure the narrative; the narrator fosters the 
interweaving of voices and opinions in order to present a multi-relational account that 
mimics the process of becoming acquainted and reaching conclusions. 
Amos Barton, the first outsider-within, is introduced via the nostalgic narratoes 
disapproving disquisition on the changes wrought on Shepperton Church, all of which 
convey a tacit disapproval of the literally 'innutrient' Barton (SCL, 5), whose baldness 
becomes a metonymic clue to his lack of nurturance. Barton, a relative newcomer, is 
intent on 'progress' even as the villagers resist. Eliot's studies with Lewes, her 
knowledge of evolution and her familiarity with Spencer's ideas of social and 
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psychological progress alerted her to constant ongoing change. However, the natural 
laws that govem a community, and the individuals who comprise it, must be valued and 
understood. Amos's first mistake is to force change without knowing or understanding 
himself or his environment. His second mistake is in not forging relationships. 
The narrator reneges on his initial negative presentation with a sympathetic 
outline of the hardships of Barton's life, which may leave the reader confused. Are we 
for Amos or against him? Possibly against if the narrator's forceful present-tense report 
of a conversation between Barton's parishioners at Cross Farm is to be our guide. The 
reader is on the margins of the scene, dragged there by the narrator, and learns that 
Barton is bad tempered, not 'overburthened i' th' upper storey' (SCL 11) and generally 
deficient. This is an example of Comte's observation by comparison, so that the reader 
may form premises by induction. But then, should the attentive reader trust these 
characters? Are their morals and judgements sound? Mrs Patten, a malevolent, 
unchristian, miserly woman, plans to leave her devoted niece penniless. Mr Pilgrim is a 
worldly, intemperate man who values only money-generating ailments. All are 
variously in bondage due to inadequate knowledge. Meanwhile, even the narrator has 
distanced the audience, ordering us from scene to scene and accusing us of being 
cmiserable town-bred reader[s]' (8). And Mrs Hackit? She only supports the Bartons 
once she perceives that her 'good nature ... was a little in contradiction with the dominant 
tone' (11). This comment reveals much about the character's opinion of herself, but the 
reader should be wary for Mrs Hackit deludes herself She will later bow to public 
opinion and betray Milly Barton - when it seems best not to contradict the dominant 
tone. 
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The reader is constantly warned to be careful of swift judgements. As Eliot was 
aware from her study of hermeneutics, from Spencer's incessant warnings about 
careless dabbling with natural laws, and from her own experience of gossip, it is 
necessary to know all the facts before forming conclusions, even if 'nice distinctions 
are troublesome' (33). The text encourages provisionality, questioning and hypothesis. 
The critic Norton considers the narrator disturbing, as he listens to 'superficial and 
externalized, as well as simply inaccurate, information about their curate' (1989,219); 
while Eliot's publisher John Blackwood commented: 'Perhaps the author falls into the 
error of trying too much to explain the characters of his actors by descriptions instead of 
allowing them to evolve in the actions of the story' (GEL 11,272). Blackwood and 
Norton seem to expect stable and coherent figures to evolve, but the very point of the 
many 'descriptions' from varied sources is the lack of stability and coherence. The 
different accounts are to foster contradictory and inconclusive impressions. 
Amos sees himself as influential, rational and learned, for there is: 'nothing like 
a man who combines shrewdness with energy. The wisdom of the serpent ... was one 
of his strong points' (SCL, 15). Seeing himself as a typical male history-maker 
(Dinnerstein 1976,176-9), Amos refuses to be governed by female power - such as 
Milly's aunt, or the propriety of the ladies of Shepperton - yet is happy to return to the 
mother's tender care (SCL 188). The cumulative picture of Barton is so negative - from 
the narrator's account of his physical appearance, to his brusque treatment of his wife - 
that even the temptation to see ourselves as the 'largest souls' (21) does not make it 
easy to sympathise. Yet Amos is in the 'wrong place', and the narrator's brief 'picture' 
of the other life that could have been his, by its very simplicity and clarity, induces 
sympathy for this 'honest faithful man' (2 1). 
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Nfilly's love for her husband is one argument encouraging sympathy, but as 
Amos consumes her love, constantly 'showed no recognition of Milly's attentions' (25), 
and fails in all caring and clerical obligations, then the reader's sympathy is inhibited. 
He lacks mere pity, and seems incapable of any relational care; he has confused Mrs 
Patten with doctrine, offended his congregation, and forced too much change too 
quickly. This lack of relationality is mirrored in the arrangement and linkage of the 
'snapshots' of life within the tale. There is sympathy and care among the parishioners, 
and love surrounds Milly. However, linking all these 'tableaux' is Barton's spare lonely 
111, threading his linear route between all the web-like sites of potential connection that 
he fails to make. There is a tremendous sense of loss that calls up the absent mother and 
foreshadows the loss to come. This tension between connection and separation runs 
throughout the tale. 
The narrator's pleading apostrophes to the reader demand sympathy - the 
technique that Pace (1986) assumed unnecessary. Despite critical comment that Eliot's 
narrative voice is as yet immature - 'she miscalculates her tone, reaches too eagerly 
towards us, is too arch, too intense, too solicitous' (Hardy 1993,191) - she does show a 
remarkable understanding of the reader's psychology. These appeals, follow passages 
where Barton has been disparaged. Firstly, the narrator wishes the reader to understand 
the circumstances which led to Amos becoming placed beyond his abilities (SCL 20-1), 
for the changing nature of work and class increasingly permitted mobility. Spencer 
expressed fears of society evolving faster than man, so that Amos may be a victim of 
this evolution. Secondly, the narrator appeals to the readers' sense of themselves as 
ordinary mortals, whose 'very faults [are] middling' (40). In short, if we condemn 
Amos we must condemn ourselves. The opening of Chapter 5 is one of George Eliovs 
most direct appeals for sympathy on behalf of 'commonplace people'; it is a 
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defamiliarising intrusion which stirs the readers out of the fiction and provokes their 
analysis - possibly even their leap to an intuitive sympathy that will transcend 
difference. Yet it is an exceptional demand from an author - imagination, sympathy 
and understanding for the character most responsible for the crisis. 
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Milly's miscamage precedes a decline into tragedy. The details surrounding 
the loss of this child are absent; it is literally a loss represented metaphorically. The 
silence is also scathing irony, in that such subjects were not discussed yet women 
constantly died. Thus sympathy for Amos becomes even more difficult. Milly's 
acceptance of the Countess's extended stay is the catalyst for the removal of all help and 
sympathy from herself As another relative outsider, Milly is supported only so long as 
she conforms to conventional duty. Just as Gilligan's ethic of care is phenomenological 
(Brabeck 1993,37), so is Eliot's analysis of all the 'selves-in-relation' that constitute 
her ideal communities of individuals. Contextual relativism is called for in judging 
Milly, yet it is not forthcoming. 
Amos follows his Christian and human duty in assisting the Countess and 
defending his innocence, but the continued maintenance of his rigid 'justice' in the face 
of hardship for his family seems stubborn selfishness. Opprobrium for Amos doubles 
once Mlly is pregnant again; Victorian readers would blame Amos for Milly's 
condition, and Amos's neighbours 'regretted that Mr Barton did not more 
uninterruptedly exhibit a superiority to the things of the flesh' (SCL 40). Blackwood 
did not like the particularisation of the children in the deathbed scene (GEL 11,272), but 
their touching and kissing is a significant relational image. In particular, little Walter 
16 It is now generally agreed (Norbelie 1992,64; Marcus 1975,40) that George Eliot does not make a 
mistake in her timetabling, and that the 'illness that made [Milly's] lips look pale' (SCL 3 8) was the loss 
in March of the child referred to at the beginning of the tale. This also means that the 'seven months' 
baby (56) dead by December, was conceived soon after the miscarriage. 
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reaches out and 'speaks' at the moment of separation. This portrait of connectedness, 
and remembrance of pre-oedipal love, reaches out to the reader, surprising even those 
selfish and trivial men at the Garrick who 'mingled their tears with their tumblers' (GEL 
11,293). 
A muted message is that Milly is partly responsible for the tragedy. As Mrs 
Hackit says of Mrs Barton: 'It goes to my heart to turn my back on her. But she's P the 
wrong to let herself be put upon P that manner' (SCL, 44). Selflessness - which 
characterises Milly and the stereotypical image of Victorian women - is as much the 
cause of tragedy as selfishness and inflexible uncaring duty. A common perception of 
Milly among contemporary critics is as a representation of the 'Angel in the House' 
(Lodge 1973,19; Knoepflmacher 1968,55), with Eliot assumed to valorise selflessness. 
Yet it must be remembered that Eliot had done much to kill her own 'Angel in the 
House' - for once she felt the power of her own writing she was not prepared to be 
selfless. On being asked to write for a friend, she commented: 'It is a question whether 
I shall give up building my own house to go and help in building of my neighbour's 
garden wall' (GEL IL 431-2). Given such an attitude, it is unlikely that Eliot would 
demand selflessness from women; and her writing always 'participates in the 
undermining of polarities' (Beer 1986,28). 
If the rising tide of evolutionary, sociological and psychological doctrine was 
set to condemn women to domesticity, then Eliot's irony reveals a reticent yet radical 
social comment. She may also be parodying Spencer's theories of sexual selection 
when she describes the lovely Milly as a fitting prize for the ordinary Barton. This 
critique is also mirrored in Milly's fate, for it is her constant 'giving' that kills her. 
Milly is at a level of moral development where her caring extends only to others and 
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does not include herself (Gilligan 1982,69). She is the ideal mother of Comtean and 
'Woman's Mission' ideology - female images that Eliot had recently subverted in her 
essays 'Margaret Fuller and Mary Wollstonecraft' and 'Silly Novels'. 
Finally, the narrator's 'set-piece' description of Milly is deeply ironic. The idea 
of the 'soothing, unspeakable charm of gentle womanhood! ' (SCL 16) is undercut even 
as the narrator eulogises. The narrator suggests the reader would be scandalised if Milly 
'had descended from the serene dignity of being to the assiduous unrest of doing' (16), 
yet this seeming 'Positivist' mother - nursing her restless child like the statue on 
Comte's tomb - never stops doing. The enthusiasm of the account conveys that Nfilly is 
good and lovely, but the narrator's insistent use of 'You' when addressing the reader is 
distracting. However, it does cause a questioning of the narrator's account. For 
Milly's goodness is not in doubt, but the worth and honesty of her allotted role is. She 
dies from a neglect sanctioned by the self-sacrifice demanded of women. She dies from 
her husband's neglect - because his construction as a man does not include the capacity 
to care; she also dies from the community's neglect, where all caring is delegated to 
women who are, however, bound by social mores. Henry James argued that in any 
conflict between irony and sympathy, irony was always sacrificed (Booth 1961,48). In 
this early work the irony is reticent but it is pervasive. 
The community try to compensate at Milly's death, but care and sympathy 
cannot be retrospective; they should be ongoing, with constant monitoring and 
feedback - as in the mothering that Ruddick describes. The women may be unsisterly, 
but the portraits of the men are damning. Leslie Stephen objected to the account of the 
Clerical Meeting, feeling that Eliot was merely in search of characteristic touches 
(Stephen 1924 [1902], 58); but this portrait of the barren nature of the clergy is essential 
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to the relational structure of the story, for care does not emanate from those most 
charged to nurture. Only Mr Cleves is 'the true parish priest, the pastor beloved' (SCL 
46), he is the first of Eliot's matemal men -a character-type that develops throughout 
her oeuvre. The period of death and bereavement is characterised as relational by the 
movement of characters, with many acting on the margins and carrying out 
interweaving patterns of care, while at the centre, helped by this support yet still alone is 
Barton. 
The surface reading of the tale is that the experience of death and suffering 
allows Barton and his parishioners to become more caring and sympathetic; its apparent 
intention is that the readers will be so moved both by the content and the strategies of 
narrative structure that they may themselves experience sympathy for Barton. 
Realisation by Amos that Milly 'was gone from him' and that he really never could 
cmake up for omissions in the past' (60) is more painful for its sparseness - mirroring 
Amos's very lack. Elizabeth Ermarth suggests that as 'Death is the great economist' 
(1985(b), 61) then the trauma of MiIlY's death may shake the characters and assure 
"'respectful pity... (62). This inadvertently points to one latent reading of the text, for 
pity is really all that the parishioners feel. Ermarth's suggestion is too unrelational; it is 
sympathy, if not empathy, in the readers that is desired, not mere pity in the characters. 
However, a more negative latent reading is possible - involving the question of 
whether Amos really acquires sympathy. Although the 'terrible keenness of memory 
and imagination which bereavement gives' (SCL 60-1) makes him realise how selfish 
and unloving he has been, there are ominous overtones. When Amos visits Milly's 
grave the narrator explains that 'love is frightened at the intervals of insensibility and 
callousness that encroach by little and little on the dominion of grief, and it makes 
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efforts to recall the keenness of the first anguish' (63). While true, this is also a warning 
to be wary of forgetfulness and lack of imagination. For Patty, the Bartons' eldest 
daughter, takes on her mother's role and is sacrificed as Milly was before her (Norbelie 
1992,66-7; Brady 1992,67). Early in the story Patty is perceived as already 
reproduced as a mother (Chodorow 1978, passim) and is observant where Amos fails 
(SCL, 19), although her 'preservative care' was not enough to save Milly. 
At this point it is impossible to ignore Marian Evans's own history - this fate 
could have been hers. The last sentence of the story is consoling from a conventional 
point of view, but from the perspective defined by ferninst object-relations theory it is 
chilling: 'Patty alone remains by her father's side, and makes the evening sunshine of 
his life' (64). The 'consolation' of the sentence is to be gleaned by the father, with 
Patty as its source but not its recipient. Eliot had issued the imperative 'never to beat 
and bruise one's wings against the inevitable, but to throw the whole force of one's soul 
towards the achievement of some possible better' (GEL IV, 499). A surface reading of 
'Amos Barton' may achieve the meliorist increase of sympathy that is a 'possible 
better'. However, always present is the reticent, subversive reading: the unconscious 
beating and bruising that demand radical change. 
In 'Mr Gilfil's Lovestory', Eliot also exhorts sympathy from the reader for her 
second cleric, although again the sympathy may be misplaced, and there is much for the 
reader to analyse. At the opening of the tale Mr Gilfil has recently died and several 
6post-mortem' vignettes reveal that the Parson had cared for, and loved his parishioners 
in a personal, relational way, and was loved by all who knew him. The reader may be 
uncertain whether to approve of this pipe-smoking, gin-drinking old man of lax 
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doctrine, yet the narrator's opinion, and multiple reports of his intuitive sympathy and 
duty belie any disreputable image. Further, Mr Gilfil has a hidden past, about which the 
narrator drops sufficient hints to intrigue the reader, eventually granting himself a 
hypothetical reader's question, M Gilfil was a bachelor, then? (SCL, 75). 
Such a direct dialogue with the reader, while in danger of destroying the sense of 
fiction, preserves the illusion of story-telling; especially as it implies that Gilfil - and 
the narrator - actually exist. It even links relational concern to the reader. However, 
with regard to the love story, the narrator warns 'refined lady-readers' (SCL 74) that 
they should not object, as 'gin-and-water, like obesity, or baldness, or gout does not 
exclude a vast amount of antecedent romance' (74). Such topics were not the usual 
fodder of Black-wood's readers, and such approaches to 'implied readers' can be 
distancing, for they are sufficiently specific for the actual reader to Wish not to be 
associated with them (Warhol 1986,811). However, readers are encouraged towards 
sympathy, for when young and handsome, Gilfil had a beautiful, talented bride who 
died in childbirth. Since then his relationship to his parishioners had saved and 
sustained him as a caring vocation, for 'It had like to ha' killed him when she died, 
though he never gev way, but went on ridin' about and preachin' ' (131). In a 
telescoping of time that encompasses decades of 'ridin' about and preachin' ', George 
Eliot gives readers an instant explanation for this confusing cleric, and it is such 
relational touches - as much as 'unfinished baby-caps' (129) - that encourage 
sympathy. 
The narrator's revelations excuse this strange beginning to a love-story, 
generating desire to know more. To tell a story's outcome in the first episode of a serial 
work was unusual, yet Eliot was always taking arms against the conventions of popular 
170 
fiction (Rowland Tush 1993,9; Carlisle 1982,166). Confusion over what to think 
about the characters was far more pronounced when the Scenes were published. 
Readers were used to a more Manichaean approach, even from the less populist authors: 
Jane Eyre - good; Blanche Ingram - bad. George Eliot was writing very much against 
the grain compared both to the more predictable 'serial' plots that were then appearing 
in Blackwood's (Martin 1994,54), and when compared to the hordes of 'Silly Novels' 
that were her main competition and set the 'horizon of the expectable' for a particular 
genre (Rowland Tush, 10- 11). In her 'Silly Novels' essay, Eliot had insisted that the 
creal drama of Evangelicalism ... lies among the middle and lower classes' (1992,315) 
and illustrated this in her first fiction. Yet John Blackwood enquired: 'when are you 
going to give us a really good active working clergynianT (GEL 11,345). Eliot's reply 
was that : 'I undertake to exhibit nothing as it should be; I only try to exhibit some 
things as they have been or are' (GEL H, 362). Yet throughout all her works, irony 
constantly underlines what should be, or rather, what 'should not be' (Cervetti 1992, 
354). Exhibiting things as they are means multiple perspectives, which leads to 
uncertainty about how to judge characters and events. 
An introduction to young Gilfil is achieved by moving the story back to 1788, 
and a meeting with his guardian Sir Christopher Cheverel and Captain Wybrow, 
Cheverel's nephew and heir - and Gilfil's opponent for the love of Caterina Sarti. All 
are orphans and relative outsiders; Caterina is an Italian foundling, and the men are 
pseudo-sons. Despite Wybrow being preferred by both Caterina and Sir Cheverel, the 
narrator presents Gilfil with his 'open face and robust limbs' (SCL 80) as a general 
favourite. Yet Gilfil is not as handsome, is not the heir, and, while sympathetic, is 
judgmental, so that Taterina, like the rest of us, turned away from sympathy which she 
suspected to be mingled with criticism' (85). 
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Caterina, the true outsider, is another piece of Italy brought back by the 
Cheverels from their architectural foraging trip. As such, she is almost completely 
objectified. Uglow criticises Caterina's stereotypical presentation, seeing her as 
e conceived almost entirely in cultural terms' (1987,86), but this mimesis is exactly the 
point. Consciously or not, the author's construction of Caterina reflects the 
objectification that has been her experience. Her only moments of individuality are the 
semiotic release of her singing, and the superb irritation that makes her turn from the 
critical, duty-laden Gilfil. Generally, only Caterina! s malleable social self is apparent 
(Flax 1987,92) - the one usually encouraged in women - and the passion of her sexual 
self is sublimated via her singing. She lacks any form of 'adequate knowledge', never 
having been encouraged to exercise any freedom or understanding, and is thus subject to 
'fancy' and in bondage to her passions. In this tale Eliot deconstructs the stereotypes 
associated with 'gothic' stories, yet John Blackwood was still expecting the typical 
romance outcome: 'I look with great anxiety for the picture of her half-broken heart 
turning to Gilfil' (GEL 11,297). Since Eliot has already displaced expectations by 
revealing the outcome for Caterina and Gilfil, the Gothic tale becomes Comte's 
observation by experiment as the text engages the reader in 'working out' what happens, 
so that reading becomes active and creative (Iser 1974,275), giving exercise for the 
imagination in anticipation of sympathy being demanded. 
With no clear sense of self, Caterina's multiple roles and relationships result in 
her objectification. Images of Caterina as pet or animal abound, and 'all perhaps 
involve a lack of respect for Caterina as a person. The images make her into an object, 
something less than human' (Lodge 1973,26). For the Cheverels are lacking in care; Sir 
Christopher calls to mind many of Jane Austen's lamentable patriarchs, who have 
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forgotten their chosen obligations as landlords and guardians in their concern with 
property. Wybrow releases Caterina's desire and suppressed selves, but he realises that 
in her passion she may be capable of contravening the family duty demanded by Sir 
Christopher. Yet Caterina is unable to assert herself, inhibited by fear of further loss. 
Her lack of fictional life, particularly in the central part of the tale, reflects this lack of 
subjectivity and power as she becomes more passive and selfless on the surface. The 
awareness that she is totally dependent is chilling. For she believes she has glimpsed 
love and purpose, yet a conventional duty to 'parents' and a culture that have never 
valued her demands repression and denial. 
While Gilfil adores Caterina his increasing adherence to the masculine justice 
ethic of Sir Christopher distances her. Feuerbach would argue for blood and love, not 
laws. David Lodge is surprised that Gilfil 'is also implicated in the insistent pet- 
imagery and illusion' that surrounds and objectifies Caterina. For him this blurs the 
cmoral-imagistic pattern' dehumanising Caterina, because Gilfil's love for Caterina 'is 
supposed to be selfless and perceptive'. (Lodge 1973,26). Lodge misses the point that 
sympathetic care, which is crucial to Eliot, is in conflict with the dominant justice ethic 
which has seduced Gilfil. This consideration permits a reading where Caterina is 
indirectly betrayed by Gilfil, because of his greater respect for Cheverel's 'duty' than 
for her. It is an example of coercive duty subverting the primal ethic of care bom of the 
'I/Thou' relationship, as variously described by Rousseau, Feuerbach and Spencer. 
That we find it so difficult to perceive Gilfil as selfish, and are propelled into the 
dominant reading of the tale - whereby the Cleric should be the main recipient of our 
care and sympathy and the main source for others - is partly because of the precedents 
set by the romantic genre. The narrator has won the reader over to sympathy for Gilfil 
after an inauspicious beginning, and having been convinced he is the 'romantic hero' it 
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is difficult to view him as flawed. But Gilfil is the only character who does not have to 
fight for self-preservation against Sir Christopher, who sees the full extent of his 
despotism, and who knows the damage done to Caterina. 
The moment when the reader fears that Caterina will kill Wybrow is a false 
climax (Knoepflmacher 1967,13) yet perfectly possible given the state of mind 
conveyed. John Blackwood remonstrated, but Eliot wrote explaining why she could 
not modify Tina's behaviour: 'My artistic bent is directed not at all to the presentation of 
eminently irreproachable characters, but to the presentation of mixed human beings in 
such a way as to call forth tolerant judgement, pity and sympathy' (GEL 11,299). When 
Caterina races from gallery to woods intending to stab Wybrow, the narrator becomes a 
stranger with gothic horror diction - Caterina's actions so estrange us that even 
language becomes distanced. At the moment when she talks of killing, Caterina's 
speech is that of another and in a future tense; she is a 'she'; Caterina finally voices 
herself as 'other' and is outside herself with grief 
Caterina returns to infancy, dislocating space and time - thus altering all her 
perceptions - by returning to childhood; literally to Dorcas, and metaphorically in her 
catatonia by a brief rebirth into a pre-oedipal time without pain (Norton 1989,221). 
The phases of her illness are a second growth into adulthood. Meanwhile the narrator 
insists that Gilfil 'had lost the being who was bound up with his power of loving' (SCL 
153), as if Caterina had mothered him, yet she is still 'his little bird', an object to be 
owned (154). Gilfil counsels Caterina and absolves her of all guilt: 'Our thoughts are 
often worse than we are, just as they are often better than we are' (159). There is a 
strong element of role-reversal here. If Caterina has reverted to a child-like state, then 
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Gilfil is the mother, and Caterina! s mirror-response to him helps restore her. The 
narrator suggests that a 'brave and faithful' man's love has in it the cmaternal 
tenderness' that he experienced with his own mother (154-5). This, plus his early love 
for Caterina, may explain Gilfils caring abilities which have been overshadowed by his 
severe justice ethic and duty to Sir Christopher. In her re-awakening to recovery via 
music, Caterina admits defeat, reconciles herself to dependance, and acknowledges the 
need for Gilfil as 'something to cling to' (163). 
Caterina again confronts the situation common to women, where marriage and 
motherhood are her only options. 'Amos Barton' had reminded the reader of the truth 
of Victorian childbirth, and although muted, the text is unequivocal that Tina is not well 
enough to face pregnancy: 'her health continued too delicate to encourage the slightest 
risk of painful excitement' (165). Gilfil's passion exceeds his maternal thinking, so that 
in claiming his love too early he condemns her to death. This is not the 'looking, 
holding (as opposed to acquiring), self-restraint, humility, and empathy that comprises 
the maternal discipline' (Perry & Brownley 1991,215). Knoepflmacher, with reference 
to Caterina! s singing from Gluck's Orfeo, concludes: 'If Tina is identified with the 
fragile Eurydice of Orfeo, Maynard Gilfil cannot aspire to become an Orpheus able to 
follow his beloved into the realm of shadows' (1967,14). However, Gilfil's devoted 
love has already won Caterina back once. He followed her into illness, depression and 
near-madness. His mistake is to renege on his pact with 'Care', by wanting Caterina too 
much, too soon. In marrying her, Gilfil has looked back and lost Caterina forever. He 
becomes 'the poor lopped oak' (SCL 166) because he failed Caterina, but the 'noble 
tree' persists. The 'Epilogue' returns Gilfil to the reader as the sympathetic cleric of the 
opening, with his imagination expanded by his experience of loss and guilt; this latent 
reading of passion over-ruling sympathy and care is distanced, and to most readers there 
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predominates the manifest tale of a blighted life spent working to regain a balance of 
sympathy and duty. 
In the third story, 'Janet's Repentance', the outsider is the Evangelical preacher 
Edgar Tryan, while Janet Dempster - wife of Tryan's main opponent - is the outsider- 
within. Both characters challenge community mores and accepted gender roles, while 
they battle egoism and altruism in attempts to find peace and human connection. Again, 
change causes intolerance within the community. Ostensibly suspicion and fear are 
aroused by the advent of evangelicalism, but the muted fear is that the working classes, 
women, and the ethic of care may have acquired a champion in Tryan. The oppositions 
explored within the first three chapters form the base for the development of the 
remainder of the tale. John Blackwood felt that this long introduction did not assist 
f materially in the movement of the story' (GEL 11,344), but in fact it bears significantly 
on the central ethical debates. 
Although the reader does not meet Mr Tryan until the third chapter, the cleric is 
constantly discussed. He is fiercely opposed in the community by Anglican 
traditionalists and the narrator portrays his 'Red Lion' opponents, particularly Lawyer 
Dempster, as loathsome. Through his brutal yet pretentious talk, unsavoury appearance, 
and egotistical misappropriation of language, Dempster condemns himself and raises 
Tryan. His seizure and control of speech suggests post-Freudian theories of male 
access to language - and it is significant that Dempster's wife, Janet, is silenced and 
absent from the text for some time. Dempster and his crew are Hobbesian men bent on 
self-interest. In this portrait of Milby all those branches of social convention that Locke 
and Hume expected to assist man's moral sense - God, justice, and public opinion - are 
corrupt or manipulated. They have more in common with Spencer's notion of false and 
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coercive duty. The good folk of Milby seem in need of a sound clergyman, but Mr 
Tryan 'held peculiar opinions' (181), and Evangelicalism was viewed as a 'disease' 
(182). 
As before, the narrator challenges the reader with different versions of the cleric. 
He is finally encountered at Mrs Linnet's cottage. The text declares that 'it was much 
pleasanter in Mrs Linnet's parlour than in the bar of the Red Lion' (SCL 183), and there 
seems little doubt that 'these ladies have retained standards other than those prevailing 
in Milby and so provide a footing for Tryan's ideals' (Carroll 1980,338). John 
Blackwood concentrated, like critics since (Noble 1965,99), on the comic function of 
such groups, lamenting so much 'humour in the delineation of characters who ... are not 
in themselves interesting' (GEL 11,344). But his own author would wam him not to 
make swift judgements. Few critics examine the ethical and narrative function of the 
Linnet ladies, particularly in relation to the introduction of Tryan, the practice of 
sympathy, and the importance of the gender debate. 
The significance of placing this chapter in opposition to the first, with the 
narrator's depressing disquisition in between, is to draw attention to the parlous state of 
gender, class, and caring relationships in the town. The narrator jokes about the Linnet 
ladies' 'susceptibility towards the clerical sex! (SCL 19 1), but Tryan represents a type of 
man not widely available. The jests at the ladies' expense are a technique to allow a 
male narrator to air his credentials and thus foster complicity with the readers, so that - 
as with George Eliot's 'male-joumalist! voice - the extreme message that these men lack 
the virtues of care, sympathy, justice and any duty that Eliot would value, may be more 
easily imbibed. Far from condemning the narrator's attitude, it is apparent that Eliot 
devises a speaker who understands women's 'yearning for a third gender that does not 
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fall into the rigid categories of masculine and feminine' (Brady 1992,80). Tryan, as 
one of Eliot's 'maternal men' combines an ethic of justice vvith an ethic of care 
(Gilligan 1982,167). 
It is significant that the ladies are physically marginalised at the edge of 
Paddiford Common, the working-class region of miners and handloom weavers. Eliot 
is often criticised as being too melioristic, fearing change and revolution, and not being 
sufficiently committed to social criticism, to the denunciation of class and gender 
oppression (Marcus 1975,25,37; Bedient 1972,33-34). However, such objections rise 
from a 'vein of phallic criticism' (Cervetti 1992,352) which feels that social criticism 
should be 'militant ... propagandist' 
(Bedient, 33). Eliot's method of attack is a subtle 
narrative subversion. Milby society labels the Linnet ladies 'vulgar women' (SCL 192), 
possibly because they are not wealthy enough to demand respect. Yet they are also 
, different'; they are independent, resourceful and comfortable enough not to require any 
old marriage as a 'preservative from want'. The reader might believe such feminine 
homilies once they read on and realise that at the same time that Tryan is talking to the 
ladies, Dempster is becoming dangerously drunk in order to go home and beat his wife. 
It is at Mrs Linnet's that we first hear of Janet Dempster. Oblique comments alert the 
reader to a mystery (SCL 190), for Janet has turned to drink. 
It is an anti-climax when Tryan finally appears. Damnation by Dempster and 
adoration by the ladies lead the reader to expect a pre-fall Satan, and his petulant 
outburst at the loss of the Sunday Lectures does betray marked egoism. However, 
Tryan demonstrates that he can control his passions, and ponders where his judgement 
had failed. This humility and willingness to reconsider the correspondences between 
his own ideals and the different layers of the community show an understanding of the 
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workings of both nature and psychology. He is at once the best of Spinozan, Comtean 
and Spencerian men, but the reader is still undecided, and consciously or not, Eliot 
works well to create this uncertainty, so that sympathy, tolerance and understanding - 
when it eventually surfaces - will surprise 'even the trivial and the selfish' into 
'attention to what is apart from themselves' (Eliot 1992,263). This long introduction to 
Tryan is essential for an understanding of all oppositions. The method of constantly 
presenting individuals via the direct opinions of other characters in the works is what 
Marcus describes as 'a mode of dramatized discourse' (1975,28) which 'enables us to 
regard the characters that are being created from a number of different points of view' 
and conveys the 'relativism of human reality' (Marcus 1975,29). 
Janet Dempster, the outsider-within, does not appear until the fourth chapter, at 
which point the account of her husband's drinking is a frame for the beating that is her 
nightly experience. Janet is silent. Women's silence is a powerful and recurring image 
in Eliot's work. Generally they are denied access to language, and so lack the power to 
represent themselves; however, silence here is more significant, for Janet was a 
relational woman, and to remain silent denies connection. Her silence serves to re-open 
the 'gap' between Robert Dempster and woman/mother that his relationship with her 
had closed; he experiences rejection again. These few paragraphs, and the pause before 
the beating finally begins (198-9) are among the few in the work that contain little 
ambiguity. Elsewhere the reader puzzles about what is happening, and where sympathy 
is due; but here, the multiple perspectives are lacking. Surely Janet's call upon the 
reader's sympathies and those of her community is so evident as not to require such 
clarity? Yet Miss Pratt's attitude (274) prepares the reader for the central contradiction, 
explaining why George Eliot could not permit a more veiled reading of Janet's 
predicament. 
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Blackwood was worried about Janet being driven to 'so unsentimental a 
resource as beer' (GEL 11,344-5), and a similar response to Janet - ostracised and 
receiving no support - is presumably what George Eliot feared from her readers; hence 
the unambiguous violence in order to win sympathy. Thus the narrator acts throughout 
as if the moral pathway is unambiguous: the reader just needs more tolerance, 
imagination and sympathy to work it out. Contemporary criticism was more offended 
by Janet's drinking than Dempstees violence (Carroll 1971,49-70), and few shared 
Eliot's 'satisfaction in Janet' (GEL 111,35). But she insisted that Tryan would 'carry 
the reader's sympathy' and that she 'had made it apparent in [her] sketch of Milby 
feelings on the advent of Mr Tryan that the conflict lay between immorality and 
morality - iffeligion and religion' (GEL 11,347). More specifically the opposition is 
between self-interest and intuitive sympathy, and intuitive duty versus convention. 
Blackwood commented: 'Hitherto Janet and Tryan, who ought to bear the the 
chief burden of the interest, do not stand out from your canvas so distinct in form and 
substance as your other figures' (GEL 11,359). Yet the relatively submerged presence 
of the two outsiders, both suffering and isolated while living within a complex web of 
relationships, is a significant absence. Both characters are 'I, in isolation, with no sense 
of 'Thou'; they are hemmed in by conformity, by lack of close relationships to confirm 
their sense of self, and distracted by an oscillation between selfishness and selflessness. 
Dialogue is always symbolic of connection and sympathy, yet both have few honest, 
open, personal talks, and the need to relate powers the caring work of both. Janet had a 
close loving relationship with her mother that reproduced caring, sympathy and 
relationality, while her education and separation may account for her independence, 
autonomy and 'difference'. She satisfied her need for connection and care via kindness, 
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with the result that she clings to this 'vocation' even when Robert's acts or her own 
drinking leave her beside herself. 
Meanwhile, Tryan has begun to energise the community into a new regard for 
itself and has precipitated 'that idea of duty, that recognition of something to be lived 
for beyond the mere satisfaction of self, "which is to the moral life what the addition of 
a great central ganglion is to animal life... (Carroll 1980,339, quoting SCL). Thisnew 
nerve pathway in Milby is furthered as Tryan's movements and interactions of care and 
support increase and affirm connection. Sympathy and intuitive duty became more 
clearly defined and practised by more of the townsfolk, as 'a rule of goodness higher 
than the opinion of their neighbours' (SCL 228). Meanwhile, Dempster makes angry, 
lonely dashes for money or revenge. The tragic irony is that both sets of passionate 
movement will result in their deaths. 
Until her personal crisis, Janet's life has been a Comtean one of resignation and 
activity. However, Dempster pushes her too far, and 'for the first time in her life her 
resentment overcame the long-cherished pride' (244). As Dempster's own life fails, his 
only power is beating Janet, who yet is too proud to submit. Readers expect a fearful 
beating, but Dempster merely puts her outside. This may appear an anti-climax, but 
Eliot's psychology, both for the character and reader, is profound. As a relational and 
autonomous woman, Janet's 'self depends on her pride in herself and her connection to 
others. In the community she represses all sides of herself other than the social, caring 
side expected of women, while with Dempster she maintains her autonomy. But if 
Janet no longer preserves this strong, proud role, then Dempsteespower is over. Thus 
when Janet chooses possible death (245), Dempster humiliates her instead, thus 
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attacking her relational self Such degradation expresses far more than the beatings that 
Janet is dependent. 
Tryan confesses his own sins in order to convey to Janet his understanding that: 
'sympathy is but a living again through our own past in a new form ... [and] ... confession 
often prompts a response of confession' (358). In a letter to Blackwood when first 
introducing Eliot's work, Lewes said that the tales were of the clergy, 'solely in its 
human and not at all in its theological aspect' (GEL 11,274). In this sense Tryan is a 
Feuerbachian man: he re-connects Janet to a fully human 'I/Thou' relationship rather 
than persuading her to God. His 'cure' for Janet is a talking cure, which involves 
reason as well as sympathy. As Tryan's ministry develops, greater experience adds to 
his abilities, for caring begets caring. This process corresponds to Gilligan's accounts of 
increasing ethical awareness as a result of taking responsibility for moral decisions. 
George Eliot's sympathy was concerned with all, with individuals and communities, but 
did not rest on generalisations based on statistics - hence her attack on utilitarianism at 
the beginning of Chapter 22. She feared actions based on rational considerations alone, 
and so the narrator argues that 'emotion, I fear is obstinately irrational; it insists on 
caring for individuals' (270). 
There is a possiblity that Janet will adopt selflessness, and hence her desire to 
return to Dempster when he is ill and the hope that love could be recaptured if he 
survives. This is a very powerful Spinozan doctrine, urging the forgiveness of those 
who do not have control of their lives. The account of Dempster's death disturbed 
Black-wood who wished that he 'had pressed George Eliot more to curtail or to indicate 
more delicately the Delerium. Tremens scene' (GEL 11,394). Janet's pity is intensified 
by observing Dempster's suffering. However, it is pity and not sympathy that Janet 
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now feels (282). The accounts of Dempster's earlier violence, and the extremity of his 
delirium offers a fierce textual warning against selflessness; now Janet merely desires 
that Dempster would 'read the full forgiveness that was written in her eyes' (388), but 
also that he would ask her pardon; both are essential. The moment of Dempster's death 
is left deliberately ambiguous: although Eliot would wish sympathy for him, it would 
not be at the expense of Janet's new-found sense of self-in-relationship. 
While Dempster's death is a convenient plot move which releases Janet from an 
abusive past - and the unlikely ideal future of her fantasy - it also allows for a closer 
exploration of selflessness. In daring to leave Dempster, she has begun to include 
herself in her decision-making in a way neither selfish nor selfless - the two poles she 
has been torn between in her marriage. She also questions the conventional duty that 
binds her to him. Although Janet quickly fills her days with good works, 'the chief 
strength of her nature lay in her affection' (285), and caring for others is a vocation. 
Such caring is not altruism because she is including herself when she chooses to care; it 
is a Kantian 'imperfect duty' to others. Caring also saves Janet from her addiction: 
'Whenever the too well-known depression and craving threatened her, she would seek a 
refuge in what had always been her purest enjoyment - in visiting one of her poor 
neighbours' (286). Janet's inclusion of herself in care is reflected in her persuading 
Tryan to take more care of himself so that he can live among them longer. Having 
experienced both Dempstees selfishness and supposed rationality, and Tryan's 
selflessness and excess of fellow-feeling, Janet comes to embody a balanced form of 
both. She guides Tryan out of his selfish selflessness which can now be perceived as 
guilt over Lucy and a reaction against his own strong egoism. Their relationship has 
began as a Comtean priest advising a woman; but now the roles are reversed as Janet 
begins to show Tryan the dangers of his selflessness. In finally acknowledging his need 
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for affection, even love and desire, 'he was conscious of a new yearning for those pure 
human joys which he had voluntarily and determinedly banished from his life' (298), 
and there is a great deal of suppressed eroticism in the final relationship between Janet 
and Tryan. 
The harmony of sympathy that Adam Smith describes is attained when both 
have learned from each other, Tryan accepts earthly love and abandons his self- 
sacrifice, while Janet embraces the life of sympathy and caring that satisfies her most. 
Janet may be supported by a belief in the love and forgiveness of God, but she is also 
supported by her feelings for Tryan (263). She returns to where she always wanted to 
be, a member of the community who is valued for her reason, intelligence and 
sympathy. That she adopts a caring that yet includes herself, as does Tryan, is 
symbolised by the mutuality of their kiss. Janet survives - spared the usual 'death or 
marriage' alternatives available to heroines. There is an openness about her ending, and 
while it is not an exceptional fate for a woman, it is her choice. Although Janet is saved 
and the community temporarily improved, the submerged message is less about the 
improvement of sympathy and duty in the characters in the text than about how much 
the text can promote sympathy and duty in the reader. The caring that George Eliot's 
fiction promotes is not self-sacrifice, since caring has to include the self. Further, duty 
is not blind duty to husband, or role, or position in the community, nor is it a duty that 
endlessly attempts to atone for past sins. 
Scenes of Clerical Life was well received, yet Eliot declined to write more 
stories, wishing instead to work on the larger canvas of a novel (GEL 11,381). Fromthe 
very first paragraph, Adam Bede (1998 [18591) is a multiple narrative in that differences 
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or oppositions are constantly offered, analysed and dramatised, while no-one and 
nothing is as it seems. The narrator is attempting a realistic account from the miffor of 
his memory, but warns us that 'The miffor is doubtless defective; the outlines Will 
sometimes be disturbed; the reflection faint or confused' (AB 175). Within the complex 
community of the novel, intuitive sympathy and duty are lacking, as are imagination 
and caring, also reason and justice. The causes of this erosion of care and justice 
originate largely in the change from a Gemeinschaft to a GeselIschaft culture (Graver 
1984,94-105) as external or urban influences contribute to the depletion of caring. 
Adam Bede himself is influenced by the rise of the individual and plans to 
advance himself, he pursues study, work and common sense, to the exclusion of family 
relations and imagination. Comte blamed individualism for the erosion of family-based 
societal values and the subsequent halt to the spread of altruism. While Adam has made 
a personal decision to stay with his family and meet his 'obligations', he is generally 
more influenced by conventional duty and Christian self-interest ('It 'ud make a poor 
balance when my doings are cast up at the last, if my poor old mother stood o' the 
wrong side' [AB, 48)) than by love or understanding. Another 'transition' factor is the 
decline in the authority of the aristocracy, church and family. The obliteration of the 
Donnithorne coat-of-arms from the weathered inn sign is symbolic of the Squire's 
general abdication of care and duty. Later, the narrator takes up the rhetorical debate 
with the reader as to whether Mr Irwine is a sound minister for the community or not. 
Meanwhile, family values may seem superficially strong, but there is already evidence 
of breakdown. Dinah lives away from her Aunt, while more significantly, Hetty's 
mother moved away and Hetty only returned as an orphan outsider. Further, 
conventional or societal mores have increasingly taken over from morals; thus both Mrs 
Poyser and Lizbeth Bede are more concerned about the cleanliness of their house than 
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loving their offspring. False education and instruction of the type that Rousseau 
describes have aided the establishment of these 'artificial virtues'. Further, the God of 
man's religion is now the false God of theology so that while the villagers follow 
Christian rituals with feeling, there is little understanding. Overall Mr Irwine's flock 
are still in the fetishistic-theological stage, with only Adam or Arthur aware of any 
4positivistic' aspects to come. Rituals within the community still provide some sense of 
care and belonging, but they also mask fragmentation. 
The structure and form of Adam Bede contribute to the assumption that all is 
calm. The novel is massive and slow-moving, and the early books follow the format of 
the Scenes with the narrator leisurely threading a way between 'pictures' of Hayslope 
life. The surface-tale predominates and lulls the reader (Carlisle 1982,9), and it is 
common to view Adam Bede as a stable and coherent pastoral (Bedient 1972,35-6; 
Shuttleworth 1984,28), yet there are many clues to the contrary. Eliot's Strauss 
translation served as her introduction to hen-neneutics, and it is possible to imagine 
Eliot's text imitating the Biblical pattern: looking back at the past, yet re-writing it for 
the reader to produce these tales as myths in order to bring about change. 
Again Eliot follows the fortunes of certain outsider characters in order to map 
the action of sympathy and duty - particularly to see who administers them, and who 
does not, and also to investigate how these virtues are endangered. The theories of 
sympathy which I believe Eliot to have incorporated into her definition - from Spinoza 
to Spencer - all suggest that the development of sympathy begins in close kinship 
relations. As sociality and experience develop, and as the faculty develops in certain 
individuals, sympathy may be extended to the community, and even beyond - but only 
when conditions are stable and secure. In times of change and transition, sympathy may 
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be limited and is generally not extended to relationships of 'difference'. Therefore, in 
communities such as Hayslope, where tolerance may not normally extend far beyond 
the parish boundaries, and where change is beginning to be felt, sympathy is more 
difficult, and coercive conventions become more rigid. 
Gender difference is a dominant theme and central to any interrogation of 
Eliot's sympathy and duty. The double opening of the novel involves 'an indoor and 
an outdoor, a workscene and a landscape, a "realistic" and a "mythic", a masculine and 
a feminine' (Gates 1998,2 1). Yet while the landscape is feminized - even interpreted as 
a description of a female body (Beer, 1986,61) - and nature is typically associated with 
women as opposed to culture and language, it is Dinah with a masculine power who 
dominates the landscape, controls the onlookers, and has usurped the role of male 
preacher. Several critics also argue that there is a narrative split between ... the analytic 
narrator" and the "sympathetic narrator"', an uneasy alliance resulting in "a disjunction 
of power and sympathy... (Logan 1996,19, quoting Bonaparte). I read this as a 
sympathetic aspect combined with a rational aspect, which together question power. A 
disjunction is present, but is not divided between gendered voices. 
Dinah is introduced before the reader meets her via characters such as Wiry Ben 
and the anonymous traveller. All the discussion of Dinah is from the male point of 
view (Lawless 1990,253), which adds to the sense of gender opposition. The main 
comment is always that Dinah is pretty. This insistence on her beauty is a normalising 
technique; Dinah is less powerful, ffightening and different when classified as pretty 
woman. However, Dinah is also 'unselfconscious like a boy', which subverts gender 
assumptions and marks her as the antithesis of the conventional romantic heroine 
(Rowland Tush, 28). This in turn attracts the reader's attention to what she says. Dinah 
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is unconscious of her appearance and sexuality because she has not been constructed to 
value them; perhaps there has been no third term, no male to seduce her to 
heterosexuality as Freud and Lacan would expect. She does not blush, simper or avert 
her eyes, but meets all intrusive looks with a clear, calm, sympathetic gaze that invites 
relation, but does not possess or allow possession. Her gaze transcends the gender 
barrier (Levine 1996,122) so that she can communicate with all, while she seizes 
language and uses her voice to urge sympathy and salvation. 
Yet as an authoritative woman, it is Dinah's sense of self that commands 
respect. The reverence Dinah receives contrasts starkly with the lack of civility and 
concern generally afforded Hetty. Dinah's refusal of Seth Bede's proposal suggests that 
the duties of her vocation are stronger than any maternal or sexual desire. Yet Dinaws 
role is still a nurturing and traditionally female one, and overtly her character is 
sympathetic, caring and understanding. Orphaned at an early age, Dinah was mothered 
by her Aunt Judith, also a caring, relational woman, but one who worked, had a 
vocation, and held a position within the Methodist community. In Chodorow's terms, 
Dinah experienced both a personal and a positional relationship to her primary carer, 
which I contend explains both Dinah's caring, relational abilities and her sense of 
autonomy. Further, with the character of Dinah Morris, Eliot subverts the notions of 
true womanly behaviour as expounded by both Comte and Spencer. Not only does 
Dinah work outside the home, she adopts the 'male' role of priest; worse, when she 
finally gives up her preaching, it is for a sexual relationship, while she simultaneously - 
as I will argue later - escliews much of her former selflessness. 
Hetty Sorrel is absent from the text until Chapter Seven, although she has been 
variously discussed. This absence along Nvith the fact that she is remarked 'on' without 
188 
any suggestion of relationship, indicates both her isolation and her secondary status. 
Adam loves Hetty, but all other comments are negative. Even Seth regrets Adam's 
passion (34), while Dinah's reference to Hetty as 'that poor wandering lamb' (. 4B 1998 
[1859], 34) is disturbingly condescending, although the reader's response may depend 
on how Dinah is perceived. Hetty's critics can themselves be questioned, thus the 
discerning reader will avoid hasty decisions. 
Dinah's sermon and its effect are of primary importance in questioning her 
valuing and use of sympathy and duty. Imagining Jesus in Hayslope, she highlights the 
qualities of sympathy and tolerance needed in a Christian community - qualities lacking 
during Hetty's plight. Yet there is a sudden switch to an account of a vengeful God 
unwilling to save latecomers - that is, those who will not heed Dinah's warnings, now: 
'Jesus, who stands ready to help you now, won't help you then .. ATow he looks at You 
with love and mercy ... then 
he will turn away from you, and say, "Depart from me into 
everlasting fire... (31, my italics). The narrative disjunction here is not remarked by 
critics - perhaps the theatricality of the sermon masks it - but Dinah changes from 
sympathetic, caring voice to judgemental, doctrinal voice. Dinah's tactic is to tempt 
and then terrify those she would save, yet without ever enlightening them. The narrator 
gently undermines Dinah's strongest pronouncements; she looks with 'appalled pity' 
(AB, 28) on these sinners, rather than sympathy, so that the effect on the listeners is to 
evoke fear rather than understanding. This Janus-faced preacher-woman, one moment 
gentle and caring, seemingly feminine - yet non-sexual (Levine 1996,114-17) - the next 
accusing and talking of 'bottomless pit[s]' (AB, 31), is often attacked by modem critics. 
Herbert sees her sermon as violently Calvinistic and accusatory, representing the type of 
Evangelicalism attacked by George Eliot in her 'Dr. Cumming' essay (1974-5,415). 
Thus it is not clear if Dinah is sympathetic according to the terms I have established, or 
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where exactly she regards her duties to lie. Perhaps it is this personal and positional 
confusion that Eliot is exploring: 'My irony, so far as I understand myself, is not 
directed against opinions - against any class of religious views - but against the vices 
and weaknesses that belong to human nature in every sort of clothing' (GEL 11,348). 
When Hetty appears, it is in comparison to Dinah. Her beauty is the attraction 
for Arthur Donnithome, is possibly the only aspect of herself that has ever been praised, 
and it is heavily emphasised in the narrator's descriptions. Her beauty 'with which you 
can never be angry, ' (AB 83-4), does much to exonerate Hetty for those who, like Mrs 
Poyser, are 'fascinated in spite of themselves' (84). Eliors ire is not so much directed 
against pretty women via her portrayal of Hetty as the society which creates silly, naive, 
uneducated women. The comparison of Hetty with 'spring-time' and 'young frisking 
things' (84) darkly suggests that such innocence does not last. However, Spencer argues 
that such beauty in women is a result of sexual selection; and men find it attractive 
because it resembles that of young vulnerable babies. Significantly, Hetty lacks all such 
sympathies and hates babies, lambs and fluffy chicks, thus seriously undermining one of 
Spencer's main tenets. There may also be a 'false air of innocence' (84), but this is 
female ignorance, bom of the male belief that women need to be kept ignorant - 
particularly of sexual matters - for their own protection (Paxton 1991,53), a theory the 
Poysers adopt with disastrous consequences. Adam's eventual anger and remonstrance 
arrives partly because he recognises this false virtue and the harm it does. 
Arthur Donnithorne has come literally to see Hetty, while ý& Irwine has come 
to talk to Dinah. Hetty is in 'The Dairy', Dinah discusses 'Vocation'. Irwine is 
fiiendly, formal and egalitarian with Dinah, while Arthur's manner changes from 
studied gallantry to seductive intimacy once alone with Hetty (86-7). Unlike Dinah, 
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Hetty is totally self-conscious and 'quite used to the thought that people liked to look at 
her' (96). Yet Hetty's inability to understand her current emotions is not false 
innocence, but a lack of experience, particularly of happiness and love. The marked 
attentions of a handsome man whose approving gaze and intimate voice suggest wann 
relationship, conjure a return to idyllic happiness. One emphasis of the narrator's is to 
suggest that 'Hetty's dreams were all of luxuries' (99), but such is to ignore and 
minimise the sensuality that suffuses the alternate descriptions of Hetty's fantasies. 
However, as a warning to readers not to be seduced by this description of romantic love, 
the episode of Arthur's filling up little Totty's empty pink purse is an almost obscene 
gesture. 
In person, Dinah and Hetty provide an immediate opposition in intuitive 
sympathy and duty. 'Languid' and 'pettish' Hetty is shocked by the news of Thias 
Bede's drowning, but is not 'deeply affected' (95); while Dinah's response is one of 
empathy. However, Mrs Poyser's own reaction shows less care than Hetty. Like 
Dinah, Hetty is an orphan, with Mrs Poyser as her primary carer. Mrs Poyser talks 
constantly of teaching Hetty her 'duty', but this is domestic duty - and to be subservient 
to her betters. Otherwise, duty is a matter of petty conventions. In praising the 
twonderful' Mrs Poyser, John Blackwood provided ironic insight; he regarded Hetty's 
indifference to Totty as evidence of her perverse, unfeminine nature (GEL H, 510). Yet 
Hetty is described as a motherless child of seven or eight when her nursemaiding began 
with baby Marty, and she has nursed each child since. Prophetically she declares that 
she 'would have been glad to hear that she should never see another child again' (155). 
Blackwood failed to notice that Mrs Poyser constantly delegates her children's care 
(Logan 1996,20); she conforms well to Dinnerstein's image of both the all-powerful 
mother that all wish to escape, and the Evil Stepmother. Since Mrs PoYser's care does 
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not foster self-sufficiency and maturity and Hetty's life is still completely managed 
(Creegor 1956,228), she has a 'child-like trust that she will be taken care of (Logan 
1996,21), a trust later betrayed by all. Dinah has the freedom to increase her 
experience, while Hetty resorts to lies and deception. No tenderness, love or emotional 
care is ever offered to Hetty, and although not educated she is a perfect example of a 
Rousseauan child who has not been nurtured but corrupted by social conventions. 
The narrator's warnings about making snap decisions continue, although the 
emphasis now is to be wary of appearances, and not to think that 'nature has theatrical 
properties, and, with the considerate view of facilitating art and psychology, "makes up" 
her characters, so that there may be no mistake about them' (AB, 23). In particular the 
characters are warned not to assume that women's beauty is a sign of moral virtue. 
Both Adam and Arthur, blinded by Hetty's beauty, misunderstand her inner nature - for 
with Hetty, Eliot parodies Spencer's theory that beautiful women make good mothers 
(Paxton 1991,48). Adam, believing in his own sense of good and right, creates Hetty 
out of his own image and believes Hetty, as yet an innocent child, will outgrow her 
fancifulness. But as the text warns: 'Nature has her language, and she is not 
unveracious; but we don't know all the intricacies of her syntax just yet, and in a hasty 
reading we may happen to extract the very opposite of her real meaning' (AB 1534). 
After his father's death, Adam strives to be sympathetic and understanding, but is too 
controlled by reason - he thinks that the answer to all problems lies in his mensuration 
tables. Adam has much adequate knowledge but lacks the imagination and experience 
for intuitive sympathy; he cannot put himself in anyone else's position and he cannot 
understand Hetty's fears and desires until her crisis. 
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Hetty's life before Arthur has been hard and frighteningly limited, while 
A. rthur's advances are outside her frame of reference. However, as Hetty relates neither 
to his reality nor hers, and barely recognises the subject-status of anyone, then 
impropriety has scant foothold on her psyche. But Arthur should know better: perhaps 
if he had read 'The Thom' in his copy of Lyrical Ballads he would have heeded the 
warning presented there instead of declaring the rural poems to be 'twaddling stuff 
(AB, 65). In the many passages where Arthur debates with his conscience and appears 
to win the battle against his desire for Hetty, the narrator's own analysis often features 
as a parallel account. The 'narrator' alternates between being so extreme in Arthur's 
defence that it becomes a parody and points up the dangers of Arthur's behaviour, 
suggesting that despite Arthur's good intentions, trouble never falls on him alone (124- 
6); while also reporting all that Arthur whistles, sings, reads, admires or admits, all of 
which labels him the perfect 'rake'. Yet Blackwood described Hetty as 'the little 
villain' and pitied Arthur (GEL, 11,484). If such opinions were typical, then Eliot had 
undertaken a serious struggle in encouraging sympathy for characters such as Hetty. 
Throughout, the narrator skilfully undermines and subverts certitudes, not only 
by presenting multiple points of view or 'dramatised discourse' but also via his own 
disjointed voice. These effects are seen particularly in Chapter Nine, 'Hetty's World', 
where the rational narrative account of Hetty's own, yet third-person, inner monologue 
reveals her petty, shallow soul; while at the same time the narrator provides an 
alternative sympathetic commentary. Her soul, with its 'very limited range of music, 
will not vibrate to the emotions that touch others (96); her 'sphere of comparison' (97) 
of men was not large, and she had led a very sheltered life. We are also told that her 
aunt and uncle did not esteem her as a daughter, so that she would have been placed as a 
servant elsewhere if her uncle had not 'brought her up as a domestic help' (98). Further, 
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for Hetty to marry Adam would be a move to hardship, while 'she felt nothing when his 
eyes rested on her' (99). Hefty may be a selfish little egoist, but to choose hardship 
without love would be lacking in self-preservation. Further, her state of bondage, of 
triviality and inadequate knowledge is not her fault. 17 Hetty does have free will, but 
her limited experience makes moves beyond her determined role difficult. Critics 
generally assume that Hetty is an object of dislike to the narrator and even to George 
Eliot on the grounds of. 'Eliot's insistence throughout the novel on [Hetty's] vanity and 
materialism' (Carroll 1971,50-1). However, these qualities are objectively probable 
given Hetty's experience, and are always balanced against her lonely existence, and her 
lack of education, hope, or love. 
In the 'Bed-chamber' scene, Hetty is perceived in all her narcissism, and the 
mirror is her main companion - whether literally or in the form of watching eyes. She 
seems promiscuous, responding to any gaze, while Dinah responds only to a look of 
love (Levine 1996,117,120). However, Hetty's relation both to the mirror and men's 
gaze corresponds to Winnicott's account of the mother's gaze'as the mirror which 
validates the child's existence and importance (1971,130-8). Hetty, seeking the love 
and validation of the mother - which was never forthcoming - may thus not be capable 
of sympathy, love and relationship, for she cannot see 'the othee at all. If Hetty is 
incapable of sympathy, then Dinah strives to be totally selfless. The narrator's abrupt 
redirection of the readers' attention to Dinalfs bed-chamber accentuates the contrast. 
Dinah is correct in her surmise that it was not that 'Hetty did not love Adam well 
enough to many him', but that there was 'a blank in her nature' (AB, 158). Dinah's 
imagination here - in contrast with Irwine's lack when Arthur approaches him - 
demonstrates her sympathy in action: 'Dinah's imagination and sympathy acted and 
" Atkins provides an extended Spinozan reading of Hetty's character, vAth many observations of a 
similar nature (1978,139-57). 
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reacted habitually, each heightening the other' (158). This formulation recalls Hume's 
description of our mental and moral powers functioning in combination. But despite 
her vision of Hetty trapped in a thicket of sin and sorrow, Dinah lacks the understanding 
to relate to Hetty, and her idea of 'trouble' merely causes distress. While Dinah is 
overflowing with sympathy, her doctrinal harshness interferes and hinders intuition. 
The narrator observes that 'the higher nature has to learn this comprehension [with the 
lower nature] ... by a good 
deal of hard experience' (150). This description may draw 
upon evolutionary concepts, suggesting that Dinah is more highly evolved than Hetty, 
but I think it refers to the levels of sympathy that Eliot describes in the Riehl essay. 
Dinah has intuition and often achieves the higher sympathy, but lacks experience, so 
that her imagination and sympathy have nothing to react with. Moreover, as women of 
their time and class, both lack the language to discuss love and sexual feelings and 
communication is unforthcoming. 
Perhaps Adam was on the threshold of Dinah's thoughts. At her encounter with 
him in the cottage, his 'dark penetrating glance' had caused a 'faint blush' (117). 
Dorothea Barrett considers Dinah's vocation to be a form of sexual sublimation, arguing 
that her 'bedchamber' revery is about Adam rather than God (1989,40-1). Imagining 
no spectator except perhaps God, Dinah has the window, the landscape and the moon as 
her companions. Because this is Dinah, and the narrator refers to 'the Divine Presence' 
(157), the reader may be distracted from the sensuality of the passage, as Dinah 'melted 
away like ice crystals in a warm ocean' (157). But the window suggests a liminality to 
be explored as she sinks into her reverie (Levine, 119-122) - the landscape was earlier 
sexualised, yet the moon goddess is chaste. Dinah's absence in the text from now on 
symbolises the lack of sympathy within the community - there is no one for Hetty to 
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turn to. Dinah's independence is rare for a woman, and is later taken to belie her caring, 
altruistic persona, when she cannot be found by her family (415). 
Chapter Seventeen announces a change in the novel's pace and focus. The 
engaging narrator who has guided the reader through a calmly linear introduction now 
becomes a distancing presence, addressing the implied reader brusquely. Under the 
guise of readers complaining that Irwine is not an ideal Pastor, the narrator highlights 
the uncertainty surrounding people and opinions. The narrator is not just claiming that 
people are variable and complex, but by raising the question of the Rector he forces a 
reconsideration of all the clues within the first volume. There is also a disingenuous 
appeal to accept people as they are, to 'tolerate, pity and love' (176). While tolerance is 
desired, the unspoken requirement is also that we have to change if we are to become 
more sympathetic. Using the well-known comparison to Dutch paintings, the narrator 
pleads for the beauty of truthfulness - thus excusing his portraits of ordinary, fallible, 
(mixed' human beings - as well as for the beauty of form and human sympathy; which 
constitutes a statement of Eliot's artistic aims and ideals. For truth is difficult while 
falsity is easy, and so truth - like the mirror - may not be flawless, but varied, 
contradictory and subjective. This interlude also suggests more change to come. By 
multiply signalling a disruption in time - breaking the linearity of the story, and 
reporting a conversation with an elderly Adam Bede sometime in the past of the writing 
yet in the future of the setting of the tale - the narrator forces a reassessment of 
everything to this point, particularly the nature and function of sympathy and duty. 
When Adam encounters Hetty and Arthur in the wood, the reader is already 
expecting a ddnouement. Adam's slowly-rising hopes have been buoyed by his success 
and preferment, and since in all his scenes with Hetty and Arthur the reader is 
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constantly and painfully aware of that other reality, a continuing dramatic irony mounts. 
This secret knowledge of hypocrisy, faithlessness and dishonesty, shared by reader and 
narrator, subverts all the communal gatherings that should strengthen the idea of 
community. To see relationship perverted in this way, when previously in the novel it 
has been the key to all good - the connective principle knitting together all that was 
positive despite all the failures of sympathy and duty within the community - provides a 
powerful learning resource for the reader. 
That Arthur is kissing Hetty shatters Adam's reality and a 'terrible scorching 
light showed him the hidden letters that changed the meaning of the past' (AB 296). 
Such an epiphany provides only Spinoza's 'laming sympathy', unless something is 
learned from the experience. For Adam, all his reason and logic, all he has built his 
concept of self and future on, are suddenly called into question. Thus, it is easier for 
him to restore his image of Hetty and blame Arthur completely than to effect a complete 
change in his own judgement. The fatal flaw is that when robbed of reason - without 
his own carefully constructed ethic of justice to support and protect him - Adam falls 
prey to his passions (Atkins 1978,105). The world is turned upside down as Adam 
denies his station and ultimately accelerates his class movement. Subsequently, guilt, 
remorse and even fear for Arthur's life mask his returning reason. If Adam had 
remained in control of his passions then the possibility of Arthur's continued hypocrisy 
and faithlessness would have occurred to him (Atkins, 105). But Adam has to return to 
his own values and believe Arthur's 'truths', and he is soon 'attributing imaginary 
virtues' to Hetty (SCL 353). The narrator still respects Adam, while pointing out that he 
could not 'imagine narrowness, selfishness, hardness in [Hetty]' for he 'created the 
mind he believed in out of his own' (354). His insistence on an immediate letter of 
separation from Arthur ultimately worsens the situation, for this 'hard' letter causes 
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Hetty's inability to act, for she comes to hate the writer (334). Selfishly, the letter is for 
Adam, not Hetty, so that he may stand a chance of winning her back. In a few Weeks 
the 'hopes he felt about Hetty softened a little his feeling towards Arthur' (354). Like 
Dinah, Adam knows nothing of Hetty, of her desires and fears, and both fail Hetty by 
believing that they know best, and by succumbing to their own needs. 
The reader has already been alerted by the warning that Hetty is a woman 'with 
a woman's destiny before her ... [with] vain hopes' that may become a 'rancorous 
poisonous garment' (249). The chapter 'The Hidden Dread' alerts readers to Hetty's 
pregnancy, via the very pregnancy of the prose: Hetty is 'oppressed', and illness had 
'confined' Mrs Poyser (362). The revelation is sudden - it is November, Arthur left in 
August, and Hetty's fears were not voiced when Adam proposed. This construction of a 
suddenness of fear following an absence that created hope begins an escalation in 
tension and the generation of sympathy for Hetty. Arthur was aware of the risk, but the 
withholding from the reader of Hetty's growing realisation mirrors Arthur's escape from 
his responsibility. In the description of the 'coming on of her great dread', the narrator 
subverts the pathetic fallacy, for, with the beauties of nature might 'be mingled for your 
ear ... a 
despairing human sob' (364), as simultaneously, pink and white Hetty becomes 
metonymically represented by her 'red cloak', thus conveying her state and thoughts of 
suicide by a pool in the Scantlands. If ElioVs novels 'effect changes in her readers' 
(Graver 1984,11) and encourage tolerance and sympathy, then a constant balancing is 
necessary between challenging the audience's beliefs and yet not offending them. The 
balance becomes more difficult in Adam Bede, for Hetty's offence is extreme, and 
sympathy has to be worked for by Eliot. 
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Tremendous fear of "'The Parish... propels Hetty on her j ourney, so keeping her 
respectable in all but her most despairing moments. 
18 Hetty reveals her knowledge of 
hardness, for her family are 'hard in their feelings even toward poverty ... and had little 
pity for want ... 
but held them as a mark of idleness and vice' (378). Finally, resourceless 
Hetty does not have herself to turn to, and nothing in her construction has prepared her: 
'Hetty's was not a nature to face difficulties ... There was not much room for her 
thoughts to travel in the narrow circle of her imagination' (335). The choice to flee to 
Arthur has been regarded as a 'gesture of abandonment, a refusal of responsibility' 
(Uglow 1987,108) on Hetty's part, but I see her decision finally to act as a moral step 
forward, given her utter passivity. Hetty grows morally as she begins to take 
responsibility for herself, as Gilligan describes from her research. 
The first glimmerings of insight into others and their feelings occur once Hetty 
has made her decision. This unlooked-for broadening of Hetty's response begins to 
place her within a reality peopled by others: 'The new susceptibility that suffering had 
awakened in her' (373) creates fellowship as she comes to accept her own subjectivity. 
From selfishness, passivity and passion, even her striving for life is a major movement. 
Reticence still dilutes the harshest truths and '[Eliot's] sympathy for her characters is 
usually too deep' for her irony to be too strident (Forster 1983,487). Yet, for almost 
the first time, Hetty thinks of someone - another female - in positive terms and 
remembers Dinah's 'affectionate kindness'. Her hope is buoyed by the realisation that 
Dinah, an outsider like herself, 'did not think about things as other people did' (380-1). 
The account of Hetty's return journey is written with such empathic understanding that 
the reader has first-hand experience of despair, near-suicide and the final love of life 
18 Logan (1996,25-6) provides a full analysis of the limited options available to pregnant single women. 
The reviews ofAdam Bede were critical of the account of Hetty's pregnancy, labelling it an unsuitable 
topic for a novel: British Quarterly Review, no 45, Jan 1867,164; Saturday Review, no 7,26 Feb 1859, 
250-1. 
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(386-7) that pulls her back from death. In a masculine aspect, the narrator prays: 'God 
preserve you and me from being the beginners of such misery' (389). 
The birth and Hetty's infanticide are only accounted for later via Dinah! s 
mediation and by the reader's prior knowledge that Hetty has been condemned to death. 
This precise crafting maximises the sympathy already generated by the free indirect 
account of her journey. An immediate account of the child's death might risk the 
reader's fellow-feeling for Hetty. Dorothea Barrett claims that'If we feel too much for 
Hetty at the end of the "journey in despair", the infanticide is calculated to dispel that 
sympathy' (1989,48), but this is not the case. Rather, Hetty's confession is given 
distance and the shadow of death to render her act forgivable to the reader. Distance is 
achieved physically, temporally and emotionally via the account of Adam's quest for 
Hetty. The reader is jerked back with the realisation that life has been going on. This 
jolt is compounded by Adam's journey paralleling Hetty's, as Dinah's absence parallels 
Arthur's. Further, neither the reader nor Adam anticipates the charge of infanticide. 
While the reader is aware of Hetty's pregnancy, the revelation of the child's death both 
mirrors Adam's shock and intensifies the reader's experience. Irwine's pain at Arthur's 
involvement heightens the tension, and all are forced to acknowledge that beliefs about 
themselves and others are false. Such a climax brings the realisation that moral choice 
does lie within, as Irwine had stressed to Arthur, even though the latter persisted in 
viewing it as external and saw himself as a victim of fate, rather than able to act in a 
way implied by Bray's 'philosophy of necessity', or Spinoza's determinism. Adam's 
present refusal to believe ill of Hetty is part of the same self-delusion that kept her 
innocent in his eyes. 
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Despite the fact that Martin Poyser had earlier said 'I'll not turn my back on hee 
(402), once Hetty's crime is revealed the sympathy is as unforthcoming as Hetty had 
feared. The dreadful irony that their hardness led Hetty to a greater crime never occurs 
to the Poysers. As the narrator remarks on Mr Irwine's surprise at Mrs Poyser being less 
severe than her husband: 'We are often startled by the severity of mild people on 
exceptional occasions; the reason is, that mild people are most liable to be under the 
yolk of traditional impressions' (413). Such lack of sympathy stresses the adherence to 
mores as opposed to morals that Rousseau and Feuerbach warned against. That Mrs 
Poyser is more sympathetic lies in her greater intelligence, reason and imagination, yet 
she still acts as the voice of established values and is ultimately as inflexible and 
incapable of sympathy as her menfolk. 
1856 was rocked by a debate about infanticide, prompted by an article by the 
Rev William Smith, who insisted that mothers accused of infanticide were regularly 
being acquitted (Morris 1990,76-7). Smith argued that this laxity was an erosion of 
moral standards. Eliot, on the other hand, demonstrates via Hetty that myriad 
circumstances demand leniency. Relativism, not blind justice was called for. Most of 
the women charged were, like Hetty, young, single, working class, and abandoned by 
men. Eliot foreshadows later appeals, such as Gilligan's desire for a caring ethic 
combined with a justice ethic. In the cultural climate created by Comte and Spencer, 
who regarded women as the personification of morality and the embodiment of an 
innate and universal nurturing role, then Hetty is punished for what would be deemed an 
unnatural act (Morris 1990,79). Eliot shows that it counts against Hetty greatly that her 
counsel 'tried, without result, to elicit evidence that the prisoner had shown some 
movements of maternal affection towards the child' (433). Eliot's condemnation relates 
to the period when Adam Bede is set - for Mary Voce, on whom Hetty's tale is based 
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and who was comforted by ElioVs Aunt Samuel, was executed for infanticide in 1802 
(Uglow 1987,100) - yet she also counters the many calls for greater severity during her 
own time. 19 Yet at the time, infanticide was possibly seen as the lesser of two evils 
compared to keeping illegitimate children on the parish (Logan 1996,24, n 13). 
The witness-accounts in the trial further demonstrate that any tale has multiple 
strands, for none includes Hetty's own story. As a literary and a moral exercise, Eliot's 
novel departs from 'the literary convention in which unwed mothers find redemption 
through maternal ideology' (Logan, 18) and demonstrates that biology is not enough to 
make a caring maternal woman. Further, if Hetty displays the self-preservation 
described by Spinoza, then her actions can be seen as a return to nature, demonstrating 
clearly the paradox of Spencer's two disparate views: he cannot expect to have both 
nurturing women and the 'survival of the fittest ethic', unless conditions are equalised. 
Trauma has returned Hetty to a child-like stage - she cannot mother a child because she 
is still one herself. Hetty refuses to acknowledge any part in the baby's life or death, 
like a child blind to all reason and sensibility. Here the narrator acts as a mirror, like 
the conscience described by Adam Smith. 
Even during her prison visit, Dinah continues to misunderstand Hetty, who 
clings to her merely as 'this something' for it is only 'the human contact she clung to' 
(AB 448). Again Dinah's attempts to talk of God produce fear and incomprehension. 
An understanding of either death or God is beyond Hetty, whose drive is still for self- 
19 Between 1623 and 1803 women accused of infanticide were presumed guilty until proved innocent, 
with any concealment of the pregnancy considered to be evidence of an intent to murder (Clayton 1991). 
This becomes a point of law concerning Effie Deans' baby in Scott's Ae Heart qfMidlothiaa Eliot is 
perhaps allowing for her readers being aware of the way the laws had changed since the late eighteenth- 
century, while presenting a warning against the 1856 argument. 
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preservation; even at the end she declares: 'I wouldn't mind if they'd let me live' (449). 
Dinah's doctrinally-fuelled exhortations closely parallel her sermon on the common, the 
difference being that Hetty only has 'now' in which to repent. While the opportunity to 
tell her truth is undeniably welcome, and her words confirm that the intention to kill 
was not absolute, Hetty is moved to speak more by hopes of human forgiveness, the 
need to unburden her guilt, and the love and physical affection Dinah provides, than by 
thoughts of everlasting life. 
Holding the condemned Hetty in her arms, Dinah has no time for mistakes, and 
while she talks of not hurrying God's work, and of feeling the 'Divine presence more 
and more' (448), it is ultimately Dinah who speaks and prompts Hetty's relief of 
confession. Her description of herself as part of the Divine presence is Feuerbachian in 
that Dinah as human is God-like. While Dinah talks of God's forgiveness she is also 
encouraging her to relate, love, trust and unburden. Hetty's confession is so terrifying, 
for briefly she was intending to kill the child - believing in her near-madness that she 
had no other way out - that tremendous sympathy and startled condemnation are 
brought into play. Hetty asks: 'Dinah, do you think God will take away that crying and 
the place in the wood, now I've told everything? ' (455). There is no answer, for a 
spiritual God was not involved. Dinah is not being arrogant and usurping God's place 
as Logan suggests (1996,20) when she says that Hetty 'has confessed all to me ... she 
leans on me for help' (457). With no conception of God, Hetty is confessing to Dinah, 
but it is the quality in Dinah as a caring human who helps and listens which is God-like. 
Dinah is in the early stages of recognising the greater importance of human agency in 
sympathy. She develops a personal duty to care for humans in this life, not the next. 
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Adam perceives that Hetty's only strength lies in her contact with Dinah, whom 
she obeys'like a little child'(460). For Dinah has become the mother and, by reflecting 
back a better Hetty, has promoted some genuine penitence and the memory in Hefty of 
'the love that she had once lived in' (461). Yet the extent of Hetty's growth is limited; 
selfishness may be fading, but selflessness is not yet born. Hetty begins to think of 
others, tentatively, as when she says of Arthur: 'I hated him ... but Dinah says, I should 
forgive him ... and 
I try ... for else God won't forgive me' (461). Despite his hardness, 
Adam never really doubts Hetty, especially once he realises his own fault; as Bartle 
Massey says, 'you'd a notion she'd got another sort of nature inside her" (458). He does 
not accept that she wittingly murdered the child and constantly excuses her on the 
grounds of her innocence and of Arthur's greater culpability. He has learned sympathy 
and understanding from his own experience of pain and suffering. 
Adam's suffering has produced such moral growth that forgiving Hetty is not a 
test, since he had already done so; it is in forgiving Arthur that he demonstrates true 
sympathy. By the time they meet in the woods, Adam has learned that 'Anger 'ull 
mend nothing' (466), and, once certain that Arthur has repented, he forgives him and 
acknowledges his own hardness in the past. That 'the folks at the farm were too hard' 
with Hetty (469) had prompted his care for her and made him extra harsh on Arthur, but 
now as with Hetty, Adam's suffering permits recognition of the other's suffering and 
allows him to forgive. At this point, Adam represents George Eliot's ideal of a growth 
to sympathy through suffering and experience; he has made the transition from the 
rational and unimaginative to a sympathy and caring for others that also includes the 
self. Ultimately, Adam achieves Spinoza's intuitive sympathy, as all his faculties 
combine in helping his empathic understanding of Hetty. 
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Arthur's growth is perhaps the greatest, for he had further to go and had a greater 
responsibility to accept. On his return to Hayslope on his grandfather's death, the 
dramatic irony is intense. Arthur is like Hetty in not accepting responsibility for his 
acts - both are in bondage, yet Arthur has less excuse. When Arthur and Adam meet, 
the signs of suffering that Hetty recognised as herself in Adam are visible in Arthur, and 
'Adam knew what suffering was - he could not lay a cruel finger on a bruised man' 
(465). The same signs subdue Arthur who still smarts that Adam makes him feel 'the 
irrevocableness of his own wrong-doing' (467). The death of Hetty conveniently 
relieves Arthur of his greatest test. It is this, rather than Adam and Dinah's marriage, 
that is the main fault in the novel. Meanwhile, Dinah moves from the margins of 
society into its centre as a result of her experiences of Hetty's suffering. Her growth to 
sympathy is greater than generally acknowledged, for she has acquired the 'hard 
experience' and the bruises and gashes (161) necessary to embrace the 'lower nature'. 
Dinah fully realises the power of relation and acknowledges the importance of the 
listener, rather than the preacher it is the power of the self-in-relation, or the 'I/Thou'. 
There is general objection to the final book of Adam Bede. Feminist critics 
object to Dinah's loss of vocation and her acceptance of the traditional roles of wife and 
mother, taking particular objection to the fact that Hetty's death is necessary to allow 
this end (Brady 1992,85; Uglow 1987,111). In choosing Adam rather than devotion 
to her faith, however, Dinah chooses sexuality. That she should choose to be sexual is 
also Feuerbachian, for her experience with Hetty has taught her to love herself and not 
be so selfless. Further, it can be objected that in choosing to be a wife and mother she 
chooses a secondary vocation, for she keeps the major part of her work by talking to 
people in their homes - the result of her own learning process with Hetty whereby she 
can now relate to the 'lower natures'. She also practises the duty of sympathy, rather 
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than duty to a theological God. The doctrine of her sermon is gone, and the harsh 
judgemental rhetoric that deformed her caring sympathy is eschewed for a Spinozan and 
Feuerbachian ethic, without the dogma of Comte. 
Dinah's reluctance to change to the Church where women's preaching was 
allowed indicates far more than submission. Adam suggests that Dinah thought it best 
to set an example to other women, who mostly 'do more harm nor good with their 
preaching' and do not have her gift (539). But Dinah has learned just how inadequate 
her own gift was, with the villagers untouched by her sermons, her family not grown 
towards sympathy, and Hetty confused by her attempts at spiritual ministry. Caring and 
sympathy are still part of her vocation, but the judgemental doctrines are overthrown. 
Dinah is now a woman finally constructed as both personal and positional. Her role as a 
Methodist preacher previously provided an outlet for both aspects of her personality and 
gender. However too close an adherence to the harsh doctrine of the Church rendered 
her inflexible, unforgiving, and unintelligible to her listeners. Previously Dinah had no 
choice, but now her choice with Adam is not an issue of marriage versus vocation as 
Barrett describes, but a matter of sexual satisfaction, love, and sympathy for herself, and 
the ability to practise a casteless vocation of caring, with independence and autonomy. 
Adam and Dinah were George Eliot's pet characters (GEL VIII, 201) and the 
amount that they grow and change is central. It is also important to remember that 
love, the look of love and all other signs of caring between Adam and Dinah are mutual: 
'For Eliot, a reciprocal gaze is apparently fundamental to a mature sexuality in men and 
women alike' (Levine 1996,118). Both Adam and Dinah need to become self- 
conscious in order to realise the full impact of the love of the other, and both must 
experience this mutuality. Finally, both have to learn from their experiences of the 
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suffering of others in order to have personal relationships that involve the self and the 
other. The wedding of Dinah and Adam therefore celebrates their happy ending as a 
mutually supportive 'I/Thou' relationship, even while it accentuates Hetty's absence. 
The narrator's remarks about those who are absent highlights the lack of sympathy and 
duty that led to the downfall of both Hetty and Arthur. 
Hetty's crime was too great to go unpunished; but if readers can be persuaded to 
sympathy and understanding for Hetty, and possibly to extend this into their own lives, 
then. 4dam Bede will have achieved much - her hanging would have detracted from this 
achievement. Further, sympathy for Arthur and acceptance of Adam's forgiveness of 
him would also have been impossible to win if Hetty were to be executed. The details 
of Hetty's fate and her subsequent death after seven years are problematic, for the 
horror of transportation is also too great and has to be glossed over. Yet Hetty is a 
spectral presence: she disrupts the 'happy ending' and returns to subvert the text in a 
deeply ironic way. Alarmingly, many readers wanted a sequel to account for Hetty's 
transportation and exile (GEL 111,3), something else Eliot could not allow if her wider 
message of sympathy and duty was to spread. At the end, the social and class changes 
involved in the marriage of Adam and Dinah are less important than the move to a 
doctrine of sympathy and duty, by all for all, that would itself ultimately overthrow the 
crime that destroys Hetty. Eliot was no longer content to make moral observations via 
herjournalism. Her desire to change herself and other people's sympathies sanctioned 
her literary ambitions, and she had to publish successful texts in order to achieve 
anything. Despite its faults, Eliot was fully justified in loving Adam Bede and being 
'deeply thankful to have written it' (GEL H, 505). 
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Chapter Five - Extraordinary Individuals in Ordinary Environments: 
The Mill on the Floss and Romola 
The Mill on the Floss is an angry exploration of how intuitive sympathy and duty may 
be opposed and deposed by narrow or gendered definitions of virtue and convention; 
these false values may even inhibit and destroy individuals who do not conform, and 
Maggie Tulliver is the ugly-duckling heroine who rejects the ill-fitting moulds prepared 
by family, community and the reading public. The faint trailing echoes of a sympathy 
and duty that Eliot would value inhabit the text, but the reader has to work hard to 
isolate these virtues. Maggie and Tom here represent all 'young natures' who, 'in the 
onward tendency of human things have risen above the mental level of the generation 
before them, to which they have been nevertheless tied by the strongest fibres of their 
hearts' (MF 272-3). Forced into gendered personalities which suit neither their 
reproduction nor inheritance, and bound by rigid maxims that have no lasting value, 
they strive to find an ethic to live by. 
Despite early signs that the novel is to be a Bildungsroman (Brady 1992,94), 
readers' expectations are subverted, for there can be no growth to vocation and 
autonomy for Maggie as a woman of the period, and as a woman excessively 
constrained by webs of connection. The Bildungsroman scaffolding is typical of all 
systems that do not accommodate women, from Spinoza's Ethics to Lacan's account of 
women's exclusion from the Symbolic Order. Even Tom's progress is repeatedly set at 
a tangent by relational demands. Chodorow's relation-based account allows for a 
rereading of development which shows the linear progress of traditional 
autobiographical approaches to be deeply flawed, and in the Mill they are mimicked, 
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ironised and questioned. The word 'development' originally derives from the French, 
Ivelopper' suggesting something wrapped in several layers (Esty 1996,144); which is 
far more appropriate for the gradual unwrapping of Maggie's life that Eliot presents 
here. The lives of Tom and Maggie ripple out as layers of absence, opposition, rupture, 
renunciation, isolation and loss, as Eliot develops further the idea of intuitive sympathy 
and duty being opposed to false virtue and convention. 
It is a commonplace that The Mill on the Floss is Eliot's most autobiographical 
work. Despite the phenomenal success of . 4dam Bede, the period 1858 to 1859 was a 
disturbing and melancholy time. Controversy surrounded one Joseph Liggins, who 
claimed to be 'George Eliot', while in September 1859 Blackwood - underestimating 
Eliot's insecurity - suggested that the Mill be serialised anonymously. As Eliot's 
identity had recently leaked, Blackwood anticipated an adverse effect on sales, but his 
remark that 'it would be great fun to watch the speculations as to the author's life' 
represents an amazing 'lapse of tact' (GEL 111,161, n3). A temporary rift ensued. Yet 
Blackwood's concerns were justified. In July 1859 The 4thenaeum had published a 
ferocious attack by William Hepworth Dixon accusing the 'strong-minded lady' of 
manufacturing the Liggins fiasco as a publicity prank (Haight 1968,290-1). Eliot's 
desire to cling to her incognito further complicated matters. Friendship with Chapman 
was severed and that with Spencer strained after Chapman's attempts to 'sound' 
Spencer over the identity of George Eliot (GEL 11,494, n7). That friends could not be 
trusted intensified Eliot's depression and isolation, for as Lewes's 'Wife' she was 
already ostracised. Lewes was all she had, and he was constantly in ill-health. All of 
these anxieties were further compounded by grief, for in March 1859 Eliot's sister 
Chrissey died. Her deathbed letters, in which she bitterly regretted the cessation of 
contact with Eliot following the news of her 'marriage' to Lewes, was a tremendous 
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shock; Eliot declared it had 'ploughed up my heart' (GEL 111,23). The Mill on the 
Floss therefore has its genesis in a period of loss, betrayal and outsidership. 
The autobiographical elements suggest a need to exorcise the pain of family 
relationships. The novel begins in 1829, with Maggie ten and Tom thirteen - as Mary 
Anne and Isaac would have been (Ashton 1996,234). However, The Mill on the Floss 
is fiction, and Maggie is not George Eliot. Extrapolating from Barbara Hardy's theory 
of unrealized or 'possible' lives (1959,135-54), another reading is that 'Maggie is the 
other possible Marian Evans who never left her home, never broke the ties most sacred 
to her, never discovered the George Eliot in herself' (Barrett 1989,53). There is also 
more overt emphasis on gender roles than in the previous works, generated by Eliot's 
anger at the gender standards that were being used to judge her in 1859, and by anger at 
the values which could have condemned her, like Maggie. As Eliot claims her role as a 
woman writer, her narrator becomes more feminine, and although the sex is ambiguous, 
a relational voice, which I will call feminine, dominates. 
The first sentence of The Mill on the Floss is a broad, rushing, passionate plunge 
into the story, only for the reader to be stopped short. This alone mimics Maggie and 
Tom's story. Further, the narrator's description of a solitary girl watching the circling 
Mill wheel and patternings of the water suggests Maggie's centrality, but also a fluid 
submergence - 'I am in love with moistness' (MF 8) - that is both pre-oedipal and 
sensual. Childhood is the river and the mill, and the story returns there rhythmically 
and repeatedly. The novel is titled The Mill on the Floss, precisely because this is the 
metonymic site of love, warmth, care and connection. The recognition and relation 
signified by 'home' structure the novel during the absence of other constant and 
consistent loving interconnection. This is the beginning and the end, and the primal 
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point of connection for Maggie and Tom: 'we know ourselves as separate only insofar 
as we live in connection with others, and ... we experience relationship only insofar as 
we differentiate other from self' (Gilligan 1982,63). 
Maggie is individual yet always in relation; she is first seen in vibrant 
connection with the landscape, and the whole basis of the text is interaction. Maggie 
may ask, 'If the past is not to bind us, where can duty lie? We should have no law but 
the inclination of the moment' (AF 475), but only after a lifetime spent making 
mistakes in following the inclination of the moment, while acquiring sympathy and duty 
and understanding how to employ them. Critics comment on the falseness of the 
narrator's references to the lost but happy infancy of Tom and Maggie. That 'the golden 
gates of their childhood had for ever closed behind them' (191) is disputed on the 
grounds that the reader hardly sees any golden childhood. Yet this is a realist novel: life 
existed before page one and at thirteen Tom is nearly a man, so childhood was virtually 
over. All the tokens of care - Tom's painting of the Devil (19) and the present of the 
fishing line (34) - also indicate that there was much for Maggie to love at one time. 
Otherwise, early childhood love is an absent referent that keeps sounding throughout the 
novel, suggesting that there was a time of love, caring and closeness. It is this 
remembered absence that keeps Maggie tied to Tom even when they fail each others' 
ethics and expectations. The supreme importance of this fundamental link of unseen 
but ever-present happy childhood needs to be understood by the reader in their analysis 
of duty and sympathy. 
The narrator is sometimes perceived by critics as a representation of the adult 
Maggie looking back on her past, but Maggie is dead (Barrett 1989,52-3), and despite 
the 11', this is not to be a first-person narrative, although 'the empathic maneuver (sic) 
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stands' (Landa 1991,43), capturing the reader and suggesting the narrator's caring 
connection to Maggie and establishing her as the main consciousness. That the narrator 
appears to be looking back on her past, and becomes submerged in the presentness of 
that past, suggests tremendous identification. While this narrative feature strengthens 
ideas of an authorial and an autobiographical voice, it also presents a different voice. 
This is an ever-more engaging, empathic narrator. Even the fond, familiar account of 
the mill and river evoke sympathy, for we also learn an early attachment for places and 
things. This narrator is more personal, relating both to a community and the individuals 
in it, reporting on the correspondence between internal and external environments as 
Tom and Maggie evolve. While there is still much 'dramatic discourse' between 
characters that presents alternative readings of both themselves and others, and a 
weaving beneath all accounts continues to present different interpretations, far more is 
conveyed by the nuances between the different gradations of the narrative voice. Ironic 
comment is even more difficult to discern, often achieved by opposing contradictory 
aspects of a single voice; leaving the reader to read any incongruities. The multiplicity 
of the opening narrative voice is an example: author, narrator, character; present and 
past, waking yet dreaming. The reader should realise that this is no stable, coherent 
tale. 
The sudden plunge into the intimacy of the Tulliver and Dodson family is 
startling for the reader. Even E. S. Dallas saw the novel as a portrait of 
'bestial ... vulgar ... repulsive ... 
insect life' (Haightl965,12); Eliot was shocked: 
So far as my own feeling and intention are concerned, no one 
class of persons or form of character is held up to reprobation or 
to exclusive admiration. Tom is painted with as much love and 
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pity as Maggie, and I am so far from hating the Dodsons myself, 
that I am rather aghast to find them ticketed with such very ugly 
adjectives (GEL 111,299). 
Revelations about the family vary from direct narrative comment to shades of narration 
within a character, to direct speech from characters who present multiple accounts of the 
Dodsons and their moral values. While their code of behaviour is no longer suitable for 
the evolving world of Maggie and Tom, it has presumably developed from a kinship 
code of sympathy and duty such as those described by Hume, Smith and Spencer, and it 
still has some standards to offer. For example, family connection is recognised and Mrs 
Glegg will stand by Maggie in her crisis (MF 499). Yet behaviour for the Dodsons is 
largely determined by a mythical public opinion, so that leaving unimpeachable wills 
amounts to duty - despite the fact that the opinions of others are barely valued by the 
Dodsons. (58). Eliot's sympathy - as a caring, compassionate fellow-feeling which 
requires practice and encouragement - barely exists in the family, much less empathy, 
and the dominant virtue is pity, whereby Tessy, I'm sorry for you' (73), signals 
nothing but contempt. 
The Dodsons have evolved and differentiated from their common origins and 
creed; they are now outsiders to each other, so that there is no clear code to pass on. 
The narrator is at her most obviously ironic concerning family foibles, for although we 
are told that there were 'particular ways of doing everything in that family' (43), the 
narrator gradually reveals, through various levels of comment, that all of them disagree 
with each others' methods. Further, there is only Mrs Glegg with the moral strength to 
utter the 'disagreeable truths that correct family feeling dictated' (43). For example, 
while Tulliver's culpability in his own ruin cannot be ignored, his family share the 
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responsibility, for Mr Deane admits later that he knew Tom's education would be all 
wrong: 'It wasn't my business, and I didn't interfere: but it is as I thought it would be' 
(230). A small observation, yet the narrator's tunnelling suddenly revalues Dodson 
codes. Minding one's own business while a family member ruins himself is not a 
'duty' George Eliot would recognise. To observe this Point is not to be writing 
different stories, but it is about the multiple 'might have beens' that are such a large part 
of this novel, consciously or not, and which all provide practice in realising the nature 
and function of sympathy and duty. 
Maggie and Tom are both presented as outsiders within their own family. 
Darwin insisted that "'individual differences are highly important to us, as they afford 
materials for natural selection to accumulate"... This emphasis on slight differences, 
deviations, rather than approximation to the parent-type, is among the most profound of 
Darwin's challenges to conventional thinking. Not the normative but difference proves 
to be the generative principle' (Beer 1996, xx-xxi, my italics). Therefore, that Maggie 
is described as 'this small mistake of nature' (MF 13) should be celebrated, for it should 
have allowed her - like Tom in his different way - to act as the generative principles for 
family and society. Eliot was familiar with the developmental debate, and actually read 
Origin ofSpecies in November 1859 while writing The Mill on the Floss (GEL 111,214), 
although she was still most influenced by Lamarckian theory and Spencer's work, rather 
than Darwin's natural selection. 
Darwin distinguished between sexual selection and natural selection, 'thereby 
seeming to recognise the degree to which sexual selection is social selection' (Beer 
1996, xxvi), and Mr Tulliver has been experimenting. He chose his wife because 'she 
was a bit weak, like; for I wasn't agoin' to be told the rights o' things by my own 
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fireside' (MT7 19). Eliot observes in 'Margaret Fuller and Mary Wollstonecraft' that 
'Men pay a heavy price for their reluctance to encourage self-help and independent 
resources in women' (1992,185). She argues that women's development should be 
changed, and demonstrates in her novels the damage caused not only by feeble-minded 
women such as Mrs Tulliver, but by men who are complicit in the constant reproduction 
of such women. Spencer's argument that man's sexual choice was for attractive, 
altruistic women who would be submissive wives and nurturing mothers is also 
parodied by Eliot in the depiction of Bessy. Tulliver is reminiscent of the breeders in 
The Origin of Species, but complains: 'That's the worst on't wi' the crossing o' the 
breeds: you can neverjustly calkilate what'll come on't' (MF 12). The progress that 
Spencer describes is expected, but as Darwin was to explain, inheritance was an 
arbitrary process and did not necessarily include progress. Both Maggie and Tom are 
rejected because they do not conform to gender norms, not being pretty enough or 
clever enough. Spencer was radical for the time in blaming both parents for children's 
developmental problems and recommending that fathers take more of a role. However, 
Tulliver attempts further social selection by sending Tom to school with no 
consideration for Tom's preferences or abilities; as Comte warned, Tom becomes a 
possession to be exploited. 
The psychology of Eliot's characters is carefully constructed, yet the varying 
empathy and observation of the reader will produce individual assessments. Fludernik 
suggests that Mrs Tulliver and Lucy are 'exposed as contemptible and weak' (1992, 
176), but I disagree. Close reading reveals that both are oppressed, Bessy by her elder 
sisters (MF 44) and Lucy by her mother (62). As Eliot invites speculation about her 
characters' moral construction, Chodorow's accounts of gender differentials in 
personality formation are useful. For example, Tom is shown as cherished by his 
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mother, his Dodson characteristics transcending difference even as his maleness pushes 
him into a strongly gendered position. Further, Tom has a positional role as a Tulliver 
male; he is scathingly disdainful of women, acquiring a rejection of the female after his 
early expulsion from the pre-oedipal, and from years of listening to, and valuing, his 
father. From his father's legal wranglings Tom also acquires some sense of honesty and 
rights, but not yet the knowledge or understanding to determine whether these are based 
on reason and sound emotion, or ignorance and 'Spinozan' passions such as fear and 
pride. 
As later events reinforce Tom's need for rigid maxims to live by, his own 
concepts of duty and justice will override any caring, family feeling from childhood. 
The narrator, who personifies 'Nature' as a hard character like Eliot's 'Dame Nature', 
comments on her 'cunning' in hiding 'rigid and inflexible purposes' and 'unmodiflable 
characters' within such bits of 'pink-and-white' (MF 33) as Tom. Such damning 
prophecy is sandwiched between Maggie's delight at Tom's return, and his present of a 
fishing line for his little sister. Tom's introduction is thus an oscillation between 
brotherly love and assertion of self-righteous masculine superiority. While Maggie is 
portrayed as thoughtless and careless and Tom is justified in being angry, the violent 
language of his condemnation ensures a readerly sympathy for Maggie. Tom's justice 
ethic already lacks contextual relativism for others, while allowing it for himself he 
says that he does not forget things (36), but he forgets to love and care for his sister. 
However, Tom's character deserves sympathy and tolerance, for like Maggie he is the 
victim of gender expectations, and Eliot intended him to be understood. When Dinah 
Mulock diagnosed authorial disdain for Tom, Eliot observed that she alone had created 
any respect that is perceived: 'the exhibition of the right on both sides being the very 
soul of my intention in the story' (GEL 111,397). Although there is little overt 
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sympathy for Tom, Eliot constantly presents Maggie and Tom as both being right: Tom 
is always more dutiful andjust, while Maggie is more sympathetic and caring. 
Maggie's imagination, love of music and beauty all condemn her as being 'like a 
Bedlam creatur" for her mother, while her dark hair and 'brown skin as makes her look 
like a mulatter' (A4F13) may explain maternal rejection. Extrapolating from 
Chodorow's theory of gender difference, Maggie's 'difference' has circumscribed her 
mother's love. Although she was passively mothered she experiences mother loss as 
Kristeva describes it (Doane and Hodges 1992,56-61). Maggie has effectively left the 
pre-oedipal early and turned to her father and Tom for the agency and authenticity that 
Chodorow describes as essential for the formation of a self-in-relation (1989,106). 
Maggie lacks initiation into her female role, yet as a woman can expect nothing from 
her positional role with her father. The absence of Maggie's domestic training is 
symbolic of her rejection of feminine passivity, yet she is sympathetic; she feels for the 
'Prodigal Son' (MF 32) and will not allow Tom to be judged capable of turning his 
father out (17). In 'Being and Doing' Chodorow reports that girls are generally 
constructed for nurturance, and thus know their role from early on (Chodorow 1989, 
28). However, Maggie's turning to her father and Tom is a metonymic linkage 20 as 
their relationship stands in for the lost maternal bond. Although Maggie is happiest 
with masculine language and ambition, in opposition to Lucy's feminine role, her use of 
language is characteristically metonymic rather than metaphoric. Metonymy is a major 
trope within this text, signifying connection. The narrator's own play with metaphor 
(MF 13940) highlights Mr Stelling's incompetence, for in attempting to totalise with 
metaphor he consequently never explains anything to Tom and only provides endless 
replacements. Meanwhile Maggie always offers contiguous stories that show 
connection and care: she worries if Philoctetes had a sister to care for him (182), and 
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renames, connects and sympathises, for metonymy is about renaming (Matus 1988/9, 
310). 
Maggie's quest for sympathy is double; she desires to receive it, for she is 
critically aware that no one judges her with justice, but she also wishes to improve and 
extend her sympathy and care. She is sensitive, but lacks reason and full understanding 
and is governed by passionate self-interest. The reader's sympathy is elicited by the 
constant criticism Maggie receives, and by her desire to improve and be loved, and by 
her always 'wishing she had done something different' (AP7 53). The reader is secure 
because we identify with the characters' mistakes. The greatest injustice and violation 
of Maggie's identity is when Tom tells her 'YoUll never go far into anything' 
following Stelling's judgement on women's 'quick and shallow' intelligence . Maggie 
is speechless and 'so oppressed by this dreadful destiny' (150-1) that she is briefly 
ousted from her hard-won claim on language. Yet Maggie's continued rebellion in the 
face of criticism, undermining, and violation should be praised, her rebellions constitute 
'a key site of protest in Eliofs text' (Fraiman 138). 
In one of the major patternings of connection in the text, Maggie and Tom are 
frequently presented in opposition. Their attempts to transcend this opposition usually 
precipitate scenes of rupture, as they strive confusedly after each others' sympathy and 
duty, as Maggie shoulders the duty of feeding Tom's rabbits, only to fail (IN 3 1). But 
Tom's realisation of the importance of love is measured by his vAthdrawal of it as 
punishment (36). Because Tom measures himself against his own construction of duty, 
in the absence of other clear guidance, he lacks a sense of other as conscience as Adam 
Smith describes, and thus lacks the imagination to sympathise. Yet there is recognition. 
In the scene of the jam puff bisection (45-6), Tom insists on justice in the division and 
" See Matus 1988/9 on metonymy and relationship. 
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the sharing, yet expects and anticipates Maggie's sympathy to provide him with jam. 
Maggie meanwhile follows Tom's rules, never imagining that he anticipates her 
bending them. Once again the narrator demonstrates Tom's undermining of his own 
maxims. From his position of gendered power Tom expects to be loved and cared for 
despite his harshness and rules, the irony being that he cannot reciprocate. This is a 
hidden moral; the narrator lays out all the arguments, but leaves it to the reader to draw 
conclusions. In microcosm, Tom's behaviour here is an example of the wider 
functioning of gender ethics, with women expected to care while being harshly judged, 
while men expect care and temper judgement of themselves. 
Scenes of Maggie and Tom's various ruptures highlight the need and isolation of 
Maggie, as Freud's 'fort, da' game or Klein's absent mother, is repeatedly replayed. 
Generally Maggie incarcerates herself, while independent Tom wanders free. Maggie, 
desperate for love, relationship and sympathy, is alone with no role or purpose. She 
revels in her senses as part of her emotional release; it is a return to the semiotic, which 
like the flow of the river and the pulsing of the mill wheel suggest a return to the time of 
oneness which she wishes to recreate with Tom. The text suggests a comfort in her own 
abjection: sobs, tears, gasps; even a 'wretched pleasure in the hollow resonance' (37) of 
the womb-like loft. Meanwhile Tom exerts his mastery and role by discussing business 
with Luke and administering justice to Bob in purposeful language (49). Both children 
always display excess. Tom's justice ethic is excessive, while Maggie's selfish 
passions are extreme and overwhelm duty. 
Tom senses his father's rejection, and the narrator confirms that it has been 
difficult for him to accept that 'he was not to be brought up to his father's business' 
(133). His greatest shortcomings are his shyness and lack of facility vvith language, but 
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then as he has not been granted full access to his male role, access to symbolic language 
is also reserved. Tom believes his schooling will not matter when he is a man. it will N 
of course, but not the subjects on the timetable, for Tom experiences the false schooling 
that Rousseau fulminates against. In particular, school produces a 'painful sense that he 
was all wrong somehow' (136); even Tom's definition of masculinity is challenged. 
Stelling imposes a different standard, 'something higher in the eyes of the world than 
that of the people he had been living amongst ... he, Tom Tulliver, appeared uncouth 
and stupid' (141). If the Symbolic Order registers cultural phenomena, then Tom 
experiences a different symbolic, and different languages, which he will use on leaving 
school. Meanwhile, he is expected to live according to a rigid system which is alien to 
his needs and abilities. Despite the 'fibre that turns to true manliness' (143), that he 
displays in caring for little Laura Stelling, he is so defeated and emasculated at school 
that he turns to an even harsher masculinity. Tom enters his uncle Deane's world as the 
newly evolved man and can adapt, although he develops his own justice further as a 
certainty to cling to. Ironically, the brief experience of caring for Laura suggests the 
solution to life, for as Tom leads her by her ribbon in the garden it is his care and 
sympathy that point to salvation. For 'Laura', means 'path' from the same route as 
'labyrinth' (Hillis Miller 1976,59); but such a path, with an innocent woman leading 
the way, will not open again for Tom until the end. Meanwhile, Maggie's schooling is 
also taking place, but merely constitutes an absence within the text. This omission is a 
moral comment that both mimics society's attitude to women's education, while further 
subverting the notions of a double Bildungsroman. 
Small, discrete examples of sympathy occur repeatedly, as if reminding the 
reader of this lack. Even Tulliver recognises the sympathy of kin that is the basis of all 
loving care, and connection with his sister prevents him from ruining her. He also 
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experiences imaginative intuition: concern for Maggie in case Tom should ever desert 
her; 'his love and anxiety for "the little wench" had given him a new sensibility towards 
his sister' (84) and Gritty 'stands in' for Maggie. Aunt Gritty herself is an oasis of 
sympathy - one of the few sites of unconditional love that Maggie experiences. 
Further, despite his self-pitying outbursts, Philip Wakern furnishes another example of a 
maternal man. His sufferings have left him exquisitely sensitive to the emotions of 
others - although he is not yet intuitive - and he recognises Maggie's potential for 
empathy. While Maggie cannot as yet discern the difference between sympathy, pity 
and 'feeling sorry' she begins to learn from Philip's responses. Philip alone divines 
Tom's fears of being lamed after his accident, sympathises, and is able to act. He also 
enters into intelligent, empathic communication with Maggie, perhaps the first she has 
ever experienced, and establishes himself for the future as a caring friend. However, the 
question for the reader is whether Philip's sympathy, even here, is a form of self-interest 
rather than mutuality. 
The detailed length of the early books slows the narrative, while stressing the 
importance of connection. There are numerous supportive passages where the narrator 
demonstrates that Maggie 'was a creature full of eager, passionate longings for all that 
was beautiful and glad; thirsty for all knowledge' (MF 235). Further, while Tom's 
'difference' is not urged so strongly and is masked by accounts of ill-humour and harsh 
judgement, the text nevertheless demonstrates Tom's growth beyond his father's 
powers, while his willingness to change and develop exceeds the careful Dodson spirit. 
That he dreams of being 'a Tamer of horses ... dispensing treats and benefits to others' 
(310) suggests an imagination generally hidden, and a largesse alien to the Dodson 
spirit. Although Eliot herself lamented that she concentrated too much on the early 
books (GEL HI, 317), the detail and the familiarity with Tom and Maggie is not an error 
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as critics often suggest. The indecent haste of the ending compared to the lengthy 
intimacy of the early part intensifies the waste and horror. Critics argue that Eliot's text 
is flawed, but the ending creates an alienating effect for the reader: the pointless loss 
after the finely drawn picture of earlier life catalyses intuitive sympathy and the reader 
is forced to acknowledge the fictionality of the text and step back to evaluate life itself. 
The discursive passage at the beginning of Book Four, which compares the 'grovelling 
existence' of the Rhone inhabitants to the 'sordid life ... of the Tullivers and Dodsons' 
(AIF 272), is a return to the narrator's distancing approach of the earlier works. This 
consideration of 'oppressive narrowness' is necessary so we may fully understand the 
impact of this reactionary community on Maggie and Tom. Further, the shock of 
Tulliver's irreligious and vindictive revenge pledge at the end of Book Three needs 
countering, yet the narrator's method is this vitriolic attack. The debate thus created - 
between character, narrator and reader - promotes an analysis of where right, sympathy 
and duty do lie; while the hyperbole of the passage mirrors the excess that is to come. 
Following the account of Tulliver's downfall, Maggie and Tom are variously 
associated with Comte's oppositions of activity and resignation (GEL 11,134). 
Superficially, Tom is active: working and exhibiting moral strength and a sense of 
obligation to clear the family name. As a woman, Maggie must adopt resignation for 
she cannot act. That 'there was no music for her any more' (W 286) is mimetic of this 
closed life; there is nothing sensuous, no serniotic rhythms and returns to early excess, 
only sordid tasks and oppressive empty leisure. Only if she had 'been taught "real 
learning and wisdom... would there be any hope of progress (286). Her father is bitter, 
seeing Maggie only as a beauti6l possession, one devoid of value by virtue of his fall 
(280). Tom's troubles are sounded throughout this section, but Maggie's is generally 
the dominant point of view. The extent of the damage to Tom's character needs to be 
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understood by the reader, the narrator provides the evidence of his pent-up anger and 
postponed hopes, but in fleeting comments. His pain is not dwelt upon like Maggie's. 
Strangely, Maggie's sympathy for Tom is absent from the text, which instead 
emphasises her laments that he is not there for her (279-80). Tom may crave love and 
care, but to give in is feminine, and clinging to his masculine role is Tom's only 
support. Otherwise his renunciation becomes as extreme as Maggie's passions, while 
his chosen duty is Tom's 'God' in the way that Feuerbach describes man's false 
theological God as replacing his sense of other or 'Thou'. Self-in-relation is lost and 
material strivings rather than a search for knowledge or happiness are seen to fill Tom's 
life. Such loss and absence indicate afresh that this is not at all the typical male quest 
novel, and without the 'other' or alter ego, Tom lacks a conscience to guide his duty, 
especially towards Maggie. 
Amid this misery, Bob Jakin is a symbol of hope, sympathy and kindness as he 
develops a metonymic stance of duty and sympathy, caring for his mother and family 
and continuing to aid Tom and Maggie. Bob is one of the few well-mothered characters 
in the text. He is also pivotal in an evaluation of the different ethics of Tom's justice 
and Maggie's care. When Bob and Tom fight as youngsters, the narrator provides the 
contextual understanding lacking from Tom's rigid justice by observing that any 'fine 
moral aroma' would be incomprehensible to the 'public opinion of Kennel Yard, which 
was the very focus or heart of Bob's world' (52). Tom cannot yet understand lives 
different from his own and is ignorant that his justice is alien to Bob. Yet years later, 
Bob allows himself to be won over by Maggie's sympathy and duty when he promises 
to abjure the use of his 'big thumb' (284-5). Bob is also a major plot device, he both 
moves the story and lightens the mood; literally 'bobbing' up when things are grim. He 
is Rousseau's child, unpolluted by education and convention, as Bob said to his mother, 
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if she had sent him to school more he 'could ha' read P the books like fun, an' kep' 
[his] head cool an' empty" (314). Bob is free and adaptable; far more than Tom he is 
the newly evolving man, particularly as he moves through the class barriers. His 
imagination runs riot yet his reason and calculation are unsurpassed, and he constantly 
displays admirable intuition, and reads people exactly. The scene of his seduction of 
Mrs Glegg is superb. By inadvertently supplying Maggie with a copy of Thomas A 
Kempis' TheImitation of Christ, Bob serves to further advance her resignation into an 
active renunciation. Meanwhile, he provides Tom with the means of becoming 
financially active. 
Maggie's period of renunciation as a result of reading Thomas A Kempis is 
presented as part of a necessary learning process and is neither condemned nor lauded 
by the text. The narrator is simple and genuine in the account of the book's worth, but 
irony is Maggie's desert as she welcomes humiliation and self-sacrifice. The narrator is 
gentle - for renunciation is clearly a survival tactic - while also noting that the hand that 
wrote the text had awaited the 'heart's promptings' (291), but Maggie 'threw some 
exaggeration and wilfulness, some pride and impetuosity, even into her self- 
renunciation' (292). Yet self-denial and quiet calmness permit the only relations 
possible, and the good, quiet Maggie becomes as close to her father as circumstances 
will allow. Maggie has moved from Gilligan's first to second stage of moral 
development, from selfishness to selflessness. However, interaction is required - moral 
authority housed in a text cannot hope to produce moral strength without practice. 
Eliot's own text encourages analysis while hoping that readers will take their growing 
moral values into the world. 
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The meeting with Philip Wakem precipitates an oscillation between selflessness 
and selfishness. Harmful self-sacriflce should be rejected, or, as Philip prophesies, it 
will erupt with a devastating force; but this same renunciation has kept Maggie sane. 
Also, she cannot act against those she loves most. It is wrong that the sacriflce of 
Philip's friendship is demanded, but cleaving to her family was a duty chosen freely 
within her determined limits. Although the choice to continue seeing Philip has a selfish 
component, in that Maggie desires love and friendship, the aspect generally ignored by 
critics is that womanly sympathy and a recently flourishing selflessness also encourage 
her to put Philip before herself and her chosen duty. That Maggie's meetings with 
Philip require serious consideration by the reader is highlighted by their juxtaposition 
with the account of Tom's trading success, although this actually took place much 
earlier. Tom's anticipation of clearing his father's name should promote a questioning 
of Maggie's behaviour and place Tom in a more sympathetic light. 
Maggie concedes when Tom forces her renunciation of Philip, yet it is her 
decision. This is the first example of her successfully controlling her passions. She 
concedes out of sympathy for her father; her ethic of care would not hurt him further 
whereas Tom's justice would reveal the harsh truth at the risk of destroying his fragile 
health and reason. Now Tom has gained a mastery of language and is no longer shy or 
awkward. However, during the scene with Philip the language of both is that of the 
romance novel. Rather than being allowed to consume the content of the novel, readers 
are faced with the artificiality of the situation and forced to analyse. What is actually 
taking place is a competition between dominant males where both claim to know what 
is best for Maggie. At the time of publication, Bulwer Lytton wrote praising the novel, 
but suggesting that Maggie's silence was uncharacteristic, and that surely she would 
have defended Philip. Eliot agreed that Maggie was too passive (GEL 111,317). 
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However, I would argue that this is not the old Maggie: she now practices self-control, 
and only speaks out when Tom goes too far, but after Philip's declaration of love, there 
was also, ca certain dim background of relief in the forced separation' (W 348). When 
Maggie appeals to him that his duty could involve the care, understanding and 
sympathy that she has to offer, he dismisses her values insisting: 'if you can do nothing, 
submit to those that can' (AfF 347) and seemingly accedes to her opinion that he has no 
pity, no sense of his own imperfections, or awareness of his own sins. 
Thinking back on the work, Eliot remarked that 'I can see nothing in it just now 
but the absence of things that might have been there' (GEL HI, 285), yet all the absences 
are significant. Maggie's isolation of herself when she goes away to work after her 
father's death is a personal choice and an exercise in moral control. When she returns 
home and Tom releases her from her promise, so that she may see Philip Wakem, he 
accuses her of lacking judgement and self-command. However, she is always striving 
to develop morally. There is no corresponding self-awareness from Tom. Even Lucy 
fails to breach Tom's rigid maxims regarding Maggie and Philip (A4F 455-7). He has 
lost that imaginative ability which occasionally has broken out to rescue him to 
sympathy. Tom's reticence could suggest a non-relational character, but subtly, the 
narrator reveals that he is lonely and constrained. 
That Maggie develops a passion for Stephen Guest represents the excess 
following on renunciation that Philip had warned of long ago. Many readers objected to 
Stephen as the representation of Maggie's lover. When responding to Bulwer-Lytton's 
dismay at Maggie's choice, Eliot argued that the psychology she had created for Maggie 
allowed such a decision (GEL 111,318). Further, as Brady notes, to claim that Stephen 
is unworthy of Maggie presumes a requirement for a happy union of equals, and Eliot's 
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tale refuses this romantic ploy as it has refused most other conventional plots - 'both 
Philip and Stephen are exposed as imperfect suitors, and the novel's focus is thus 
shifted away from idealistic notions about courtship' (Brady 1992,101). 
With Stephen there is a sexual attraction in the text that was absent with Philip. 
Eliot conveys Maggie's fluid attraction as vivid sense perceptions. All Stephen's 
features - attar of roses, diamond ring, manly grace - stand in for the sensual, serniotic 
over-abundance that Maggie has been denied. He has a supportive strength, yet with an 
intellectual appeal; he is roses - and Maggie is 'quite wicked with roses' (MF 441) - 
and he is the music Maggie has long been deprived of Above all, Stephen is eye- 
contact, the mirroring look that tells the child it is loved, that gives validation. This is a 
heady brew, suggestive of the oneness of the pre-oedipal growth to self-in-relation 
(Chodorow 1989,105-8). Further, everything about Stephen is unlike Philip, yet 
mimics a cultured Tom; Stephen hunts, rides, knows business and industry, and has the 
same conceited dismissal of women. He is symbolic of the unavailable connection; 
even his egoism is akin to Tom's and plays an equal but opposite role in catalysing the 
d6nouement. Given Eliot's own position and particularly the dropping of her incognito 
just prior to the release of The Mill, her decision to describe an illicit relationship, and 
one with such erotic overtones, was both honest and brave. It was also risky, and when 
Blackwood eventually published The Mill, Mudie contemplated boycotting the works 
because of moral qualms over Eliot's relationship with Lewes ( Martin 1994,114). In 
Book Seven the narrator addresses Maggie's quandary directly: 'The great problem of 
the shifting relation between passion and duty is clear to no man who is capable of 
apprehending it' for we have 'no master key that will fit all cases' (A4F 497). This is a 
'brave authorial remark' given Eliot's own sexual choice (Ashtonl996,236), it is also 
echoed by the contextual ethics that Gilligan advocates. 
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In a self-conscious aside the narrator remarks that Maggie's story would not be 
interesting if she was a society lady who knew how to cope with Stephen's flirtation 
(A, fF 384-5). Such a metalingual comment 'addresses the codes and conventions of the 
narrative act and thus foregrounds its artificiality' (Malmgren 1986,481). Malingren 
suggests that as a realist Eliot would not wish to do this. Such repeated stepping back 
however, is a reminder to the reader, not only that this is fiction, but that it is not to be 
consumed, and needs to be analysed, learned from and maybe acted upon. Further, the 
regularity of the effect suggests Eliot's intention. Narrative comment decreases once 
Stephen is present (Doyle, 78), but then it is largely unnecessary for Stephen's actions 
are obvious, he is set on conquest. Even if in love he essentially conducts a Darwinian 
campaign of sexual selection and dominance. Stephen's language on his visit to Aunt 
Gritty's reveals a character in contravention of all of the moral values established both 
by Eliot's text and in the developing character of Maggie. The dominant word is 'I', 
and the declaration is driven by self-interest. The attention Stephen gives to his chosen 
obligation to Lucy is negligible, the lack of sympathy for all others is striking, and his 
lack of empathy for Maggie's struggles disturbing. Her promise to Philip in particular 
is dismissed as 'unnatural' (MF 448). Stephen's is not an ethic of care balanced with an 
ethic ofjustice, his care is for himself alone, and his idea ofjustice involves his 'rights' 
as an alpha male. Stephen's words and actions should condemn him according to the 
values already established. Yet the reader is continually diverted by the prevailing 
discourse of romance and convention. Stephen is always O-V We centre of Stephen's 
campaign, whereas Philip's arguments to her always placed Maggie's concerns along 
with his own. However, the narrator needed to reveal Philip's more subtle ulterior 
motives and manipulative tendencies, while the absence of comment on Stephen's 
persuasive techniques is significant. The readers and Maggie are deemed capable of 
228 
reading Stephen's self-interest. Those readers who want a happy romantic ending are 
possibly the ones who find the ending flawed. 
Drifting on the river is mimetic of Maggie's emotions while she ponders her 
options. In first going with Stephen the choice is purely for herself, to be with a loved 
object-substitute and be loved. As her chosen duty to Tom, Philip and Lucy begins to 
impinge, then Maggie is tom between two types of altruism. Does she give up Stephen 
for the others, or give up the others for Stephen? Maggie is won over by a selfless 
sympathy for Stephen. When he offers to stop the boat and take all the blame, she 
cannot allow it. In these stages, knowledge, reason, passion and imagination are 
gradually brought into play. It is only in the final stage, when Maggie dreams of Lucy, 
Philip and then Tom, that she realises where her own choice lies, while including others 
with the least hurt. Her semiotic choice is between a rejecting Tom and a Tom at home 
in the mill who 'was not really angry' (470). Maggie's final choice must hurt Stephen, 
but she includes her own desire in choosing the Tom who signifies all relational love, 
and the very point where duty lies. 
That Tom is not equal to Maggie's love should be no surprise to the reader, 
unless implausibly happy endings are expected. The narrator recommends tolerance for 
Tom and not being too 'severe on his severity' for his 'family feeling had lost the 
character of clanship' as a result of personal pride (500) and Tom's turn to 'I' overrules 
all care and love of 'Thou'. Bob remains as a maternal man, and Dr Kenn proves to be 
another, as he laments the loss of all concern for 'Thou' in his parishioners. That the 
community opposes him over Maggie demonstrates the general lack of sympathy, and 
signals the triumph of artificial virtue. Gilligan (1982,148) has already claimed Eliot's 
'man of maxims' passage (MF 498) as support for her work, and Eliot clearly outlines 
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the distinction between the minds that want general rules and ready-made patentjustice, 
and those that accept 'growing insight and sympathy' and even the 'trouble of exerting 
patience, discrimination, impartiality' not to mention, experience, knowledge, insight 
and the creation of 'wide fellow feeling'. Gilligan's account of the complex means of 
acquiring the full ethic of care, balanced with reasoned, knowledgeable justice , yet 
allowing for contextual relativism, clearly appears to reflect much that the narrator, or 
even the author, is advocating in this passage. Yet a choice for slow-growing sympathy 
is not easy. 
In the period immediately before the flood, the predominant emotion presented 
in the text has been forgiveness. All forgive Maggie except Tom, but nevertheless she 
is finally aware that love lies within. Prior to the flood she despairs, yet also accepts 
forgiveness and contemplates the contrast between the two letters from Philip and 
Stephen. Philip's letter is an exercise in fellow-feeling. He addresses Maggie's trials, 
the troubles of others, praises her strength and honesty, speaks of all that she has taught 
him, but barely mentions his own desires. Meanwhile, Stephen's letter is an exercise in 
'I': 'a passionate cry of reproach: an appeal against her useless sacriflce of him; of 
herself. against that perverted notion of right' (513). While Maggie is nearly swayed by 
selfless sympathy for 'Stephen's tone of misery', the letter is burned. Eliot's heroine 
has made her ultimate choice as signalled by the dream on -the river - and her first 
appearance in the novel. Maggie's rescue of Tom is not selfless; it is a choice for 
herself, as well as a rejection of all who demand selflessness. In choosing Tom, Maggie 
has finally worked out her own moral pathway, which includes an acceptance of the 
best of his justice ethic. Eliot was never solely concerned with women and feminism; 
neither are Chodorow and Gilligan. All are concerned, "ith the harmful results for both 
men and women of gender-role damage. Chodorow believes that both genders need to 
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change, while Gilligan accepts that both care and justice have their place, and Eliot 
insisted on the importance of both the 'ethics' that Tom and Maggie exhibit. 
The mill and river have essentially vanished, for Tom has tied himself to wrong 
objects that occupy the space of sympathy and care. The flood, representing the anger 
of all damaged lives, sweeps all away. Hence Tom's silence, for his limiting 'chain' of 
signifiers has been washed away. The narrator assumes his thoughts and responses, but 
the silence is more significant; it is pre-oedipal, and gives power to Maggie, so that 
briefly they become autonomous woman and maternal man. Tom always thinks he 
knows Maggie, but full knowledge only arrives at the end when intuition coincides with 
emotion, reason and knowledge, and Tom realises what she has done and perceives the 
extent of her love. He is thus able to access his own buried emotions that link them 
back to their connected infancy. 
Everything in the life portrayed for Maggie and Tom has led to this joyous 
reconciliation and tragic waste. The ending is absurd and extreme but it is also the only 
way of achieving the impossible reconciliation of the two opposing doctrines that 
Maggie and Tom represent, while also providing a melodramatic ending largely 
acceptable to most of the Victorian reading public. Yet there is also an excess that 
promotes an examination of the fiction. Hyperbole alerts the reader to an understanding. 
This loss, waste and tragedy is the result when lives are forced into false and opposing 
roles and when sympathy and duty are forsaken. From the realist point of view, Tom 
and Maggie could not be reconciled and live, and no happy ending was possible. From 
Eliot's point of view, progress and continued development are not possible for 
individuals and communities - for 'I' and 'Thou' - unless these two opposing strands are 
reconciled. In fact, the text may question the whole notion of progress via the arbitrary 
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nature of the deaths - which perhaps suggests that Darwin's influence had disturbed 
Eliot. However, the ultimate conclusion is that sympathy can catalyse progress, for 
Tom has been won by sympathy. Thus although a balanced reconciliation of opposites 
is achieved, Maggie's sympathy and care prove dominant. 
Although Silas Marner (186 1) was George Eliot's next published work after The 
Mill on the Floss, Romola was conceived first. Lewes had suggested a historical 
romance concerning the life of Savanarola during their visit to Florence in May 1860 
(GEL 111,295) and Eliot began work researching on their return. In August she 
proposed the anonymous serialisation of the work in Maga to Blackwood (GEL III, 
339). That Eliot proffered such a move, after her extreme reaction to Blackwood's 
intention of publishing The Mill anonymously, is an indication of her insecurity 
concerning Romola: 'I am quite without confidence in my future doings'. 
For the purposes of my analysis I wish to discuss Romola alongside The Mill on 
the Floss, albeit briefly, partly because the ideas in Romola follow so closely on those 
established in the earlier work, but primarily because I consider there to be a continuum 
between Silas Marner, Felix Holt and Middlemarch, with a distinct change in form and 
development of themes. I also consider Romola to lack any new narrative or formal 
developments, when compared to The Mill on the Floss. Further, while Romold does 
extend the themes developed in The Mill on the Floss to extremes, there is no profound 
evolution of issues. 
Research for Romold was extensive and continued from 1860. After a second 
visit to Florence in April 1861, Eliot's journal details her phenomenal reading and 
research programme between July 1861 and June 1863 when the novel was finally 
232 
finished (GrJ 1998,96-118). Eliot read everything, from the texts of the period - 
including Savanarola's own works - to books on history, language and costume. She 
only began thinking about the plot in September 1861 (102) and declared 'I began my 
novel ofRomola' on I Jan 1862 (107). Critical opinion on Romola is more varied than 
on any other work. F. R. Leavis describes it as the novel of 'a mind misusing itself' 
(1983,65), while Beer sees Romold as pivotal 'in her growth as a woman writing' while 
admitting that it is 'heavy going' (1986,113). Beer suggests that the historical distance 
granted by the setting allows Eliot to extend certain themes (114), thus she presents an 
extremely radical example of a society in flux and a more intense critique of gender 
relations than in The Mill. 
Romold was conceived as a historical novel and there has always been intense 
debate concerning its success in this genre. Leslie Stephen felt that Eliot's desire for 
historical accuracy paralysed her imagination (1924,130) - thus Romold fails because 
of the history; meanwhile, Ashton sees the depiction of Fifteenth Century Florentine 
society as a 'comparative failure' (1983,53). Even Lewes implored Blackwood to 
'discountenance the idea of a Romance being the product of an Encyclopaedia! when 
talking to Eliot (GEL 111,4734). My own opinion is that the history, while absorbing 
and fascinating for itself, replaces or diverts the thematic and formal development that 
was otherwise proceeding in Eliot's work. The effort of the historical detail, and in 
particular the attempt to incorporate it searnlessly into the plot, uses up energy that in 
other novels is devoted to creative progress. The structural and thematic links to the 
earlier works are strong, but if Romola is one pivotal novel, I consider Silas Marner to 
be a far more important one. 
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Another major area of analysis of Romold is that 'If any of her works may be 
called "Positivist", it is Romold' (Ashton 1983,5 1). This frequently explored argument 
centres largely on Romola Bardi's development from a pagan to a theological or 
Christian stage, and then from a metaphysical to a Positivist stage, where altruism 
supposedly dominates. Dorothea Barrett provides a detailed summary of Comtean 
interpretations of Romold, but also provides an investigation of Eliot's moves beyond 
Comtean theories to articulate new ideas (1989,75-98) which deserves a close reading. 
From my perspective, Romold continues the investigation of sympathy and duty 
in family and community relations, particularly during a time of immense social 
upheaval. Further, as in The Mill on the Floss, the clash of individual desire with that of 
family or community is explored, with major oppositions established between 
competing moral stances. For all its grandeur, Florence is still a community like St. 
Ogg's with similar concerns and Romold is essentially a study of character and 
environment (Sanders 1978,1724). Like Maggie Tulliver, Romola has little 
experience of morals and relationships beyond her immediate family. As a motherless 
child, Romola has turned to her father and brother for love and self-definition, although 
her brother Dino leaves, when she is only six, to become a priest. Dino is disowned by 
his father for this choice of Christian benevolence, service and selflessness, over an 
academic, humanist vocation. Romola possesses sympathy and relationality, born no 
doubt of her kin relationships and any mothering she may have received, but she is also 
constructed as a proud, intellectual woman, whose limited life inhibits wider moral 
development. Her only concept of duty is that owed to her father and his work, 
therefore she cannot comprehend Dino's beliefs and vocation. Even when he is dying 
Romola cannot empathise with him. 
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Tito Melema is the outsider who breaches the Bardis' isolation, winning Romola 
as his bride. The detailed portrayal of his gradual slide from lazy, selfish, self- 
preservation to utter moral corruption, where he trusts no one - not even himself - is the 
most interesting facet of the novel. Tito has no concept of obligation. He begins life in 
Florence knowing that he has abandoned his step-father to a life of slavery, and in 
hugging this secret to himself the fears of discovery and exposure grow, making him a 
haven for secrets and evil generally. Any seeming sympathy displayed by Tito to 
Romola, Bardo or others is merely calculated self-interest. Once he is safely married 
and Bardo's heir, his attentions to them wane. 
Romola is won over by techniques similar to those of Stephen Guest: friendship, 
intellectual acknowledgement and discussion, strong sexual appeal, and above all, a 
visual recognition that conveys the love and validation usually offered by the mother; 
'Tito's glance ... 
had that gentle, beseeching admiration' (R 58) which Romola desires. 
Despite her intellect and learning Romola is denigrated by her father for being female. 
Regardless of her selfless love and devoted work, Romola, like Maggie, cannot 
transcend gender to become as valued as a son. When Tito fills that vacancy, Romola 
becomes doubly repressed and oppressed by patriarchy. Romola is the last occasion 
when Eliot explores father/daughter ties, from now on she concentrates on love beyond 
the family. There is an unspoken realisation in the text that a masculine linear descent 
of family property and reputation is far more important in the society and family than 
the relational and metonymic links which have tied and supported Romola; it is this 
lateral kinship with its potential for a 'web of connection' which interests Eliot (Beer 
1986,117). Brady also emphasises exactly how masculine and misogynist the 
Florentine culture of this period was and traces Eliot's detailed representation of 
women as items of abuse, use or exchange (1992,120-7). 
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As Tito degenerates in a life of political intrigue, he betrays first Bardo and then 
Romola. Her brief development of imagination and sympathy atrophy as she adopts a 
proud, selfish, self-preserving autonomy. Romola resolves to flee Florence in order to 
become a woman of self-supporting learning, yet even in this act she is guided by 
damaged feelings, for 'there could be no law for her but the law of her affections' (R 
305). A meeting with Savanarola checks Romola's flight, for he wishes to conquer her 
pagan pride and win her to feminine and Christian altruism for the service of Florence 
and its people. As Savanarola is offering both an alternative duty and vocation via this 
philanthropy, Romola accedes, for without Tito and her father she is no longer wife or 
daughter and has no role. In Gilligan's terms, Romola has moved from a position of 
alternating egoism and selflessness with her father and Tito, to altruistic selflessness. 
Yet Savanarola's rigid maxims already clash with Romola's moral sense. He argues 
that her God given duties are those of a wife and woman and that no one can choose 
their duty (341) -a doctrine clearly opposed by Eliot. Ultimately Romola chooses 
submission to Savanarola, yet it is the beginning of choice for herself, for 'she had 
found an immediate satisfaction for moral needs' (367). Like Tom and Mr Tulliver, all 
Patriarchs fail their dependants by adhering to a rigid, linear ethic of justice that does 
not allow for consideration of others. Romola is initially seduced by the duty and 
vocation Savanarola offers and her experience of enforced caring in the city slowly 
allows lateral connections to form and the emergence of sympathy; but also the 
consideration of herself. 
Romola's small store of sympathy grows as she works, although she never 
enjoys selflessness; Eliot emphasises that altruism is not woman's natural inheritance 
and Romola 'bad no innate taste for tending the sick' (R 366). Personal relationships 
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promote sympathy and sociality more readily, and Romola's greatest moral growth at 
this time comes from caring for Tessa and her two children by Tito. Caring promotes 
caring and Romola grows in relational and moral awareness. However, as her 
experiences teach her tolerance and understanding she rejects Savanarola's rigid 
maxims (Uglow 1987,169). Faced with Tito's adultery Romola finally questions where 
'the sacredness of obedience ended and where the sacredness of rebellion began (R 
442); the struggle is an intensification of Maggie's choice between family ties and her 
own needs. However, here there is no transcendent love or deep sense of self-in- 
relation, to keep Romola. 
Savanarola remains inflexible and uncaring even when Bernardo, Romola's 
Godfather, faces death. It is this choice of rigid duty to a God, over care and sympathy 
for an old man that causes Romola to flee again. Tito and Savanarola are the moral 
antitheses against whom she struggles. Tito does not make decisions as such, he has no 
maxims, morals or duties as guides, he merely follows the inclination of the moment - 
he personifies Kant's image of immoral action, he is also an extreme development of 
Stephen Guest. Meanwhile, Savanarola allows for no contextual relativism, he lacks 
any intuitive sympathy for the moment and the circumstances of the case. Romola has 
neither Tito's complete lack of moral belief nor Savanarola's absolute certainty; 
consequently she constantly questions herself. 'It belongs to every large nature, when it 
is not under the immediate power of some strong unquestioning emotion, to suspect 
itself and doubt the truth of its own impressions, conscious of possibilities beyond its 
own horizon' (R 328). Brady suggests that two struggles continue throughout the book, 
power versus sympathy (1992,120), however, although both Tito and Savanarola are 
swayed by power and lack sympathy, Savanarola is guided by duty. As with Tom and 
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Maggie, Romola's opposition places the duty of sympathy in the ascendent over any 
external duty to God, State or family. 
Although it is an idealised and utopian representation, Romola's drifting on the 
sea and eventual landing at the plague village suggests a brief return to the mother and 
the serniotic, a re-realisation of the self-in-relation. She is tempted by death, but no 
more of Eliot's heroines die after Maggie, and Romola is able to gain strength from her 
brief isolation and rebirth. The experience of community relationship which follows in 
the village promotes caring, and yet also leads to Romola's choice for a life of love, 
connection and leaming with her female community in Florence, rather than the 
altruism of the village. Romola has learned to recognise and transcend difference to 
develop both imagination and sympathy, 
Romola returns to Florence. Personally, Romola has achieved the knowledge 
that leads to freedom and happiness, she has transcended her bondage to linear, 
inherited, family connection and chooses a web of relationship. That all the male 
protagonists in Romola die is not a symbolic punishment, but I do consider it suggests 
that Romola's relational yet autonomous caring is seen as evolutionarily superior, while 
patriarchy, clergy and corruption become extinct. Further, that Romola is seen 
concentrating on the education of Tessa's son Lillo may suggest that male children are 
most in need of matemal thinking, teaching and relationship if the rejection described 
by Chodorow is to be overcome. This is not primary parenting but it is some from of 
reparation so that the evolution of matemal men and autonomous women can to 
proceed. Now, with the added input and inspiration provided by the interruption of 
Silas Marner, Eliot moves on to the major phase of her work. 
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Chapter Six - Maternal Men and Autonomous Women: 
Silas Marner and Feltv Holt 
For much of its history Silas Marner was generally regarded as a minor work, falsely 
perceived as 'too obvious and lightweight to merit serious critical discussion' (Dawson 
1993,26). However, considerable re-evaluation has taken place, 21 for as Carroll 
observes: 'the very simplicity and economy ... led to the persistent undervaluation of 
the novel' (1967,167). The initial response to the work on publication was favourable. 
The Saturday Review thought Silas Marner as good as Adam Bede, with its greatest 
strength being the realistic picture of the poor people of Raveloe, and the lower gentry 
(13 April 1861, xi, 369-70). E. S. Dallas in The Times agreed, suggesting that Eliot 
presented boors and peasants in all their innocence, ignorance and callousness, while 
still maintaining their humanity and compassion. The general opinion was that this 
work lacked the faults of Adam Bede and The Mill, but that its brevity, simplicity and 
subsequent lack of moral and intellectual scope rendered it lightweight. However, R. H. 
Hutton in the Economist felt that there was a strong intellectual impress in the manner 
by which Eliot draws the reader's attention to the psychological effects of the story (27 
April 1861,455-7). Hutton hones in on the points that render Silas Marner central to 
Eliot's oeuvre, for it presents in microcosm her main thematic concerns and is a simple 
prototype for future formal techniques. 
1860-61 was a disturbing period for Eliot. With Lewes's eldest son Charles now 
living with them, they took a house in the city for the sake of his work. While obviously 
loving Charlie, Eliot must have found her new role of adoptive mother unsettling. Her 
letters to Blackwood tactfully ignore his requests for progress reports on the new novel 
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(GEL 111,355-7) while complaining of illness and depression. There was also the brief 
temptation of a divorce abroad being a possibility for Lewes, although when this proved 
a false hope Eliot insisted that she preferred her 'excommunication' (GEL 111,366). 
When Silas Marner was finally under way, Eliot described it as having 'thrust itself' 
between her and Romold (GEL 111,360), a 'sudden inspiration' unfolding itself 'from 
the merest millet-seed of thought' (GEL 111,371). The many problems with the 
complexity of Romola, following on the awareness that aspects of The Mill had escaped 
her control, may have led Eliot to desire a simple work through which to present 
profound issues, while also experimenting with formal approaches. 
Silas Marner is frequently compared to a fairy tale and many critics do not look 
beyond this vehicle to the substance of the story (Carroll 1967,167). But Eliot employs 
such a frame to mythologise her experiences and ideas. She knew that Spinoza 'showed 
an understanding of the social function of religious myth' (Ashton 1994,156), while 
Strauss in his examination of the hermeneutics of Scripture demonstrated the value of 
telling moral tales that did not preach. Thus the disguise of a simple moral fable 
conceals the profound questioning of fundamental values at work in the novel. It has 
been specifically compared to 'Rumpelstiltskin' (Beer 1986,126), where in order to 
regain his child, the King has to discover the name of the gnome who spins flax into 
gold. 
Eliot's novel mimics this tale yet achieves role-reversal and moral analysis in a 
fabular mould that is unparalleled until the works of Angela Carter. The novel subverts 
gender stereotypes, demonstrating that Eliot is not merely proto-feminist but is 
questioning all gender roles. The work also questions and parodies all parental, 
21 See: Thale 1958; Thomson 1965; Milner 1966; Carroll 1967; Dessner 1979; and Dawson 1993. 
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proprietal and Christian duties. Every assumed moral norm of her period is interrogated 
and compared to the importance of the natural laws and the power of sympathy and true 
duty. As with The Mill, Eliot is concerned with the reconciliation of opposites and the 
antagonism between equally valid claims. 
Silas Marner signals Eliot's first full use of a double plot, while still 
investigating the subject of alienation within a complex web of connection -a theme 'gývcý i-ý 
to reach its apotheosis in Middlemarch. The double plot relates well both to alienation 
and to Feuerbach's idea of the double consciousness of 'I/Thou' - which itself extends 
ideas of exchange between author and text, text and reader and reader and author. One 
of the main functions of the double plot is to examine the opposing values of 
supposedly 'feminine' caring and connection, and 'masculine' separation and justice as 
represented by the characters of Silas Marner and Godfrey Cass. Their interwoven 
histories lead the reader through the web of Silas's increasing connectedness, set against 
Godfrey's life of linear individuality. This shuttling between the two characters in the 
carefully arranged chapters mirrors their approaches to relationship, and their personal 
ethics of care versus justice. 
The ever-present metaphor for evil in the novel is absence, which is repeatedly 
set against relationship. Both Silas Marner and Godfrey Cass are outsiders, with 
relationship initially absent. Silas is introduced in a fantasy setting of fear and fable, 
with the narrator reporting the mistrust and superstition with which he continues to be 
regarded, despite his having lived in Raveloe for fifteen years. Although the narrator 
intimates that Silas is a harmless recluse, the reader receives a welter of fears and 
prejudice and so may reserve judgement. As each 'supernatural' element is undercut by 
the narrator, the reader gradually gains understanding: 'wanderers' become mere 
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weavers. George Eliot's illumination of the fear that results from 'ignorance and 
insularity' (Thomson, 1965,71-72) allows the reader to see why Silas is regarded with 
suspicion, but also to feel sympathy both for Silas and the villagers who are unable to 
recognise and transcend difference. 
This fostering of false fears in the reader is a dramatic equivalent of the 
problems described by Feuerbach; many people find 'difference' an insurmountable 
barrier and do not regard different others as fellow beings, therefore sympathy cannot be 
extended. Since Silas has lived in this village for fifteen years with no fellow-feeling 
extended to him, Silas Marner is decidedly no pastoral idyll. The air of superstition 
also obscures the moral problems under investigation - as the romance plot does in -The 
Mill - with the result that the image of a simple moral fable persists. Having established 
Silas's alienation, and fostered the reader's uncertainties about his nature, only then 
does the narrator recall Silas's Lantern Yard experiences. His past shows him to be 
deserving of sympathy and understanding, since he is 'both sane and honest' (SM8). 
The dialogue that immediately characterises Godfrey's story -a dialogue absent 
from Silas's tale until his visit to The Rainbow (Thomson 1965,77) - gives a false air of 
relationship, for Godfrey is neither close to father, brothers nor community, and lacks 
any sympathetic connection. Thus for both characters, relationship is lacking. 
However, the main absence is the maternal and all the caring values traditionally 
associated with the mother. The description of a 'domestic life destitute of any 
hallowing charm' (SM, 23) explains Godfrey's need for feminine order and gentleness 
as well as his misguided search to replace the lost matemal. It is often via the love of a 
woman that men reclaim the lost unity with the mother; yet the memory of rejection is 
always with them so that love is conditional and wary (Chodorow 1978,199). 
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ironically, Godfrey's marriage to Molly Farren has intensified his lack. Yet Godfrey's 
love is always expressed in terms of neediness and possession, like the men Dinnerstein 
dismisses. Nancy 'would be his wife, and would make home lovely to him', so 
drawing him in with her umbilical 'strong silken rope' (SM 30). But in his single- 
minded, self-interested pursuit of love and autonomy, Godfrey lacks all care (Gilligan 
1982,74) and thinks in terms of his rights when as yet he has not earned them. 
Unlike Silas, Godfrey has no sense of connection, and few memories of love and 
caring. For despite overtones of alien origins Eliot's narrator reveals Silas as a caring, 
relational man. From 'the close fellowship' (SM7) of Lantem Yard, the early portrait is 
of the man that only Silas remembers: 'the same Silas Marner who had once loved his 
fellow with tender love' (84). That Silas had a long and close relationship with his 
mother is made manifest by the memories that knit him to the maternal throughout the 
novel. On finding the golden child Eppie on his hearth, Silas immediately wishes to 
name her after his mother and sister (122). The reader is also told that he had 'inherited 
from his mother some acquaintance with medicinal herbs and their preparation' (8). As 
a child he was old enough - and therefore loved by a mother for long enough - to imbibe 
this herb-lore. Silas has also developed the relational love common to women - 
possibly acquired while looking after his sister - for Chodorow argues that caring 
promotes caring. I perceive the Calvinist community of Lantern. Yard, with its seeming- 
brotherly love, to be Silas's mistaken mother-substitute. The text describes the 
community as 'the fostering home of his religious emotions' (SM 14), but from the 
narrator's scattered clues, I see Silas's values and emotions as already existant and 
fori-ned in a previous loving relation, while Lantem Yard - as chosen foster-home - 
perverts those emotions. Dolly Winthrop's theory later is that love was interrupted by 
the Lantern. Yard religion, and hers is the best theology in the novel (Carroll 1967,185). 
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The women in the story also lack mothers: Nancy, Priscilla, and of course, 
Eppie, who, we are told, even before her mother's death was used to cry 'Mammy ... 
without expecting tender sound or touch to follow' (SM 119). Both Nancy and Priscilla 
exhibit a closeness and veneration for their father that are common in Eliot's tales of 
mother-absence. They can afford to be proud and have 'no opinion o' the men', 
because they do have 'a good father and a good home' (91). Priscilla would not wish to 
leave her father, given her security, love and autonomy at home; while Nancy would not 
settle for a man who cannot compare to her father. Yet Mr Larnmeter is rigid and 
pernickity, and may be the source of Nancy's arbitrary inflexibility. It is ironic that all 
the main characters are portrayed as making false choices in their search for substitutes 
for mother love. 
Fathers are also a major relational absence. Some critics see Silas's turn to the 
Chapel as a search for the father (Emery, 1976,57-59), however, insufficient analysis is 
made of Silas's perception of the faith as caring. Yet the Lantem Yard community 
proves to be both a false father and mother in its stripping away of connection and 
ultimate betrayal of Silas. First Silas abandons his mother's herb-lore in the fear that it 
is contrary to the church's principles; he thus seals off fundamental 'channels for his 
sense of mystery' (SM 8). Religious feeling then becomes 'shaped by an interpretation 
of the Unknown that excludes the matemal principle' (Paxton 1991,99) as memories of 
his mother and sister are repressed. Silas thus embraces the institution of religion which 
Feuerbach portrays as sealing man off from the fidl love and understanding of self-in- 
relation, as well as rejecting the growth to knowledge and understanding of all natural 
laws which Spinoza saw as the route to happiness and eternity. 
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While Eliot had become more tolerant and understanding of the help and support 
to be gained from religion since her 'Holy War' period, she was still opposed to all 
systems that claimed ultimate formulas: 
I have faith in the working-out of higher possibilities than the 
catholic or any other church has presented, and those who have 
strength to wait and endure, are bound to accept no formula 
which their whole souls - their intellect as well as their emotions 
- do not embrace with entire reverence. The highest "calling 
and election" is to do without opium and live through all our 
pain with conscious, clear-eyed endurance (GEL 111,365-7). 
This opinion proves to be startlingly appropriate to an analysis of Silas Marner. Silas's 
Chapel proves to be a Patriarch who judges and rejects without love, understanding, or 
justice. ironically, Silas and the friend William who betrays him were known as 'David 
and Jonathan' (8), Jonathan being also condemned by a drawing of lots. After the theft, 
betrayal and the illogical, uncaring judgement passed on him, Silas rejects the Church as 
it rejects him. 
Silas turns to his weaving because he finds in its rhythms, repetitions, sounds 
and touch the only certain comfort and security available to him. Weaving symbolises a 
return to the pre-oedipal - Silas literally does have to climb into his loom-womb - and 
recalls Kristeva's account of the semiotic, the phase when the child is at one with the 
mother, and pulsions traverse the body (Moi 1986,90-98). It is a return to the pure 
sensuality and total unity of an infant, and, with hand and eye and the 'immediate 
promptings' (15) of bodily needs satisfied, Silas is able 'from pure impulse without 
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reflection ... to 
bridge over the loveless chasms of his life' (15). When he flees to 
Raveloe, he goes to where 'mother earth shows another lap' (SM 13), and in his virtual 
solitude for the next fifteen years, Silas can be considered as trying to recreate an idyllic 
phase of love and unity. 
Silas's role as a weaver is doubly an access to comfort, as it provides his 
positional being - his relationship to the masculine world. As Chodorow describes, 
male children gain a positional relationship to their father and masculinity, often via a 
role which has to be learned. In addition to his feminine caring, Silas also has his role, 
or vocation, possibly acquired from his own father. Thus Silas's work has not lost its 
purpose, as some claim (Johnstone 1992,36) - instead it gains extra importance in 
allowing him to maintain some sense of self Work is his salvation, and although the 
weaving becomes a drug equivalent to Molly's opium, it is more respected and validated 
for men who are in denial of love (Brady 1992,117), and is an option not then available 
to women - such as Maggie - when isolated and alone. Silas's coming and going in his 
loom and his movements about the village recreates the coming and going of the good 
and bad mothers as he attempts to reconstruct a self-in-relation. 
Godfrey's experience is quite different. Even as a first-born male he lacks a 
clear role and almost certainly experienced an early separation from his mother, being 
pushed into a gendered role of supposed autonomy and masculinity in a fiercely 
misogynist household. Godfrey is very much his father's son in that he was intended to 
adopt the patriarchal role, a role which he cannot forsake and so hides the truth of his 
marriage. However, Godfrey's positional relationship with his father has not been 
successful partly because his father is not a positive role model, also Godfrey is not 
certain of his future place, and would have preferred more discipline from his lax and 
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contradictory father. Squire Cass, typifying much that Spencer had lamented in male 
parenting, threatens to re-assign his fortune (25) and so controls and undermines his 
heir, regarding Godfrey as a possession. The presentation of Godfrey is contradictory. 
He is seen as cowardly, procrastinating, and prone to trust to chance rather than his own 
ability to change his fate, yet is also strangely endearing. The presentation is 
sympathetic, with Godfrey's morally doubtful arguments relayed by the narrator without 
adverse comments. Compared to the treatment of Hetty Sorrel in Adam Bede, sympathy 
for Godfrey is sought by the narrator all along. This appeal is essential to underpin 
Godfrey's status as a central character, for he does not conveniently disappear like 
Hetty. Thus the reader's sympathy must be won for the character by presenting a 
convincing psychology, seemingly formed by experiences and an inheritance that never 
promised strength, honesty and care. 
Silas Marner appeared in 1861, two years after Darwin's On the Origin of 
Species Through Natural Selection. With the topics of inheritance and 'nature versus 
nurture' buzzing among the educated reading public, the Squire's reference to Godfrey 
taking after his mother (70), while his own character exhibits numerous faults is a 
deeply ironic manoeuvre, which yet summons great sympathy for Godfrey. The Squire 
is weak, ill-managing and manipulative, his only concerns being his own ease, money, 
and his supposed prestige in the neighbourhood. There is a complete absence of care 
and sympathy, with total unconcern over Dunstan's absence. The Squire is the source of 
Godfrey's shortcomings, either via poor nurture or the poor nature available to be 
passed on. In addition, Eliot's understanding of science, philosophy, and the means by 
which knowledge, reason and feelings are all acquired by experience and relationship 
and are then physiologically and psychologically incorporated to form personality. Not 
only is the Squire presented as a poor parent but throughout the text the narrator has 
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emphasised that the Squire neglects his proprietal role as a landowner and member of 
the gentry. Such a thorough account of gender and personality formation as Godfrey's 
is striking, and largely succeeds in winning sympathy for a character by displaying a 
contextual relativism which Godfrey himself will not prove able to display. Such 
psychological workings are profound for a work often dismissed as minor. 
In her presentation of Godfrey's history and influences, Eliot also employs 
Kant's theory of time and space as concepts of the mind, or modes of perception, which, 
when applied to sensory input, effect or order the way we perceive things. Godfrey, a 
character within a text, is yet presented through time and space so that the fortnation of 
his personality is understood. Eliot also utilises this technique in relation to the 
complete absence represented by Silas's cataleptic trances. If time and space are the 
means of understanding by which we modify all empirical data, then their suspension 
for the duration of Silas's absence not only explains his lack of understanding of events, 
specifically the Lantem Yard theft and Eppie's arrival, but allows Eliot as author to 
change the present and thus the future. While some readers may have regarded Silas's 
trances as uncanny and supernatural - as do the inhabitants of Raveloe - and thus well 
within the remit of the tale as fairy story, Eliot is most likely to have perceived 
catalepsy as a medical condition. Even though no explanation existed then 
(Shuttleworth 1984,80), Eliot's own experience augmented by her knowledge of 
Spinoza would re-assure her that the as yet unknown laws of nature account for all 
inexplicable occurrences, such as illness, disease and disturbing behaviour (Hampshire, 
121). 
However, as Sally Shuttleworth observes, the use of the trances presents Silas as 
powerless and unconscious at the two major points when 'the discontinuity of his social 
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history' (1984,81) occurs. E. S. Dallas whose 'theory of narrative progression and 
psychological development is based upon uniformitarian principles' objected to the 
introduction of such chance, on the grounds that it upsets the pleasure of fiction if the 
reader cannot rely on the presentation of character and thus calculate results 
(Shuttleworth, 81). However, writing in the wake of Darwin's Origin of Species, Eliot 
was now able to understand the full implications of the operation of chance in his theory 
of natural selection. Therefore chance has a scientific precedent and presents life as 
lacking continuity and control; as unstable, incoherent and lacking in full explanation 
and understanding - just as I believe Eliot had always presented life via her novels. 
Thus the chance, unconsciousness and powerlessness of Silas's loss of community and 
return to relationship via Eppie is clearly paralleled to the chance, powerlessness and 
lack of good 'conscious' behaviour of Godfrey's marriage to Molly and his rejection of 
Eppie. Such coincidences are therefore no more unlikely than the arbitrary series of 
events that have led to the evolution of mankind via natural selection. Given such 
coincidence, Silas's constant refrain that his stolen gold has become the golden child 
Eppie is not an unreasonable account of evolution. However, just as Priscilla's 'pork- 
pies don't turn out well by chance' (97) Eppie does not turn out to be good, intelligent, 
spirited, autonomous and caring 'by chance', but as the result of Silas's love. Spencer 
repeatedly argued that the white, Western, middle-class male was the peak of evolution, 
and that his main characteristics were autonomy, action and egoism, while altruism and 
caring relatedness were female charactersistics. Within a framework that is primarily 
concerned with nature versus nurture, Eliot parodies these notions. The Cass males fail 
to meet Spencer's strictures, Molly lacks the maternal care supposedly innate in 
attractive women, while the humble weaver demonstrates all the gender values that 
Eliot most revered. 
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Before Silas can become a good parent, he needs to work through and 
consolidate his own experiences. The gold that Silas earns comes to 'mark off his 
weaving into periods' (SM 18), just as the mother's coming and going interrupt the 
child's sense of unity, laying the foundations for a self who has to separate, but who can 
maintain a relational love that is the essence of maternal care. Silas's weaving and the 
relational movement, the equivalent of a child's 'fort/da' game, are part of the healing 
process. Kristeva describes the pulsions of the serniotic as prerequisites for the 
acquisition of symbolic language (Moi 1987,161-2), thus Silas's weaving is a precursor 
to social reintegration. His reaction to Sally Oates' illness had prompted 'a sense of 
unity between his past and present life, which might have been the beginning of his 
rescue' (SM 16) had he contined to practise his herb-lore (Thomson, 78). However, his 
role as a weaver does create the network of weblike connections that later become his 
support. However trivial, the incidents with Sally Oates and Silas's affection for his old 
brown earthenware jug (Carroll 1972,179) demonstrate that his caring and relational 
abilities are still vital, for our sympathy is also encouraged and maintained in relation to 
objects. I disagree with Milner that Silas's isolation causes an attachment to things 
bordering on fetishism (1966,719): Silas merely values all those substitute love-objects 
by which he maintained sympathy and connection during his absent years. 
Silas's weaving is also an important act of creativity. As Eliot writes Silas's 
tale, so she has her character Silas weave his 'tale' of cloth. Feuerbach had advocated 
that while we always succeed best in what we do willingly, our happiest activity is to 
actively produce, and so Silas is doing the one activity left to him that is productive, and 
produces happiness. Further, his weaving is creative not only because of the cloth 
produced, but because the flaxen lengths generate gold, and the gold becomes his 
children - his only outlet for love and relationship. Surprisingly, in object-relations 
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theory any creative act repeats the separation from the mother (Wright 1991,84). It 
mimics the child's differentiation via the process of gradually becoming a separate self 
by individual acts. Thus the product created from Silas's weaving may recreate the 
growth and separation process by which any child gradually comes to be a self-in- 
relation. Above all Silas's work brings gold, a metonymic substitute until Eppie's 
arrival. 
Eliot's own creativity also produced the gold which allowed her and Lewes to be 
free and happy, while also permitting their continuing care of Lewes's children. Thus, 
such a story is singularly appropriate at the point where Charles Lewes enters her life 
and becomes her adoptive son; for as Eliot was to display in Silas Marner, adopting, 
caring for and nurturing a child may be as creative as fathering or giving birth. 
Adoption can be seen as a model for humanly created ties, one extending the concept of 
sympathy by transcending difference and not relying on pre-formed sympathetic 
attachments based on relation and familiarity. What Silas achieves is the highest form 
of moral and emotional development advocated by Spencer, Comte and Feuerbach, 
while his example also serves to educate his community. 
Molly and Godfrey created Eppie, yet little is said of Molly, who constitutes yet 
another absence whose tale is pieced together from scattered references. Perhaps Eliot 
was aware of the impossibility of winning readers' sympathy for a barmaid opium- 
addict who risked her child's life in the New Year snows. Yet, Silas recognises a 
fellow-outsider and rushes to the Red House in search of the doctor. Although the use 
of free indirect speech provides a sense of drowsy delirious absence, yet Molly is 
presented as clinging to her daughter even as the opium deprives her of consciousness - 
unlike Godfrey, who in his opium of desire for Nancy ignores his child. Like Hetty, 
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Molly dies while her seducer is relatively unscathed and her death conveniently saves 
Silas from emotional isolation (Uglow 1987,148). Attempting to accommodate all the 
conflicting demands for sympathy is perhaps less plausible than all the chance and 
coincidence of the novel. Godfrey is excused by his wife's addiction, an excess capable 
of permitting her death, while Molly is not damned - which would blight Eppie's 
presentation - by being presented as a caring mother to the last. However, Molly's 
death is an important social comment, and the moral pivot of the novel is that Eppie 
later refuses to be bought by the same man who exploited her mother. Perhaps the only 
means of making a strong attack on the exploitation of women was via the death of a 
character who could not otherwise be defended, but who is later celebrated in a strong 
daughter. 
Molly's situation also presents unnarratable subjects for Eliot, who as a 
consequence needs to rely on the reader's experience to complete the voids. The reader 
is told that Godfrey, encouraged by Dunstan, was propelled into his marriage by 'a 
movement of compunction'(29) suggesting perhaps that he thought Molly was pregnant. 
But a 'delusion' was revealed to him, and the narratoes comment that 'if Godfrey could 
have felt himself a victim' (30) indicates that Godfrey was duped. To consider Goffrey 
a victim is a possible stance if the reader is to exonerate and thus sympathise. Yet 
simultaneously, the narrator reveals that Godfrey accepts responsibility, cursing his own 
, vicious folly' (30) - an acceptance of culpability that may further encourage sympathy. 
Godfrey's beloved Nancy is everything that Molly Farren is not. She is prim, 
pure, pretty and always aware of propriety, yet 'slightly proud and exacting, and as 
constant in her affection towards a baseless opinion as towards an erring lover' (91). 
While such a nature augurs well for Godfrey being forgiven, it suggests any life with 
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Nancy would be exacting. It also suggests inadequate knowledge and a lack of 
reasoning powers. Nancy is barely educated, but according to most theorists of the 
period, such as Spencer, Comte and all supporters of 'Woman's Mission', Nancy's 
natural altruism and general womanly qualities should be all that Godfrey requires or 
needs in a wife. Eliot refers to this topic in every novel, variously and subtly railing 
against women's lack of good education by showing the disadvantageous outcomes for 
men as well as women. Here the presentation of Nancy's feminine ignorance is far 
more subtle than in Mrs Tulliver or Hetty. However, Nancy can be recognised as a 
gentle precursor of Rosamund Vincy, for her ignorant will is to prove as indomitable. 
Silas accepts chance, and capitalises on it, yet knows that progress partly 
depends on his own actions; Godfrey's reliance on chance, however, is so absolute that 
it takes the place of God. Godfrey's freedom from an ethical God again suggests the 
ideas of Darwin, whose account of the mutations that fit or unfit an organism for its 
medium allow Eliot to play with the idea of chance as a way to compare and contrast 
Silas and Godfrey, by rooting the events in their individual histories (Beer 1986,128). 
But Darwin proposes arbitrary evolution as opposed to Herbert Spencer's belief that 
change with time is always progressive, an improvement (Paxton, 105), and thus we see 
the characters obeying the chance laws which have constructed them. On the other 
hand, their attitudes and responses to chance introduce the idea of voluntary agency 
while still reflecting their different psychological and social development. 
Dunstan's theft of the gold is the first step in the inevitable convergence of the 
two plots. Until now the stories of Silas and Godfrey have been rigidly separate. But 
Silas now has the knowledge of a community -a network that his weaving has created - 
and he is able to seek aid in The Rainbow. George Eliot stressed that Silas Marner was 
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intended to set 'in a strong light the remedial influences of pure, natural human 
relations' (GEL 111,379-82). However, that Blackwood also lamented the lack of a 
character 'of whom one can think with pleasure as a fellow creature' (In, 380) suggests 
that the whole message about extending sympathy to all others has passed him by. 
Yet life is grim in Raveloe. While it may be rural, it is not Wordsworthian. 
The conversation in The Rainbow is the reader's first experience of Silas's peers, and, 
as many other critics have variously claimed, its function is far more than comic. 
Firstly, the conversation establishes Silas and Dolly as morally and intellectually in 
advance of their fellow villagers, even while it demonstrates the male working 
community as 'glued' together by fellowship. When discussion is heated, the landlord 
keeps the peace, insisting that everyone is right, even when they are patently not, even 
when there is no real argument. Relationship and fellow-feeling are far more important 
than the rights of the debate, as Gilligan submits is the norm for those who exercise an 
ethic of care. This scene sets an example over 'rights" that should later guide Nancy 
and Godfrey: 'We're all good frinds here, I hope ... You're both right and you're both 
wrong ... there's two opinions and ... 
I should say they're both right' (46). Most 
important in this interlude however is the time given to spiritual and moral matters, and 
most relevant to the theme of gender reversals is the account of the incorrect 'sexing' of 
Nancy's parents' vows at their wedding, with such a reversal shown to be irrelevant to 
the success of a relationship. Various suggestions are made as to what rightly holds a 
relationship together: words, meaning, or register. However, as we are eventually to 
appreciate, it is loving, mutual relationship composed of sympathy and duty, care and 
justice; and in this Eliot is stressing her own Feuerbachian stance on marriage. 
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The Rainbow interlude is crucial. In this ravel of conversation and inter- 
relationship Silas finds support and his first public voice. In confiding, he quickly feels 
the stirrings of a connection which the narrator intimates has been long - and slow- 
growing: 'Our consciousness rarely registers the beginning of a growth Within us ... there 
have been many circulations of the sap before we detect the smallest sign of the bud' 
(54-5). Fellow-feeling returns as Silas apologises to Jem Rodney for falsely accusing 
him of the theft, for 'memory was not so utterly torpid' (55) that Silas should forget his 
pain over a theft he did not commit. Silas Marner 'is a fable about speech, about the 
way men should talk to men, and about the way they fail to do so', for many types of 
speech are 'inimical to the need for sympathy and fellowship' (Preston 1980,113). 
When falsely accused in Lantem Yard, Silas 'feels a revulsion against speech' (14) 
which is largely maintained until his visit to The Rainbow. This visit is one turning- 
point of the novel, for With the absence of the gold relationship ironically begins to flow 
back into Silas's life. Silas welcomes intrusion, realising that help has to come from 
outside While much of the sympathy is flavoured with egoism, as his neighbours seek 
to point out where Silas has erred, he recognises 'the desire to give comfort' (SM 80) in 
Dolly Winthrop, who personifies care. Thus the healing process has begun even before 
Eppie's arrival; his ability to be a related, caring person has only lain dormant. 
When Eppie appears on Silas's hearth, his first thought is that her gleaming hair 
is the gold 'brought back to him', but his second thought is to hope and imagine that it 
is 'his little sister come back to him in a dream' (SM 109). The immediate promptings 
to care for the child have their origin in Silas's care for his dying sister (109). Eppie 
facilitates his 'growing into memory' awakening 'old quiverings of tenderness - old 
impressions of awe at the presentiment of some Power presiding over his life' (109). 
Silas's change to a caring, relational male cannot be considered dramatic or 
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discontinuous when the clues about his earlier life are considered. Silas just needed the 
'-chance' to rediscover relationship, that form of chance described by Darwin as 'the 
name we give to "as yet unknown laws... (quoted in Beer 1979,82). 
Silas's insistence on keeping Eppie is a release for Godfrey that permits the 
realisation of desire. With Molly dead, Dunstan absent, and the child fostered by Silas, 
Godfrey can claim Nancy and secure his role and his inheritance via the children he 
anticipates. Yet Godfrey does not even begin to understand the true nature of a father's 
duty. With his narrow conception of justice, Godfrey does not consider the wider 
repercussions of his actions (Gilligan 1982,24-32). In this respect he resembles his 
father, who in his single-mindedness, rarely thought of the consequences for his tenants 
of his lax paternal role as landowner, until that is, his own needs were pressing. 
Godfrey 'was not critical on the faulty indulgence' (SM 65) but of the demand for 
reparation; we are to see that he is his father's son when he is to act in this way 'With 
Silas. A prophetic note was struck when The Rainbow's landlord was alarmed at the 
idea of paying Mr Tookey to stay out of the choir on the grounds that 'paying people for 
their absence was a principle dangerous to society' (46). Yet ironically, this is 
effectively what has happened with Dunstan, and Godfrey does the same to Silas when 
he eventually tries to 'buy' Eppie back. 
For Godfrey, on seeing 'his own child carried in Silas Marner's arms ... there was 
one terror in his mind ... that the woman might not be dead. That was an evil terror' 
(112). This is the danger point with regard to the reader's sympathy for Godfrey. His 
inner debate reveals that he lacks the moral courage to own his VAfe and child; he still 
waits on chance, but the reader has been well been prepared to expect such moral 
cowardice from Godfrey. This is as much as Eliot can do to maintain sympathy for 
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him, given the rejection of Eppie that is to come - although the reader is partly won 
round by the happy accident that means Silas can keep the child (Martin(a) 1972,486). 
The sight of his dead wife stays with Godfrey, but this and the 'conflict of regret and 
joy' he feels when the child shows 'no sign of recognition' (116) are not enough to 
overcome the 'sense of relief and gladness' (117). Inwardly he vows he will do 
everything for the child 'but own it'. Ironically, Godfrey is hoping that the child will be 
happy without him, because he, 'the father would be much happier without owning the 
child' (117), yet he is merely moving into a new phase of isolation, and one that will 
eventually corrupt Nancy's happiness. 
There has been much critical debate on the differences and similarities between 
Godfrey and Silas (see Martin 1972,479), but their response to chance and crisis clearly 
demonstrates their difference. For this is the centre of the story, the point of moral 
choice for both. After his denial of Eppie, Godfrey's creativity is at an end and he is 
described as working only to keep vacancy at bay, while Silas regains purpose, 
happiness, love and community as he simultaneously gives these things to Eppie. 
Silas's caring grows into the love that Sara Ruddick calls 'matemal thinking, (Ruddick 
1990, passim), which he attains as he struggles to protect Eppie in the stone hut that 
becomes a 'soft nest for her, lined with downy patience' (128). He takes her on his 
travels, ensures she is educated, and learns to share her with others (cf Ruddick 1990, 
17-23). Most significantly, Silas realises that Eppie 'must have everything that was 
good in Raveloe' (129). Eppie is Christened, goes to church, and becomes an accepted 
member of the community, and Silas is accepted for 'the little child had come to link 
him once more with the whole world' (129). This successful parenting via love alone 
may seem too idealised, but as a counterbalance, George Eliot has already demonstrated 
'the impotence of parental love without nurturing love' (Beer 1986,132). 
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That Silas should develop into one of George Eliot's most successful mothers 
contradicts Spencer's insistence on women's innate mothering skills - and men's lack of 
them. Paxton's account of George Eliot's 'ongoing feminist efforts to demystify 
"maternal instinct" by noting, as in Adam Bede, the differences between the capacity for 
reproduction and the psychological disposition for maternity' (1991,110) bears 
comparison to Chodorows account of mothering as psychosocially reproduced in most, 
but not all, women - so that many are not inclined or suited for mothering. Paxton also 
notes that Eliot only ever refers to 'maternal tenderness' or 'mother's love'and never 
'instinct' (I 10). Silas's decision to care for Eppie is not altruistic, and is never presented 
as such in the text. He gains companionship and relationship from Eppie and achieves 
Gilligan's highest level of caring by choosing to include himself in the relationship. 
Godfrey remains childless, even though the main outcome of his actions sixteen 
years earlier was that Nancy did marry him, and now fills his life with the orderly 
feminine calm and love he once so desired. He sees his childlessness as retribution for 
his disowning of Eppie, but fails to understand that his overall pain is not imposed by 
God or Fate, but because of his lack of sympathy, care and the relational duty. He is 
prey to Eliot's 'inexorable law of consequences' because he played with the natural 
laws and set in train the events he suffers. Even the pain caused by Nancy's 
stubbornness is the result of his own choice of a woman who behaves so, as Lydgate 
will choose Rosamond. Both Godfrey and Nancy suffer, but Nancy accepts it as God's 
will, even to the extent of refusing to adopt a child - she will not go against what is 
ordained. The narrator presents the irony of her self-comforting thought that if Godfrey 
had married 'a woman who'd have had children, she'd have vexed him in other ways' 
(SM 153). There is evidence in the text of Nancy"s suffering, yet grief has been 
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repressed in deference to God and Godfrey. Her main aim is to continue to brighten 
Godfrey's hearth and have him love her. That Godfrey has allowed Nancy to treat 
herself like this, to be so selfless, confirms that he has still not learned to care. The 
narrator muses about why Nancy and Godfrey are as they are in free indirect speech 
which reads as if each were wondering about the other; why is she so rigid in her beliefs 
and routines, and why was he so uneasy about the lack of children? Such techniques 
serve to remind the reader that we and the narrator know such things, but Nancy and 
Godfrey do not. 
All men of propriety in the novel having failed in their duty; only Silas, Dolly, 
Aaron and Eppie represent the moral core and extend care and sympathy. The catalyst 
for Godfrey's decision to tell Nancy about Eppie is the return of Marnees gold. Godfrey 
thinks that reclaiming Eppie can be achieved as a 'Levi-Strauss' exchange, part of the 
sexual economy. Previously Eppie was an 'it' to be provided for: 'That was a father's 
duty' (SM 13 1). Now Godfrey does not attempt to reason beyond this 'predetermined 
course of action which he had fixed on as the right', and dismisses 'other people's 
feelings counteracting his virtuous resolves' (SM 164). Eppie is his property, to be 
disposed of and acquired as he thinks fit, as Comte lamented was often the case. 
Godfrey may also fear Eppie's possible marriage, when she would cease to be his 
property, but fails to realise that from the day when Silas acknowledged her as 'Thou' 
Eppie has been her own '1'. Godfreyhas no notion that Silas would 'rather part with his 
life than Eppie' (152). 
Bonaparte considers Eppie as a Proserpina figure (1991,58) who has filled 
Marner's years with love and laughter. She fills the cottage with life and now her 
abundance overflows in her garden scheme. Lacanian psychoanalytic theory suggests 
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that women do not have full access to language, as their closer relation to the mother 
means they 'lack the lack' that powers a man's desire once he has been separated from 
the mother's love by the law of the father (Homans 1986,6-15). But Eppie, in being 
mothered by a man, can achieve not only relationality born of close caring love, but via 
this complex mother/father figure can also claim language as her own. Her talk and 
plans dominate. Feminist critics worry that Eppie's role is restricted, yet she has 
rejected other negative female role models. She will not be Nancy with her adherence 
to a patriarchy that gives false support; nor will she be Dolly, the best of 'notable 
mothers' (SM 118) yet sacrificing herself to constant caring, motherhood and a husband 
who drinks (Brady 1992,110-111). Eppie has chosen caring, nurturing Aaron - he is 
very much Dolly's son. Further, Eppie will not be a victim like Molly, for while loving 
and acknowledging her mother - and Eppie does believe that 'a mother should be very 
precious' (142) - she has her own aims and will include herself in her care, which 
includes caring for Silas. It is her choice. The narrator reports her ironic opinion that 
Silas 'loved her better than any real fathers in the village seemed to love their 
daughters' (142), a sad indictment of both men and their attitude towards daughters. 
Eppie is the moral centre of the novel (Gilbert 1991,106) and Nancy is not 
because like Godfrey she values propriety, or Spencer's false duty, or 'rights' over 
feelings. For Godfrey, Eppie is to be a lifeline - one he can exert control over, reeling 
her in to save himself as he once reasoned Nancy would save him. But to Silas, Eppie 
is a complex web or text, woven with care over the years by many hands, and there is 
no easy control over her voice of the shuttle, nurtured by her relational yet independent 
upbringing. Eppie has recreated herself, as Silas did, and rejects Godfrey's offer, aware 
that Godfrey would have allowed her to go to the workhouse all those years ago. 
Meanwhile Silas demonstrates his curious altruism that yet includes the self, as he again 
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keeps Eppie's love by not trying to hold her, and lets her answer for herself He 
facilitates the different voice and Eppie chooses freely, as Silas always allowed her to 
be free. Eppie opts for love, empathy, care and a preferred duty to Silas, not the blood 
link of the patriarchal father. She bases her choice on knowledge, reason and feeling. 
Eppie is aware that Godfrey would own her as a possession, but by not 'owning' her 
earlier, he has forfeited the rights of a father (Sadoff 1982,72), and Eppie is not to be 
won over by the material and social status he offers. Like Stephen Guest, Nancy and 
Godfrey speak of their need and of what Eppie will mean to them; they do not engage 
with her needs, or the fact that she includes Silas and all her friends and neighbours in 
her care. 
As Gilligan describes in her account of the rigid justice ethic, Nancy and 
Godfrey do not question themselves, acknowledge their mistakes, recognise the truths 
of others, or any contextual determinants. For Eliot, however, as for Gilligan, right and 
wrong are not easy to decide, because right is always dependent on circumstances. 
Silas had at first said that he would only keep Eppie until someone else appeared who 
had a right to her, but by this time his care supercedes biological rights. As Dolly says, 
right has to be earned and always involves a corresponding duty. Godfrey claims to 
have duty and right on his side, but ignores all Silas's duty and care woven over the 
years, and this attitude generates 'repulsion' (SM 166) in Eppie. Silas knows that the 
'feelings inside us' (164) are not to be wiped away by self-righteous justice, and finally, 
gaining voice and releasing his anger as a result of the love manifested in Eppie's 
defiance and refusal, joins her in defeating Godfrey. Eppie has not cýcV,; esce4to the 
, law of the father' (Gilbert 1991,122) for she rejects the false father and chooses love. 
Unlike the King in Rumpelstiltskin, Godfrey cannot reclaim Eppie because he does not 
know true names. 
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The ending of Silas Marner is the strongest but simplest statement yet of George 
Eliot's doctrine of sympathy, and particularly of the argument that there is a duty of 
sympathy, but one that always has to include care for the self Godfrey's selfishness is 
his downfall, Nancy's selflessness hers, while Silas and Eppie in their mutual love 
achieve a caring that yet includes the self Meanwhile the tentative gender role changes 
give a subversive suggestion about the way toward sympathy and duty. Again, this is 
no pastoral stasis, for major changes have been made, and the novel anticipates others. 
For Eppie has a life beyond the text, one she has chosen for herself. 
Felix Holt was first conceived on 29 March 1865, when Eliot declared to her 
journal: 'I have begun a Novel', and by June 1865 she was reading the beginning to 
Lewes (GEJ 1998,124). Apart from lists of her background reading and the 
extraordinary series of letters between her and Frederick Harrison - as he assisted her 
vAth the complicated legal aspects of the plot (GEL IV, 221-260) - there is little 
comment on the book until terms and details are discussed with Blackwood. The novel 
is more complex than earlier works, even without the legal windings, and Eliot admits 
to Harrison that 'the threads are so woven together that I do not know how to separate 
them without leaving you in a state of mystification as to my intentions' (GEL IV, 237- 
8). 
The introduction, with its sweeping account of history, geography and 
sociology, prepares the reader for a tale of a larger, wider society than had so far been 
typical of Eliot's fiction. The narrator's references to the whole country - and even the 
world via Harold Transome's travels - suggest an opening up that is reflected in the 
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novel's move to the town from the country. Yet the headlong narrative, yoked to the 
image of Sampson the coachman driving his team into the metaphorical abyss of the 
future (FH 9), suggests a disturbing period of change and fragmentation ahead - both in 
life and in the novel. But I for one have no problems vAth what I interpret as Eliot's 
suggestions for a way forward. 
For the purpose of my analysis, Felix Holt suffers from being between Silas 
Marner and Middlemarch. As a novel it is still a major achievement, despite the greater 
renown of Eliot's other works. However, its success pales somewhat if perceived as a 
development of one work and practice for the other. Felix Holt develops and extends 
both the themes and form already employed in Silas Marner. Eliot's artistic ambitions 
and thematic concerns have widened, such that in Felix Holt she analyses a situation 
where urbanisation, industrialisation and a rapidly changing population profile have 
produced a society not a community, and one where there is a decrease in general care 
and concern for others, and for relationship. As Comte had observed: where society 
becomes larger and more impersonal, then familial and communal sympathy, 
benevolence and duty may decay. Felix Holt illustrates this breakdown at various levels 
of society and considers some of the suggested solutions, the 1832 Reform Elections 
being one of the most obvious, although Felix Holt - Eliot's anti-hero - has other ideas. 
In all this provincial turmoil, an examination of the role of sympathy and duty is still the 
prime concern of the author, which includes generating the readers' concern. 
Eliot presents the town of Treby Magna in 1832 as a complex environment - 
almost an ecosystem - with inter-relationships and connections clearly mapped, 
although the full extent to which the many different 'organisms' depend on each other 
and are disturbed by events within the society is not initially apparent. The play of 
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chance and coincidence is central, with the more impersonal revelations of the legal- 
inheritance plot highlighting the other freely chosen risks of the characters, as Rufus 
Lyon, ý&s Transome, Jermyn and others trust to chance in the hope of avoiding moral 
revelations. The characters and their relationships being primary, the novel investigates 
all internal and external environments rigorously, in keeping with a Spencerian and 
Darwinian concern for inheritance, psychology, and a natural-history inspired check on 
correspondence. Thus the character analysis increasingly reflects ideas of Spencer's 
individual as part of the species, and Feuerbach's 'I/Thou, while I perceive a concern 
comparable with Chodorow's self-in-relation. History, family background and personal 
moral and emotional debates are present in the text in order to provide three- 
dimensional characters. As befitting an increasingly complex society, the themes under 
investigation are extended. Clerical, proprietal and parental issues remain central, but 
the novel develops an investigation of class and gender, while also demonstrating that in 
any society there are no rigid demarcations between spheres, personal or political. 
Formall Eliot has developed the double plot employed in Si as arner, yI M4 with 
the story of the Transome family investigated alongside the lives of the Lyons and 
Holts; the two strands meet, entwine and then sunder. In fact, the plot is multiple; there 
is a public and a personal dimension, a doubly political and romantic narrative, and 
even a legal and 'gothic' plot, all portrayed for the reader via a greater return to the 
dramatic discourse whereby the narrator gives multiple accounts of characters and 
events from numerous perspectives. There is much less telling and more showing than 
in Silas Marner, but any information is rarely simple; as always, the reader has to work, 
even create, to arrive at their moral version of Eliot's tale. The various strands of 
narrative, opinion and dialogue, and even the presence or absence of characters and the 
ever-fragmented flow of the various themes vAthin the novel, are like the strands within 
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a web - disappearing and emerging as different aspects of the tale are relegated or pulled 
to the surface. Thus all aspects, background or foreground, internal or external, public 
or private are variously important, whether present or absent, connected or contiguous. 
As in the earlier works, absence is still a major metaphor throughout the novel; 
for example, Mrs Transome is absent from the entire centre of the novel, while fathers 
are generally absent - literally or metaphorically. However, connection and contiguity 
have become far more important. Hence, absence and connection alternate, again like 
threads weaving in and out, with the points of connection mirroring the need for 
relation; thus as Silas's temporary mental absence brought him Eppie, so the absence of 
intolerance and anger in Rufus Lyon brings him Esther. For rather than absence, the 
polar opposite of connection is to be isolated or non-relational, and self-in-relation is the 
most important factor for Eliot, suggesting an ability to transcend difference and be 
sympathetic. Rufus Lyon begins the novel as the only character capable of this virtue, 
but by the end the importance of relation has spread. 
The main burden of the novel is to stress this importance of human relation, but 
also to demonstrate that the emergence of men and women with more interconnected 
natures is possible. Matemal men and autonomous women can evolve, and such 
mutuality of characteristics, rather than the extreme gender-role polarisations - the 
dangers of which were explored in the earlier works - permit the possibility of a 
genuinely radical change of society. Silas Marner demonstrated Eliot's first 
development of such characters, with the example of Silas's ability to nurture and care, 
and Eppie's intelligence, facility with language and exercise of choice. Felix Holt 
develops these possibilities further. However, the experiment evolves beyond the 
characters, for the proposition contained in Felix Holt - one either ignored or 
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unperceived by most critics - is that such a radical reorganisation of ideas can be 
extended out into society. What Felix advocates in his address and in his planned 
lifestyle, is a development of Comte and Spencer's idea that a change of ethics in people 
rather a change of politics in society is requred. In Felix Holt, Eliot has begun to plot a 
malleable utopia, based on intuitive sympathy and duty. It is for this reason that 
feminist object-relations is so appropriate for a modem analysis of Eliot's novels, as the 
work of Chodorow and Gilligan is profoundly radical, yet is also dismissed as 
essentialist and conservative. This link is not to suggest that Eliot would welcome the 
concept of degendering, but her stance on woman's role and nature in her letters is 
generally ambiguous, while in her novels it is more radical than many critics allow. 
In a letter to John Morley in May 1867, she explains that she considers the 
"'intention of nature... argument a 'pitiable fallacy' (GEL IV, 364), suggesting that she 
does not accept that women are innately tied to domestic, nurturing and non-intellectual 
roles. This opinion reflects sentiments first voiced in her 'Margaret Fuller and Mary 
Wollstonecraft' essay of 1855. In particular, Eliot stresses that she would support a 
system which could give 'an equivalence of advantages for the two sexes, as to 
education and the possibilities of free development' (GEL IV, 364). She frequently 
repeats a desire for an equal and good education for women (GEL IV, 425; 468), 
although she does believe there is a precious 'special moral influence' (IV, 467) that 
women possess by reason of their matemal capacity and which must be preserved. 
Graver suggests that Eliot like Comte, believes that women are morally superior to men, 
but Graver's references are to the above letters, which I find quite ambiguous on the 
whole, or to works on Eliot which do not offer any fresh primary evidence (Graver 
1984,176). However, Eliot suggests that we were proceeding towards 'a more clearly 
discerned distinctness of function ... with as near an approach to equivalence of good 
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for women and for men' (IV, 365). While ambiguous - and Eliot frequently qualifies 
herself in comments on the 'Woman Question' - this idea of some degree of interchange 
between the sexes has radical potential, no matter how limited Eliot's intention. It may 
reflect Spencer's idea that as development proceeds and conditions become easier, there 
will be less need for many of the sexually selected differentiations, although it seems 
more likely that Eliot means an equality, possibly where the roles of men and women 
are both valued, which would support her hopes of mutual relationships. Elsewhere she 
adds that 'complete union and sympathy can only come by women having opened to 
them the same store of acquired truth or beliefs as men have, so that their grounds of 
judgement may be as far as possible the same' (IV 468), implying that all notions of 
women lacking justice and judgement are conventionally constructed, based on factors 
of education and experience. Further, Eliot believed that the lives of both men and 
women 'ought to be passed together under the hallowing influence of a common faith as 
to their duty and its basis' (V, 58), which may suggest that duties, if not actually 
common, could be worked out by both sexes, instead of decided by men and imposed 
on women. Certainly she adds that this can only be produced by both men and women 
having the 'same store of fundamental knowledge' (V, 58). 
Catherine Gallagher observes that 'Eliot saw her own literary practice as a 
primary mechanism for social reform' (1988,224), and the point ignored by most critics 
is that, as with Comte, Spencer and Spinoza, Eliot believed all areas of life to be open to 
ethical reform. In Chapter 42 of The Mill on the Floss, she provides a fiercely ironic 
analysis of how the 'good society' in order to exist requires 'nothing less than a wide 
and arduous national life condensed in unfragrant deafening factories' (A4F, 291-2). 
This sentiment is generally regarded as an aberration on Eliot's part, some brief flirting 
with radicalism, yet her concern, contempt and anger are self-evident. I believe that 
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much radicalism in her work is missed because it is less strident or explicit than 
mainstream radicalism. One of the major critical stances in relation to Felix Holt, 
particularly before the advent of feminist criticism, was to consider the novel as a 
social-problem, political or industrial novel belonging to the same genre as Dickens' 
Hard Times, Mrs Gaskell's Mary Barton and North and South or Kingsley's Alton 
Locke. Two main objections are raised against most of these works. 22 The most 
common is that while these works may exhibit a genuine concern and sympathy for the 
plight of the working classes, there is generally a conflict between sympathy and fear, 
with the authors reneging on a realist representation and following through of the issues 
they have raised: 'They deny the centrality of class and process threatening working- 
class elements into less disturbing, middle-class or classless forms' (Hobson 1998,20). 
Thus the novels' radical and militant protagonists often die, emigrate, or form 
questionable pacts with the bosses - the result in most novels being a containment of 
working-class unrest in preference to a genuine questioning and challenging of the 
status quo. This stance characterises Raymond Williams' approach in Culture and 
Society. Providing more specific criticism of Felix Holt on this issue, Arnold Kettle 
admired the initial depiction of radicalism as a social force, but felt that ultimately the 
novel failed, because Eliot refused "'to face, morally or artistically, the problems she 
has set in motion.. (quoted in McSweeney 1991,123). McSweeney's assessment is 
that Eliot displays 'the middle-class intellectual's fear of the mob' (123). 
Williams also voices the second major criticism, that there is a tendency for 
these novels to move towards a sentimental stance - which is his summary of any 
emotional or relationship subplot. 'Implicit in this diagnosis is a strict delineation of 
"industrial" novels as separate from and superior to ... merely sentimental fiction' 
22 1 rely on the work of Hobson 1998, Gallagher 1998, Lesjak 1996, and Ingham 1996 for my background 
to the 'social-problem novel' debate that surrounds Felix Holt. 
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(Lesjak 1996,79). Effectively these critics enforce 'separate spheres' (80) - there is no 
place for emotion in politics or political novels. But Eliot, working to counter such 
arbitrary oppositions throughout her entire intellectual life, maintained that all factors - 
knowledge, reason and emotions - have to be taken into consideration whenever any 
decisions or duties are considered. In his introduction to the Penguin edition of Felix 
Holt, Peter Coveney observes: 'It would of course have been against the whole grain of 
George Eliot's mature talent to deal with private and public themes in disconnection' 
(1972,18). In effect he echoes Eliot's narrator who stresses that her work is primarily 
concerned with the 'private lot of a few men and women; but there is no private life 
which has not been determined by a wider public life' (FH 43). The narrator's 
implication is that within the course of the novel the inextricable interconnections 
between private and public life for these characters are to be fully observed and 
analysed. Other critics, less censorious of the presence of both a political and a personal 
dimension to the novel, nevertheless complain that the two parts do not work together, 
and that there is an uneasy relationship (Doyle 1981,96; Johnstone 1994,113, quoting 
Thale and Thomson). However, I believe that the connections are all meaningful in the 
text and can be observed by the sympathetic reader. Certainly all of the relationships 
within the novel have their political aspects. In a brief aside, Rufus Lyon mentions how 
his own concern for radical politics is opposed by his brethren who 'contend that a share 
in public movements is a hindrance to the closer walk' (FH 56). 
Eliot's heroines, slowly evolving as the novels multiply, are not all the 
neglected, objectified or abused creatures first encountered in her works. After Maggie, 
her women do not die: thus Romola survives her male oppressors - patriarchs, cleric and 
husband - while Eppie chooses her own father - and lover - based on their sympathy and 
care. In Felix Holt women and men are seen to be beginning to evolve to a point where 
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they recognise and value each others' strengths. But this is not complementarity. In 
Felix Holt, opposing values have crossed into the 'separate spheres' and transcend all 
boundaries: Felix binds the finger of little Job Tudge while Esther seizes language to 
defend Felix. 
Mrs Transome is Eliot's first representation of a woman who has dared to seize 
power. For years she has run the estate. While cramped by 'small immediate cares and 
occupations' and lacking in 'any large sympathy' (FH 23) as worries and fears have 
eroded any caring and relational faculties - as Comte and Spencer warn happens with 
disuse - she has nevertheless turned her world upside down. She is a female agent, a 
subconscious subversive, and she topples both the gender and patriarchal powers that 
initially govern her, and that later - in the shapes of her son and her former lover - are to 
humiliate and disown her. In taking a lover from a lower class she defies the mores 
which led her to marry an inferior man to earn a contiguous relationship with the wealth 
and power otherwise denied her as a woman. Sadly, she lives in bondage to guilt, fear 
and shame, all useless emotions according to Spinoza, and dwells increasingly in 
isolation, dreading the discovery of her dark secrets - her Dantesque underworld of 
4quivering nerves of sleepless memory' (11) - yet briefly she had chosen, seized and 
enjoyed her passion. 
With reference to Mrs Transome, Uglow insists that 'although Eliot presents a 
world "governed by forces", pitiless general laws of natural and social evolution, her 
interpretation of determinism does not free people from the burden of choice' (1987, 
180). Yet while Mrs Transome is not as determined by fate as she fears, but is instead 
haunted by her own past choices, she was at least able to choose - which is an advance 
on earlier Eliot heroines. While she is not presented as a figure to be admired or 
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celebrated, her actions challenge all gender and class norms and false duties that would 
contain women. Further, Eliot is once more parodying Spencer and Darwin's notions of 
female nature; Mrs Transome may have been sexually selected for her beauty and other 
womanly qualities but she preserves herself, her lineage, and the estate via faculties not 
generally associated with women; in particular, she chose her mate and clearly displays 
that full fatherhood, biological and social, is a privilege that has to be negotiated with 
free women. 
Yet this particular reading would not be blazened when the novel was published. 
For Mrs Transome has transgressed, and Eliot has to work to gain sympathy. This is 
achieved both structurally and thematically, yet all threads relate to the central 
arguments of the interconnection between sympathy and duty, the personal and the 
private, and the possibilities of gender-role change. The return of Harold Transome 
after fifteen years is the grand set-piece of the novel's opening. As yet, the reader is 
ignorant of his parentage, although sympathy and understanding are generated by the 
text for a nervous mother anticipating her son's return. Sympathy is swiftly magnified 
when Harold Transome does not value his mother at the same worth as the nan-ator; 
within minutes he is ignoring her words in preference for those of the local paper (FH 
18). From this point on, everything that Harold says to his mother is condescending, 
dismissive and insulting. He does acknowledge a son's duty of care, but this is material 
only and he possesses no sympathy. His mother is reduced in a few pages from a 
powerful matriarch with a role and position in life to a dependent creature to be 
patronised: 'you've had to worry yourself about things that don't properly belong to a 
woman' (20). Mrs Transome gains the reader's sympathy before the narrator's 
frequent comments about Harold become indiscreet. While she is as great an egoist as 
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her son - nearly all of these major characters are - she does crave relationship and 
mutuality. Yet after all her loneliness, connection to her son is denied. 
Memories of motherhood secure sympathy for Mrs Transome, although the 
tenor is mixed as if testing the reader's tolerance. This mother wishes her eldest 
imbecile child dead, so that the child who provided her with 'absorbing delight' and 
enlarged 'the imagined range for self to move in' (22) might benefit instead. Yet the 
metaphor of the passive pretty egg, grown into a 'brown, darting determined lizard' (22) 
conveys this mother's loss. The narrator also makes it plain that motherhood is not 
enough for many women, since 'mothers have a self larger than maternity' (94). This 
harsh and honest attitude to motherhood is relatively unusual, but Eliot was by now 
deep in the throes of step-motherhood, and often acknowledged that her own life was no 
longer her own. Yet Mrs Transome is to be doubly sympathised with, because not only 
has this son removed from her the sense of self and vocation that for years has filled her 
life beyond motherhood, but he does not give himself in relation. The image of Mrs 
Transome lashed with exquisite threads cutting her flesh is multiply suggestive (94). 
She is in bondage to her guilt and fear, she is in bondage to Harold's maleness and lack 
of sympathy and understanding, and she suffers by virtue of unwanted connection. The 
threads are both a metaphor for the bond to her child which she could not bear to break, 
yet also suggest metonymously the shadow life that links her to Jermyn and shame. 
Sympathy is finally won via the interview with Jermyn. That his 'moral 
vulgarity' (97) falls like cuts upon Mrs Transome recalls the pain her of connection to 
their son. Jermyn's selfish, unsympathetic cupidity is clear, and enough is said for most 
readers to finally understand that he is Harold's father. Many critics lament the fact that 
Mrs Transome - possibly the most strongly drawn and attractive character in the novel - 
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is absent from the text for the whole central section. It is regarded as a flaw. However, 
no one notes that the absence follows immediately on the revelation about Jen-nyn. This 
distancing is necessary to maintain the reader's sympathy, while it also signifies the 
position of Harold's women by their absence. He is in the world of politics, while she is 
confined to the domestic and personal, and exists in isolation surrounded by images of 
autumn and decay, a fate that could be Esther's. 
Gallagher suggests that Eliot's works are metonymic in that they assume that 
'observable appearances bespeak deeper moral essences' (1988,375). In other words, 
we read characters' natures and values according to the external signs that Eliot 
presents, just as Mrs Glegg's mood could generally be judged according to the laxness 
or crispness of her 'curled fronts'. Thus the 'skill of the portrait' should give 'their 
whole moral nature' (376). Yet Mrs Glegg's hairpiece told us nothing of her family 
loyalty and sharp discernment. In Adam Bede the conversation between Mr Irwine and 
his mother makes it quite clear that appearances are not to be relied upon as an accurate 
guide to character, while Rufus Lyon affirms that he abstains 'from judging by the 
outward appearance only' (FH 52). The metonymic signals contiguity, a linkage or 
touching that lies along boundaries, something that stands in for, but does not stand for, 
something else. A metonym is therefore not so easy to read, requiring greater reason, 
understanding and intuition. Rufus Lyon, Jermyn and Mr Transome all stand in as 
fathers, but that tells us little about them as individual men. 
Mrs Transome exists in strong counterpoint to her husband, who, despite being 
one of the most senior of the local gentry, is the weakest and most powerless of 
characters. Again the stereotypical norms of gender, patriarchy and gentry are 
overturned. While Mr Tmnsome is a figure worthy of sympathy -a character who, 
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Spinoza would argue, cannot be blamed for his shortcomings - he and his dead son 
Durfey are a metaphor for the decay of the landed classes. This decay is mirrored in Sir 
Maximus Debarry's lack of care for all, although his son, rich, powerful and 
aristocratic, is one of the most caring and just characters in the novel. That he moves to 
Rome and Catholicism VH, 132-3) is one of Eliot's classic touches, inserted to jolt the 
reader out of any complacency, prejudice and intolerance. Maybe some readers were 
able to respond to Eliot's ethical guidance and reach the sympathetic conclusion, that 
Debarry would still be a caring, just and relational man even if Catholic. The reader has 
to work out the moral problems Eliot sets. The character and event detail of the novels 
constitutes the experience and experimental evidence, and it is up to the reader to form 
premises and induce conclusions. This Comtean process of observation by experiment, 
is central to the linking together of the novel's two strands - personal and political - into 
a complete caring ethic. Further, to connect is to be capable of transcending, capable of 
being sympathetic or even empathic. 
As Eliot depicts the slow evolution of autonomous women, she also shows the 
development of maternal men, men who are capable of exhibiting the caring and 
sympathetic virtues that Eliot herself valued in women, while also retaining the 
traditionally masculine attributes of reason, knowledge and autonomy. Rufus Lyon is a 
maternal man in the mould of Silas Mamer, yet with great knowledge and 
understanding; he even questions pre-destination - what Felix calls his 'awful creed' 
(FH 63). He is another stepfather who would be dangerously selfless in his love, were 
it -not for Feuerbach's belief that such sympathy for a loved one is never truly selfless, 
as love for the other always includes the self. As Gilligan observes, the highest moral 
stance is where we include ourselves in our love of the other (1982,74). Feuerbach 
stresses that sacrificing one's own happiness for another should only occur when the 
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sacrifice is more important than one's own happiness. Yet Mr Lyon's sacrifice of his 
earlier status as preacher and theologian was first compensated by his love of Annette 
Ledru, and then by his love and sense of relation to Esther. Feuerbach states that: 
'Love does not exist without sympathy, sympathy does not exist without suffering in 
common' 0 854 [1841], 54), and both have lost Annette. 
The critic Brady fails to recognise Lyon's relational care, commenting only on 
his irritation, impatience and insensitivity concerning his servant Lyddy and ý&s Holt 
(1992,145), and suggesting that Annette gave far more to him than he to her. Yet the 
portrait painted by the narrator, and via most characters, suggests Lyon is an utterly 
honest and moral man, who acknowledges his faults - except perhaps his tendency to 
discuss and digress to excess - and who would be the first to acknowledge his debt to 
his wife, just as he prays for patience for dealing with the needs of his 'weak sisters' 
(46). Even Philip Debarry admires him. He is the least egotistical of the main 
characters, concentrating on Esther, his creed and the souls of his parishioners, almost 
to the exclusion of self, yet in this his chosen duty he is happy in a Spinozan sense. 
Nevertheless he too seeks greater connection and is completed by Felix's friendship and 
finally by Esther's love. 
As examples of non-maternal men, Jermyn and his son Harold Transome exhibit 
the dangers of the gender. Jermyn first appears to the reader amid a welter of hints that 
Harold is his son. Harold's uncle Lingon has warned him to let Jermyn 'drop gently and 
raise no scandal' after the election (FH 30), adding later 'dash it! You're a Lingon 
whatever else you may be' (3 1). In addition, the narrator's comparison on their first 
meeting, of the plump white hands of father and son, ends with a knowing aside that 
Harold's 'suspicions were not yet deepened' (32). When the truth is revealed it is a 
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shock for the reader to realise the complete lack of filial regard in Jermyn, who would 
prefer it if Harold did not exist (33). While Mrs Transome palpates with thoughts of 
Harold as her child, Jermyn never reveals any relational stance. Such an absence shows 
Jermyn's lack of imagination, conscience and sympathy, even more than his callous 
clashes with Mrs Transome in Chapters Nine and Forty Two. In the former, both wish 
Harold had not been born (98), Jermyn because this unwanted son makes life difficult 
Mrs Transome because she cannot bear the possible loss of her son's love and the 
shame when he realises her fall. This dominant mood persists in the later chapter, but 
now Jermyn would have Harold know the truth, merely in the hope of saving himself 
(335). This absence of all recognition, acknowledgement and relational feeling in 
Jermyn is submerged in the text, yet is fundamental to the reader's understanding of the 
wider importance of sympathy, care and, in this case paternal duty. Eliot expects this 
observation of absence from her readers if they are themselves to achieve connection 
vAth the text and interpret the moral. Thus the greatest contrast and foil to Jermyn's 
lack of paternal care is Rufus Lyon's excess of love for Esther. There is little sympathy 
for Jermyn, who is a complete egoist devoid of any saving emotion. Most of his 
business activities are immoral: in his dealings with ýArs Transome and Harold he 
shows no remorse or concern for relationship, and his wife and daughters are thought of 
chiefly in terms of expense (99). Perhaps Jermyn influences Felix's awful vision of 
what happens when men raise themselves out of their class. In fact, the only point of 
possible readerly sympathy for Jermyn is that he is constantly derided for being a self- 
made man, 'one of your middle-class upstarts who want to rank with gentlemen' (30) as 
Lingon describes him. 
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Felix Holt, generally not well liked by critics, is often seen as Eliot's meliorist 
mouthpiece for arguing against riot and violence. Meanwhile, for feminist critics he is 
as paternalist and oppressive as Transome or Jermyn. However, the main objection 
appears to be that Felix does not conform to socialist or feminist norms. Admittedly, 
the character lacks depth, while Eliot - or at least the narrator - idealises him too much. 
Yet I believe that Felix is far more radical than the radicals, and capable of growth to a 
less gendered position. Also, as with Stephen Guest, the lack of narrative criticism on 
Felix (Doyle 1981,101) may suggest that his moral stance, faults and all, is clear 
enough for the reader's interpretation of his character. The lack of narrative comment 
does not signal approval, merely suggests that more careful analysis is required. 
As a radical, Felix describes himself as wanting to go 'to some roots a good deal 
lower down than the franchise' (17H 224) and has a long-term, meliorist policy to which 
he plans to devote his life (Hobson 1998,21). The critic Deborah Guth compares Felix 
to Schiller's William Tell, both of whom oppose organised politics and appear to be 
individualists (Guth 920). However, although Felix is a loner, he is still more Spencer's 
individual in a species, so thatwhen he meets the congenial Minister of Malthouse Yard 
he immediately wishes to stay and talk (FH, 57). His concerns are about mutuality, 
give-and-take and debate, not rules and forced coercion. He appears to possess the 
beginnings of Gilligan's union of care and justice, although in his case less egoism is 
required on questions of rights, more sympathy for others, and care for himself - 
Feuerbach would see his rejection of love and sexuality as irrational. 
The Augustinian stance was that the State was the force of protection 'to restrain 
and coerce sinful men' (Peel 1971,72). However, as Enlightenment philosophy saw 
man improving gradually - becoming virtuous and growing to benevolence - the idea 
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developed that 'public opinion based on "moral principle"' (72) would take control, 
with the result that the laws and state would not be needed. This political ideal, 
historically central to the dissent tradition, also describes the background philosophy of 
Spencer and Eliot. It also suggests an appropriate context for Felix's stance. As he says 
in his speech, votes won't raise the working classes; only public opinion can do that, for 
which it is necessary to change people if we are to value each other more. While not 
exactly opposing universal suffrage, Felix does want 'something else before all that' 
(FH 246). His account of how the extension of the franchise could militate against 
working men if manipulated by the ruling class is described as 'Eliot's prophecy', 
which is itself often considered an accurate account of how the working class were 
derailed, fragmented and disempowered (Lesjak 1984). 
The main point of Felix's speech is to oppose the working class being kept 
ignorant so that all they could offer with their vote is 'ignorant power' (FH, 247). His 
speech is essentially Spinozan in that he wants to move against 'vain expectations' 
(248) and thus raise people out of bondage. He wishes to encourage reason and 
knowledge among the working classes for its own sake, and their sake, but not solely 
for escaping from their class. It is not a fall for Felix to choose to stay in his class (FH, 
55,363), as some suggest (Ingham 1996,128). Most critics ignore this class loyalty, 
but Hobson defends Eliot's picture of Felix Holt as being closer historically to accounts 
of radical working men, and far more politically daring than is usually credited (1998, 
21). He refers to the writings of a working man called Samuel Bamford, whose 
rnernoirs Eliot read as part of her preparation for the novel (GEU 1998,124). Bamford 
suggests that a change in working men, 'in the heart and home', was necessary before 
political reform would be of use (Hobson, 22). Hobson does not think that Eliot 
followed this aspect in her characterisation of Felix, but I consider that there is plenty of 
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evidence to show that Felix wished to live a moral, honest home and work life, and 
wished the same for others. Felix can be considered a labour pioneer soldier like 
Bamford, of whom there were many, quietly working among their class to improve 
conditions, knowledge, reason and self-respect (Hobson, 24). 
Felix does have a strong ethic of care and justice. His objections to his mother's 
potions, the teaching and work with the miners, his desire to protect them from the evils 
of 'treating', and his misguided efforts to redirect the mob on polling day all affirm his 
care of others, although like Dinah Morris, more knowledge, experience and sympathy 
are needed if he is going to interpret and thus help others. For example, he frequently 
misjudges the minds of the miners, being too idealistic. Guth suggests that Felix is too 
out of touch and does not understand that morality will often be counterproductive 
where anger and poverty are so extreme (1999,921). Spencer had made it clear that 
sympathy and the higher virtues could only flourish and be extended once life is safe 
and comfortable, and Eliot suggests that for the workers it is still too hard. Self- 
preservation will come before benevolence. Eliot's representation of the miners in their 
utter ignorance and innocence is embarrassing and condescending (FH, 110-119), but 
that itself does not, I think, invalidate the idealistic ethic with which she imbues Felix. 
When he naYvely declares that to convince and thus aid the miners he will 'lay hold of 
them by their fatherhood' and set one of their little sons in their midst (110), he is 
unwittingly ironic given the model of fatherhood portrayed elsewhere in the text. 
However, he does show by this and many other statements that for him the political is 
inextricably personal. Gillian Beer suggests that Mrs Transome challenges sexual 
mores more than Felix challenges political values (Beer 1986,134). However, Mrs 
Transome has challenged more than sexual mores - she is attacking the very bedrock of 
the political system that Felix is questioning. Yet this comparison does not negate his 
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actions, for by bringing a matcrnal thinking to bear on political thought, Felix is making 
as great a challenge against the ruling hegemony as is Mrs Transome. 
Thus, not only is Fclix's stance far more radical than is usually credited, but he 
is always concerned with the personal life of his class. This connection is also present 
in his rclation with Esthcr, for from the moment they meet lie is concerned with how 
this attractive 'person' would clash with his 'political'. What most critics miss or 
ignore in their relationship is that the), arc besotted with each other from first sight and 
that their intcrchangcs arc funny. The importance of the romance plot is also to afford 
more sympathy for the unctidcaring Felix, basically he is shown as human, and capable 
of failing in love. The imrmtor claims that on first their meeting, Felix 'would not 
observe' Esther, but tlicn proceeds to give a dctailcd description of her charms (RH 58) 
that originatcs from Felix. Esther likc%vise notices every fine feature of Felix's in a 
4 glance'. From then on, both arc attractcd and both against their will. Unconsciously, 
Felix strives to %voo Esthcr, winning licr to his work and moral stance. Yet he is not 
patriarchal or misogynist, but merely challengingly egalitarian; while his manner is 
bullying and arrogant, lie at least engages her on serious topics and expects an 
intelligcnt woman's ans%vcr, all their conversations make a marked contrast to Esther's 
vacuous, flirtatious exchanges %vith Harold Tmnsome, where she acknowledges 'how 
angry they would have made Felix' (150). 
In Chapter Ten, Eliot sets out a programme of improvement for women, and 
while it is galling that it stems from this male demagogue, it is also presented in so 
ironic a manner, that Eliot, I feel, wished to %vin the emancipated women to mutual love 
by the sense of Felix's reason, and %vin the sentimental women to emancipation by the 
force of his emotions. For this is purple prose; Felix behaves like a proto-Mills and 
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Boon hcro who has read J. S. Mill. Wishing to have Esther rcalise her fullest worth, he 
makes plain his belief that woman does not have to accept subjection - 'let her show her 
power of choosing something Ix-ttcr' (104) - which echoes Eliot's repeated belief in free 
will within a lot determined by the the natural laws. Esther's bondage to niceties such 
as wax candles - which here (ire metonymic representations of a leisured life - and also 
that she is ruled by fancy (104) arc nicrcilessly laid bare. Yet this entire passage, where 
Felix says lie wants her to change, is a declaration of love. But Esther is to also win 
Felix to greater sympathy, caring and an acceptance of self-in-rclation, away from his 
austere philanthropic role. Doyle suggests that fie accepts a 1-cuerbachian role and even 
sees his sexuality as a result of this po%%-crful attraction (1981,98), while Alicia Carroll 
observes that for both, the argument over Byron and his poetry reveals their sexuality to 
each odier(1992,248). llowcvcr, more than this rather Freudian reading, the exchange 
reveals their desire for relationship, connection and mutuality. 
Harold Transonic stands in cold opposition to Felix, regardless of any 
similarities between them, for they represent extreme poles of moral, political and 
gender beliefs. As such an extreme egoist, Harold has very little care or sympathy for 
anyone, and ackno%vlcdgcs fc%v duties or obligations. Overall, fie has knowledge, 
reason and experience but lacks imagination, sympathy and conscience. In particular, 
Harold would restrict women; treating them with contempt as 'slight things' (149) and 
repeatedly underestimating them. Echoing Herbert Spencer, he tells his mother that 
'Women, very properly, don't change their views' (35), never realising that she is far 
more radical than he. This personal stance also forms the core of his political creed, for 
unlike Felix his politics arc to do with money, power and status with no concern or care 
for the working class or anyone else. As he would exploit the election, so he would 
exploit Esther once her lineage is known. Uglow observes that his plot to win and wed 
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Esther parallels the power lobby that took place to regain power via the working classes 
in the 1867 enfranchisement (1987,188). 
Alicia Carroll suggests that Harold's oriental background is Eliot's means of 
criticising British Imperialism, whilc demonstrating his self-seeking, manipulative 
tendencies in relation to Esther, anit further parodying many of the so-called 'radical' 
candidates of her time, whosc politics were purel), personal (1992,251). Harold's 
background certainly adds a 'Gothic' element to the already bizarre translation of Esther 
from Malthousc Yard to Transomc Court. Howcvcr, her education is equally swift. At 
one time she would have cxlxctcd to be happy, but since r-clix asked her to change she 
needs more than incrc wealth, flattery and leisure. All along she senses Mrs 
Transomc's pain and is early unwilling to be considered as posing for a family portrait 
(F-H 321). Meanwhile Mrs Transonic fears Esther being her son's captive (313) as 
much as she would love her as a daughter. 
Two final revelations convince Esther where tier future lies, the first being 
Harold's comment that his first wife was a slavc (352). Esther is suddenly confronted 
with the reality or Byron's Gothic excess and sees the danger of tier situation. Further, 
when Harold has discovered his parcritagc and spurns his mother, Esther perceives the 
years of pain Mrs Transonic has endured because of men. Initially Harold cannot 
transcend the difference lie now perceives in his mother. As Dinnerstein describes, 
Harold had never really appreciated her as a separate subjectivity -%vith needs and 
desircs. Discovering tier history is like a retaliatory rcbirthing where Harold now rejects 
her. If Harold is a total egoist, he %vas possibly, unconsciously, created so by his 
mother, who no doubt adored and spoiled him, while also rejecting him both for his 
gender and his relation to Jcnnyn. Thus Harold has possibly been constructed in 
282 
extreme rqJcction because or difference. lie may also have been rejected yet again on 
his return home. Mrs Transonic does not recognise her own child when they first meet - 
'she heard herseir called "Mothcrl"... but ... this son who had come back was a 
stmngcr... thc sense of strangcncss came upon her like a terror' (16) - and immediately 
sees his terrible resemblance to Jcrinyn. There is no recognition, no cyc-contact with 
Harold, and lie is pushed away again. Is Mrs Transonic projecting her own fears onto 
Harold? Is she now as she %sus when he was a child, both the bad mother and the good? 
For we never hear of 1-farold's memories of his childhood and only know he was keen to 
leave and did not return until power was his. Alicia Carroll observes that 'some readers 
have noted that the issue of reform in P'eld Holt connects an individual's moral to his or 
her political a%vareness to such an extent that "family politics reflect national politics", 
(1997,238, quoting Gallaglicr). Thus from the opening chapters, the political in the 
Transomc family is incxtricably bound to the personal. Harold's choosing to become a 
radical is merely a rcflcction of the difference that already exists at the heart of the 
family. Perhaps for all his unprepossessing callousness and egoism, Harold deserves 
the readers sympathy too. Beer proposes that Harold does not grow in any way (1986, 
145), but he is able to go to his mother, although more is unknown. However, this very 
absence could promote sympathy, while also making it clear that, evolutionarily, the 
Transomcs constitute an exhausted line. 
Although Esther persuades Harold to go to his mother in order to comfort her 
and be reconciled (even saying '0,1 think I would bear a great deal of unhappiness to 
save her from having any more' [393]), Esther chooses freedom. She goes back to her 
father and her narro%v life without knowing if Felix loves her. She chooses self-respect 
and the promise of happiness that Felix and her father have demonstrated to exist 
through work. Lcsjak observes that Felix has put himself outside the economy of 
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exchange (1996,98), a position that Esther no%v also shares. She is not her father's to 
give and this independence is shown by her rejecting both Transome and a fortune. She 
takes charge of her life and makes decisions, She does not give herself up to Felix, but 
is ready to mcct him half-%ýzy if tic too can change and accept womcn as other than a 
blight on men's work. Alison Booth notes that %vhcn Esther is alone in her room on her 
final night at Transonic Court, she opens her blinds because 'She wanted the largeness 
of the world to help hcr thoughts' (1-71388). Esther's cmotion anticipates Dorothea's in 
Middlemarch (1992,151) aftcr her night's despair. Esther's action reflects 
Schopenhaucr's belief that surrendering to the ethically sublime or a oneness with the 
world reflects happiness and exultation in the loss of individuality: "'a vanishing 
nothing in the face of stupendous forces.. (McCobb, 543, quoting Schopenhauer). 
Most would fear such loss, but E-sther's moral gro%vth is signalled by this mcrging with 
the world and loss of individuality, for the sympathetic person is "'not oppressed but 
exalted" by the world's immensity, and can identify her "I" with the "Thou" of the 
species' (543). 
Esther is initially an extreme egoist, although well-mothered, fathered and loved. 
While in bondage to life's trivia she rccognises virtue, and, with practice, knowledge 
and experience, is capable of intuitive sympathy and duty, as is early reflected in her 
turn to her father. Unlike Harold Transome, with whom she can be set in parallel, she 
immediately realises her father's pain and love over all the lost years. From this flash of 
empathy, Esther is able to grow into the duties that she chooses. Brady considers that 
Esther is pushed into selflessness when she chooses to marry Felix (1992,140), but to 
stay with Transome would have been a selflessness equivalent to Gilligan's second 
stage where she places others before herself I also do not think that Esther is choosing 
only Felix's cause and work (Brady 138). Bored -%vith the inactivity at Transome Court, 
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she tells Fclix plainly that she intends to work (FII 396). She has already chosen 
transgression by speaking at the trial. While the gentry normalise and romanticise her 
action and sentiment, she speaks out of a forgetfulness of self - which again is to 
rccognise the 'othcr' and forgct the self through sympathy. Such a move has already 
been seen with Eppic, and it anticipates Dorollica. While these may not be feminist 
actions according to many m-critictli-ccritury definitions, these women are happy, 
choosing freedom, sexuality, mutuality, and happiness through advancing knowledge, 
reason and sympathy. 
Yet Felix also has to choose to change. In accepting a wife he cares for himself 
and acknowledges his need to be a self-in-rclation, but he also accepts modification. He 
agrees to the money Esther has secured for them and accedes to the idea that she will 
work, and even teach him things (r-11 396). Gillian Beer, while acknowledging Felix's 
ability to change and also to awaken change, feels that the novel is one of powerlessness 
and impotence, as Mrs Transome's rage and transgression achieve nothing, the political 
parties do not understand change, and Rufus Lyon's Christianity appears a doubtful 
option (1996,145). I-lowever, Felix and Esther suggest an alternative; mutual 
relationships where both arc valued. Felix, like Mrs Transome, has experienced a futile 
beating and bruising (01, IV, 499) and knows there has to be another way. While 
there is a latcnt desire for swift change in the text, what I consider to be Eliot's mildly 
utopian intentional offering is almost as hidden. Extrapolating from Comte's system, 
but eschewing his doctrinaire gender roics and enforced altruism, while also including 
Spencer's ideas on a slow growth to sympathy and justice as conditions improve, Eliot 
is, I believe, suggesting the beginnings of a nc%v type of social selection, even sexual 
selection. Here what is chosen is a growth to "as near an approach to equivalence of 
good for women and for men' (GE-1 IV, 365) as is possible. 
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Chapter Seven - Novels Without Heroes or Heroines: 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda 
Middlemarch represents a disturbing perfection in relation to my remit of examining the 
development and deployment of George Eliot's concepts of sympathy and duty. I 
consider it to be the pinnacle of her art in terms of theme and forrn, particularly in 
relation to her empathic narrator and the complex, interwoven examination of 
characters, events and all the relationships and inter-relationships. However, 
Middlemarch is perhaps disappointing in that its overall message is that we all - all of us 
- may have to be content with less, in exchange for happiness and freedom in mutual 
relationships. The hints of possible utopias still present in Felix Holt are gone. It is as 
if Eliot's old adage never to 'beat and bruise one's wings against the inevitable but to 
throw the whole force of one's soul towards the achievement of some possible better' 
(GEL IV, 499) has finally been accepted. While this augers well for the steady, 
ineliorist advancement of an intuitionist sympathy and duty, there is a price to be paid. 
Eliot began 1869 by confiding to herjournal that one goal was to write 'A Novel 
called Middlemarch' (GEJ, 134). As early as March 1867 Eliot had indicated to John 
Blackwood that she contemplated another 'English novel' (GEL IV, 355), while the 
notebooks that she kept between 1867 and 1871 reveal the extent to which she 
constantly searched and researched in order to gather the material towards this, her most 
complete web of interdependent lives (Pratt and Neufeldt 1979). For nearly two years 
her efforts were concentrated on what was to become the Lydgate and Vincy portion of 
Middlemarch; Eliot only began 'experimenting in a story' that was eventually to 
become 'Miss Brooke' towards the end of 1870 (GEJ, 141-2). These two tales are then 
searrilessly woven together, following the pattern of the previous two works of dual 
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plot, again incorporating a search for sympathy and duty in an ever larger and more 
complex society. While family, clergy and proprietal care are again lacking, the main 
relationships under observation are those between the sexes. Although the work clearly 
demonstrates the extent to which women are oppressed, repressed, damaged and limited 
as a result of harmful gender role constructions and expectations, Middlemarch also 
harks back to The Mill on the Floss and Tom Tulliver, in order to examine fully the 
damage done to men. Middlemarch is Eliot's most comprehensive and holistic 
treatment of human relationships, extending her analysis of the effects on personality, 
gender and relationships of sympathy and duty, care and justice. The novel was finally 
published in eight instalments between December 1871 and December 1872. Despite 
Eliot's usual agonising during composition that she could never produce anything 
comparable to her past work - at one point she described Middlemarch to Lewes as the 
'rinsings of the cask' (GHL V, 246) - it was received with more acclaim and popularity 
than any of her previous novels. 
In a letter of 1868 to Clifford Allbutt, Eliot wrote of her 'conviction as to the 
relative goodness and nobleness of human dispositions and motives' (GEL IV, 472). 
Such a declaration confirms the impression that Eliot expected a natural benevolent 
moral sense in people, while also accepting from her experience and revealing 
repeatedly in her writings the equal conviction that goodness had to be worked for and 
practised. While this belief ultimately forms part of the overall impression of 
Middlemarch, it is a hard-won impression that rests on textual affin-nation that most of 
the characters are good, unless damaged by their upbringing and experience. Further, 
Eliot illustrates - as she hoped to demonstrate via influence on her readers - that 
sympathy and an intuitive duty could win all but the most hardened wretches back to a 
state of goodness and nobleness. However, none of the characters in Middlemarch is 
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truly exceptional. Even those who have potential do not achieve greatness, although 
some with the most questionable beginnings develop exceptionally well. 
Middlemarch is essentially a novel of anti-heroes and anti-heroines. With 
regard to both Dorothea, and Lydgate in particular, Eliot almost idealises her 
protagonists only to drag them back to ordinary life (Guth 1999,916). This reversal of 
expectations quickly involves the reader more intensely, but also contributes to the 
overall anti-climactic effect. However, the technique also adds enormously to the 
sympathetic appeal for the reader. This presentation of characters both ordinary and yet 
potentially exceptional is Eliot's most subtle handling of psychologies yet; we were 
never in any doubt that Felix and Esther were not ideal, but the narrator of Middlemarch 
repeatedly succeeds in suggesting worthy protagonists while simultaneously revealing 
their feet of clay. Even Casaubon glows when first presented alongside Brooke. 
However, from the first pages of the Prelude the reader has no excuse for not realising 
that these are 'blundering lives' (Mm 4). The main representations in Middlemarch are 
still the commonplace lives and relationships seen in Scenes of Clerical Life, but now 
the pain of thwarted ambition and success causes a closer analysis of what constitutes 
freedom and happiness. 
Having met Dorothea and Lydgate, the reader may nevertheless still hope for 
epic lives rather than tragic failures, even as these characters are simultaneously 
undercut by the narrator's irony. Dorothea is beautiful, fine of form and stature, 
remarkably clever, and linked metonymically to the Blessed Virgin. She is a character 
to seduce any woman reader of learning, beauty, desire - or pretension - and any man 
who dreams of a worthy woman. Whatever the later revelations about her faults and 
shortcomings, once Dorothea is linked to the image of Saint Theresa - despite the 
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narrator's clear disclaimer that this is not a tale of successful Sainthood - the image of 
Dorothea's special nature remains. That she is trapped by her gender and by social 
conventions and by the fact that there was 'no coherent social faith and order which 
could perform the function of knowledge for the ardently willing soul' (Mm 3) all 
serves to provoke sympathy. The Prelude is scathing in its condemnation of 
assumptions about women's nature and in its suggestion of the conventional moulds of 
(sameness' into which they are forced (4). From this condemnation of society's attitude 
to women and from many other such examples in the novel it is hard to imagine how 
anyone can doubt that Eliot is a profoundly feminist writer. While I argue that Eliot is 
not primarily or solely concerned with women - for her concern is for humanity and the 
novels also demonstrate the damage done to men, both by the gendered demands made 
on them and by the effects on them of the foolish and dependent women they help to 
create - her anger and reforming zeal constantly demand the reader's, and society's, 
sympathy for women, and she demands change. I consider Eliot a feminist, but she is 
also always a humanist. 
That Dorothea is an orphan, has been parcelled out to a various and inadequate 
education, and is forced to defer to Mr Brooke heightens the reader's sympathy. 
However, Celia has more common sense; Dorothea's learning pales into insignificance 
if compared to that of Mary Ann Evans; and the idea that she yearned after 'some lofty 
conception of the world' which might yet 'include the parish of Tipton' immediately 
sketches in her limitations, pretensions and egoism (8). As F. R. Leavis observed, 
'Dorothea ... 
is not exempted from the irony that informs our vision of the other 
characters' (1983,90). 
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Lydgate has a more equivocal introduction via the tongues of Middlemarch (MM 
89-91), but the reader eventually discoverý that he is intelligent, poor, ambitious, 
committed to his vocation and determined to achieve great good in medicine. The text's 
reference to Henry Fielding (Mm 139) prepares the reader for the narrator's direct 
address: we are to be included in the analysis and invited to step back and consider 
Lydgate. This intertextuality also serves to place Lydgate in our minds as firmly among 
famous men and the 'tempting range of relevancies called the universe' (139). The 
narrator's first-person account draws us in, we quickly have a personal interest, and 
Lydgate's life of orphaned intellect, self-tutored evolution and chosen education, 
together with his passionate, reforming and empathic and dutiful vocation, wins great 
sympathy (140-7). He is obviously a Spinozan man, seeking full knowledge and thus 
finding happiness, activity and even hints of blessedness. 
The narrator's finely nuanced account of a man obviously capable of doing 
'good small work for Middlemarch, and great work for the world' (147) overshadows 
Lydgate's obvious isolation and outsider status, and his brief but disturbing history of 
unfortunate attachment. It also draws a veil over any earlier disappointments for the 
reader, as on Lydgate's first appearance the narrator reveals that Lydgate's character 
was, after all, of a masculine ordinariness; for outside his professional intuition, Lydgate 
lacks sympathy. Despite his many advantages, he repeatedly fails to empathise with the 
hopes, fears and politics of Middlemarch in general and so quickly fails in his wider 
social relationships in a manner similar to Amos Barton. More tellingly, Lydgate 
cannot understand women. He initially dismisses Dorothea's earnestness by asserting 
his 'reasons' over feminine 'moral sense' (91) - by now an obvious warning sign in 
Eliot's texts. This lack of consideration of a major facet of the internal environment, 
particularly in relation to women, is to be his downfall. 
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All this early and subtle questioning of the main protagonists seems to grow 
organically from the text, with a far more reticent irony employed than usual. Many 
warning signs are not obvious upon first reading or are revealed before the reader 
understands their significance to a particular character. Thus reader sympathy depends 
on an ability to read all the signs, to analyse, but also, as always, to not jump to any 
early conclusions. Yet ultimately, much criticism of the novel, past and present, centres 
on readers' disappointment with Dorothea, Ladislaw, Lydgate and others, because they 
are not what the reading public want them to be. They are not ideal, they do not achieve 
exceptional things, even that they are stereotypical male and female heroes and 
heroines. While Eliot's texts have always subverted readerly expectation, in relation to 
her other works the characters of Middlemarch almost suggest a reverse evolution, or a 
lack of progress, in that the characters become less and less ideal-seeming within the 
work, yet are ultimately more real and ordinary. Perhaps this temptation of potential 
not achieved may generate the reader's active concern and cause it to be extended into a 
duty of sympathy for this life, since it is obviously unobtainable in the life of the novel. 
Middlemarch is a successful and well-researched historical novel, set nearly 
forty years before its publication and just before the failure of the First Reform Bill 
attempt. However, Middlemarch is also a natural history, a study of the ecosystem that 
is Mddlemarch. 23 An ecosystem is a community of organisms all variously relating 
with one another, while also interacting with the environment in which they all live, as 
well as variously modifying their own - and sometimes each other's - internal 
environments. An ecosystem is a fertile metaphor by which to examine the 
relationships within Middlemarch: not as food chains and webs and the flow of energy 
23 1 hope that this ecosystem metaphor is original, but I suspect it may not be. However, I have been 
unable to find any source where it has already been applied, despite a considerable search. 
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through the community - although this is an image to preserve given Spencer's ideas on 
energy - but as an economy of sympathy and duty. Chains and webs can be mapped 
showing the giving and receiving of intuitionist sympathy and duty in contrast to the 
patternings of false virtues and conventions. As the multiple points of similarity and 
divergence between all the characters in Middlemarch are so complex, this analogy with 
an ecosystem permits an organic exploration of the text. 
It is quite common to use the metaphor of the web in relation to Eliot's works, 
Middlemarch in particular. Hillis Miller observes that the web is one of the most 
frequently applied 'totalising metaphors' together with woven cloth, flowing water, and 
the labyrinth (1975,12-3) - all of which suggest connection, relationship and even 
metonymic linkage. George Eliot herself refers to the complexity that is her novel as 
'this particular web', suggesting both the whole and also the individual 'human lots', 
and how they are 'woven and interwoven' (Mm 139). The metaphor of an ecosystem is 
even more suitable as it relates so well to aspects of Eliot's life and history and to all the 
science, natural history and evolution which was her daily fare and intercourse with 
Spencer and Lewes. It is particularly apt since, unlike many critical approaches which 
concentrate on dualities - such as the obvious gender polarities (Beer 1986,196-7) - to 
consider Middlemarch as an ecosystem highlights all the many relationships, 
correspondences and influences as parts of an organic whole. It illustrates how all 
characters are in a state of interdependence and the importance of this connection, also 
how the internal changes in one character may seriously affect the external and internal 
environments for others. Thus Featherstone's fluctuating passions produce adverse 
material and emotional states for Fred Vincy, his family, the Garths and eventually even 
for Bulstrode. It is a wonderful mapping of the 'law of consequences'; or then again, 
chance as being the laws that we do not yet know. Such a holistic consideration also 
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illustrates more clearly than Eliot's earlier works that the personal is always both public 
and political; it also encourages a consideration of the natural laws and Spencer's 
warning that we meddle with the complex interactions of cause and effect at our peril. 
In particular, Middlemarch as ecosystem demonstrates how gender construction, false 
virtues and conventions impede the growth to happiness, freedom and tolerance. 
Eliot presents established groups of organisms who variously support and 
nourish each other, such as the Garths, Farebrothers, Chettams and even the Vincys. 
There are others who neglect, pervert or fail their parental, clerical and proprietal duties 
such as Brooke, Bulstrode and perhaps Cadwallader. Changes in the external 
environment affect all: so that the railway, changing education and increased class and 
social mobility have many repercussions. Meanwhile changes in various internal 
environments also have far-reaching effects: Dorothea would claim knowledge, reason 
and vocation beyond that normally expected by women; Fred Vincy evolves to disobey 
his father with regard to both love and vocation; while Ladislaw lacks the usual male 
growth to positional masculinity and is thus one of the most pleasantly feminine of men. 
Some organisms are seeming-outsiders with scant connection, such as Casaubon, while 
others are outsiders-within like Featherstone, Bulstrode and even Dorothea. These, in 
their own way, cause disturbance, even chaos. Outsiders such as Lydgate and Ladislaw 
have good intentions, make connections, but are never accepted and choose to leave 
both to stabilise the environment and to develop elsewhere. Finally some such as Rigg, 
Raffles and even poor Casaubon and Rosamond are parasites, capable of doing various 
degrees of damage, utterly lacking in intuitive sympathy and duty, and operating 
according to their own maxims regardless of the natural laws and the effects on their 
and others' environments. 
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While Eliot creates and examines each one of these characters in detail, they are 
never imagined or represented in isolation. The debate over whether Eliot is more 
concerned with community, relationships or individuals is not an issue, for - as 
consideration of Middlemarch as an ecosystem illustrates - the individual is always also 
a member of the species, part of the 'I/Thou', a self-in-relation. Of course the 
individual is always important, Eliot repeats this in her letters and novels, and does not 
advocate self-sacrifice. Given the influence of Spinoza and Spencer she may even 
accept that self-preservation is primary. However, the surest means of self-preservation 
is to be in relation, to be part of a mutually supporting group. In fact, Spinoza's idea of 
punishment is the inability to live in harmony with others. Thus Eliot values both the 
individual and the species, and as Spinoza, Spencer, Feuerbach even Schopenhauer have 
indicated, sympathy best preserves the community and the overall conditions that make 
life possible for all individuals. Therefore the narrator is always variously reporting, 
commenting and revealing from multiple viewpoints, from individuals and from 
species. The reader's creative task is to sift this data and arrive at conclusions 
concerning what is best and what is not, for all; balancing in a constant feedback 
process all the various shades of emphasis and relevance between individual and 
species. The reader becomes almost as much a scientist as Lydgate. 
Lydgate is described as searching for the 'primitive tissue' (Mm 147), and critics 
have debated whether Eliot was searching for the same via her texts - although Beer 
insists that Eliot knew there was no one tissue (quoted in Barrett 1989,142). However, 
while Eliot demonstrates infinite individual differences between the organisms within 
the tissue of her community, she did accept Spencer's theory of differentiation and 
growing heterogeneity from homogeneity. Therefore her characters are the primitive 
cells - if not tissue - in her natural history analysis and what she is investigating is the 
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various relationships, connections, internal and external changes, which variously cause 
differentiation. Middlemarch is her most consummate f experiment in life' (GEL VI, 
216); the text observing, hypothesising and demanding that readers do the same in order 
to determine exactly what produces a Rosamond or a Dorothea, a Lydgate or a 
Ladislaw. 
Paxton reports Shuttleworth's opinion that Eliot's commitment to organicisin 
restrained her feminism (1991,190). Undoubtedly, Eliot's concern is with all 
humanity, not just women. She values men and women equally and her novels are 
humanist as well as feminist. Her organicism helps her to understand that for any 
individual 'organisms' to survive and prosper, all must also be cared for. The entire 
ecosystem must be considered. However there are many aspects to this questioning of 
her feminism. Despite Eliot's own skills and intelligence, - and the knowledge that 
women were not permitted the education and experience to sift their potential - at the 
time of writing Middlemarch she was aware of science declaring that women were 
irrevocably determined by their nature and biology. Darwin's The Descent ofMan was 
published at this time, and over the years Spencer had increasingly adopted the 
scientific belief that women were more altruistic, less judgemental, and were 
constrained by their biological construction. 
As she read, discussed and understood all this research, Eliot was probably 
undecided - tom in her opinions. A letter of 1868 to Emily Davies discusses physical 
and psychological differences between the sexes that she believes cannot be ignored 
(GEL IV, 467-8). Further, as with Florence Nightingale, while Eliot wished women to 
have the full opportunities of education and experience so that their nature might 
develop to a stage to be 'treated with scientific certitude' (Mm 4) - and perhaps to be 
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free of the endless demands and assumptions that they will always nurture everyone - 
she also acknowledged and valued women's sympathetic, caring values. The same 
letter to Emily Davies stresses that we cannot afford to lose all the gentle, affectionate 
and maternal values that are associated with the feminine character (IV, 468). All this 
evidence means that Eliot is always qualifying the 'feminism' in her texts - and in her 
letters - and she does not rule out the possibility that a definiteness of both nature and 
function might be resolved via our evolution proceeding toward a more 'clearly 
discerned distinction of function' (GEL IV, 364), although she does not know what this 
may be. Further, any moral solutions which she suggests for women's advancement do 
not necessarily take a form that modem feminists would agree with. I believe that her 
advocacy of happiness in mutual relationships - where women are more autonomous but 
men are more matemal than was expected by Victorian standards - has much in 
common with the ideas presented by Chodorow and Gilligan which suggest that 
changes in gender construction will benefit men as well as women, although - as 
already stated - Eliot would not advocate degendering. 
As with Eliot's other communities, intuitive sympathy and duty are relatively 
lacking in Middlemarch and are also overshadowed by tremendous egoism in all of the 
main characters. Dorothea and Celia are more alike than they imagine in that both 
believe that they are always right. The same is variously true of Casaubon, Lydgate and 
Rosamond. All of them, in failing to recognise difference are unable to transcend it and 
enter into an empathic, understanding relationship with the other. All the characters 
begin the novel very much alone, in spite of family connections. The crucial question is 
whether they can gain knowledge and understanding from experience and thus extend 
their faculties and achieve imaginative intuitive sympathy, value duty over convention, 
and finally advance to mutual relationships. Despite his 'scrapes' and for all that he is 
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not presented as exceptional, Fred Vincy begins the novel with the greatest moral 
profile because love and fellow-feeling with another allow him to realise his lack; he 
knows there is a higher duty he could be performing - beyond entering the church for 
prestige, position and pleasing his father, or observing societal norms such as not eating 
smoked herring at mid-moming, or marrying according to his station. 
As Celia repeatedly points out, Dorothea 'sees what nobody else sees' and 'yet 
never see[s] what is quite plain' (Mm 35-6). While reporting this observation is one of 
the narrator's means of removing Dorothea from any pedestal upon which the reader 
may have placed her, as well as anticipating the misjudgement over Casaubon, this is 
not a universally negative quality. Hillis Miller observes that Dorothea's 'literal myopia 
is a metonymy' (1975,19), but while her short-sightedness stands in for Dorothea and is 
responsible for her recognition of, and linkage to Casaubon, with greater experience and 
knowledge Dorothea is also able to recognise, value and relate to Lydgate, Farebrother 
and Will. As Dorothea is used to not having her 'different voice' heard, so she is adept 
at hearing the different voices of others - although more reason and judgement are 
required. As yet, Dorothea is ill-made. While not exceptional, her ardour and moral 
stance exceed her environment. She possess the philanthropic urge which Will calls her 
'fanaticism of sympathy' (Mm 216). However, this suggests the first capacity for 
sympathy that Eliot describes in her Riehl essay, that which 'requires a moral sentiment 
already in activity' (1992,263). It is as if she were educated towards some compulsory 
altruism, as Comte would advocate for women. Dorothea may have been well- 
mothered, for she did not lose her parents until aged twelve and, like many of Eliot's 
heroines, she is both relational and autonomous. However, as for so many women of 
the day, her ideas and desires of vocation have been drawn into an altruistic mould. 
Barrett suggests that, as she lacks a father figure and Mr Brooke is so inadequate, she 
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may be attempting to remedy that absence in her life by marrying Casaubon (1989, 
127). Yet the text has already suggested that she likes to worship at the feet of learned 
older men (Mm 10), perhaps first encouraged in this by her father. 
However, Dorothea is not being selfless when she wishes to be with Casaubon. 
She wants to work, learn and 'become wise and strong in his strength and wisdom' (Mm 
208). Eliot believed that women deserved the opportunity of some engrossing study, 
and should not be expected to live 'too exclusively in the affections' (GEL V, 107). 
Dorothea's philanthropic sympathy represents such self-repression, yet she does already 
'delight in ideas' (V, 107), while Casaubon may be the first intelligent man to whom 
she 'could confess without being laughed at' (V, 107). Because of this recognition of 
'difference' and acknowledgement of each other's isolation and loneliness, Dorothea 
and Casaubon believe that they empathise, but they do not. As realisation grows in 
Dorothea, her 'individual awareness' slowly develops to 'deal with the world it has not 
made' (Ermarth 1985(b), 112). As she perceives her own 'moral stupidity' (MM 208) 
she is able to grow in knowledge, reason and experience, until a fusion with her 
naturally benevolent nature permits first pity and then sympathy with Casaubon. The 
description provided of Dorothea's realisation of Casaubon's 'equivalent centre of self 
(208) mirrors the wonderful experience of sympathy as empathy that Adam Smith so 
valued: 'to conceive with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but feeling - an 
idea wrought back to the directness of sense' (208). The critic Neil Hertz sees this 
realisation as Dorothea accomplishing an 'exemplary action, the acknowledgement of 
an irreducible difference between persons' and signifying that she not only overcomes 
her own egoism, but also a troublesome inner difference (1979,79). That the narrator 
addresses the reader directly here, announcing that we are all 'bom in moral stupidity' 
(Mm 208), is one of the many examples where a presence is invoked by the narrator 
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(Smith 1977,194-5) to prompt the actual reader into a response, in this case an analysis 
of both the characters and themselves. 
Throughout, Dorothea has no community of like minds to cling to (Beer 1986, 
164), unlike Eliot once she had met the Brays - so again we are considering alternative 
stories. Hence Eliot's novels are neither for the initiated nor the exceptional but for all 
isolated women with aspirations greater than their opportunities or abilities. Casaubon 
too is isolated and appears to have been so, both professionally and personally, for 
much of his life. Like Dorothea, he also operates within his determined freedom, yet 
chooses not to evolve. It is this egoistic certainty that makes sympathy for Casaubon so 
difficult for the reader. The many-levelled, multiple discourse that takes place 
concerning Casaubon will vary in its influence on the reader according to our response 
to Celia's dislike of white moles, Sir James's contempt for thin calves, and ýArs 
Cadwallader's spite at being thwarted in her match-making. Rather than the opinions 
of the other characters, it is Casaubon's own revelations, via the narrator, that decide the 
matter. For example, his letter of proposal to Dorothea is yet another study of the 
masculine 'I', dwelling on how Dorothea is eminently suited to meet his needs (Mm 
42); her intelligence is a bonus but she is wanted primarily for her feminine qualities of 
4ardent self-sacrificing affection' (49). 
Casaubon's egoism far outweighs Dorothea's, and it is the narrator's simple 
straightforward remark that Dorothea was asking if she was good enough while not 
teaching Casaubon 'to ask if he were good enough for her' (50) that first reveals this 
fact, irrespective of the opinion of others. Later, it is his complete lack of imagination 
and sympathy and his rigid maxims born of convention that alienate the reader. 
Casaubon's realisation of his lack of 'masculine passion' and the shallowness of his 
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feelings (61) do not raise his concern for Dorothea, although the reader may be alarmed 
for her; further, when he fails to exhibit any imagination, 'interest or sympathy' (195) 
for the glories of Rome even his intellect may be questioned; finally, his complete 
inability to understand Dorothea's desire to work with him suggests Spencer's idea that 
women should not work, and further prompts the reader's concern. Of course, 
Casaubon conceals a secret. He fears discovery as a failed intellectual and initially fears 
the keen spur of Dorothea's intellect, judgement and imagination. Instead he retreats 
into inadequate knowledge. His 'Key to all Mythologies' has become his bondage, to 
which he clings for identification and certainty just as Tom Tulliver clings to his 
maxims. Meanwhile, Casaubon blames all outside agents and refuses responsibility. 
He spirals into a fancy or paranoia that corresponds to Spinoza's most basic form of 
knowledge. 
Apart from pity the reader can offer little. However, the narrator's direct 
insistence that we consider Casaubon's centre of consciousness instead of always 
following Dorothea (Mm 275-6) again demands and provokes a reader response; 
perhaps even greater imagination and sympathy in life. Both Dorothea and Casaubon 
had wished to fill the absence in their lives and fail. Dorothea is to evolve in sympathy, 
while Casaubon becomes intellectually and evolutionarily extinct. However, the greater 
danger was Dorothea's seduction to self-sacrifice. When Casaubon has consulted 
Lydgate and realises that he may not live for much longer, his rejection of Dorothea's 
concern and pity hurts and angers her (Mm 418-21). However, as she constantly 
debates and questions herself she comes to realise the pain, grief and fear he must be 
facing. Briefly, Dorothea gains a notion of the full intensity of 'that roar which lies on 
the other side of silence' (192). With this revelatory burst of intuitive sympathy, 
Dorothea is able to forgive and turns again to Casaubon; acknowledging with respect to 
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her own hurt that she would 'never again expect anything else' (422). She is grateful 
that she has not hurt this 'lamed creature', however, her enduring emotion is pity. 
Syrnpathy has enabled her to recognise the gulf between her and Casaubon, and imagine 
his state, but Dorothea is still growing morally and cannot yet understand all the other 
fears that torment her husband. 
The moral chasm between Dorothea and Casaubon was greatest over his 
complete denial of Dorothea's concept of justice concerning Will's inheritance (Paxton 
1991,193). Her arguments represent a fusion of Gilligan's justice and care ethics, 
honouring Will's moral and family rights, caring for him, yet including herself in the 
decision. Yet then and later Casaubon can only insist that Dorothea adhere blindly to 
his judgement. In this alone does he mirror back her image of helping the poet Milton. 
When Dorothea moves to her later stage of pity and selflessness in the face of 
Casaubon's fear of death, she is again vulnerable to his demand that she put aside her 
own judgement and obey only his. While Dorothea is unaware that part of Casaubon's 
demand is for her not to marry Ladislaw, pity almost leads her into sacrificing herself to 
the completion of Casaubon's work. She is saved from this by his death -a convenient 
deus ex machina (Postlethwaite 1990,214). However, Dorothea's moral development 
continues, she is not yet skilled in sympathy, and has not fully learned to include her 
self in her care, but increased experience and knowledge will permit her growth to a 
stage beyond selflessness. 
Early reviews of Middlemarch judged the work to be largely about women, their 
condition and their education (Beer 1986,147-8), with the Saturday Review most 
concerned lest all women express discontent at the state into which they are born and 
become subversive, particularly if these same women begin to question their nature as 
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well as class and economic issues (149). Yet although contemporary readers recognised 
these feminist issues, they were largely ignored by critics until the 1970s. Instead, most 
critical comment presented Eliot's fiction as a hymn to the status quo, and in the 
seventies feminists often objected because Dorothea did not succeed in the way that 
Eliot did (Austen 1976). That Eliot's subversive message was repressed suggests how 
disturbing it was. Much of Eliot's writing is about the act of persuasion, and 'As 
Wolfgang Iser has noted, the purpose of literature is more often to change our view of 
reality than confirm it, with the result that all good literature is disturbing' (Smith 1977, 
192). However, Middlemarch is also about men, and how they are damaged in this 
environment of dictated gender norms, false virtue and convention. 
Caleb Garth and Camden Farebrother represent maternal men who extend 
sympathy and care to all who require it, almost to the point of being selfless. Further, 
Caleb represents the only positive father-figure in the novel. Significantly he plays a 
major role in ensuring that Mary and Fred are happily united. Fred, influenced by 
Caleb's fatherly presence as a child, finds his vocation via Caleb's reverence of 
'business'. The egos of Mary and Fred are like two candles reflected in a pier glass and 
always circling around each other, merging and moving apart, always, especially in the 
case of Mary, maintaining their ego, ensuring self-preservation, yet aware of and caring 
for the other. Yet Fred is also his father's property - whereas Rosy has to be exchanged 
- and his father can demand any role of him. An early essay by Chodorow 'Being and 
Doing' is an examination of the psychological significance of role training and identity 
formation. Their precise role was often withdrawn from middle-class Victorian sons, 
who knew only that they had to reject all 'feminine' behaviour. Chodorow's work 
suggests that Fred's irresponsible behaviour is an indication that he has 'little 11real" 
place in the surrounding adult world' (Chodorow 1989,28). Mary's maternal thought 
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and feeling reflect the best of relational care and autonomous independence. While she 
achieves no exceptional success, although she does produce a book, she saves Fred and 
is the strongest woman in the text. What is more she achieves happiness, freedom and 
even blessedness, and regardless of conventional feminist comment, this is an 
exceptional achievement. 
The character of Will Ladislaw is often criticised as a dilettante and not good 
enough for Dorothea, yet the descriptions of Will as poet, painter, dramatist, writer and 
journalist could easily be about the young George Henry Lewes. For Will is a materrial 
man. He is well-mothered, with a father he revered, but he definitely originates from a 
line of spirited women. He is an outsider, like Dorothea, yet learned, sympathetic and 
caring. It is this very unconventionality that has him condemned as unmanly (Brady 
1992,165) both by characters and critics. Further, his relation to money, inheritance, 
work and vocation is very much like that of a woman (Beer 1986,172). He has not been 
constructed as a positional male, has no more idea of vocation than Dorothea, yet love 
for her causes him to seize his independence and work, with the result that the 
importance of Reform reveals his vocation. 'Our sense of duty must often wait for 
some work which shall take the place of dilettantism and make us feel that the quality of 
our action is not a matter of indifference'. Will accepts the idea of working for reform, 
even though it is not 'that indeterminate loftiest thing which he had once dreamed of as 
alone worthy of continuous effort' (Mm 454). 
The attraction between Will and Dorothea is another stage of development in 
Eliot's representation of mutual relationships, for Will is not a mentor like Philip 
Wakern or Felix Holt, but an equal who openly looks to Dorothea for moral guidance. 
it is perhaps the closest representation of Eliot's relationship of mutuality with Lewes. 
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However, a frequently cited problem of their gendered relationship is that Will's 
adoration objectifies Dorothea (Brady, 165). Particularly, Will's declaration to 
Dorothea, 'you are a poem - and that is to be the best part of a poet - what makes up 
the poet's consciousness in his best moods', is considered to reduce her to an aesthetic 
object and part of the male poet's mind (165). While there is no escaping this 
interpretation, another reading is to consider Will as comparing Dorothea to the 
ethically sublime, that which Schopenbauer describes as a means of escape from the 
centrality of the ego and a possible path to sympathy. It is more than Dorothea being a 
muse, since she can enable Will to be a better person. Yet there is the danger that this 
again places her on a moral pedestal, like Comte's altruistic mother, but instead 
Dorothea can be that observer who helps to form the conscience - as Adam Smith 
describes - she is a 'Thou' to Will's T as he would be Dorothea's best 'Thou'. Many 
mortals 'hold half their rectitude in the mind of the being they love best'; as Mary is 
already Fred's 'conscience' so Dorothea and Will may become "'The theatre of all ... 
actions... for each other (Mm 240). 
By contrast, Lydgate, despite his attractiveness, lacks all awareness of 
difference; he treats people impartially, but does not understand the extent to which 
individual realities differ. Unable to recognise different voices, he has no awareness of 
what needs to be transcended in order to achieve sympathy. There is no suggestion of 
any matemal influence and relationality in Lydgate's life, and his interaction beyond the 
brusque politics of his profession and class is limited. He does possess a tremendous 
imagination, if not intuition for his scientific work. The narrator's inspiring account 
spirals in and out of description and free indirect speech to provide a twofold eulogy on 
the joys of creative imagination, 'the exercise of disciplined power ... the fullest 
obedience to knowledge ... energetic alliance with 
impartial nature' (162). It is 
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repeatedly conveyed that in Lydgate there is the potential for excellence. He seeks and 
actually begins to achieve a transcendence via his work after a manner which 
Schopenhauer would equate with a freedom from the will. Barrett suggests that 
Lydgate is presented as being what Dorothea imagined Casaubon to be, while the 
narrator never denigrates Lydgate's abilities in the way Ladislaw is ironised and 
undermined (1989,150). Yet all of this imagination is completely absent from his 
relationships with others. He cannot read or handle Bulstrode, fails to see that the 
political always becomes personal and he quickly has both his internal and external 
environment polluted. Most important, Lydgate cannot read or handle Rosamond: 
'Each lived in a world of which the other knew nothing' (Mm 163). 
Rosamond is the novel's egoist par excellence, well schooled in all the 
conventions and false virtues that Rousseau railed against and holding to them with a 
belief in right and certainty that is indomitable. Everything that Rosamond holds dear - 
her personal definition of 'bondage' - constitutes her definition of self All native wit, 
skill and intelligence are perverted to reproduce every day 'her own standard of a 
perfect lady' (MM165). As with Tom Tulliver, Rosy lacks the notion of an external 
observer as conscience and has instead 'an audience in her own consciousness'. She is 
heronly judge and does not grow to develop her own conscience further, much less to 
be advised by Lydgate as 'half [her] rectitude' (240). Eliot's employment of Herbert 
Spencer as the 'eminent philosopher' who provides the pier glass analogy (261-2) is 
significant, for Rosamond is the ultimate horror who gives the lie to his notion of pretty, 
non-working women making the best and most altruistic wives and caring mothers. 
That the candle of Rosy's ego always shows all events revolving around her, she never 
doubts. 
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While it is possible to be more sympathetic to Rosamond than to Casaubon, this 
is only because he has relative freedom and largely determines his own actions; whereas 
Rosy was subjected to, and then embraced the terrible gender construction offered by 
family and finishing school. However, Spady suggests there is always less sympathy in 
the text for those characters who are not themselves sympathetic - in particular the 
narrator's compassionate 'we' is often absent in comments about Rosy, and only 
generalisations are made to elicit sympathy (1978,70). When she realises how little 
Ladislaw values her in relation to Dorothea, the narrator describes Rosamond as 'almost 
losing the sense of her identity ... to be waking 
into some new terrible existence' (Mm 
767). Yet at this point when Rosamond is shattered, not only does the narrator fail to 
suggest mutual sympathy to the reader, but even details how Rosy would normally have 
rnanipulated sympathy from Lydgate in such a situation. That Ladislaw is forgiven the 
fact 'that he had no such movement of pity' (767) clearly condemns Rosamond. 
If the reader is searching for perfection in the relationships represented in the 
novel, then little will be found. However, the Prelude makes it clear that these are not 
exceptional lives. Lydgate cannot change Rosamond, and so ultimately his vocation 
and ideals are compromised. Yet he is not blameless. He wanted a woman like Rosy, 
and as a man who failed to allow for women having their own equivalent centre of self, 
while also being complicit in their bondage and absorption of inadequate knowledge, he 
is as much responsible for his fall from grace as she. He can change, but the fact that 
Rosamond's ego is so rigidly constructed on maxims that constitute her very being, 
means that she cannot. Rosamond's only moment of transcendence is when she tells 
Dorothea that Will is not faithless and has always loved only her. This sympathetic 
identification allows Rosamond to escape from a hateful image of herself, that of being 
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less than a perfect lady. Thus it is not an altruistic act. Briefly Rosamond achieves a 
level of care that includes the self and other, but she cannot sustain it. 
Based perhaps on Spencer's belief in a slow gradual evolution which would 
eventually result in increased sympathy by all for all, the relationships in Eliot's novels 
do show a trend towards mutuality and care. Fred and Mary achieve this, as do 
Dorothea and Will. When Casaubon dies, Dorothea is on the brink of self-sacrifice, but 
her escape signals the turning point of the novel. Once released, Dorothea becomes 
active, searching for vocation in her estate management, while her uncle braves the 
hustings, Fred reforms, BuIstrode's fortunes collapse and Will finds vocation. Dorothea 
is also able to accomplish many meliorist acts. Whereas before the subplots and themes 
of the novel followed an orderly existence, they nowjostle for the reader's attention, as 
shock waves in the ecosystem have multiple effects. 
If feminists are disappointed that Eliot's heroines do not achieve success, it is 
important to note that the men in the novel are also relative failures. The most 
successful males are those capable of transcending their masculine autonomy and 
becoming more relational and sympathetic, Fred learns the most, while Will only 
needed a vocation to suit his flexible nature. Eliot wrote that young men were 'just the 
class I care most to influence' (GEL IV, 397). Although she does not offer a reason for 
this statement, it is perhaps because they are the ones who must change the most, but 
also have the power to precipitate larger change in society. In a letter of 1868 to Emily 
Davies, Eliot reiterates her belief that men must realise the damage done to women by 
keeping them in ignorance and denying them truth, belief and access to full judgement 
(GEL IV, 468). 
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Dorothea achieves transcendence in realising that she loves Will, even when she 
believes him to be faithless. Further, she does not blame Rosamond as a rival but 
forgives her as Spinoza would advise, and assists her. Waking to the dawn after her 
night of grief, Dorothea grasps freedom and fully realises her membership of 'that 
involuntary, palpitating life' (776). Her revelling in the 'largeness of the world' (776) 
reflects both Spinoza's freedom and the happiness that comes with our growth to an 
understanding of eternity, and also Schopenhauer's account of the transcendence of our 
will and subsequent growth to sympathy when we accept our insignificance within the 
world. This is the moment that Dorothea has been growing towards since her first full 
experience of sympathy for Casaubon. Although she believes Will to be lost, she now 
knows herself and her emotions fully and can move to forgiveness and understanding as 
well as personal freedom. Later, when Rosamond reveals that Will loves her and was 
true, Dorothea is torn between selflessness and selfishishness over telling him how she 
feels; she has to choose and take responsibility, but she is now capable of it. Brady 
suggests that it is only now that Dorothea truly finds her own 'will' (1992,164). 
However, I think Dorothea knew her own will before, the difference now is that she can 
choose with adequate knowledge, and in choosing Will she includes herself in her 
caring. Simultaneously she rejects all convention. To marry Will is one thing, to reject 
money is beyond the understanding of Brooke, Chettam and Cadwallader. Yet 
Dorothea chooses love, mutual support and understanding, and the possibility of 
Spinoza's growth to blessedness. There is also a duty of sympathy, both in the 
relationship with Will, and in the work they will do together. While Dorothea is not to 
do any exceptional work of her own, she does work for reform with Will. Further, Will 
does become an M. P. and with the possible exception of Fred and Mary, they are one of 
Eliot's most successful and happy couples. 
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Middlemarch is not an undiluted happy-ever-after novel: in its realism it is a 
novel for adults. Any happiness achieved at the end results from a greater mutuality in 
relationship. The differences between the sexes, which were not yet clearly defined for 
Eliot, are not denied, but the acknowledgement of difference and the working toward an 
understanding of that difference is encouraged. Knowledge, reason, education and 
experience are seen to be the basic tools, so that ultimately maybe imagination and 
sympathy, even empathy, can flourish. From this, difference can be acknowledged and 
respected, and tolerance, freedom and happiness achieved. This scenario sounds 
utopian and Eliot may consider it possible only via a process as long and slow as 
evolution, with men becoming more matemal and women more autonomous. Further, it 
is a severely moralistic doctrine - as are the gender changes proposed by Chodorow and 
Gilligan. It advocates a moving towards sympathy, care, justice and chosen duty, by all 
for all, and this may be restrictive. It may even hinder the development of exceptional 
individuals - modem feminists fear that it is Eliot's heroines who always fail to achieve. 
However, the texts suggest that this is as likely for men as for women, while such 
failure also results from damaging relationships - such as Lydgate's and Rosamond's - 
where there is no mutuality. Further, 'George Eliot early recognised that the 
exceptional changes nothing. It carries with it no transformation of the ordinary' (Beer 
1986,202), and Eliot was concerned to effect change for all. She is therefore 
suggesting a long, slow growth to change and progress, where the ultimate outcome is 
uncertain, but where she hopes mutual relationships of sympathy, care, justice and 
chosen duty will result. The reader's active engagement in the questions surrounding 
sympathy and duty in Middlemarch will be one more step in extending this moral 
growth. 
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It is ironic that I should consider my reading of Daniel Deronda (1876) to be an 
unofficial epilogue to this thesis, when it is the most open-ended of Eliot's novels and 
one of the few without a finale or epilogue. The novel looks forward to an uncertain 
future for Eliot, her main characters, and for the world; but it also looks back, being 
almost a retrospective of Eliot's earlier fiction with multiple intertextual connections 
between characters and events (Brady 1992,175). Daniel Deronda as an epilogue 
simultaneously provides a powerful endstop to any discussion of Eliot's work, and to 
my analysis in particular, for it is a radical departure from the continuum presented by 
Eliot's previous novels, with a move to a more cynical and pessimistic account of 
relationship. Middlemarch is therefore the novel where Eliot most fully develops her 
ideas of meliorist gender relations based around the extension of intuitive sympathy and 
duty, while Daniel Deronda is pessimistic and uncertain and warrants a study beyond 
the scope of this work. 
The world and its horror is a central character in this final novel. Few of Eliot's 
works had completely excluded the wider world, but in Felix Holt and Middlemarch the 
presence of issues beyond individual, relational, rural or provincial pains and pleasures 
became more noticeable, with references to class struggle, reform, and imperialism. In 
Daniel Deronda Eliot extends her boundaries to investigate the moral issues 
surrounding race and religion, in addition to more controversial analyses of legitimacy, 
ciass decay, exploitation, sexual relations and gender roles. Beneath this analysis there 
is a cynicism which occasionally escapes Eliot's control in hyperbolic exhortations 
intended to alert the reader to action for politico-personal reform: 'this consciousness of 
a girl, busy with her small inferences ... in a time, too, when ... the soul of man was 
waking to pulses which had for centuries been beating in him unheard... ' (DD 102-3). 
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While writing Middlemarch, Efiot had followed the horror of the Franco- 
Prussian war of 1870-1 as it played across countryside she and Lewes loved. In her 
journal she asked: 'Am I doing anything that will add the weight of a sandgrain against 
the persistence of such evilT (GEI, 141). This is perhaps the first suggestion that her 
work has to seek new solutions. By the time Daniel Deronda was being composed, 
both Thornton and Herbert Lewes were dead, as was Lewes's mother and Thornton 
Leigh Hunt, while both Eliot and Lewes were repeatedly seriously ill. Further, 
imperialism dominated discussion and Eliot had observed Spencer's 'survival of the 
fittest' being so exploited that in 1881, he founded the strongly anti-Imperial 'Anti- 
Aggression League' (Wiltshire, 91). Eliot also followed the anti-slavery campaign, 
particularly since corresponding with Harriet Beecher Stowe. It was perhaps this input, 
in addition to her friendship with the Zionist Emanuel Deutsch, which prompted a novel 
relating to the quest for a Jewish homeland. She correctly anticipated that response to 
the Jewish component would be unfavourable (GE1,145) and Reina Lewis analyses the 
anti-Semitic reaction to Daniel Deronda (1996,193-201). Eliot later wrote to Harriet 
Beecher Stowe, with crusading rhetoric, on her desire to encourage the extension of 
imagination and sympathy between races and creeds (GEL VI, 301-2). 
Beyond this extension of moral and political concerns, Daniel Deronda also 
experiments with narrative organisation (Beer 1986,214). There is a more 
unstructured, dual plot, which swoops through time and space, and particularly between 
the characters of Gwendolen Harleth and Daniel Deronda. The novel is patterned 
according to the, relatively few, meetings of these two main protagonists. Above all, 
the, ending is unsettling, promoting an alternation between pessimistic and utopian 
interpretations. 
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The two main protagonists, Gwendolen Harleth and Daniel Deronda, represent 
both moral and 'romance' extremes, with Gwendolen as Eliot's first wholly non- 
sympathetic primary heroine and Daniel as a cross between a gentrified Adam Bede and 
Keats. Gwendolen is a total egoist emerged from a 'Silly Novel' and completely 
trapped by 'silly' images of women (Beer 1986,223). The early chapters present her as 
so self-centred that it is difficult for the reader to admire or sympathise either with the 
character or a society that produces such a specimen. For Gwendolen knows 'that she 
herself was admired' (DD 7), while Daniel Deronda's seeming disapproval of her 
gambling represents only a 'single negative' (7), suggesting that society has confirmed 
her high opinion of herself Yet adoration is heaped on Gwendolen by her mother - 
ftom whom she has not separated - in their relationship of mutual mothering. But 
Gwendolen is also selfish and uncaring with her mother, adopting a masculine 
domineering role as if her mother has no separate life. As Gwendolen's conversation in 
the early chapters maintain her image of self-constructed exceptional woman, despite 
growing comment from other characters and the narrator's feedback, it is a shock for the 
reader to realise in Chapters Five and Six that she really is a non-sympathetic, non- 
exceptional foundress of nothing, who is subject to fits of terror (52). It is the 
description of her fear at the vastness around her (52), a typical Schopenhaurian image 
Of the egoist, that first suggests a different moral emphasis in this novel. 
Deronda appears the radical opposite to Gwendolen, caring, selfless, feminine 
almost, yet with a strong moral stance that Spencer would never consider feminine. He 
has great ability and 'would have been first-rate if he had more ambition' (151), yet his 
passion for rowing and drifting on the river suggests a rhythmic, serniotic return to the 
mother. For Deronda is motherless, living with a man he assumes to be his father, yet 
multiply rejected as a result of realising he is illegitimate (141), at the thought that Sir 
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Hugo may not mean him to be a gentleman (143), and ftorn. the continued lack of any 
sense of true belonging. He eschews relationship because he cannot account for his 
family, yet like Will Ladislaw presents a feminine aspect in his lack of role and 
vocation. His reverie on the river describes a sense of almost negative capability as he 
indulges in a 'half-involuntary identification of himself with the objects he was looking 
at, (160). This empathic loss of self, coupled with his 'yearning after wide knowledge' 
and a general sense of disengagement with the world -a lack of striving for its own sake 
- suggests a Schopenhauerian sympathetic man, willing to 
be seduced by the ethically 
sublime or some vast aesthetic belief. 
The advent of Henleigh Grandcourt as Gwendolen's suitor further supports a 
Schopenhauerian reading. Grandcourt is pure malice and renders Gwendolen's egoism 
trivial. For Schopenhauer egoism is the main characteristic, with sympathy and malice 
as opposing poles (McCobb 1983,324). Grandcourt's permanent air of ennui initially 
masks his role as Eliot's most sadistic character and in the earlier scenes, as Grandcourt 
woos Gwendolen, he speaks so little that it is easy to believe in her triumph, particularly 
as we are always hearing her thoughts or perceiving things from her point of view, 
while Grandcourt remains an enigma. However, there are hints of gossip from Mr 
Gascoigne, Grandcourt's cruel teasing of his dog, and ultimately the revelation about 
Lydia Glasher. As the reader soon knows more than Gwendolen, sympathy for her 
grows; meanhile we are told little about Grandcourt's background to avoid any 
sympathy for him developing. 
Later, when yachting off Genoa, Grandcourt's free indirect speech reveals that 
he has no idea that Gwendolen finds him repulsive (574). His ego is so massive that he 
conceives himself as wholly attractive, he has no understanding of her feelings, and 
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seemingly no conscience. Grandcourt measures himself against his own ego, never that 
of others, and he therefore cannot grant others equality or the possession of a centre of 
self He has no sympathy or true compassion "which is the basis of justice and 
morality"' (McCobb 1983,324, quoting Schopenhauer). Tony McCobb's work on 
Daniel Deronda and Shopenhauer predates and eclipses mine (1983; 1985), although 
his work did explain why Daniel Deronda exceeds my reading of sympathy and duty. 
Eliot read Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea (1818) in 1872-3 while writing 
Daniel Deronda (McCobb 1983,323). 
Grandcourt is part of the mass of degenerate English gentry and aristocracy that 
Eliot condemns so strongly via Daniel Deronda. In addition to annoying the anti- 
Semitic lobby the novel also attacks materialism and capitalism, from the casino scenes 
to the realisation that Gwendolen's only value is as a wife or prostitute (Barrett 1989, 
164). Such a stance from Eliot - antagonising a large part of her audience - is yet 
another departure. Some critics claim that Daniel Deronda is incoherent and ill- 
structured (Doyle 1981,161), but this is the point, for its form and content mirror 
Eliot's own pessimism and anger, the state of the world the novel is describing and the 
condition of the central characters. Although often overlooked, only Catherine 
Arrowpoint represents a coherent centre and a heroine who is a descendant of Eliot's 
other spirited, autonomous yet sympathetic and morally sound women who are destined 
for a happy mutual relationship. In trying to escape her class, Catherine is one of its 
few admirable members. When she opposes her parents and insists on marrying 
Klesmer, she denounces their values, customs and their duty as 'a name for what they 
desire any one else to do' (DD 2 10). 
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Barrett also anticipates my argument to some extent, observing the change in 
Daniel Deronda in comparison to Eliot's earlier works. However, she suggests that 
Eliot has finally accepted that ordinary life is not peopled by saintly sympathetic 
personalities (1989,155-6). Thus Gwendolen's world is selfish, unspiritual and 
uncaring reality, while altruistic figures such as Dinah or Dorothea are no more. The 
'beacon' of sympathy has passed to Deronda (158) and because Eliot still desires a 
haven for such figures of 'superhuman virtue' (160) she creates the idealistic, spiritual 
quest world of Mordecai and Mirah. However, I have two ob ections to this otherwise j 
plausible reading. First, as I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, Eliot's heroines 
are not altruistic, nor do they have superhuman virtues. While some may be in danger 
of self-sacrifice, such as Janet or Dorothea, and others experience periods of selflessness 
such as Romola or Dinah, they all ultimately prefer situations - whether with husbands, 
female ffiends, or community - where they are happy, loved, and in mutual, supportive 
relationships. Also, such groupings are not so rare or full of excess virtue in the earlier 
novels for them to be ticketed as 'superhuman'. Although there are few good family 
relationships in Daniel Deronda, the Meyrick and Cohen families do demonstrate care 
and a duty of sympathy, that is not excessive. Secondly, while Barrett considers 
Deronda to be sympathetic, he is actually altruistic. To tutor Hans to the detriment of 
his own studies, or to risk Grandcourt's displeasure towards Sir Hugo in order to aid 
Gwendolen are acts beyond empathy. Nfirah even imagines him giving himself to be 
eaten by a poor starving tigress (DD 399) 
in meeting first Mirah then Mordecai, Daniel finds a 'family' and some sense of 
connection. He is drawn by a sense of recognition and belonging that transcends 
difference, for there is immediate empathy. Daniel was with his mother until aged two 
before Sir Hugo adopted him - long enough for much rejection, with a mother more 
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'absent' than most. The psychology for such a character explains the sense of alienation 
and absence that Eliot constructs around Deronda. He repeatedly separates himself 
from groups, disentangles himself from conversations, is always at tangents, on the 
edge, and is felt as a presence but rarely speaks - until he meets Mordecai. If Alcharisi 
was as indomitable with her child then Deronda's calm will-lessness makes sense; 
perhaps he perceived there was no point in striving. It is almost trite that he should 
prefer the meek, loving and subservient Mirah - who is happy to be rebuked by the men 
in her life - than a Gwendolen who with talent could have been another Alcharisi. That 
Deronda is summoned to meet his own mother when the sense of the Cohen's mutual 
mother-love is enveloping him, is a major evolutionary move. 
When Deronda's mother reveals his history, particularly that she deprived him 
of his Jewish heritage, the narrator remarks that to Daniel this news 'made an epoch' 
(538). This echoes Eliot's remark when she first read Darwin's Origin of Species. 
Leaming of his own 'origins' is not just devastating and revelatory news for Deronda, 
but it signals a catastrophic leap from the decaying life of the English gentry, to a new 
life of mutual relation, spiritual quest and total absorption in a sublime movement. The 
presentation of Alcharisi is mixed. There is sympathy for her illness, yet repulsion at 
her cold unemotional reaction to her son. Eliot obviously values the woman's gift and 
her right as a genius to pursue her vocation, lauding it with the declaration, 'you can 
never imagine what it is to have a man's force of genius in you, and yet to suffer the 
slavery of being a girl' (541). Yet Deronda's 'pain of repulsed tenderness' and her 
rejection of his love: 'you owe me no duties' (543) cause her action to be lamented, 
even as she declares, 'I am not a monster, but I have not felt exactly what other women 
feel' (539). In this representation of Alcharisi, Eliot seems to be balancing a woman's 
desire for vocation against her own repeated fears that women could become unsexed 
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and lose their precious caring ability. A reading that develops from the conclusion to 
middlemarch, yet which is also appropriate to a Schopenhauerian interpretation, is that 
exceptional people may have to stand outside the realm of mutual relationships, in order 
to be excused the reciprocity demanded by sympathy and duty. Alcharisi is treated 
ambivalently because she briefly tried to have both. While Eliot acknowledges that 
Alcharisi was not able to control her life and thus her fertility, to have a child is to 
accept the duty of sympathy and care - and as Eliot has argued repeatedly in the novels 
maternal or paternal care is far more important duty than was generally accepted in her 
period - thus Alcharisi has transgressed. Eliot's fears, at scientists' pronouncements of 
women's determination by their biology, appears to lead her to a conclusion that women 
may have to choose between genius and relationship, or motherhood. 
It is a deeply ironic arrangement that Deronda should encounter Gwendolen, and 
aid and counsel her in the aftermath of Grandcourt's drowning, subsequent to the 
meetings with his mother. Thus coincidence is employed to ensure that Gwendoline 
and Deronda will not travel the same route again. For Gwendolen is free of Grandcourt 
just as Deronda discovers he is free to pursue Mordecai's dream. Further, Gwendolen is 
thrown into frightening perspective by the image of Alcharisi. It is not clear if 
Gwendolen could have done, or willed, more to save Grandcourt - or what Deronda 
really thinks - but she has possibly rejected a drowning man, just as Deronda's mother 
had rejected him, his father, her father and the Father of their faith. Further, if 
Gwendolen is compared to Mirah, then a man who makes her unhappy has drowned, 
while Mirah's unhappiness because of her father almost caused her to drown herself. 
Since first perceiving the extent of Gwendolen's unhappiness, Deronda has been 
her therapist - her Comtean priest. Beer considers that Deronda is duplicitous in not 
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revealing his other life and love to Gwendolen, and that ultimately he leads her on and 
then abandons her (DD 224). There is a certainly a strange ambiguity in his manner. 
Since learning of his origins Deronda is full of love, happiness and zeal for the 
homeland quest. This recognition of personal bonds has briefly enriched his 
relationship with Gwendolen, but his altruism is replaced by sympathy with her pain, 
which prompts his delay in telling her his news. Deronda is not uncaring, but the 
impression conveyed is that the higher nature of his sublime political and religious 
endeavour will replace all other chosen duties and caring. Effectively, Deronda does to 
Gwendolen what his mother did to him. Eliot seems to have moved from the 
organicism of her personal and political union, to suggesting that some abstractions are 
more important than individuals. 
Gwendolen undoubtedly grows in understanding and sympathy; meanwhile her 
will to strive and survive supports her, as she repeats endlessly to her mother 'I shall 
live' (692). However, the message of her letter to Deronda is unclear. That she may 
'live to be one of the best of women, who make others glad that they were born' (694) 
may suggest a moral growth in that she will no longer think only of herself and may 
evolve to become an Esther or a Romola; it may even indicate the possibility that she 
will herself eventually accomplish sublime works; however, it may just as easily 
suggest that she will be the caring nurturing one, rather than the doer. Further, the letter 
both suggests an overall sense of relationship, which is obviously still valued, yet there 
is also the image of Gwendolen in isolation. Thus the fate of both protagonists is 
multiply open and uncertain. Eliot does still accept the ability of individuals to change 
themselves and grow towards sympathy and a personal definition of duty, although in 
Gwendolen's case it is a muted celebration and the success begins to seem limited. 
However, Eliot also embraces a new option, that in some situations the only alternative 
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to the beating and bruising of wings is to make dramatic moves and change the 
environment itself Thus the move to the 'Promised Land' is utopian, pragmatic yet 
also pessimistic. 
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Conclusion 
Having established my definitions of Eliot's 'intuitive sympathy and duty' in Chapter 
Three, I maintain that throughout her fiction Eliot's primary concern is to encourage a 
growth to sympathy and duty in her readers. Overall, Eliot furthers her aim by 
illustrating the concepts of sympathy and duty, by demonstrating how they contribute to 
the 'growing good of the world' (Mm 822), by detailing the damage caused when they 
are absent or false, and by investigating how their action is impeded or improved by 
society. In particular, Eliot inducts her readers into the realisation that for sympathy 
and duty to be acquired and practised by all, then knowledge, reason and understanding 
are required - as are imagination and emotion - and that all of these need to be pmctised 
and extended. In short, she gives scientific explanations of profoundly moving 
experiences. Her portrayal of the moments where her characters finally achieve 
intuitive sympathy - such as Dorothea's extension of sympathy and support to 
Rosamond, despite her belief that Will may love Rosamond - demonstrate epiphanic 
experiences where difference is recognised and transcended so that tolerance, 
understanding and growth are possible. 
Yet Eliot's texts repeatedly demonstrate that the sympathy and duty operating in 
the communities of her fiction are not the intuitive sympathy and duty that she valorises. 
Instead they comprise an expectation of selflessness, largely from women, and the 
imposition of mores, maxims and artificial duties which are largely dictated by state, 
church and family - and which have often lost any real relevance. The reader is actively 
involved in evaluating the virtues on offer. Eliot also reveals how women suffer as a 
result of the demands made on them by the expectation of selflessness, or by the action 
of other false duties. When her heroines die their sacrifice is never condoned - although 
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it may require readers already skilled in sympathy and duty to fully perceive this. 
Further, Eliot is not solely concerned with the lot of women, she also explores how men 
suffer from a gender construction which always expects them to be judgmental, 
ambitious and to eschew caring. All these considerations are explored in the early 
fiction and the reader is encouraged to question and consider all sympathy, duty, care 
and justice, weighing up the different evidence. It is also necessary to be tolerant of the 
new and the different, while not jumping to swift conclusions. Above all, a 
consideration of relationship is stressed, for sympathy and duty operate within 
relationship. 
While there is a tendency for sympathy to be prioritised in the fiction, Eliot also 
establishes the centrality of duty and the imperative that the two need to work together 
in harmony. In particular, Eliot opposes the gendering of sympathy and duty, or care 
and justice. This is best illustrated in The Mill on the Floss, where the text emphasises 
that the ethics of both Tom and Maggie are necessary and need to be valued and 
encouraged by all, for all. Further, from the beginning of her work she always portrays 
women characters who are strong, independent and capable of observing intuitive duty 
and sound justice provided they are not coerced by convention, Dinah Morris being one 
example. Equally, there are always caring men who have matemal sympathy, such as 
Mýr Cleves and Mr Tryan. Whatever Eliot's reservations about the precise difference 
between the sexes, sympathy and duty are demonstrated as too important for either to 
reside wholly in one sex. 
As Eliot's oeuvre develops, her texts also consider how these virtues and values 
can best flourish. Her early works acknowledge the importance of surroundings and 
community, and characters may need to develop sympathy and tolerance in order to 
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adapt and cope with a changing environment. Those later works which are influenced 
by Spencerian and Darwinian evolution begin to explore the psychology of the 
characters closely, considering the internal environments in order to examine what 
facilitates a growth to sympathy and duty. In Silas Marner, both Silas and Godfrey are 
seen as products of their early environment, with Silas the one able to recognise and 
follow the duty of sympathy because he had received the type of care he will give to 
Eppie, While Eliot does not anticipate the type of 'degendering' advocated by 
Chodorow, she does experiment with ideas of nature versus nurture, and repeatedly 
demonstrates that men can become as caring and maternal as women, while some 
women, such as Priscilla Lammeter or Hetty Sorrel, are not maternal. 
Felix Holt develops the issue of maternal men further, but is also concerned with 
changing the wider environment to develop communities where sympathy and duty may 
nourish. Here both 'Reform' and Felix's ideas of personal reform suggest the way 
forward. Not only will Felix and Esther change themselves and each other to grow into 
more caring, sympathetic, relational yet autonomous and independent people, but they 
will work to do good small work in their community, in order to bring about a meliorist 
change that corresponds to social evolution. Thus all may grow to intuitive sympathy 
and duty. This theme is pursued ever further in Middlemarch. Lydgate may fail to 
improve the health of the environment and the people living in it, but Fred and Mary, 
Will and Dorothea, via political reform, education, land reform and the love and care of 
children, all promote changes that will facilitate increased sympathy and duty. 
Eliot therefore concentrates on changing the internal environment of individuals, 
so that they may become more caring and just, but this is ultimately to lead to changes 
in the wider environment, so that conditions for all may improve. She may seem to be 
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very Comtean, borrowing his ideas of a slowly improving environment, where 
sympathy and sociality begin in the family but move out to society, but while Comte 
may have provided the utopian blueprint, the more generous ideas for sympathy and 
sociality come via Spinoza, Feuerbach and Spencer. Further, much of the 
philosophical, psychological and physiological detail stems from the many and varied 
influences who all contribute towards Eliot's doctrine. Finally, unlike Comte's 
supposed utopia, there is fun, freedom and happiness in most of Eliot's futures. This 
meliorist growth to intuitive sympathy and duty in family and community may not 
foster the growth of the exceptional individual, but then as Barrett has noted (1989, 
175), the triumph of the exceptional woman [or man], does not make the lot of the 
ordinary [man and] woman easier, and Eliot was primarily concerned with ordinary 
people. 
However, by Daniel Deronda, Eliot appears to be doubting her ideas of a 
growing sympathy and duty. In response to the growing nihilism of the period, the 
imperialism, racism, capitalism and general degeneracy of the ruling classes and 
institutions, Eliot deviates from her main strategy of slow gradual improvement. 
instead she opts for a catastrophic break, where Deronda and Mirah will transplant 
themselves. Eliot has not lost faith in the value of sympathy and duty, but the 
prevailing mood of Daniel Deronda exhibits a fear of growing egoism and suggests that 
societal change is so fast that the moral growth of humans cannot keep pace. Spencer 
had always warned that the moral growth that he described could only proceed when the 
environmental conditions for all were improving towards greater stability and security, 
but the society Eliot depicts in Daniel Deronda is fragmenting and growing more 
intolerant. 
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Throughout her fiction, Eliot's aims for her characters and readers are happiness 
and freedom. However, by the end of her career, pessimism suggests that her mcliorist 
ideals may be insufficient to counter the growth of self-interest. In an untypical utopian 
yet pragmatic gesture, Eliot has her male protagonist retreat to the 'Promised Land', 
while both she and he seemingly abandon her reformed, egoist, anti-heroine to survive 
alone, facing an uncertain future. Eliot made it fairly clear after Daniel Deronda that it 
was unlikely she would write a major work again. She suggests in a letter to John Cross 
that she would be beckoning 'death by writing any more novels' (GEL VI, 415). 
Perhaps the symbolic gesture of her final novel is to suggest that happiness and freedom 
were found, via intuitive sympathy and duty while in relation, in her 'Promised Land', 
with Lewes, while the heroine all alone was a role she had attempted and did not enjoy. 
Overall, despite the pessimism and recourse to the utopian in Daniel Deronda, all 
Eliot's texts maintain an emphasis on the importance of sympathy and duty, but they all 
also stress the value of mutual relationship. 
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